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Greetings
I am pleased to have the opportunity to once again welcome the readers of the 
Eurasian Integration Yearbook. 
Since we released our first Yearbook in autumn 2008, several events that 
impacted on virtually every aspect of the Bank’s operation have taken place. The 
Bank’s membership has grown in number, and with the addition of Armenia, 
Belarus and Tajikistan, the Bank has become a truly multilateral financial 
institution. New investment projects in Russia and Kazakhstan began, and 
a new Anti-Crisis Fund was established by the EurAsEC member states. All 
these developments, aside from expanding our horizons, call for the Bank to 
employ the capacity and resources that it was endowed with to the maximum 
effect. The status of an international development bank requires that we are 
well equipped and flexible to respond to the challenges of the present. 
Supporting economic integration among the member states remains at the 
core of our mission. In particular, we prioritise projects that advance mutual 
trade and investments. The Bank actively seeks to identify and support 
business projects, which could contribute to regional economic cooperation. 
At present, the Bank intends to focus on electric power sector, transport 
infrastructure, machine-building and innovative high-tech projects. We very 
much look forward to seeing business empowered and taking a more proactive 
role in shaping economic ties between the region’s countries demanding the 
ideal policy environment, and engaging in partnerships with governments in 
the implementation of large-scale infrastructure development projects. A 
number of our projects lead to the creation of joint ventures and other types 
of corporate integration. 
The effects of the global financial crisis hit the economies of the EDB member 
states and inevitably impacted the state of their economic cooperation. The 
volumes of mutual trade and investments contracted. The shortage of liquidity 
forced many potential borrowers to postpone new investments and projects. 
The crisis elevates the role and capacities of national and international 
development banks. And it is the development banks that are not only capable 
of spurring large-scale infrastructure development projects on, but also 
facilitating the mobilisation of additional resources in order to overcome the 
crisis period. 
The establishment of the EurAsEC Anti-Сrisis Fund has been a significant 
development for the EDB. The Bank was selected an implementation agent 
of the Fund. This choice, in our view, is quite justifiable. Our mission and focus 
of operations provides a unique opportunity of insight into the nuances of 
economic and business environments and the socio-political aspects of 
Dear readers, 
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development in the region. This knowledge and understanding ensures that 
the Bank makes informed investment decisions. 
The objective of the EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook is to present to the 
international community substantive research on economic and political 
integration in the post-Soviet space. We welcome this opportunity to 
share our knowledge of Eurasian integration with the readers of the Bank’s 
publications and hope that our audience will grow while our list of analytical 
products expands. 
With best wishes,
igor finogEnov
chairMan of thE board 
Eurasian dEvEloPMEnt bank 
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Dear readers,
I have the pleasure of welcoming you to the second issue of the Eurasian 
Integration Yearbook. At the EDB Strategy and Research Department, we 
closely monitor regional integration processes and collect data on countries 
and sectors, strategic issues, and economic development and cooperation. 
We use this information internally for project analysis and evaluation, as well 
as for EDB publications, including industry reports, the quarterly Journal of 
Eurasian Economic Integration, monthly integration digests and this Yearbook. 
Thousands of people subscribe to our publications. 
The year 2008 was rich in events that inspired discussions, research and 
analytical reviews. As far as integration issues are concerned, I draw your 
attention to the adoption of the CIS Economic Development Strategy for the 
period up to 2020; the positive developments in the formation of the EurAsEC 
Customs Union; Georgia and Uzbekistan declaring withdrawal from CIS and 
EurAsEC respectively; the establishment of the EurAsEC Anti-Crisis Fund; and 
gas transit disputes. The net sum of positive developments and challenges 
does not offer a single opinion on whether integration processes in the past 
period were advancing or rescinding. 
Nevertheless, some achievements are unquestionable. The political will of 
the heads of EurAsEC states advances the formation of the Customs Union. 
Taking bottom-up view, we observe cross-border exchange between small 
businesses as well as investments and acquisitions by large companies in 
neighbouring countries. Business is performing as an economic agent of 
integration that facilitates effective interaction between the countries. 
Our primary mission is to identify and support business projects that bring 
about sizeable integration effects. Networking with expert community, as 
well as research and analytical work, form the core of our knowledge and 
operations both in the member states and selected sectors. We constantly 
seek to better tune our services to the needs of our shareholders and clients. 
In October 2008, the Bank became an observer in EurAsEC. The engagement 
of the Bank’s representatives in expert discussions on various aspects of 
regional cooperation will enable the stronger coordination of activities with 
EurAsEC, as well as launching joint regional initiatives for the benefit of 
member states. 
We believe that the Eurasian Development Bank is well positioned to facilitate 
more active economic interaction in the region through identifying and financing 
projects with integration potential. We also constantly seek to expand our 
range of analytical products in pursuit of our strategic objective of becoming 
a leading centre and repository of knowledge on integration processes in the 
CIS space. 
vladiMir yasinskiy 
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The Crisis-Related Threats to Integration 
The on-going crisis has triggered qualitative changes in the global political and 
economic architecture. Separate elements of global economic and financial 
reforms are already visible. In particular, the process of G20 institutionali-
sation, which reflects the growing weight of developing economies, has finally 
begun. Following a slowdown of operations over the last decade, the role of IMF 
has increased rapidly, as the institution finds itself at the forefront of helping 
many national economies survive. The idea of the world reserve currency is 
actively discussed and IMF’s SDRs are the most commonly mentioned option. 
Furthermore, for better or worse, a global financial regulator is likely to be 
established. 
There is less substance on the level of post-Soviet regional integration. The 
EurAsEC Anti-Crisis Fund, designed to help less developed countries of the 
region stabilise their economies and launch important transborder integration 
projects, stands out. Also, Russia’s massive financial aid to its neighbours, 
in particular Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia, is worth mentioning. At the 
same time, the wave of protectionism is gaining ground as countries resort to 
any means available to counteract their shrinking GDP. Unfortunately, there is 
high probability that the crisis will not push the countries of the region toward 
qualitatively new parameters of comprehensive economic cooperation and a 
more efficient mode of the realisation of the vast integration potential. 
In general, a global economic crisis is unlikely to affect integration in a critically 
damaging way. However, the introduction of protective measures in support 
of domestic producers by a number of countries sends a troubling message. 
The consequences are dire. On balance, the crisis bears in itself more threats 
than opportunities for the consequential development of regional economic 
integration. For the post-Soviet countries, which are not even bound by 
the WTO rules, protectionist policies are all too tempting. However, the 
immediate gains conflict with the requirements of optimal foreign trade policy. 
Recent years witnessed very promising developments along the ‘bottom-up’ 
approach to integration based on market economy principles – namely the 
rapid growth of mutual trade and investments, corporate expansion across 
the border, the nascent Eurasian transnationals, the technological alignment 
Introduction
EvgEny  
vinokurov 
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in crucial sectors, and the large-scale transborder infrastructure projects. 
Will short-sighted policies damage the first healthy sprouts of Eurasian 
economic integration? 
The Growing Base of Economic Integration 
Mutual trade, mutual investments, and corporate expansion are building a 
firm foundation of regional economic integration. 
Volumes of mutual trade have risen continuously over the last years. For 
instance, trade turnover between Kazakhstan and Russia grew by 30% per 
year and reached $19.7 billion in 2008, increasing twofold from $9.7 billion in 
2005. The bilateral trade turnover of other countries (most significantly, that 
of Belarus and Russia) increased at a comparable rate. All EurAsEC bilateral 
trades, large and small economies alike, demonstrated mutual growth of 
between 50% and 200% over the last three years. Table 1.1. shows trade 
flows between EurAsEC member states, which are marked by relatively high 
levels of economic interaction. 
Introduction
Trade turnover  
between countries 2005 2006 2007 2008
Russia-Belarus 183.0 199.0 207.0 3188.9
Russia-Kazakhstan 979.0 12807.0 17.0 19731.7
Russia-Kyrgyzstan .0 7.0 1 19.0 1 802.9
Russia-Tajikistan 33.0 0.0 772.0 1002.8
Kazakhstan-Belarus 23. 3.3 2.3 7.0
Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan 3.1 0.7 17.0 08.
Kazakhstan-Tajikistan 17. 18.1 198.9 29.
Belarus-Kyrgyzstan 10.8 21. 2.8 7.8
Belarus-Tajikistan 12.0 18.0 3.0 7.1
Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan 2.9 2.7 30. 3.2
Total trade: 27255.8 35023.3 45922 58362.5
Тable 1.1.  
Trade turnover 
between EurAsEC 
member states  
($ million)
Source: CIS 
Statistics Committee
Nevertheless, the slowing pace of trade growth marked 2008. This can 
be attributed not only to the naturally slower pace of growth in wealthier 
economies but also to the negative consequences of the economic crisis, which 
became evident in the fourth quarter of 2008. 2009 is likely to become the 
first year since 1998 when trade volumes will contract. The data for the first 
quarter of 2009 confirms this observation. For instance, Russia-Kazakhstan 
turnover went down by 44.6% in January-March year on year. At the same 
time, Russian exports to Kazakhstan, impacted by the large percentage of 
machinery and consumer goods trade, decreased by half. 
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The pace of trade growth looks slow compared with that of mutual 
investments that have boomed over the last few years (naturally, from a low 
starting point). Practically all of the major economic sectors were affected, 
including hydrocarbons, metallurgy, machine building, agriculture, transport, 
telecommunications, development, and electric power generation and 
distribution1. It is remarkable that the investment growth is reflected not only 
in sheer volume but also in the quality of mutual investments. We witnessed 
the first massive long-term investments into capital-intensive projects, the 
first portfolio investments (previously virtually unknown in the post-Soviet 
area), and the formation of the first Eurasian transnationals. 
Russian investments  
in EurAsEC countries
EurAsEC countries’  
investment in Russia
2000 2008 2000 2008
Total Total
Direct and 
portfolio 
investments
Total Total 
Direct and 
portfolio
Belarus 90.2 771.2 1.9 2. 103. 32.7
Kazakhstan 2.2 99.7 30.2 .7 89.8 228.0
Kyrgyzstan 0.0 20. 0.1 0.1 70. .2
Tajikistan 0.0 1.7 1.2 0.0 2.9 0.0
Uzbekistan 0. 333.9 20.7 3. 7.0 .2
Total EurAsEC: 92.8 1287.1 9.1 11. 1101.7 271.1
Total CIS: 555.6 2521.4 1921.3 19.3 1502.6 562.8
Тable 1.2.  
Cumulative mutual 
investments of 
Russia and the 
EurAsEC states, at 
the beginning of the 
year ($ million)*
Note: * excluding 
investments within 
the banking sector
Source: Federal 
State Statistics 
Service of Russia
The total volume of cumulative Russian investments in other four EurAsEC 
countries grew by 160% over the seven years from 2000. This figure is even 
more impressive for the CIS – 350% (excluding banks). On the other hand, 
EurAsEC countries’ investment in Russia increased 100 times during the 
same time period, from a negligible size to a magnitude comparable with 
Russian investment in the EurAsEC. This fact clearly demonstrates both the 
growing size of the post-Soviet economies and their growing awareness of the 
vast advantages provided by the neighbouring large market for their goods, 
services, and expertise. 
1 For example, MTS and Vympelcom represent brilliant cases of brand new corporate 
transnationals in Eurasia. Developers from Kazakhstan and Russia have ventured into each 
other as well as in Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus, and Tajikistan. In power sector, Sangtuda-1 HPP 
with the installed capacity of 670 MWt, the largest power station constructed in Central Asia 
over the last 20 years, has been built and set in operation by the Russian INTER RAO. Also, the 
third power block of Ekibastuz GRES-2 with the installed capacity of 500 MWt, is likely to be built 
by the Russian-Kazakh joint venture. There is also a high probability that the new 1 GWt power 
block of the nuclear power station in Armenia will be built by joint effort.
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The situation changed quite abruptly in the second half of 2008. The global 
economic crisis forced post-Soviet states to focus on their domestic markets, 
as most active market players were compelled to concentrate all available 
resources in their home markets in order to survive. Mutual investments 
virtually came to a halt. Large foreign investments suddenly became impossible 
without the direct participation of the states (such as the planned Russian-
Kyrgyz joint venture, which was established to build Kambarata-1 HPP). 
Although the absolute volumes are still relatively low compared with the 
absolute size of the regional economies and their economic potential, we 
have witnessed an unprecedented surge in mutual trade and investment. In 
fact, what we saw amounts to the restoration of cooperative ties between 
the post-Soviet ‘Eurasian’ economies, based on the new market foundations. 
The goal for policy makers is clear: prevent the economic crisis and related 
protectionist policies from reversing this very positive trend. 
The Concept of the EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook
This is the second EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook. The first one, published 
in 2008, is also available online and free of charge.2 The Yearbook is there 
to improve access for the global community to the best articles published 
in Russian and to provide a comprehensive and coherent view of regional 
integration in the ‘Eurasian’ area. It publishes a wide range of articles and 
other materials on the theory and practical aspects of Eurasian integration. 
The major part of the almanac consists of English versions of selected articles 
published in the Journal of Eurasian Economic Integration and other analytical 
publications of the EDB. They are supplemented by the Integration Chronicles 
and other specialised analytical materials. Papers written specifically for the 
Yearbook are also welcome. 
While primarily focusing on economics, the Yearbook addresses a broad 
spectrum of urgent issues in Eurasian integration. This includes theories of 
integration; economic integration (trade, investment and financial institutions); 
institutional integration; other cooperation issues in the post-Soviet space; 
and experience of regional integration in the other macro regions of the 
world. The reputable Advisory Council ensures the quality of the volume. The 
Council currently comprises twelve world-class experts on various integration 
issues from countries like Belgium, France, Kazakhstan, Russia, the U.S.A. and 
Ukraine. 
A pertinent and non-trivial question relevant to the idea of this volume would 
be the definition of ‘Eurasia’ in the context of ‘Eurasian integration’, terminology 
used widely on the pages of this volume. Since 1991, geographers, economists, 
political scientists, and social scientists have struggled with the terminological 
Introduction
2 At http://www.eabr.org/eng/publications/IntegrationYearbook/
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ambiguity concerning the states of the former Soviet Union. The term ‘post-
Soviet space’ is frequently used, as is the term ‘former Soviet Union’ (FSU). 
Another commonly used description is the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS). However, all of these denominators hold obvious deficiencies. To 
begin with, the first two terms are derivatives of the past, i.e. they draw on a 
non-existent political entity. Conversely, the CIS draws on an existing political 
entity, which has only limited relevance to the politics and economics of the 
region. Quite apart from these factors, all these terms artificially bind the 
actual political and economic geography of the region. 
The straightforward solution to the problem would be to find an appropriate 
geographical description of the territory in question. In my opinion, ‘Northern 
and Central Eurasia’ would be the closest to being correct. However, this 
sounds a bit awkward, and would be far too long a phrase for practical use.
In our Journal of Eurasian Economic Integration, and in the Eurasian Integration 
Yearbook, we focus predominantly on the post-Soviet states. When doing so, 
we can combine the emphasis placed on the internal integration processes with 
the willingness to address any external integration considerations of the post-
Soviet states. I believe that the current geo-economic situation is favourable 
to the new round of economic integration on the Eurasian continent, this time 
in a qualitatively ‘smaller’ world. Due to their geographic location and national 
economic interests, Russia, Kazakhstan, and other FSU states are directly 
interested in Eurasian integration, which would overspill the tight boundaries 
of the post-Soviet space. 
The Contents of the Yearbook 
The EDB Yearbook 2009 consists of an introduction, full-length papers and 
reports as well as a regional integration chronicle. The volume is composed 
of six parts. 
The Yearbook starts with a ‘Chronicle of Eurasian Regional Integration in 
2008’, compiled by Natalia Maqsimchook, a senior analyst with the EDB 
Strategy and Research Department. This thoughtfully structured digest 
covers the economic, political and social dimensions of interaction between 
the member states of the CIS and EurAsEC. It provides the Yearbook’s readers 
with updates on the status of the current and new policy initiatives within and 
between the integration groupings, as well as an overview of business activity. 
The Chronicle was placed at the very beginning of the volume on purpose as 
we wanted to precede the academic analysis with the dynamic picture of what 
was actually going on in 2008 in terms of integration and cooperation. This 
picture is in fact quite mixed. Positive developments in the corporate sector 
and substantial advances in the formation of the Russia-Kazakhstan-Belarus 
Customs Union are on the positive side, while the negative consequences of the 
economic crisis, Georgian-Russian war and subsequent Georgian withdrawal 
IntroductionEvgeny Vinokurov “Introduction”
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from the CIS, accompanied by the suspension of Uzbek membership in the 
EurAsEC amount to a retreat in integration processes. 
The next part of the Yearbook features three high quality papers dedicated 
to institutional integration and its relation to economic growth. Alexander 
Libman and Leon Zewin provide a qualitative and quantitative assessment 
of the relationship between the territory size and the efficiency of integration 
groupings. The chapter defines six organisation models. The efficiency of each 
model depends on its ability to support a full-scale integration project, avoid 
the trap of quasi-integration, and maintain the required balance between 
market exchange and redistribution. The chapter by Johannes Linn and 
Oksana Pidufala contains an analysis of the experience of regional economic 
cooperation organisation relevant to Central Asia. The last chapter of this part, 
written by Alexander Libman, defines the role of regionalisation in Central Asia 
and provides an analysis of bottom-up integration approaches in the region. 
The next section, ‘Economic Integration: Trade, Investments, and Ecology’, 
contains four papers, which look into various trade- and investment-related 
issues. Starting with an analysis of regional trade arrangements by Irina 
Gurova, we logically move to Boris Heifetz ‘Russian Direct Investments in 
the EurAsEC Countries: Developing Energy and Transport Infrastructure in 
Eurasia’. These papers are followed an assessment of relevant transborder 
ecological problems in Central Asia by Vladimir Yasinskiy and Alexander 
Mironenkov. 
Following on from this is a discussion about the growing cooperation 
in the financial sector. This part comprises one report and two papers. 
Zhanara Sagimbayeva of EDB provides a concise overview of the activities 
of international and regional development banks in the region. Multilateral 
development banks play a significant role in economic development. Notably, 
their relative standing is growing in the times of economic difficulties. They are 
also important actors in promoting global and regional integration through 
large infrastructure investment, relevant technical assistance, and research. 
I would like to draw the reader’s attention to this overview as it represents 
the first attempt to summarise the activities of multilateral development 
banks in our region. Further, Michail Golovnin analyses the prospects of a 
joint stockmarket infrastructure and Evgeny Vinokurov looks into developing 
mutual investments in the CIS banking sector. 
In the subsequent part of the Yearbook, we deviate from the functional 
analysis of economic cooperation and jump onto the seemingly technical 
– but actually highly pertinent and policy-oriented – issue of monitoring and 
measuring integration. Philippe de Lombaerde rightly points out that these 
questions cannot be reduced to a set of technical problems, as the starting 
point for setting up a system of indicators is usually political in nature. The 
purpose of monitoring is usually the evaluation of regional integration policies, 
Introduction
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given the ‘implementation problem’ faced by several regional initiatives, and to 
test the quality of regional governance. The paper that follows Lombaerde’s 
highly informed discussion of indicator-based monitoring is Brendan Whyte’s 
piece on visa-free travel as an indicator of global integration. He draws on the 
comprehensive study of visa-free travel privileges by Henley & Partners, a Swiss 
firm specialising in migration. The paper analyses the dataset, and confirms 
that the ability to travel visa-free to other countries is strongly correlated to 
the wealth and openness of a traveller’s own country. Using population figures 
for each country, a Global Travel Freedom Index was developed. 
The concluding part of the volume is actually the largest one. It is devoted to 
the transport sector as one of the most interesting functional sector where 
integration can bear visible fruits. EDB has recently published a report on the 
EurAsEC transport corridors, which sets the stage for discussion in further 
papers by Yuriy Shcherbanin, Leonid Kozlov, Alexey Belyakov, and Vitaly 
Zbaraschenko. The authors shed light upon various aspects of transborder 
infrastructure, such as railway transit corridors, transport-energy water 
systems, proposed new navigation canals enabling transborder shipping, etc. 
The section is highly practical but may also be useful for more theoretically-
inclined researchers. 
Overall, the Yearbook intends to provide a dynamic overview of integration 
processes in the post-Soviet ‘Eurasian’ space and the challenges to which 
the Northern and Central Eurasian states will have to provide adequate 
responses. I genuinely hope that the yearly EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook 
will become a reliable companion to those studying regional integration. Once 
again I am pleased to direct readers to the EDB website, where this volume, 
the previous Yearbook, the Journal of Eurasian Economic Integration and a 
number of reports and stand-alone papers relevant to regional integration are 
available to download free of charge. 
I would like to thank Vladimir Yasinskiy, Head of Strategy and Research 
Department at the EDB, for continuous support. I am most indebted to Gulnaz 
Imamniyazova, our diligent and thoughtful literary editor and proofreader, and 
Natalia Maqsimchook, Senior Analyst at the Economic Analysis Division, for 
her invaluable help along the way. Our permanent partner, Ruan publishing 
company, was instrumental in producing this volume.
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This section of the Yearbook offers our readers a chronicle of the integration 
events in the year 2008. It covers the economic, political and social dimensions 
of interaction between the member states of CIS and EurAsEC, updates on the 
status of current and new policy initiatives within and between the integration 
groupings, as well as an overview of business activity. 
All the events of the previous year can be divided into “before” and “after” 
the breakout of the crisis. The integration development processes in the 
post-Soviet space generally showed positive dynamics in the first half of the 
year. The Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) accelerated its work 
on the formation of a Customs Union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan 
at its core. To this end, a set of documents on the Customs Union was 
ratified. These documents set out provisions for the establishment of a single 
customs territory, providing an exhaustive list of considerations to guide 
decision-making on consolidating customs territories of individual countries 
into a single space and the finalisation of the Customs Union formation. The 
Institutional framework of the Union started to shape up with the signing of 
an Agreement on the Customs Union Commission. The competencies and 
authority of the EurAsEC Court grew with the addition of arbitration functions 
within the organisation. 
The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) concentrated on the 
development and adoption of the CIS Economic Development Strategy up 
to 2020. The overall objective of this document is to invigorate economic 
development in the member states, facilitate growth and economic security, 
and ensure a higher quality of life. Priority spheres of interaction between the 
CIS states included free trade zone matters, the formation of the common 
economic space, and the development of specialised product markets and 
the transport corridors network. In addition, yet another CIS priority of this 
Strategy up to 2020 addresses cooperation in the energy sector with a view 
to increasing the reliability of energy supplies and optimising the use of fuel 
and energy resources in the member states.
Trans-border cooperation and the large-scale modernisation of key industries, 
as well as infrastructural projects in energy and transport sectors, were the 
main themes for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) during 2008. 
Proposals on the establishment of a common energy market and transport 
Chronicle of Eurasian 
Regional Integration 2008 
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corridors were announced. More so, the idea of the SCO Development Fund to 
support pilot projects in the member states was discussed. 
It was apparent that in 2008, the manifestation of existing controversies and 
problems within regional groupings was stronger than ever. Membership in the 
CIS shrunk with Georgia announcing its exit, as did the numbers of stakeholders 
in the EurAsEC with Uzbekistan’s suspension from participation. 
Business activity during the first three quarters of 2008 remained relatively 
high according to the recorded positive dynamics in mutual intra-trade 
between the member states. The most notable growth was observed in the 
mutual trade between Russia and Belarus, Russia and Kyrgyzstan, as well as 
between Belarus and Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. However, due 
to the financial crisis, countries’ general economic policies and, particularly, 
companies’ investment plans, were faced with substantive changes. By the end 
of 2008, the majority of countries reported a sharp drop in the GDP growth 
rates, as well as cuts in employment and national currency devaluations. 
Chronicle of Eurasian 
Regional Integration 2008 
Natalia Maqsimchook “Regional integration events digest 2008”
Main macroeconomic indicators, as % of the previous year 
Kazakhstan Russia
2007 2008 Jan-Mar 2009 2007 2008
Jan-Mar 
2009
Gross domestic product 108. 102.1 9.2 108.1 10. 87.71
Industrial output 10. 102.1 9. 10.3 102.1 8.7
Agricultural output 108. 9. … 103.3 110.8 …
Capital investments 108.2 10. 9.1 121.1 109.1 8.0
Exports to CIS 12.9 139.08 3. 12.3 132. 0.932
Imports from CIS 132.0 119.8 73.39 133. 122.2 2.772
Ukraine Belarus
2007 2008 Jan-Mar 2009 2007 2008
Jan-Mar 
2009
Gross domestic product 107.3 102.1 … 108.2 110.0 101.11
Industrial output 110.2 9.9 8.1 108. 110.8 9.
Agricultural output 9. 117. … 10.1 108.9 …
Capital investments 128.3 10.7 … 11.1 123.1 120.0
Exports to CIS 17.0 127.9 .2 130. 128.38 8.22
Imports from CIS 127.0 131.29 3.12 130.9 137.01 9.082
Тable 2.1.  
Main 
Macroeconomic 
Indicators of 
selected CIS 
member states, 
2009
Source: National 
Statistical 
Committees
1 Index of industrial output for basic kinds of economic activities computed on the basis of the 
data on change in volume of agricultural production, mining and quarrying, manufacturing indus-
tries, production and distribution of electric energy, gas and water supply, construction, trans-
port, retail and wholesale trade.
2 January-February 2009 as % of January-February 2008.
3 January-September 2007 as % of January-September 2006.
4 January-September 2008 as % of January-September 2007.
28 Eurasian Development Bank
EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook 2009
News from regional organisations
20th meeting of EurAsEC Interstate Council
January 25, 2008
A regular 20th meeting of the Eurasian Economic Community Interstate 
Council was held in Moscow. Prime ministers of EurAsEC member states 
adopted the concept of forming a common transportation space that will 
give a start to a brand new stage of integration in transportation sphere. 
The Interstate Council also addressed the issues of development in the social 
spheres of EurAsEC member states and determined actions to deepen 
integration. The project of EurAsEC intergovernmental target programme, 
entitled “Innovative biotechnologies” and prepared by the government of 
Belarus, was also proposed for approval. Moreover, during the meeting the 
prime ministers of Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus signed nine documents on 
establishing the EurAsEC Customs Union.
 2007 2008
Russia 8.1 .
Kazakhstan 8. 3.0
Belarus 8.2 10.0
Kyrgyzstan 8. 7.
Tajikistan 8.7 7.8
Uzbekistan 9. 8.0
Armenia 13.8 .8
Azerbaijan 2.0 10.8
Ukraine 7.3 2.1
Moldova 9.9 9.0
March 08 . .8 1.1 7.
June 08 . . 0.9 .8
Sept. 08 .2 . 0.9 .
Dec. 08 7.7 .7 0.8 .9
March 09 9 .8 1 7.2
Тable 2. 3.  
Unemployment (%)
Source:  
National Statistical 
Committees 
Тable 2. 2.  
Economic growth in 
CIS (%)
Source:  
National Statistical 
Committees
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In general, experts and analysts 
are unanimous in the view that a 
global financial In general, experts 
and analysts are unanimous in the 
view that a global financial shock 
cannot affect integration in a critical 
way. However, the introduction of 
protective measures in support of 
domestic producers by selected 
countries is sending a rather troubling 
message. 
In this context, Russia and Kazakhstan 
are taking over crisis management 
role. Russia’s partners in regional 
groupings not having a resource 
cushioning against economic and 
financial crisis are in acute need of 
credit and grant support. Despite 
its adverse impacts, the current 
situation could unite the member 
states of CIS and EurAsEC in finding 
approaches and implementing 
common measures to overcome 
the crisis. Establishment of EurAsEC 
Anti-crisis Fund is the first vivid 
example of such an initiative. 
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Meeting of the EurAsEC Financial and Economic Policy Council
February 20, 2008
The 5th meeting of the Council on Financial and Economic Policy of the Eurasian 
Economic Community was held in Moscow. EurAsEC Secretary General, Tair 
Mansurov, the Council members, including economy and finance ministers of 
EurAsEC member states, representatives of observer states, and experts all 
took part in the meeting.
The EurAsEC Secretary General briefed participants on the crucial issues of 
further boosting economic ties between EurAsEC member states, establishing 
a customs union and a common economic space, effective usage of economic 
potential for the improvement of living standards, and the development of 
cooperation in cultural, social and humanitarian spheres.
During the meeting, the sides came to the conclusion that EurAsEC member 
states should move on to implementing international agreements that form a 
legal base for the customs union between Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. 
The agenda of the meeting also included such issues as the draft concept of 
the EurAsEC intergovernmental target programme for the strengthening 
and arrangement of the outer boundaries of Eurasian Economic Community 
member states, drafts of the interstate target programmes on creation 
of the unified automated information system, allowing for customs transit 
supervision in the EurAsEC member states, and on establishing a system of 
informational and methodical ware of implementing a single order of export 
control within EurAsEC.
During the meeting, the Council’s Chairman, Alexei Kudrin spoke about the task 
of selecting key projects that will be of most importance to EurAsEC member 
states. He also noted that the improvement of the investment policies of the 
member states is one of the Eurasian Economic Community’s major tasks.
Action plan of establishing the Customs Union by 2010 approved
April 23, 2008
The issue of forming a customs union and a common economic space topped 
the agenda of the EurAsEC Integration Committee meeting in Moscow. 
According to EurAsEC Secretary General Tair Mansurov, “further activities 
on establishing customs union have been defined”. The legal foundation for the 
customs union of Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus has been laid. “We have 
signed 13 documents setting out the basic regulations for the formation of 
the Customs Union by 2010”, Mansurov said. Participants of the meeting 
approved draft agreements on the information exchange between customs 
authorities, and the facilitation and mutual protection of investments. During a 
session of EurAsEC Interstate Council at a governmental level in late January 
2008, the Prime Minister of Russia, Viktor Zubkov, expressed the hope that 
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“Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan would join the customs union in due 
course”.
Russia to establish a federal agency for CIS affairs 
May 12, 2008
A new Federal Agency for CIS Affairs is being established under the Russian 
government. According to the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, the 
decision to establish a Federal Agency under the Russia Foreign Ministry was 
conditioned by Russia’s intent to develop integration processes. “The fact that 
an agency of this kind didn’t exist before doesn’t mean that we didn’t work on 
the issue. However, now there is a need to intensify interaction”, Medvedev 
said, “If we want to follow new forms of interaction and integration, we must 
also apply modern principles for cooperation with our colleagues from the 
CIS”.
Council of CIS Heads of Government 
May 24, 2008
A Draft Strategy for the Economic Development of CIS for up to 2020 
has been discussed in Minsk. It outlines the goals and tasks of economic 
integration and the major spheres of economic cooperation. The prime 
ministers of CIS member states have also discussed several propositions in the 
transport policy sphere, including a project for raising the operating reliability 
of bridgeworks on the CIS member states’ highways for 2008-2015. The 
project will contribute to maintaining and stepping up the traditional economic 
and trade transportation ties. The participants have also discussed a Draft 
Convention on Cross-Border Cooperation between CIS states and a Draft 
Convention on the Legal Status of CIS Member States’ Migrant Workers and 
their Families.
CIS Electric Energy Council to discuss issues of cooperation in the field 
of energy 
May 28, 2008
During the previous 33rd session of the CIS Electric Energy Council in Moscow, 
the participants noted the unfavourable and complex hydrogeological situation, 
which had come about due to a hard winter that demanded additional water 
intake and a low-water season in the region of Central Asia as a whole. The 
forecasted volumes of major reservoir inflow will amount to 25% below the 
norm. The issue of the rational use of transborder rivers’ potential and solving 
several technical tasks in this connection received high-priority status. A 
draft Model Agreement of Cooperation on the use of Hydropower Resources 
of the transborder rivers was presented at the session. Participants of the 
session adopted several documents on establishing a wholesale electric 
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energy market, which would ensure cooperation in monitoring crossflows and 
electric power transit between the member states of the CIS Electric Energy 
Council.
Informal summit of CIS Heads of State in St. Petersburg 
June 6, 2008
All 12 heads of CIS member states took part in the informal summit. The 
president of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev, focused on some of the major objectives 
of CIS development. Economic cooperation was named a top priority in CIS 
activities. Medvedev welcomed an initiative of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan to 
devote the year 2009 to addressing energy issues. 
Common economic issues topped the agenda of discussions. The Chairman of 
the Executive Committee CIS Executive Secretary Sergei Lebedev – briefed the 
participants on the status of work on the Strategy of Economic Development. 
Heads of state discussed the prospects of cooperation in the fields of energy, 
transport and food security. Moreover, several humanitarian issues, including 
the implementation of joint social projects, were also on the agenda.
Medvedev held bilateral meetings with the presidents of Moldova, Turkmenistan, 
Azerbaijan, Armenia, Ukraine and Georgia. During the latter two meetings, 
presidents discussed the issues of Ukraine and Georgia’s possible entry into 
NATO, as well as the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. 
The regular meeting of the Council of CIS Heads of State is scheduled for 
October 10, 2008, in Bishkek. Following the results of the informal summit, 
several decisions were taken and a number of protocols signed.
CIS Economic Council meeting 
June 20, 2008
A regular meeting of the CIS Economic Council was held in Moscow. The 
discussion on the document “On the Draft Strategy of Economic Development 
of the Commonwealth of Independent States for up to 2020” topped the 
agenda of the meeting. The draft document was approved and introduced for 
consideration of the next CIS Heads of State Council.
The participants also discussed draft priority directions for cooperation 
between CIS member states in the field of transport. 
Members of the Economic Council reviewed a draft document “On Joint 
Measures for Strengthening of Food Security of CIS Member States”. In 
addition to the aforementioned documents, the participants of the CIS 
Economic Council’s meeting addressed a number of other issues, including 
cross-border cooperation, migration policy and the fight against counterfeit 
pharmaceuticals.
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Georgia initiates procedure of withdrawal from CIS
August 19, 2008
Georgia passed a note of intent to cease its membership in the Commonwealth 
to the CIS Executive Committee, thus initiating the official procedure of 
withdrawal from the CIS.
“We have received a note from Georgia, stating that the country’s parliament 
adopted a resolution, which annuls the agreement on establishing the CIS in 
regard to Georgia. Now Georgia has 12 months for settling accounts with 
the Commonwealth. During this period Georgia will have to decide, which 
agreements within the framework of CIS will be annulled and which treaties, 
concluded within the CIS, will remain in effect”, the representative of the CIS 
Executive Committee, Vera Yakubovskaya, said.
Georgia’s withdrawal from the CIS will be completed in a year, following the 
submission of the appeal, i.e. August 18, 2009.
SCO Development Fund 
August 29, 2008
During an extended meeting of the Heads of SCO Member States, the 
participants discussed the establishment of the SCO Development Fund – a 
facility for the mobilisation of financial resources in support of the economic 
integration of SCO countries. According to Kazakh President Nursultan 
Nazarbayev, if integration in the region succeeds, by 2020 SCO member 
states would be producing up to 30% of global GDP, with trade turnover 
totalling $70 billion.
“We consider the signing of a memorandum between the Eurasian 
Development Bank and SCO Interbank Association as a positive step. The 
memorandum will provide an example of successful interbank cooperation 
and create additional opportunities to allocate resources for financing SCO 
projects”, – Nazarbayev said.
The next meeting of the Heads of SCO Member States will be held in 
Yekaterinburg in 2009.
Sessions of CIS Heads of State Council and EurAsEC Interstate Council, 
and a Meeting of Heads of Central Asian States in Bishkek
October 9-10, 2008
The CIS Economic Development Strategy was the central issue of the summit. 
The Strategy aims to strengthen long-term economic cooperation and boost 
economic integration among CIS countries. This Strategy defines the priorities 
in developing economic ties within CIS.
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The presidents discussed the status of implementing decisions taken 
during the CIS summit in Dushanbe, as well as programmes on transport – 
the central development topic of the year 2008. The CIS Executive Committee 
briefed the Heads of State on CIS cooperation with other regional organi-
sations. The parties also exchanged opinions on the issues of strengthening 
collective security and fighting crime. The current situation under crisis 
conditions, and ways of overcoming possible negative consequences of a 
global economic crisis, were also on the agenda. The participants reached an 
agreement on establishing a working group headed by Finance Ministers of 
CIS member states. Based on the results of discussion, participants adopted 
the CIS Economic Development Strategy and signed a number of documents 
related to the CIS activities and widening multilateral cooperation in several 
spheres. The Republic of Moldova took over the CIS chairmanship.
The EurAsEC Customs Union was the key discussion point for the EurAsEC 
Interstate Council meeting. Presidents examined the issues of effective use 
of transport and transit facilities. An exchange of opinions on cooperation in 
agriculture took place.
After this, a meeting of the Heads of Central Asian States was held. The main 
issues for the discussion were rational use of water and energy resources.
Uzbekistan suspends its membership in the EurAsEC 
October 20, 2008
The Foreign Ministry of Uzbekistan has forwarded a note to the EurAsEC 
Integration Committee expressing its desire to suspend membership in the 
Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC). Uzbek president, Islam Karimov, 
has sent a letter requesting the suspension of Uzbekistan’s membership in 
this organisation to the heads of EurAsEC member states.
It should be noted that the Agreement on Establishing the Eurasian Economic 
Community, dated October 10, 2000, does not provide for the suspension of 
EurAsEC membership unilaterally. But any country has the right to state its 
desire to separate from the organisation 12 months in advance of the current 
date, while settling its obligations to the Community and its members.
During regular sessions of the EurAsEC Integration Committee and Interstate 
Council at the levels of Heads of State and Prime Ministers, the issue of a 
quorum in the aforesaid organs without Uzbekistan will be considered in 
accordance with the regulatory enactment.
Uzbekistan joined the EurAsEC in January 2006 and pledged to join 
international agreements under EurAsEC in order to provide the country’s full 
participation in activities of the Community, which had not been fulfilled up to 
now.
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Meeting of SCO member states Heads of Government in Astana
October 30, 2008
The importance of large-scale modernisation of core industries and 
infrastructural projects in energy and transport topped the agenda of the 
meeting. 
The projects on SCO common energy market and common transport 
corridors could serve as an example of the global approach to selecting forms 
and mechanisms of cooperation. 
The People’s Republic of China confirmed its intentions to take part in all 
major joint investment projects and finance them. It was said that China 
intends to provide soft loans to SCO member states. As per the crisis, the 
“financial community of SCO member states needs to jointly analyse and 
forecast macroeconomic and financial processes in the world, strengthen 
the coherence of monetary and financial policy, tighten and improve financial 
control”, Wen Jiabao, the current Premier of the State Council of the People’s 
Republic of China said.
Energy, and the ways of oil transportation in particular, topped the agenda 
of discussions. Kazakhstan and Russia reached agreements on the “Russian 
route” for Kazakh oil to China. Iran is also interested in this transport 
corridor.
The prevention of emergency situations and disaster preparedness were also 
on the agenda of the meeting. Kazakhstan’s Prime Minister, Karim Masimov, 
suggested establishing an SCO Centre for Emergencies.
Russia suggested accelerating the preparations for establishing the SCO 
Development Fund that will support pilot projects in the member states.
Kazakhstan came forward with the initiative of holding a meeting of the Finance 
Ministers and heads of Central Bank of SCO member and observer states in 
Almaty.
Following the results of the meeting, the participants signed six protocols and 
reviewed an action plan for the programme of multilateral trade and economic 
cooperation. They also approved the budget for 2009 and a joint communique 
on the results of the meeting.
CIS Economic Development Strategy for up to 2020 approved
November 14, 2008 
The CIS Economic Development Strategy for up to 2020 has been approved 
during a meeting of CIS Heads of Government Council in Chisinau. The major 
goals of the Strategy are to invigorate the economic development of CIS 
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member states, secure stable and equitable economic growth and economic 
security, and improve welfare and quality of life of the population. The document 
evaluates the CIS position in the world economic system and the economic 
situation in the CIS as a whole. It also foresees the goals and tasks of economic 
integration, as well as major spheres of cooperation.
The document defines priority directions for CIS states, including the 
completion of establishing and operating a free trade zone within the framework 
of CIS in accordance with the provisions and rules of WTO, the shaping of 
preconditions for establishing a common economic space, the development 
of common markets for several types of goods (primarily agricultural), and 
interaction in transport, including the development of international transport 
corridors. Moreover, the deepening of cooperation in the field of energy 
in order to increase reliability of energy supply and effective use of fuel and 
energy resources was set as a priority task for CIS for up to 2020. The 
strategy also focuses on establishing an interstate innovation space, and 
effective mechanisms of currency and financial cooperation, as well as private 
sector development.
According to the representative of the CIS Executive Committee, “in the 
nearest future an economic policy of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States will be aimed at the development of a domestic market and the 
protection of domestic producers and consumers. In these terms, it is 
necessary to bring together the national legislation and legal and economic 
conditions of market participants’ activities”. According to expectations, 
the governments of states would work out and adopt “a range of effective 
measures on elimination of corruption and reduction of shadow economy”. 
The Strategy is to be implemented in three stages.
The CIS Heads of Government approved a range of documents, including 
priority directions for economic cooperation in the transport sector between 
CIS member states for up to 2020, food security, and the main directions of 
international transport services market development.
Joint meeting of EurAsEC Financial and Economic Policy Council and 
Council of Heads of Central (National) Bank
December 11, 2008
A joint meeting of the EurAsEC Council of Financial and Economic policy and 
Council of Heads of Central (National) Bank of EurAsEC member states has 
been held. Issues of overcoming the global financial crisis were the priority 
topics of the meeting.
Following the results of the meeting, 15 intergovernmental agreements on 
Customs Union legal framework have been signed, including a package of 
international agreements on the unification of customs regulation and trade 
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with the third countries and the agreement on a Secretariat of the Customs 
Union Commission. The participants approved the organisational structure, 
number of staff, the rules and procedures, and the budget of the Secretariat.
Moreover, the sides signed agreements on the promotion and mutual 
protection of investments, the organisation of a joint system of information 
support of the EurAsEC member states common energy market. A total of 
23 issues were addressed during the meeting, and important agreements 
on energy, common insurance market, technical regulation, sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures were reached.
EurAsEC Interstate Council’s meeting at the governmental level in 
Moscow
December 12, 2008
The Kazakh Prime Minister, Karim Masimov, briefed participants on the 
stabilisation plan, developed by the Government of Kazakhstan. He noted 
that proposed measures are of a long-term character and include five 
priority directions for state subsidies, such as support to the financial sector 
and real estate market, small and medium sized businesses, agro-industry 
enterprises, and breakthrough industrial and innovative projects.
Masimov met with the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. They discussed 
the prospects of economic interaction, as well as boosting economic ties 
within EurAsEC. The Kazakh Prime Minister also met with the president of 
the ICT Group, which specialises in mining, machine building and transport 
logistics. In October 2008, following the meeting of Heads of SCO member 
states, Kazakh and Russian entrepreneurs have signed a memorandum, 
agreeing to Ecooperate on the construction of a railway car building plant. 
Kazakhstan’s Temir Zholy National Company, the Eurasian Development Bank, 
and the Kazakhstan Development Bank, signed the memorandum facilitated 
as partners of the ICT GROUP in this memorandum.
EDB Council approves three new member states 
December 11, 2008
The Council of the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) reviewed formal 
applications by Tajikistan, Belarus and Armenia, and approved these three 
countries, as well as conditions of their membership in the Bank.
EurAsEC Interstate Council grants suspension of Uzbekistan’s 
membership in the organisation
December 12, 2008 
Prime Ministers of EurAsEC member states “decided to suspend Uzbekistan’s 
membership of the Eurasian Economic Community in line with its request”, 
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Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said, following the results of the 
EurAsEC Interstate Council’s meeting on December 12 in Moscow.
As reported, the Foreign Ministry of Uzbekistan has filed a note to the EurAsEC 
Integration Committee’s Secretariat, expressing its desire to suspend 
membership in the Eurasian Economic Community. Uzbek president, Islam 
Karimov, has sent a letter of request on suspending Uzbekistan’s membership 
in the organisation to the Heads of all EurAsEC member states.
Summit of EurAsEC Heads of State in Kazakhstan
December 19-22, 2008
During a meeting in Borovoye, the presidents of Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Armenia discussed the measures of withstanding external 
and internal challenges and threats.
The Kazakh president held a number of bilateral meetings with Dmitry 
Medvedev, Emomaly Rakhmon, Kurmanbek Bakiyev and Serzh Sargsiyan. 
The world financial crisis, issues of regional integration, and further work of 
the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) topped the agenda of the 
summit.
The presidents discussed the creation of a EurAsEC joint Anti-crisis fund of 
$10 billion. The fund will render emergency support to states that suffered 
from the global crisis. Moreover, the sides decided to establish a Centre of 
New Technology. All the agreements will become valid after the signing of the 
documents. The Heads of State agreed to adopt corresponding decisions in 
Moscow (meeting of the EurAsEC Interstate Council is scheduled on February 
3, 2009, in Moscow).
Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus are to complete the establishment of the 
Customs Union by April 2009. A majority of documents (20 out of 32) have 
been signed by now.
The presidents of Kazakhstan and Russia signed a joint action plan for the next 
two years. It included 40 items and covered the whole range of interaction, 
including politics and economy, fuel and energy complex, exploration of outer 
space, transport and communications. 
Bilateral cooperation
Documents on cooperation between Russia and Uzbekistan signed
February 6, 2008
During an official visit to Moscow, the President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov 
signed a number of documents, including a programme for economic 
cooperation between the Russian and Uzbek governments, as well as an action 
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plan for 2008-2012. Foreign Ministries of both states signed a programme 
of cooperation for 2008. Besides, the governments of both countries agreed 
to cooperate in the field of aircraft industry and integration of a state-run JSC 
Chkalov Tashkent Aircraft Production Enterprise and JSC United Aircraft 
Corporation.
Investment Fund of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
February 15, 2008
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are to establish an investment fund for joint 
projects. In 2007, the Prime Ministers of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
signed a respective agreement establishing the fund with the initial capital of 
$120 million, including $100 million from Kazakhstan and $20 million from 
Kyrgyzstan.
President of Uzbekistan to visit Astana
April 22-23, 2008
Uzbekistan is not supportive of the idea of a Central Asian States Union, 
President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov said, commenting on the results of 
his meeting with the President of Kazakhstan. According to Karimov, it is 
premature to talk about such a union, because of disparities in the economic 
development level of the Central Asian states. 
Nevertheless, as reported, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan plan to establish a 
free trade zone between the two countries. According to Karimov, all possible 
conditions must be created and all barriers to trade between the two countries 
must be removed. “Here we talk about harmonising customs and other duties, 
introducing various tariff preferences that would encourage and facilitate 
trade”, Karimov said. Following the results of 2007, trade turnover between 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan doubled and reached $1.4 billion.
Russian President to visit Kazakhstan 
May 22, 2008
During the first international visit of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to 
Kazakhstan, a number of bilateral agreements have been signed.
The governments of Kazakhstan and Russia signed an agreement on 
cooperation on the Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS), as well as 
an agreement on cooperation in the field of research and use of outer space. 
Kazyna Sustainable Growth Fund and Russian Nanotechnologies Corporation 
signed an agreement on interaction. Kazakhstan’s Development Bank signed 
an agreement of intent with Russian public corporation “Bank for Development 
and Foreign Trade (Vnesheconombank) on a long-term credit facility.
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By the end of the year, the governments of Kazakhstan and Russia expect to 
introduce a Kazakh-Russian joint action plan for 2009-2010 for the approval 
by the Heads of State. “Considering the positive experience of 2007-2008 
joint action plan, which took Kazakh-Russian relations to a qualitatively new 
level, the Heads of State instructed the governments of both countries to 
elaborate on an action plan for 2009-2010 by the end of the current year”, 
says the document signed by the Presidents of Kazakhstan and Russia.
The agreement between Kazyna Sustainable Growth Fund and Rosnanotech 
state company in the field of commercialisation of nanotechnologies is 
aimed at establishing cooperation and facilitating competitive nano-industry 
development in Russia and Kazakhstan. In accordance with the agreement, 
both parties plan to cooperate in the framework of joint projects and venture 
funds investing in nanotechnologies and nano-industry. A project on joint 
production of land-based and space-based solar batteries built on Russian 
Research and Production Enterprise KVANT technologies is considered a 
pilot project in this area.
Prime Ministers of Russia and Belarus discuss economic integration and 
common foreign trade policy
August 14, 2008
Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin held a working meeting in Moscow 
with his Belarusian colleague, Sergei Sidorskiy. The parties discussed the 
issues of bilateral relations and fulfillment of commitments on strengthening 
integration, forming common customs space and building the Union State of 
Russia and Belarus.
The Heads of government discussed the issues of national legislations 
harmonisation, the unification of customs duties, the implementation of a 
common foreign trade policy in regard to third countries, and the deepening of 
integration in monetary and financial spheres.
The parties also discussed the possibilities of involving Russian companies 
in the implementation of the state enterprise’s privatisation programme in 
Belarus. 
The Fifth Cross-Border Cooperation Forum between Kazakhstan and 
Russia 
September 23, 2008
The Presidents of Russia and Kazakhstan took part in the Fifth Cross-Border 
Cooperation Forum in Aktobe (Kazakhstan). The Forum aimed to strengthen 
integration processes between the two countries.
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Aktobe authorities seek to maximize the benefits of cross-border cooperation 
with the immediate neighbour, the Orenburg oblast. This includes, but is not 
limited to, the organisation of industrial fairs and cultural events. In 2005, 
Orsk-Aktobe Trading House LLC was established in the city of Orsk with many 
enterprises of the Aktobe region signing agreements on supply of products 
and mutual cooperation. The setting up of 10 border checking points offering 
simplified requirements for the citizens of Kazakh-Russian border locations 
became the most prominent achievement to date. 
The Presidents visited a joint Kazakh-Russian “High-tech for Regions: 
Transborder Cooperation” exhibition. Manufacturers from seven regions of 
Kazakhstan and 13 regions of Russia took part in the exhibition. A presentation 
of the Aktobe region breakthrough projects, implemented under Kazakhstan’s 
30 Corporate Leaders State Programme, was part of the exhibition. The 
launch of Voskhod-Oriel chromium ore mining and processing plant set by 
Russian Mechel (100% Russian equity) was broadcasted on-line. 
There are about 250 Kazakh-Russian joint ventures in the region employing 
over 40000 workers. Over the last three years, investors from Russia 
invested about $1.5 billion in Aktobe oblast. Launching of new enterprises in 
the oblast increased exports of copper, nickel, cobalt, chrome, alumina, kaolin 
clay, nonmetallic pipes, foamed concrete blocks, chemical and other goods to 
Russia.
Two large projects in the Khromtau region are being implemented with the 
participation of Russian investors. The CJSC Russian Copper Company is 
engaged in the construction of a high tech copper ore mining and processing 
plant, which includes three mining and processing works and a copper-smelting 
plant. Within two years, Voskhod-Oriel LLC has built a chromium ore mining 
and processing plant based on a high tech production practice of inclined 
hoisting shaft. The construction of a ferroalloy plant is foreseen in the nearest 
future. The implementation of the project could strengthen Aktobe’s rankings 
on the world chrome market, as well as provide jobs and address the social 
issues of the Khromtau region. Approximately 40% of chrome concentrate, 
produced at the plant, will be exported to Russia (Tikhvin Ferroalloys Plant) 
and Great Britain.
Mutual trade and the Customs Union
Mutual trade of CIS member states in 2008
Mutual intra-trade between the member states according to official statistics 
recorded positive dynamics. The most notable growth in 2008 was observed 
in the mutual trade between Russia and Belarus, Russia and Kyrgyzstan, 
Kazakhstan and Ukraine as well as between Belarus and Tajikistan. 
Chronicle of Eurasian 
Regional Integration 2008 
1Eurasian Development Bank
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Turkmenistan 200.8 198. . 13 - 339.7 122. 1.  18. 80.2 10.
Uzbekistan 10 12.8 1. 197.1 8. 83 303.9 10.1 18.  13. 117.
Georgia 88.9 7.1 133.9 11.8 9. 11.3 13 10. 80.2 13.  1.
Azerbaijan 139.3 11.8 12. - 107. - 19 7.3 10. 117. 1.  
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Тable 2. 5. Mutual trade between CIS countries in 2008 ($ million)
Source: National Statistical Committees 
Тable 2. 4. Mutual trade between CIS countries in 2008 (growth, %)
Source: National Statistical Committees 
 
Russia  19 99 3 189 1 802.9 1 002.8 899.9 39 787 1 79.9 910.2 3 39.2 78.7 2 02.
Kazakhstan 19 99  7.0 08. 277.1 10.  108. 21.2 37.9 1 788.2 7.2 11.8
Belarus 3 189 7.0  . 7.2 28.2  91.2 33.9 9. 17.9 . 111.
Kyrgyzstan 1 802.9 08. .  3.2 0.1 92.8 3. .3 07.0 2.9 -
Tajikistan 1 002.8 277.1 7.2 3.2  - 83.0 0. - 178.1 2.1 .0
Armenia 899.9 10. 28.2 0.1 -  289.1 - 1.0 8.8 19. -
Ukraine 39 787  108.  91.2 92.8 83.0 289.1  1 37.7  008. 2 713. 87. 98.3
Moldova 1 79.9 21.2 33.9 3. 0. - 1 37.7  1.2 23.7 .9 7.
Turkmenistan 910.2 37.9 9. .3 - 1.0  008. 1.2  132.3 11. 73.3
Uzbekistan 3 39.2 1 788.2 17.9 07.0 178.1 8.8 2 713. 23.7 132.3  11. 71.3
Georgia 78.7 7.2 . 2.9 2.1 19. 87. .9 11. 11.  813.2
Azerbaijan 2 02. 11.8 111. н.д. .0 - 98.3 7. 73.3 71.3 813.2  
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Customs Union legal framework
January 25, 2008
The Heads of Kazakh, Russian and Belarusian government signed 9 
documents on the establishment of the Customs Union, which is aimed at 
implementing a common trade regime in respect to third countries. The 
documents signed include agreements on a common customs tariff, export 
customs duties in respect to third countries, on unified rules for identifying the 
country of origin of goods, on customs valuation of goods being transported 
across the border of the Customs Union, and on the implementation of an 
agreed policy on technical control, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, etc.
As reported, on October 6, 2007, the Heads of EurAsEC member states 
signed 4 international agreements on forming an institutional framework of 
the Customs Union and defining the procedure of joining the union by other 
states, as well as an action plan of establishing the EurAsEC Customs Union 
by 2010. Therefore, a package of 13 key documents on the Customs Union 
activity has been signed thus far.
Meeting of the SCO Special Working Group on Investment Promotion
April 16, 2008
Dushanbe hosted the 4th meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 
(SCO) Special Working Group on Investment Promotion.
In the course of the meeting, the participants discussed a draft agreement on 
the facilitation and protection of the investment. They also expressed a desire 
to run an inventory of investment projects included in the SCO Programme 
for Multilateral Trade and Economic Cooperation, as well as continuing the 
preparation of an Investment Bulletin of SCO Member States.
Session of the EurAsEC Integration Committee
June 20, 2008
The session of the EurAsEC Integration Committee was attended by the 
Deputy Prime Minister of Belarus, Andrei Kobyakov; the first Deputy Chairman 
of the Government of the Russian Federation, Igor Shuvalov; and Kazakhstan’s 
Vice-Minister of Industry and Trade, Almas Kossunov. The participants 
discussed the implementation of the Action plan on the EurAsEC Customs 
Union, approved by the Presidents of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus on 
October 6, 2007. EurAsEC Secretary General, Tair Mansurov, briefed the 
participants on the status of implementation of this Plan.
Following the results of the session, the participants approved Regulations 
on principles and order of Common Customs Tariff forming and a draft 
Regulations on the adjustment of import customs duties included in the Basic 
List of a common customs tariff. Moreover, the participants discussed the 
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issue of prompting domestic procedures required for international agreements 
entry into force. EurAsEC member states are in the process of ratifying the 
aforementioned documents. 
Russian Duma ratifies four international agreements on EurAsEC 
Customs Union
October 8, 2008
A package of documents on establishing the EurAsEC Customs Union by 
Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus has been ratified. The documents provide for 
common customs space without customs duties and economic restrictions. 
The documents also include a full list of conditions, necessary for merging 
customs territories of three countries into a single space and completing the 
formation of the Customs Union.
The agreement on the Customs Union Commission establishes an institutional 
structure of the Customs Union. The Commission is a permanent regulating 
authority, comprised of deputy prime ministers or members of government of 
the Customs Union member states.
The protocol on introducing amendments to the agreed establishment of 
the Eurasian Economic Community dated October 10, 2000, has also been 
ratified. The protocol is a key document setting the legal basis of the Customs 
Union. The EurAsEC Interstate Council facilitates as the supreme authority 
on the Customs Union. The jurisdiction of the EurAsEC Court is expanding 
with the addition of dispute settlement functions within the Customs Union. 
All ratified documents had been signed on October 6, 2007, at the EurAsEC 
Interstate Council meeting in Dushanbe.
It is expected that other EurAsEC states would join the Customs union in due 
time. EurAsEC includes Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan 
and Uzbekistan. Armenia, Moldova and Ukraine have the observer status in 
the organisation.
A week later, on October 15, the Council of Federation ratified the package of 
documents on the EurAsEC Customs Union.
Kazakh Parliament approves ratification of agreement on common 
customs and tariff regulation
October 8, 2008
During a plenary session, the Lower Chamber of Kazakh Parliament approved 
the draft law “On Ratification of the Agreement on Common Customs and 
Tariff Regulation” 
The Agreement was signed on January 25, 2008 in Moscow. It aims to 
accelerate economic integration and facilitate fair competition. According to 
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the agreement, after establishing the common customs territory, the sides 
will introduce unified non-tariff measures in respect of third countries.
In accordance with Article 1 of the Agreement, a single customs tariff is to 
be used. The purpose of single customs tariff is to rationalise commodity 
nomenclature of imports to the common customs territory of the member 
states; keep healthy export/imports balance on the common customs 
territory of the member states; sustain a favourable structure of production 
and consumption in the Customs Union; protect the economy of the Customs 
Union against negative influence of foreign competition; and facilitate the 
effective integration of the Customs Union in the world economy.
Preferential tariffs could apply, including import duty exemption or reduced 
import duty rates. A single customs tariff becomes operational when the 
rates of import duties in the member countries coincide through the whole of 
commodity nomenclature.
Council of Federation ratifies agreements on widening economic 
integration based on fair competition within EurAsEC
December 17, 2008
The Russian Council of Federation has ratified a number of agreements on 
widening economic integration by means of fair competition in EurAsEC 
member states.
An agreement between Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia on the establishment 
of a common customs territory and the formation of a Customs Union is the 
result of deeper integration between EurAsEC member states. It stipulates 
the introduction and use of a common customs tariff and includes the list of 
import duties rates, as well as conditions for applying preferential tariffs.
Agreements on unified rules on the country of origin of goods aims to simplify 
and harmonise the customs procedures of members of the Customs Union 
with third countries. The agreement doesn’t apply to goods from developing 
and least developed countries.
Agreements on defining the custom valuation of goods transported across 
the border of the Customs Union are intended to unify legislation in the field 
of defining value basis of prices for calculating customs charges. Options for 
dispute settlements are being worked out with the view to facilitate economic 
development of the Customs Union. 
Industries and sectors
Armenia to join the Uranium Enrichment Centre
February 7, 2008
Armenia will become the third member of the Uranium Enrichment Centre, 
established by Kazakhstan and Russia. On May 10, 2007, Kazakhstan and 
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Russia signed an intergovernmental agreement to establish an international 
centre for uranium enrichment. Kazakhstan’s KazAtomProm owns a 10% 
share in the centre. Another 90% belong to Russia. Other participants, 
including Armenia, will join the centre by buying out parts of the Russian 
share.
LUKoil to acquire new hydrocarbon assets in Uzbekistan
March 11, 2008
LUKoil Overseas (a 100% subsidiary of LUKoil) has completed a deal with 
MGNK Soyuzneftegaz to acquire 100% of the SNG Holdings Ltd. Group, 
which includes Soyuzneftegaz Vostok Limited. Soyuzneftegaz Vostok Limited 
holds shares in the product sharing agreement (PSA) for the fields of 
South-West Gissar and the Ustyurt region in the Republic of Uzbekistan. 
The total amount of the deal is around $580 million. An authorised state 
body, the National Holding Company, Uzbekneftegaz, is the second party to 
the PSA. PSA was signed on January 23, 2007, for 36 years and came into 
effect on April 23, 2007. 
Central Asian gas to be sold at European price starting from 2009
March 11, 2008
Starting from 2009, gas companies of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan will begin charging European prices. Gazprom CEO, Alexei 
Miller, met with the KazMunayGas President, Uzakbai Karabalin, the 
UZBEKNEFTEGAZ CEO, Nurmuhamad Akhmedov, and the Turkmengaz 
Chairman, Yagshigeldy Kakaev, who all attended the meeting.
The prospects of cooperation in the gas sector were discussed at the meeting. 
Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller said that by the end of 2008, the average price of 
long term wholesale supply of gas to European customers could grow to $360 
per 1000 m3, citing expert estimates Gazprom own estimates suggested 
$354 per 1000 m3. 
In November 2007, Gazprom and Turkmenistan signed a supplement to the 
contract on natural gas supplies. Under the document, Turkmen gas would 
be supplied at $130 per 1000 m3 in the first half of 2008 and at $150 in the 
second half. Starting from January 1, 2009, the pricing formula will be linked 
to market principles. Starting from 2009, the price formula will be set by a 
long-term contract that expires in 2028. Gazprom purchases 50 billion m3 of 
natural gas from Turkmenistan annually under an agreement that expires at 
the end of the year. Gas from the Central Asian region is transported to Europe 
via the Gazprom-controlled Central Asia transit pipeline system through the 
territories of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Russia.
In accordance with intergovernmental agreements, Gazprom secures the 
transit of Turkmen gas through Russia to Ukraine. In addition, Gazprom acts 
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as the operator of Turkmen gas transit through the territories of Uzbekistan 
and Kazakhstan.
In late December 2007, Gazprom also reached an agreement with Uzbekistan 
on adjusting purchase prices for Uzbek gas to the regional market conditions. 
The price of Uzbek gas was $100 per thousand m3.
Tajikistan intends to complete construction of Rogun HPP
April 21, 2008
Tajikistan is determined to complete the construction of Rogun hydropower 
Plant (HPP) even without Uzbekistan’s consent, Tajik deputy Minister of 
Energy and Industry, Pulod Mukhiddinov, said on April 22, during the workshop 
on Central Asian Hydropower Industry. According to him, “Tajikistan will not 
wait for the consent of its neighbors and Uzbekistan in particular, on issues of 
hydropower plants’ building, especially the Rogun one, on its territory”.
At least $1.3 billion is needed in order to complete a Soviet protracted 
construction. A $3.2 billion investment will allow for the launching of all six 
units – each with a 600 mW capacity. This could double energy production 
and strengthen the energy independence of Tajikistan.
According to a representative of the Interstate Commission for Water 
Coordination of Central Asia, Denis Sorokin, building such major hydropower 
plants as Rogun may influence the environmental situation in region. “Issues 
of construction of such like HPPs must be coordinated with all countries of the 
region”, he said.
Co-financing of interstate waterworks facilities in Kyrgyzstan
May 20, 2008
In 2008, Kazakhstan will allocate 80 million tenge (approx. $6.7 million) for 
joint financing of interstate waterworks facilities in Kyrgyzstan. Kazakhstan 
doesn’t pay for water supply but takes a shared interest in co-financing 
interstate waterworks facilities on the rivers Chui and Talas, such as Ortotokoi 
and Kirov water reservoirs, East and West Chui Big Canals and a by-pass Chui 
Cnanal.
Joint venture on oil refining and petrochemistry
May 22, 2008
The Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev suggested establishing an 
oil refining and petrochemistry joint venture with Russia. “We suggest 
strengthening this vector, by creating a joint venture on petrochemistry and 
oil refining” Nazarbayev said at the joint press conference with the Russian 
President Dmitry Medvedev.
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“Most of Kazakhstan’s oil and gas goes to Europe through Russian 
pipeline network. This year we plan to export Russian oil to China through 
Kazakhstan”, Nazarbayev stated. 
Moreover, both countries actively cooperate in development of new oil and gas 
deposits in the shelf of the Caspian Sea. 
Kazakhstan plans to acquire share in one of the Ukrainian grain terminals 
at the Black Sea 
May 22, 2008
During a meeting in the Ministry of Agriculture of RK, the Director of the 
Strategy Department for Agricultural Sector Development and Agricultural 
Science, Berik Ospanov, announced that Kazakhstan plans to acquire a share 
in one of the grain terminals of Ukraine on the Black Sea.
“The ministry takes all measures to expand possibilities of grain export. With 
this aim, a grain terminal was built in Baku, and similar terminals in ports of 
Georgia and Iran are being constructed, it is planned to acquire a share in one 
of the grain terminals of Ukraine, located at the Black Sea”, Ospanov said.
Other issues discussed were the joint construction of a railway from the 
border of Kazakhstan through Turkmenistan and Iran with an exit to the ports 
of the Indian Ocean. In pursuit of the task of becoming the top 5 leading grain 
exporters, Kazakhstan’s export has to reach the volume of 12 million tons a 
year. Presently, using the traditional routes via Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan 
and Tajikistan, Kazakhstan is exporting about 9-10 million tons a year. On 
order to expand export, Kazakhstan has to use access to the Caspian Sea and 
the Black Sea effectively. The country is constructing grain terminals there 
in order to get the shortest routes to Europe, Northern Africa, Asia and the 
Arabian countries.
MTS to invest $600 million in Uzbekistan
May 27, 2008
Russia’s major mobile operator, MTS, plans to invest over $600 million 
in operations of its subsidiary in Uzbekistan in 2008-2010. MTS entered 
the Uzbek market in 2004 by purchasing a 74% stake in Uzdunrobita, 
Uzbekistan’s biggest mobile operator, for $121 million. Last year, MTS 
acquired the other 25% of Uzdunrobita’s shares for a total sum of $250 
million. According to MTS President and CEO Leonid Melamed, about 30% 
of the stated $600 million will be invested already this year and 1.500 will 
increase a quantity of base station systems. “Out of all countries we work 
in, Uzbekistan is the most attractive one from the view of growth potential 
and income from subscribers”, Melamed said. According to him, MTS will 
have a market penetration of 36% in Uzbekistan in 2009, 45% in 2010 and 
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58% in 2012. He also announced that MTS intends to launch a third generation 
(3G) network in Uzbekistan. MTS controls 52.1% of Uzbekistan’s user base. 
According to MTS, its main competitor, Russian Vimpelcom, provides mobile 
services to 35.4% of the country’s subscribers through a subsidiary.
TransContainer and Kazakhstan Temir Zholy to establish a joint venture
May 29, 2008
Russia’s largest container shipping operator, OJSC TransContainer, plans to 
set up a joint venture with Kazakhstan’s Temir Zholy to provide a container 
shipping service that would bring together traffic streams, the Head of 
TransContainer Pyotr Baskakov said.
In the beginning, a joint venture will facilitate as logistics operator. The venture 
will service container-shipping flows from Kazakhstan to Russia and back. At a 
later stage, the company could expand into acquiring its own rolling stock and 
building terminals in Central Russia and Central Kazakhstan.
Concept of EurAsEC Common Energy Market
May 30, 2008
The participants of the 12th session of Energy Policy Council under the 
EurAsEC Integration Committee approved a draft concept for the formation 
of a common energy market of the EurAsEC member states. They agreed 
to submit the concept for EurAsEC governing organs, despite a number of 
existing disagreements.
The disagreements involve issues of forming a gas market of EurAsEC 
member states and result from Gazprom’s hard line attitude towards 
conditions of access to the main gas pipeline system, transit through 
the territories of EurAsEC member states and unified policy on fair and 
transparent pricing for gas and transit tariffs.
The Council has also approved the EurAsEC Member States Joint Fuel and 
Energy Balance for 2008-2010. This document provides access for each 
EurAsEC member state to information on the current state and development 
prospects of other states’ fuel and energy markets. In its current state, a 
joint balance represents an open offer to the EurAsEC member states to 
cooperate in the field of production, supply and transportation of energy 
resources.
Second hydraulic unit of Sangtuda HPP-1 put into operation
July 1, 2008
OJSC INTER RAO UES has put into operation the second hydraulic unit of the 
Sangtuda-1 hydropower plant on the Vakhsh River in Tajikistan. The rated 
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capacity of the second unit amounts to 167.5 mW with a monthly output of 
about 72 million kWh.
The launching of the first unit of the Sangtuda HPP-1 took place on January 
20, 2008, 3 months ahead of schedule. It helped ease the seasonal energy 
shortfall in Tajikistan and accelerated the increase of HPP’s overall capacity 
to 670 mW.
In accordance with the construction schedule, the launching of the third and 
fourth hydraulic units is planned on October 15, 2008, and January 15, 
2009, respectively. It is expected that the whole process of Sangtuda HPP-1 
construction will be completed by April 1, 2009. The cost of construction is 
17.2 billion rubles.
Sangtuda HPP-1 is one of the largest investment projects in CIS with the 
participation of Russia and Russian companies. The main contractors 
and equipment suppliers for the project are JSC Silovye Machiny (Power 
Machines), OJSC Gydrostal Chekhov Plant, OJSC ChirkeyGESstroi, OJSC 
Zarubezhvodstroy, CJSC Zagranenergostroymontazh, OJSC Hydromontazh 
Trust and others. Over 4500 people are engaged in construction, including 
3600 citizens of Tajikistan.
The completion of the Sangtuda HPP will ensure power supply to the industrial 
enterprises in Tajikistan and make it possible to export electricity to the 
neighbouring countries. HPP-1 will also be able to regulate the flow of the 
Vakhsh River on a daily basis. 
Gas pipeline for Turkmen gas transit through Uzbekistan
July 1, 2008
The construction of a gas pipeline for transit of Turkmen gas across Uzbek 
territory has commenced. The joint venture, Asia Trans Gas, established by 
Uzbekneftegaz and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), will be 
responsible for the project engineering, construction and operation of the 
Uzbekistan-China gas pipeline.
The Uzbekistan-China gas pipeline length is estimated at 530 km, its annual 
projected capacity is 30 billion m3. Uzbekistan has no plans for the export of 
gas via this pipeline. The project envisages the construction of two lines. The 
first line of the pipeline and the first compressor station CS-1 are expected 
by December 31, 2009, and will be put into operation in January 2010. The 
second line and two more compressor stations, CS-2 and CS-3, are planned 
for completion by December 31, 2011. Uzbekneftegaz and Chinese Trans-
Asia Gas Pipeline Co Ltd. will monitor the implementation of the project.
Final stage of preparation for constructing third power unit of Ekibastuz 
GRES-2 
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August 11, 2008
The project’s feasibility study is prepared and agreed with respective 
authorised public agencies, an appraisal of Gosexpertiza, republican state-
owned company, is obtained, a project implementation scheme worked out 
and terms of reference for the selection of a general contractor were being 
prepared and scheduled for the third quarter of 2008.
The major construction will begin in early 2009 after a contract with a general 
contractor is signed. Letters of intent have been signed with the Eurasian 
Development Bank and Kazakhstan Development Bank. In the meantime, 
the banks will define the terms and conditions of project financing based on 
the results of technical, environmental, financial and legal expertise. Major 
precondition for financing would be a station having long-term contracts for 
electric energy supply.
Management of Ekibastuz GRES-2 power plant with the assistance of INTER 
RAO UES and Samruk-Energo JSC takes steps to accelerate the construction 
of the third power unit, which will allow for an increase in the plant’s throughput 
to 1525 mW to meet growing electricity demand in the region
Ekibastuz GRES-2 Power Station JSC is a joint energy-generating venture 
between Kazakhstan and Russia with designed capacity of 1000 mW, where 
Russia’s INTER RAO UES and Kazakhstan’s Samruk-Energo hold a 50% stake 
each.
Gazprom Neft intends to enter retail market of oil products in 
Kazakhstan 
August 11, 2008
JSC Gazprom Neft stated its intention to establish a retail fuel station 
network in Kazakhstan. Up to the present moment, Gazprom Neft’s business 
in Kazakhstan was limited to wholesale trading in crude oil via its subsidiary 
Gazprom Neft-Kazakhstan. The company will be selling oil products from the 
Omsk Refinery – Kazakhstan nearest Gazprom Neft’s principal oil refining 
facility.
Severstal to acquire Kazakhstan’s Balazhal gold mine
August 12, 2008
Severstal Resources, the mining division of Severstal, has taken control of 
Balazhal, a gold mine in Kazakhstan. The purchase of 100% of the assets was 
made through one of Severstal’s subsidiaries. The recoverable reserves in 
Balazhal are estimated at about 20 metric tons of gold, and the mine has a 
resource potential of up to 30-40 tons. 
The company has not disclosed the cost of the deal. According to various 
estimates, the deal is estimated at $30 million.
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Balazhal is located in East Kazakhstan, 260 km south of Semipalatinsk. 
Severstal Resources plans to resume production by 2009 and to raise 
output to 1.5-2 tons of gold a year by 2011.
Russian VSMPO-Avisma acquires 84.28% shares of VSMPO Titan 
Ukraine
August 22, 2008
The company owns CJSC Pipe Works VSMPO-AVISMA in Ukraine. VSMPO-
Avisma is the owner of Titan-Dnepr in Dnepropetrovsk, which is engaged 
in wholesale and retail trade, as well as intermediation and consulting in 
commerce and management. 
Zaporozhye Titanium and Magnesium Works (ZTMK) state enterprise is 
the only Ukrainian producer of titanium sponge and a main rival of VSMPO-
Avisma in the production of titanium raw materials. Moreover, the Volnogorsk 
ore mining and processing enterprise in Ukraine provides the company with 
ilmenite, necessary for the production of titanium sponge.
VSMPO-Avisma is the world’s biggest titanium producer, and supplies the 
world’s leading aircraft corporations with the metal. It exports 70% of its 
titanium and sells 30% in Russia. The state corporation, Russian Technologies 
(Rostekhnologii), owns 66% of the shares.
LUKoil, Russian oil company, plans to produce 12 billion m3 of gas annually 
at Uzbekistan’s Kandym and Gissar fields
September 2, 2008
LUKoil and the national holding company, Uzbekneftegaz, signed an agreement 
in 2001 to develop the Bukharo-Khivinskoye and Gissar oil and gas fields, which 
have estimated reserves of 250 billion m3 of gas and 10 million metric tons of 
liquid hydrocarbons. The largest gas field, Kandym, which opened in 1966 in 
the Bukhara Region, central Uzbekistan, contains commercial gas reserves of 
150-180 billion m3. Natural gas production at the fields was earlier estimated 
at around 9 billion m3. 
“Investment is currently being made in the promising Kandym and Gissar 
group projects. I am sure that these large projects, which according to our 
estimates will require around $5 billion more to complete, will produce over 
12 billion m3 of gas in Uzbekistan”. the CEO of Russia’s largest independent oil 
producer, Vagit Alekperov, said.
Alekperov said LUKoil had already invested $1.5 billion in Uzbekistan, 
describing the local climate for foreign investment as “positive”. He added that 
their Uzbek counterparts were also considering building a gas refinery. 
The implementation of projects in Uzbekistan may be viewed as continuing 
expansion of LUKoil to the south, where the vast gas reserves are 
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concentrated. Relations between Russia and Uzbekistan are stable enough. 
The only problem is the lack of a branching network of gas pipelines on the 
territory of the republic, and it is a temporary one. Either Gazprom or LUKoil 
are to start developing the infrastructure of the region in the nearest future.
A subsidiary of Russian VTB bank to start operating in Kazakhstan in 
January 2009
September 8, 2008
One of the Russian banking sector’s leaders enters Kazakhstan’s market. 
According to the Interfax Centre of Economic Analysis, in the second half of 
2008, VTB was ranked 2nd by assets among the Russian banks (the bank’s 
assets amount to 1.75 trillion rubles). VTB is also ranked 2nd by capital (352 
billion rubles) and 3rd by profit before tax (15 billion rubles). The Russian 
government owns 77% of the bank’s shares.
VTB bank entered the markets of Belarus, Georgia, Armenia and Ukraine. 
Representation office in Kazakhstan was open in February 2008. Having 
examined all possible options, VTB leadership made a decision to establish a 
subsidiary with a relatively small authorised capital.
International Financial Centre in Moscow
September 11, 2008
According to the president of Russia, an international financial centre, which 
is to be established in Moscow, will become a competitive platform and will 
boost economic integration of CIS member states and other countries.
“Establishment of a new centre is a substantial contribution to deepening 
of economic integration of CIS member states and other countries”, Dmitry 
Medvedev told a meeting on issues of creating a centre. “An international 
financial centre, located in Russia, may soon become a large and universal 
financial platform in the region. Some day it would be able to defy competition 
on global financial markets”.
Simple access to operations, special tax treatment of financial markets and a 
wide range of traded assets must be provided when establishing the centre. 
According to Medvedev, “providing informational transparency of markets 
while protecting them from insider leaks and prices abuse” is the second 
important direction of the centre’s establishment.
A third major task is the overall development of business environment. “Here 
we talk about the introduction of a comfortable transport and informational 
infrastructure, simplification of rules for visa and customs regime and, in 
certain situations, rules for property registration”, Medvedev said.
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According to him, the establishment of the financial centre will help upgrade 
the whole financial system of the country, as well as become an instrument of 
attracting additional local and foreign resources to the economy.
PromStroi Group closed deals on acquisition of specialised contracting 
companies in Kazakhstan
September 15, 2008
The acquired assets bring PSG is in the list of the top five mechanical 
organisations and in the list of the three organisations for mounting and 
balancing of automation systems on the territory of CIS member states.
Kazmehanomontazh Ltd. and JSC Avtomatika are first foreign assets of the 
company. Joining the PSG will help Kazakh companies enter the Russian 
market. New assets, in their turn, will aid PromStroi Group in strengthening 
its positions in the engineering services sector of the post-soviet space.
The acquisition allows PSG to enter Kazakhstan’s market, particularly in the 
oil and gas sector – the company’s core activities. The company plans to work 
in Kazakhstan in the first instance. PSG will also gain access to markets of 
Russia and Central Asia in the long term.
Representatives of Kazakh counterparts believe that joining the PromStroi 
Group will primarily lift growth restrictions, which is determined by the small 
potential of Kazakhstan’s market. Moreover, the companies get a chance of 
participating in tenders and project works.
Large investment projects of Russian companies in Kazakhstan 
announced during the Kazakh-Russian Forum in Aktobe
September 23, 2008
The Russian mining and metals giant, Mechel, plans to build two ferroalloys 
plants in Kazakhstan by 2012-2013. The company plans to build a 
ferrochrome plant, with a capacity of 240,000-250,000 tons of 
ferrochrome per year. The new facility will be located in Aktobe region close to 
the Voskhod chrome mine (reserves amount to 19.5 million tons of ore). The 
project is valued at $500-800 million.
Voskhod-Oriel, controlled by Mechel through the recently acquired British 
Oriel Resources Plc., is responsible for the project’s development. A week 
earlier, the company launched a mining and processing plant at the chrome 
field.
Starting from 2009, the plant is expected to produce 950,000 tons of 
chrome concentrate. At present, one third of the plant’s output will be 
supplied to Mechel’s Tikhvin Ferroalloys Plant in Russia’s Leningrad region.
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The second project to construct a ferronickel asset will be implemented at 
the Shevchenko field in Kazakhstan (Kostanai region). If the pilot project is 
a success, the second stage of the Shevchenko-based metals and mining 
company will include hydrometallurgical nickel production of 20000 tons per 
year. The second stage will get under way in 2011 and startup is scheduled 
for 2013. The concern will use sulphuric-acid leaching technology. A similar 
facility will be built in the Orenburg region. Mechel estimates the cost of the 
pilot project at $600 million.
Economic integration of the Black Sea Basin countries in tourism
October 7, 2008
A fourth conference of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) 
organisation, together with Russia’s federal tourism agency, Krasnodar 
Territory administration and the municipality of Gelendzhik resort-town, 
was held in Gelendzhik (the Krasnodar Territory of Russia). The participants 
discussed the prospects of developing health-resorts and tourist 
infrastructure in the Black Sea region. The representatives of Abkhazia, 
Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Greece, Russia and Romania took part in the 
conference.
BSEC member states have a significant potential for joint use of resorts. For 
example, a belt highway around the Black Sea is a new, and in all aspects 
profitable, project for business cooperation. It will widen the range of sites for 
visiting by tourists that are travelling by cars or buses around the Black Sea.
Azerbaijan transport infrastructure development
October 8, 2008 
In recent years, Azerbaijan has been engaged in the rapid reconstruction 
of its transport infrastructure. All works in this direction are aimed at 
developing a non-hydrocarbon segment, which is one of the major goals of 
the national economy. The implementation of full-scale projects is impossible 
without regional integration in the context of two main international transport 
corridors, Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRAСECA) and North-South running via 
the republic. The TRAСECA Multilateral Agreement was signed in Baku in 
1998 and composes Azerbaijan, Turkey, Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, 
Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Armenia.
A range of infrastructural projects was discussed on October 8-9 in Brussels 
during a meeting of the working group of experts on the Black Sea and the 
Caspian Sea basins, held within the framework of the meeting of the TRAСECA 
National Secretaries.
One of the important components of the TRAСECA transport corridor is 
overseas transport. Transit of Kazakhstan’s oil by means of this corridor will 
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be sharply increased in the very near future. Re-equipment of the Caspian 
tanker fleet is foreseen in this connection. A memorandum on establishing 
a Caspian shipbuilding facility, signed on May 19 in Baku by State Oil 
Company of Azerbaijan, Korean STX Shipbuilding Co. Ltd. and Azerbaijan 
Investment Company is being implemented.
EuroChem Mineral and Chemical company plans a large-scale project in 
Kazakhstan
October 20, 2008
The largest Russian producer of nitrogen and phosphate fertilisers, Eurochem 
Mineral and Chemical Company, plans to construct a mining and processing 
plant, as well as three plants for the production of phosphorus and nitrogen 
fertilisers in Kazakhstan.
Zhanatas, Aral-Tobe and Kesik-Tobe phosphorus deposits in the Karatau 
basin (in Zhambyl and South Kazakhstan regions) will serve a source of raw 
materials for new plants. Recoverable reserves of the Karatau basin top 4 
billion tons of ore or 1 billion tons of phosphorus pentoxide. Undiscovered 
potential resources of deposits make up about 610 million tons.
Kazakhstan’s leading manufacturer of phosphorus-containing products, 
including yellow phosphorus and mineral fertilisers, Kazphosphate LLC. is 
currently working in the Karatau basin. In spring 2008, EuroChem held 
negotiations for purchasing a 50% share in Kazphosphate, but the deal was 
aborted. At present, the holding is trying to once again consolidate its position 
on Kazakhstan’s market.
EuroChem has already registered its subsidiary in Kazakhstan, EuroChem-
Fertilisers LLC, and acquired the state-owned stake in JSC Sary-Tas plant 
(former Karatau chemical plant), on the basis of which the holding intends to 
build a new plant. A phosphorite pellets production plant stood idle since 1993, 
and needs large-scale investments and global reconstruction. EuroChem 
evaluates the project at over $2.5 billion and will finance the spending mostly 
with its own funds.
By 2015, EuroChem plans to complete the construction of a mining and 
processing plant, and plants for manufacturing nitrogen fertilisers (with 
capacity of 0.8 million tons per year), phosphate fertilisers (1 million tons 
per year) and NPK fertilisers (0.5 million tons per year). Starting from 2015, 
the three plants will produce about 2 million tons of fertilisers with sales in 
Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus and Ukraine.
Early launch of third hydraulic unit of Sangtuda HPP-1 on the Vakhsh 
River
November 5, 2008
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According to the president of Tajikistan, the commissioning of the third 
hydraulic unit of Sangtuda-1 hydropower plant will make it possible to ease 
an acute shortage of electric energy in the republic. The rated capacity of 
the third unit amounts to 167.5 mW, with a monthly output of energy set at 
about 72 million kWh. The overall capacity of HPP after commissioning the 
last fourth unit will amount to 670 mW with an annual energy output of 2.7 
billion kWh.
The construction works at Sangtuda HPP-1, carried out by Russian INTER 
RAO UES, will be completed in the first quarter of 2009. The total value of the 
project is estimated at nearly 17.2 billion rubles.
The construction of Sangtuda HPP-1 started in the late 1980s, but was 
suspended soon afterwards due to the lack of funds and a war in Tajikistan.
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko believes cooperation with 
Russian Sberbank to be promising
December 2, 2008
“At present there are no obstacles for Sberbank operations on the territory 
of Belarus”, Lukashenko said during the meeting with the Chairman of 
Sberbank’s management board, German Gref, in Minsk.
In particular, attracting funds from Russian Federation is of great importance 
for Belarus. According to Lukashenko, this type of cooperation is of prime 
importance “within the crisis period, when the country is trying to find 
additional resources in order to support the national currency and economy”.
Sberbank’s head expressed his willingness to cooperate with Belarus. “In the 
nearest future Sberbank will consider a possibility of opening new or acquisition 
of existing bank in Belarus”, Gref said.
According to him, Sberbank is ready to enter the financial market of Belarus 
on mutually beneficial terms and for at least 10-20 years. “Among CIS member 
states, Belarus is one of the most foreground and attractive”.
New 5-year term agreement on trust management of JSC Armenian 
Nuclear Power Plant signed in Yerevan
December 4, 2008 
A new 5-year term agreement on the trust management of JSC Armenian 
Nuclear Power Plant (ANPP) has been signed in Yerevan.
The agreement extends the activity of INTER RAO UES as a trust manager of 
the JSC ANPP’s financial and economic activities. According to the agreement, 
INTER RAO UES undertakes corporate governance over the ANPP’s 
activities, including control over financial flows, funding capital investments, 
and implementing a modern system of financial and economic accounting.
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The implementation of the first agreement on trust management dated 
September 18, 2003, between Armenia and INTER RAO UES, allowed the 
economical status of Armenian nuclear power station to stabilise by 2006, 
repaying a debt for the previously delivered nuclear fuel and transferring to 
purchases of new nuclear fuel at own costs, as well as implementing modern 
systems of the power plant’s economic governance.
At present, Armenia set new tasks in the field of nuclear power engineering, 
including preparation for decommissioning existing ANPP’s equipment, 
constructing a new up to date nuclear unit with the capacity of 1000 
mW, and effectively exporting excessive electric power to the neighbouring 
countries.
KazakhGold and Russian Polyus Gold agree upon new terms for 
acquisition of controlling stake in Kazakhstan’s miner 
December 29, 2008
According to the original agreement, Polyus Gold’s board of directors approved 
plans to buy a controlling stake in KazakhGold in shares and cash at a ratio 
of 70:30 (Polyus will pay for 70% of the value of KazakhGold stock with its 
own shares and will use cash for the remaining 30%, which would have been 
equal to $236 million). However, from the moment of agreement signing, 
KazakhGold shares were down 2.53% to $4.63 per share on the London 
Stock Exchange. Since September 26, when the company announced 
negotiations on the deal, the share price has fallen by 60%, leading to the 
deal’s reconsideration.
Russia’s Polyus Gold has reviewed the terms of its potential acquisition of 
KazakhGold and is now offering 0.423 of its own shares for shares in the 
Kazakh gold miner. So the deal for acquisition of 50.1% of the issued share 
capital of KazakhGold is now priced at $308 million.
It is assumed, that the whole 50.1% of KazakhGold’s share capital will be totally 
paid with the shares of Polyus Gold. 5.9% of Polyus reacquired stock may be 
assigned for this purpose. The company intends to preserve cash assets for 
future acquisitions.
Moreover, one more item was added to the deal’s terms. KazakhGold also 
plans to issue $100 million in new shares, offering them to Polyus, among 
other buyers. KazakhGold is placing the new shares to strengthen its balance 
sheet and refinance the debt.
Vnesheconombank obtains permission of Ukrainian Anti-monopoly 
Committee to purchase over 50% of Prominvestbank’s shares
December 29, 2008
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Established in August 1992, Prominvestbank, a joint-stock commercial 
industrial and investment bank, is one of the largest among the Ukrainian 
problem banks. On December 11, the board of the National Bank of Ukraine 
decided on the state’s capitalisation of Prominvestbank. The decision followed 
the failure of the bank’s shareholder Slav AG holding company to fulfill its 
obligations on purchasing the bank’s additional issue of shares for a total sum 
of UAH 900 million and attracting another UAH 4 billion for deposits. In case 
of a transaction settlement, Vnesheconombank will acquire a set of assets, 
including blocks of shares of several Ukrainian enterprises.
Political and social aspects of cooperation 
Cooperation in migration and border control
April 21, 2008
EurAsEC and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) intend to 
cooperate in the field of migration and the outer borders control, the EurAsEC 
Secretary General Tair Mansurov said. “The problem of migrant workers is 
the issue for our organisation. We must provide conditions for normal labour 
migration, which would be quite natural due to the fact that many countries 
need labour force. Meanwhile, there is a problem of illegal migration. This 
problem must be solved by OSCE, which possesses all necessary means for 
taking care of it. So we must work together in order to bring the situation 
to the iscivilised state”, he told journalists. According to Mansurov, both 
organisations have a sufficient number of common issues. The sides view 
cooperation in the fields of border and customs policy concerning prevention 
of smuggling, including weapons and ammunition, drug trafficking and 
illegal migration, a priority task for both organisations. According to the 
CSTO Secretary General, Nikolai Bordyuzha, the two organisations intend 
to cooperate in the field of outer borders control of CSTO and EurAsEC 
member states. Moreover, the sides plan to exchange information and 
cooperate in the sphere of expertise of those regulatory documents that are 
worked out by both organisations.
Interstate Information Pool may be established in CIS
May 30, 2008
A working group of the Council of Chairs of State and Public Television and 
Radio Broadcasting Companies of CIS Member States was held in Dushanbe.
The participants discussed the preparation of the project for establishing the 
Interstate Information Pool, which will make it possible to cover the life of CIS 
member states on a full, comprehensive and objective basis. It will be based on 
the principles of television information exchange. The participants of the pool 
will provide their coverage of events and facts, taking place in the country, in 
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order to form an information package that will be received by television and 
radio broadcasting companies of other states. The latter will be banned from 
altering the information. If needed, the Euronews programmes will also be able 
to receive the information packets.
The “Mir” Interstate Television and Radio Company will act as the coordinator 
and supervisor of the video materials’ joint exchange. It is planned that after 
the reconciliation procedure, the project of establishing an information pool 
will be introduced for approval to the Council of chairs of state and public 
television and radio broadcasting companies during a meeting scheduled on 
October 31, in Moscow.
Fight against illegal migration 
June 4, 2008
The CIS Joint Commission for Cooperation in Fight against Illegal Migration 
held its eighth meeting in Minsk on June 3-4. According to the Chairman of the 
joint commission, Deputy director of the Federal Migration Service of Russia, 
Mikhail Turkin, a comprehensible and explicit legislation is of prime necessity 
in order to effectively combat illegal migration. Measures taken in Russia 
could serve an example of work on improving migration legislation. Russian 
authorities simplified procedures of migrants’ registration and toughened 
administrative responsibility for different types of violations on the part of 
employers. Russia is ready to share its experience with other CIS member 
states. The meeting also considered a list of persons barred from entering CIS 
states, as well as issues related to improvement of system of control of arrival 
and staying of foreign citizens. 
The CIS experts approved a draft agreement on cooperation in the fight 
against illegal production and trade in arms and ammunition. The document 
foresees joint actions, including creation of a collective database on 
transnational criminal groups, their leaders and participants, involved in illegal 
traffic in arms. Moreover, the draft agreement foresees cooperation of CIS 
member states in prevention, identification, suppression and solving of crimes, 
connected with illegal production and trade in arms; analysis of the current 
situation; working out of coherent strategy and joint measures of control, 
as well as coordination and improvement of interaction between competent 
authorities.
Security 
SCO RATS Council held its 11th meeting in Tashkent
March 27, 2008
The Council of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s Regional Anti-Terrorism 
Structure (RATS) held its eleventh regular meeting in Tashkent on March 27.
Natalia Maqsimchook “Regional integration events digest 2008” Chronicle of Eurasian 
Regional Integration 2008 
0 Eurasian Development Bank
EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook 2009
During the meeting, delegates from six SCO member states such as 
Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan passed the 
draft of the SCO RATS Council report on organisation’s activities in 2007 
that will be submitted to the Council of Heads of State, the SCO’s most senior 
body.
The participants of the meeting in Tashkent also expressed wishes and 
recommendations on implementing the set events in 2008.
The RATS approved several basic legal documents on taking further steps 
against regional terrorism, separatism and extremism.
Session of the CIS council of interior ministers
June 28-29, 2008
A session of the CIS council of interior ministers was held in Batumi, Georgia 
on June 28-29. The ministers considered a draft agreement on information 
exchange in the field of crime prevention, including drugs and human traffic. 
According to ministers, special attention should be paid to the research and 
information component of the fight against crime, which is an effective way of 
boosting the effectiveness of CIS member states cooperation in this sphere.
The session singled out problems and the prospects of developing further 
cooperation between Interior Ministries of CIS member states in the fight 
against cross-border transnational criminality. The CIS ministers also 
discussed some organisational issues, including a hotline for coordination 
and interaction in combating IT (information technology) crimes and a 
pilot draft Internet-site of the single information base of interior ministries’ 
education facilities.
According to Russian Interior Minister, Rashid Nurgaliyev, “the hotline will 
contain information, which, according to legislations of the CIS countries, will 
be rendered under the police inquiry and without investigative order. This is 
necessary for immediate evidence saving, carrying out urgent actions and 
establishing a direct intercourse between task forces, engaged in fight against 
IT crimes”. Department of Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs may serve as a 
centre for the system of operational communications.
Prospects of regional integration in military strategic cooperation
October 23, 2008
CIS Joint Air Defence System’s command facilities and combat-duty units of 
the air defence forces held joint command-and-staff exercises. The exercises 
focused on preventing violation of air boundaries of CIS member states, as 
well as counter terrorism activities of combat-duty units of the air defence 
forces and CIS Joint Air Defence System facilities.
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During the drill command facilities and combat-duty, units also practiced 
coordinating the joint efforts to intercept enemy aircraft that have violated 
CIS member states’ national airspace. Moreover, the participants tested 
combat interoperability in counteracting aircrafts with emergency situations 
on board, which violate rules of airspace usage. The operational readiness 
of the combat-duty units was also put on test. Combat-duty units of the CIS 
integrated air defence network, which are stationed in Kazakhstan, central 
Russia and Siberia, Belarus, Ukraine, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan took part in 
the exercise.
The integration of national air defence systems in the regions of collective 
security will allow boosting the potential of combat-duty units. The 
establishment of regional air defence systems in Eastern Europe, Caucasus 
and Central Asia is planned within the framework of widening an operating 
range of the corporate responsibility in joint airspace. At present a joint 
regional air defence system of Belarus and Russia in the Eastern European 
collective security region is being actively developed.
Forums and Conferences
Caspian Energy Forum (CEF-2008)
July 16, 2008
The Caspian Energy Forum “Caspian Energy – Energy of the World” (CEF-
2008) was held on July 15-16 in the International Trade Centre in Moscow. 
The event was held under the support of the Industry and Energy Ministry of 
Russia, the Russian Chamber of Industry and Commerce, and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Russia.
The Caspian Energy Forum aims to promote international energy cooperation 
in the economic interests of the countries of the Caspian Sea region and foster 
energy security in the Caspian area.
CEF-2008 was attended by co-chairs of the Russian-Uzbek, Russian-Kazakh, 
Russian-Turkmen, and Russian-Iranian Intergovernmental Commissions, 
representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, the Energy 
Ministry, the Ministry of Natural Resources and Ecology, the Chamber of 
Industry and Commerce, the Rosatom Corporation, the Russian Academy 
of Sciences, Gazprom, the SCO Interbank Association, as well as represen-
tatives of the embassies of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and 
Iran, and representatives of oil and gas companies from Russia, Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Iran and European Union countries.
The forum’s agenda included issues on the harmonisation of the Caspian 
states’ economic development, including the development of oil and gas 
transport infrastructure in the countries of the Caspian area, oil and gas 
producing and refining facilities, enhanced investment processes, as well as 
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the implementation of existing agreements and improvement in the interests 
of economic development and ecological security of the region.
Issues of cooperation between all participants of the Caspian Region energy 
market were also discussed during the forum. Leaders and representatives of 
different international organisations will be invited to the talks in the nearest 
future.
ASEAN Economy Ministers discuss issues of boosting economic 
integration
August 26, 2008
Economy Ministers of 10 member states of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) held a meeting on August 26, in Singapore in order 
to discuss issues of boosting economic integration. During the meeting, 
the ministers called ASEAN and its partners to step up settlement of the 
remaining issues on agreements on regional free trade and extensive 
economic partnership.
In accordance with the joint statement, published after the Fortieth Meeting 
of the ASEAN Economic Ministers, the participants underlined the 
importance of observance and timely implementation of measures that are 
foreseen by the plan of establishing ASEAN economic community.
The ministers exchanged opinions on foreign economic relations, including the 
process of negotiations over agreements on regional free trade and extensive 
economic partnership between ASEAN and its partners. The participants 
called ASEAN and its partners to consolidate efforts and show flexibility in 
order to settle the remaining issues at the earliest possible date.
Third EDB conference on Eurasian integration
October 15, 2008
Eurasian Development Bank held a conference on Eurasian integration in 
Almaty, Kazakhstan, on October 15–17, 2008. 
The key issues discussed at the conference included energy sector 
development and water resources, the integration of transport networks, 
institutional and financial issues of transborder infrastructure. A round table 
on the issues of integration processes, measurement, and estimation, was 
held within the conference.
This conference brought together economists, scientists, and experts, as 
well as policymakers from Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan, Belgium, Britain, Germany, China, USA and Switzerland. 
Representatives of the World Bank and Asian Development Bank also took 
part in the conference.
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Economy of Partnership 
October 20, 2008
The regular session of the Governing Council of the United Nations Special 
Programme for the Economies of Central Asia (SPECA), as well as economic 
forums on “investment partnerships for stronger economic cooperation and 
integration in Central Asia” were held in Moscow. Promoting investment 
in transport, energy and water was the main topic for consideration and 
discussions. The meeting also stressed the need for greater cooperation 
between Central Asia and the rest of Asia, in order to find solution to the 
problems of global financial instability, and food and energy insecurity.
Speaking at the session, the Executive Secretary of the United Nations 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UN ESCAP), 
UN Under-Secretary General Noeleen Heyzer briefed participants on UN 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon’s proposal to the UN General Assembly of 
a joint UN ESCAP-UNECE (UN Economic Commission for Europe) office in 
Central Asia within the framework of SPECA.
The UN Economic Commission adopted the United Nations Special 
Programme for Economies of Central Asia for Europe, the United Nations 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, and the leaders of 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in March 1998. Azerbaijan 
and Turkmenistan later joined while Afghanistan has been invited in May 
2005. SPECA aims to strengthen sub-regional cooperation in Central Asia, 
as well as its integration into the world economy. Priority areas of cooperation 
include energy, water resource management, transport infrastructure, and 
border-crossing facilitation.
International Banking Conference of CIS member states in Baku, 
Azerbaijan
October 24-25, 2008
The first International Banking Conference of the CIS member states on the 
“Financial markets of the CIS countries: development and integration” was held 
in Baku on October 23-26 under the sponsorship of the CIS Finance & Banking 
Council, the government of Azerbaijan and the CIS Executive Committee.
About 200 representatives of executive authorities, national commercial 
entities, central and state banks, leading commercial banks, financial and 
investment, as well as rating companies of 11 countries, including 8 CIS 
member states, took part in the conference.
Business agenda and the high level of the conference’s organisation made it 
possible to consider issues of cooperation and integration in financial, banking 
and investment activities of CIS member states. The plenary meetings of the 
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conference focused on discussing the issues of organisational and structural 
support for the banking systems in the context of global liquidity crisis.
Eurasian Energy Summit
December 9-12, 2008
The Eurasian Energy Summit was held on December 9-12, 2008, in 
Shenzhen and Hong Kong. It is the first large scale fuel and energy event 
that focuses on new trends and the development of new trading routes 
for energy industries of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Central Asia and Asia 
Pacific, as well as the establishment of an effective networking platform for 
information exchange between oil, gas and power sector representatives of 
these countries. 
The Summit covered all sectors of the energy industry, with the exception of 
nuclear. It comprised 3 Forums – the Asian Oil and Gas Forum, Coal Forum 
CIS-Asia Pacific and Power and Renewable Energy Forum. The Asian Oil and 
Gas Forum in its turn consisted of specialised oil and gas technology module 
and 3 conferences. An international conference, entitled “Financing of CIS 
Energy and Infrastructural Projects on Asian Stock Markets”, was also held 
within the framework of the Forum.
Financial aspects of oil and gas, coal and power sectors performance in 
conditions of a global financial crisis topped the agenda of the Forum. 
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The size of an economic space 
Nowadays, one of the key motivations for regional integration projects is 
the economic growth which can be generated by the creation of a larger 
economic space. However, large economic areas do not always benefit from 
faster growth. In this paper we address two issues. We begin by examining 
how the size of an economic space influences economic indicators in different 
environments. In particular, we compare the contribution towards growth 
that large economic spaces make within international associations and in the 
context of globalisation. It is critical to understand the factors that influence 
the effectiveness of certain growth mechanisms, depending on how economic 
integration is organised. In other words, the organisation of an economic 
space is one parameter which, together with its size, influences its economic 
variables. A special area of interest for us has been the comparison of various 
types of association which comprise low- and medium-level economies.
The term “economic space” is still vigorously debated in social science circles 
(Biyakov, 2004, 2004а). The “size” of an economic space is another concept 
that is not universally understood. In principle, it is possible to define two 
basic “size” parameters: the geographic size of an integration project and 
the size of the population of the countries involved in the integration. Using 
population to define a region’s size is more readily accepted in economic 
theory, whilst economists rarely consider geographic size. However, we 
believe that another important parameter should be used in assessing the 
size of an economic space, i.e., the intensity of economic activity. This is judged 
on the criteria of percentage of natural resources used (agricultural land, 
water, forests and other areas); able-bodied population as a proportion of the 
total population; quality of education; and IQ levels). Measuring the intensity of 
economic activity allows us to make a more precise comparison of different 
economic spaces using a specific correction factor which reflects both 
quantitative and qualitative characteristics. However, this criterion is not yet 
fully formulated.
Population growth brings a number of advantages to an integration project. 
For example, a large region has greater opportunity for specialisation and 
division of labour based on comparative advantage, which is essential to 
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increasing efficiency. A large region also has more potential consumers, which 
allows economies of scale to be made (Rivera, Romer, 1990). In a larger region, 
there is often greater pressure on businesses to compete, thus reducing 
Х-inefficiency1. In just the same way, a large, politically decentralised region 
can spur competition between jurisdictions, which in turn serves to improve 
the quality of their institutions. The size of a region determines its scope for 
implementing large, labour- and materials-intensive projects. In addition, 
according to the “latest” trade theory, which focuses on the microeconomic 
aspects of international economic relations, the liberation of markets can 
bring about positive change in industrial structure, motivating businesses to 
adapt to stay in the market (Melitz, Ottaviano, 2008). Finally, larger regions 
tend to have a greater availability of highly qualified administrative personnel 
(Briguglio, 1995) – diversity can help to unleash their creative potential and 
foster their professional development.
Covering a large geographic area can be a factor in a region’s growth if that 
region is able to assume a prominent role in the international transport 
system. Another advantage of large regions is that natural disasters affect 
their territory unevenly, and there is always an opportunity to “insure against 
risk” by encouraging unaffected territories to support affected ones2.
However, the economic advantages of large spaces are counterbalanced by 
some significant disadvantages. This mainly concerns geographically large 
regions. The diverse geographic influences which enable regions to spread 
risk are at the same time a source of diverging preferences. Accordingly, it is 
much more difficult to find common solutions, and adaptation costs for certain 
areas may be much higher. In other words, the economic risk associated with 
smaller regions’ restricted ability to insure against risk may be the price to 
pay for avoiding the ’associated with unfavourable decision-making in larger 
regions (Spolaore, 2006). Typically, small countries and regions respond 
rapidly to economic and political change, since their administrative hierarchy 
has fewer levels than large countries. This simplifies the task of formulating 
efficient economic policies for a certain area (Rossi, 1998)3. 
Maintaining the unity of a vast geographic space requires heavy investment, 
for example, in transport infrastructure which connects separate territories, 
or in security and defence against external threats. Countries with a low 
1 X-inefficiency is an evaluation of the reduction of a company’s efficiency in relation to its 
maximum possible efficiency calculated according to the profit maximisation principle.
2 Just as importantly, large regions typically possess vast natural resources. In the neoclassical 
theory, the assumption of zero transaction costs led to the formulation of the so-called 
“unimportance of borders” theorem: the economic growth of regions does not depend on the 
distribution of resources among them. In reality, however, transaction costs are never zero; 
therefore, the geography of natural resources does matter (Nordhaus et al., 2001). 
3 For example, the European Union focuses on the so-called second-tier regions (NUTS 2) 
when selecting priority territories to receive aid. However, distortions occur systematically in 
small third-tier regions (NUTS 3), i.e., aid is provided to fairly prosperous regions, bypassing 
disadvantaged ones (Becker et al., 2008).
Institutions of Integration  
and Economic Space
7Eurasian Development Bank
population density and large geographic area face serious problems. As a rule, 
high population density is a factor in the development and even in the formation 
of states (Rozov, 2002). However, the effect of population density on economic 
growth is complex and depends on a number of institutional parameters. In 
some cases, the size of a state may ultimately become a disadvantage rather 
than an advantage (Hill, Gaddy, 2007, Chapter 2).
Size and integration into the world economy
Our study has concentrated up to now on intra-regional links. But nowadays, 
the development of global economic links has had a significant impact upon 
the ability of large spaces to generate economic growth.
The global market enables even small territories to benefit from economies 
of scale and the comparative advantages of specialisation. The availability of 
natural resources becomes less important since the main resources of the 
global economy are highly mobile. Strong external pressure to compete may 
prove beneficial, acting as a stimulus to regional economies by encouraging 
competition between companies (Srinivasan, 1986) and institutional systems. 
In the context of globalisation, small regions with a relatively homogenous 
population area able to avoid paying the additional cost associated with 
integration (and can even benefit from the effects produced by their larger 
neighbours) (Alesina et al., 2005). However, risks associated with small 
size have now emerged which would not have been present at lower levels 
of microeconomic integration. Small regions (both in terms of population and 
geographic size) often suffer as a result of their narrow export specialisation, 
which increases the volatility of export and tax revenues, restricts saving, 
investment and reduces a region’s ability to pursue an independent economic 
policy. Since there is no “fallback” in the form of a large domestic market, 
improved efficiency becomes the only way to reduce this volatility. Global 
players are less interested in small markets (especially if the market’s small 
size is coupled with high transport costs, as is the case with landlocked 
continental countries), and therefore small markets are less exposed to 
competitive pressure. Some empirical studies demonstrate that foreign trade 
accounts for a comparatively larger share in small countries’ GDP and that, 
particularly in developing economies, export of raw materials dominates the 
foreign trade structure. 
Small countries (with comparable income levels) show comparable degrees of 
specialisation, but this specialisation can vary greatly, providing opportunities 
for the adjustment of development strategies (Perkins and Syrquin, 1978). 
Limited independence in economic policy-making paradoxically combines with 
the so-called “advantage of insignificance”: often the economic regulation 
of small countries or regions is more flexible than that of large economies 
(Armstrong and Read, 2000), allowing them, for example, to formulate 
better offshore strategies. In such cases, even a narrow specialisation, such 
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as tourism, can generate rapid growth (Alvarez-Albelo, Hernandez-Martin, 
2007). 
Nevertheless, large regions enjoy greater advantages: they have ample 
resources for implementing large projects and can withstand the political and 
legal instability to which such projects may be exposed, at lower cost (Barinov, 
2007). This is particularly important in the context of weak global governance: 
every project is exposed to excessive risk, since no “global” insurance or risk 
redistribution schemes exist (one recent example being the financial crisis 
of 2008). The emergence of integration projects and the enlargement of 
economic structures is a signal to foreign investors that a group of countries 
have assumed a clear obligation. In contrast, small countries often lack this 
strength in their relations with other players, and this is an incentive to the 
integration of small countries (Andriamananjara and Schiff, 2001) or of small 
and large regions (Tsoi, 2007). It does not guarantee, however, that small 
countries will survive within such structures (Horn, 2004). 
Literature on the relationship between a country’s size and its economic 
growth is not very informative (neither are studies on other econometric 
aspects of economic growth). 
According to some studies, small regions are characterised by lower levels 
of prosperity and slower growth (Isa, 2003). There are also studies which 
demonstrate that small countries and regions are no different from large 
ones, or at least have not been in recent decades, in terms of their rate of 
growth (Armstrong and Read, 2003, Brandi, 2004). Smaller regions and 
countries may even have a larger GDP (Easterly and Kraay, 2000). 
Growth rates vary more between small countries than between large 
countries, although the latter have a more rapid growth pace on average. 
Notably, small countries provide the most impressive examples of rate of 
growth (Perkins and Syrquin, 1978). 
It is also apparent that the size of a region and its partners are significant. 
Countries which are surrounded by large and open economies tend to have 
a more rapid rate of growth (Vamvakidis, 1998), whilst changes in the 
economic variables of small economies are largely attributable to the influence 
of their neighbour countries (Armstrong and de Kervenoael, 1998). Growth 
in small countries can be associated with opportunities emerging from the 
international division of labour. This is a result of the so-called “spaghetti 
effect” created by the interlocking system of bilateral and multilateral 
agreements (Anderson and Read, 1998). However, in some cases, this 
effect can impede economic growth, if the terms of cooperation and the 
obligations and preferences associated with such interlocking agreements 
contradict rather than complement each other. This effect is especially 
pronounced in developing economies, where existing cooperation 
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agreements often do not cater for their real needs and merely indicate the 
intention to create efficient structures similar to those of developed countries, 
e.g. the EU.
In some sources, it is stressed that the EU has a positive effect on the 
economic growth of its member states in the longer term (Badinger, 2001; 
Brodzicky, 2003, 2005). These studies also examine other integration 
initiatives, concluding that the effects of integration upon low and medium-
level economies depend on the size of the participants (Berthelon, 2004).
In the era of globalisation, the degree of openness of a developing economy 
to the world, ceteris paribus, can: affect its access to foreign technology, 
investment and industrial markets; improve the quality of its education; help 
to establish serial production, etc.. 
It is therefore interesting to analyse how integration groups of different types 
or level of development take advantage of this opportunity. 
Group
Total exports
($ billion)
Exports within  
the group  
($ billion/%%)
Exports to other 
countries
($ billion/%%)
EU 32 301 (7.3) 182 (32.7)
NAFTA 178 902 (3.8) 77 (.2)
ASEAN 770 193 (2.1) 77 (7.9)
MERCOSUR 190 2 (13.7) 1 (8.3)
Andean Group   (7.8) 9 (92.2)
EurAsEC 32 3 (9.9) 32 (90.0)
Тable 3. 1.  
Exports by major 
integration groups  
in 200
Source:  
based on World 
Trade Developments 
in 200. Appendix. 
Table A 3. 
http://www.wto.
org/english/
res_e/statis_e/
its2007_e/its07-
appendix_e.pdf; 
Eurasian Community 
Countries.  
Statistics book.  
M. 2007. p. 107.
The above data require commentary. Firstly, it could be expected a priori 
that highly developed groups are more open to third countries as a result of 
the expansion of trade and investment, sale of patents, intellectual property, 
services (e.g. education), and extensive outsourcing. However, in reality, though 
these groups lead in absolute terms, lower-level groups are slightly ahead 
in comparative terms. Moreover, different groups (in terms of size and level of 
development) may be equally open to the world, but this openness may have 
restrictions: developed countries tend to trade principally within the group, 
whilst developing countries trade mostly with third countries.
Secondly, the fact that trade with third countries dominates the foreign trade 
structure of low and medium-income groups makes these groups more 
sensitive to external influences. As they strive to strengthen their position, 
regional groups of developing countries include in their “integration agenda” 
many social, environmental and security issues. This is quite understandable, 
since, in the absence of adequate protection mechanisms, a high degree of 
openness to external influences can impede economic growth or make it 
biased to one side.
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Thirdly, the fact that ASEAN has the highest index of internal trade among 
groups of developing countries suggests that the size of an internal market, 
territory, etc. should also be viewed as a factor that promotes the interaction 
of members within an integration group. This trend can also be observed in 
developed groups such as the EU or NAFTA.
Finally, since the 2008 financial crisis, large regional groups will play an 
increasingly important role in the regulation of the world economy, as the 
reform of the Bretton Woods currency system progresses; they will take 
over those decision-making functions which global institutions failed to 
perform adequately. This in turn will draw greater attention to the interaction 
and conflict between regionalism and multilateralism. This trend may result in 
the emergence of several regional financial centres and strengthen regional 
currencies.
Organisational models of an economic space
As demonstrated above, the size of an economic space can have different 
effects on its economic growth. However, there is at least one more 
parameter which is important to any evaluation of the influence of the size of 
an economic space upon its economic growth – that is, the organisation of 
an economic space. Below we discuss the most important characteristics of 
different organisational models. 
The main purpose of integration is to weaken or eliminate the economic 
boundaries which restrict the distribution of benefits or means of production. 
These boundaries are not always purely legal ones; they can be a product of 
the technological or geographical peculiarities of certain countries or even 
provinces (Pelkmans, 2008). Based on this assumption, each organisational 
model has an agent for the elimination of barriers. This agent does not 
necessarily work to redistribute benefits; its role may be to create favourable 
conditions for various other economic agents, e.g., by abolishing customs 
duties or improving internal transport routes. The creation of a common 
market in Russia (at least in its European part) in the 19th century was clearly 
associated with the development of a railway network rather than by a revision 
of political boundaries (Metzer, 1974). 
We have identified six organisational models for economic space, depending 
on what acts the agent. Government agencies take on this role in three of the 
models, and the private sector in the other three:
• common centre model: the main integration force is a supranational body 
or a central government not associated with any particular area;
• international agreements model: barriers are eliminated by territorial 
governments pursuant to agreements;
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• dominant player model: barriers are eliminated by one territorial government 
(e.g., the government of a particular area or country) which has authority 
over the other players;
• corporate investment model: the main integration agents are major 
corporations which create region-wide production networks;
• informal trade model: the main integration forces are informal networks 
comprising entrepreneurs and traders who partially operate in the shadow 
economy; 
• informal rules model: integration is fostered by common informal rules 
which are deliberately imposed by a private sector player in order to 
organise economic interaction between separate areas.
Each of these models has a long history in both national and international 
contexts. 
Historically, the common-centre model has been associated with so-called 
“military regionalism”, a political structure that prevailed across the world 
until the 19th century. The Roman, Chinese and Persian empires are typical 
examples of this (Tavares, 2004). Today, this type of integration can be found 
in the majority of unitary and federal states which pursue a common national 
policy. At the international level, the only structure that resembles the 
common centre model is the EU. In reality, however, the interests of particular 
countries or regions can be said to be “common national” or “European” 
interests. There is no clear boundary between the common-centre and 
dominant-player models, and in many cases the position of the centre is not 
necessarily dictated by any one region.
The international-agreements model by definition requires the participation 
of several national governments; this is a new development in world history 
(Kaspe, 2007). Although free trade agreements did exist in ancient times, 
they were very limited. This model was first used on a meaningful scale in the 
19th century (the customs union of Sweden and Norway in 1874–1900, etc.). 
Today, this model is the basis for most regional economic integration projects 
involving developing countries, e. g., MERCOSUR, ASEAN and others. On the 
other hand, this model is implemented by associations of regions existing in 
several federations like Switzerland, Canada or Russia.
The dominant-player model first appeared in formal and informal “international 
hierarchies” (Lake, 2009) and is carefully discussed in the hegemonic 
stability literature of international political economy. It can be identified, for 
example, in the Roman republic that extended its control throughout the 
Mediterranean and in the European colonial empires that existed until the 
mid-20th century. This model can be based on both formal domination and 
“unequal treaties” which were widely used by the great powers to establish 
control over the outlying parts of their empire. It is extremely difficult to 
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distinguish any boundaries between the forms of “indirect rule”, upon which 
an empire as a political organisation relies. The creation of a dominant 
player can itself be a manifestation of an integration model: each colonial 
empire “created” a dominant nation at its core (Miller, 2008). Generally, 
the process of developing such a model is very complex. For example, the 
Spanish empire resulted from the actions of many population groups rather 
than of the Castilians alone (Kamen, 2007), and the resulting conventions 
for redistributing benefits developed largely through bargaining between the 
imperial and colonial elites (Grafe and Irigoin, 2007).
Today, integration driven by a dominant player is frequently employed in the 
financial sector: politicians in France and the EU, for example, are showing 
a keen interest in African currency unions. Examples outside the currency 
sphere are the German customs unions (Zollverein) which formed around 
Prussia in the 19th century and the South African Customs union (SACU), 
one of the world’s oldest economic integration projects (Hancock, 2008). The 
recently established network of EU-centred agreements in the Eastern Europe 
and Northern Africa (EU Neighbourhood Policy, Mediterranean Union etc.) 
also clearly belong to this group. In some cases, this model can be identified in 
federal states, such as the German empire of the 19th century led by Prussia, 
or the Argentinian Confederation, dominated by the province of Buenos Aires. 
As a rule, such federations proved to be very unstable or metamorphosed into 
other structures based on the common-centre model (e.g., in Argentina, the 
victory of Buenos Aires triggered the shift to a common national centre).
Various forms of the informal integration which do not involve the public sector 
have long existed in the world economy. They include the informal-trade model, 
one of the oldest forms of integration, which probably preceded the emergence 
of states (Webb, 1974). It lay at the heart of many ancient civilisations, trade 
networks and gateway communities (i.e., areas that specialised in transit 
within various trading systems (Hirth, 1978). In Europe, certain elements 
of this model existed long before the Roman empire (Grantham, 2006). The 
informal-integration model is exceptionally robust: given the right technological 
and geographic conditions, it can successfully withstand the pressure of 
an antagonistic institutional climate. Even strict state regulation does not 
always check the development of informal integration. Thus, the Byzantine 
empire essentially became a centre of world trade in spite of the position of its 
authorities (Guillou, 2005). African countries exemplify this integration model 
in the modern world (Oculi, 2005).
The corporate-investment model is more sensitive to state regulation than 
the informal model. Historically, it was first embodied by the chartered 
corporations of the colonial era which acted jointly with governments and 
even performed governmental functions in the regions they controlled. Today, 
the scale of corporate investment enables companies to substitute formal 
integration processes to a certain degree. Classic examples of this model are 
Institutions of Integration  
and Economic Space
73Eurasian Development Bank
Japanese investments in Southeast Asia (Kawai, 2007) and investments by 
US companies in Mexico before NAFTA.
Finally, the informal-rules model combines the features of state domination 
and informal integration, i.e., it is driven by private sector players which exert 
influence on the integration process not through trade or investment but by 
imposing common standards and rules as a means of surmounting economic 
barriers. Surprisingly, a typical example of such a player is the Roman Catholic 
Church in medieval Europe. Its activities ultimately assisted the adoption of 
common rules and encouraged contact and interaction between European 
countries, i.e., it effectively fostered economic integration (McCarthy, 1992). 
This model also includes some lex mercatoria institutions, i.e., non-government 
regulations applied to international trade, such as international accounting 
standards (Nolke, 2003).
The organisation of an economic space and its growth
How do the above integration models influence the growth of an economic 
space? Answering this question, in our opinion, requires an understanding of 
the following three points. 
Firstly, different models have different chances of success depending on 
local conditions. If a model is selected with no regard for the region’s political, 
economic or institutional conditions, attempts to create a large economic 
space are doomed to failure. This explains why so many international 
integration projects throughout the world do not succeed. Practically all 
integration models face the same issues. In many cases, the efficacy of a 
particular model can be assessed only when different approaches to it begin 
to conflict. The format of an international agreement can determine the 
potential size of the economic space it creates; thus, the international 
agreements model is typically more effective if the number of participants 
is kept small. The dominant-player and common-centre models are very 
sensitive to the military and political situation as they affect the distribution 
of power and internal structures of countries within a region (McGuire, 2002; 
Lal, 2007). The degree of negative or positive integration largely depends on 
the selected model4. The institutional environment and other factors, such 
as the cost of reaching consensus or the heterogeneity of the participants’ 
interests, also play an extremely important role. 
Secondly, all models can, to a greater or lesser extent, be used to promote 
“quasi-integration”, i.e., an imitation of integration activity which will never 
result in the creation of a truly integrated space. Quasi-integration is typically 
masked with political rhetoric and used by the elite and their opposition as 
4 Negative integration means removing international barriers to the exchange of goods, ser-
vices, capital or labour. Positive integration means creating a common regulatory system and 
harmonising economic policies.
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a tool in their internal political struggle. Large corporations may champion 
quasi-integration with a view to securing access to government resources 
or subsidies, improving their image, achieving their political ambitions, or even 
protecting themselves against competition from third countries. In African 
countries, quasi-integration provides employment for a host of qualified 
administrators and consultants who have failed to find jobs in either the public 
or private sector (Shams, 2005). 
Notwithstanding intentional quasi-integration, any integration project may 
have other goals besides the creation of a large economic space (Libman, 
2006). Some do promote economic growth by creating conditions in which 
the internal institutions of particular countries or regions can improve. Others 
turn out to be detrimental to the economy irrespective of their declared 
ambitions for foreign trade. Moreover, some players may attempt to take 
the lead and change the integration model, which can result in a loss of 
momentum. If informal integration works to intensify competition between 
countries by promoting economic and social links between them, then, as 
demonstrated historically, it can become a real source of economic growth5 
as governments attempt to implement the international-agreements model 
or even the common-centre model in order to eliminate competition. However, 
in the latter case, there is a risk that economic growth will slow down (Chu, 
2008).
Thirdly, the dominant player has various integration mechanisms at its 
disposal. According to the ordoliberal theory, integration necessitates some 
degree of coordination of the individual plans of many economic agents. 
Karl Polanyi proposed probably the most comprehensive classification of 
integration in society by defining three methods: exchange, redistribution and 
reciprocity (Polanyi, 2002)6. Each of them relies on a specific institutional 
environment which translates a particular activity into a system of economic 
integration: the market system, the common redistribution centre and the 
symmetric groups system. It is difficult to find true distinctions between these 
ideal methods of integration: in reality, exchange is rarely equal, and unequal 
exchange can become an indirect method of redistribution where a market 
only has a specific control function as an alternative to direct hierarchy (Oleinik, 
2008). Likewise, redistribution can be just a disguise for a bargaining system, 
for example, between different ministries or lobbies. Different methods of 
integration often co-exist in society.
5 Prime examples are politically divided but economically integrated Central Europe until the 
early 19th century (Volckart, 1999), and the whole of Western Europe in the Middle Ages (van 
der Beek, 2007).
6 A similar approach based on the comparison of exchange, power and gifts was described by 
Fransois Perroux. To Polanyi, “market” is a specific institutional system or simply an “exchange 
practice”. In this respect, we use the initial classification freely and equate “market” with “ex-
change”, as economists normally do.
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According to Polanyi, not every method of integration (i.e., integration models, 
as we define them) suits the practitioners. Whilst an exchange of gifts is 
possible at an international level (Polanyi quotes lend-lease as an example), 
it is incompatible with the common-centre and dominant-player models, in 
which gifts are substituted for patron relationships (Barsukova, 2004). It must 
be stressed that integration based on exchange does not preclude the state 
acting as an important player; the latter must perform its intrinsic function to 
create the conditions for markets and competition to operate.
The common-centre model can be based on either “supporting markets” or 
redistribution, and this distinction was well understood even in ancient times. 
The integration of the early Roman empire was based on a system of markets 
within which exchange between provinces was organised (Temin, 2001; 
2001a; Kessler, Temin, 2005) and redistribution served only to maintain 
high living standards in the capital. In the late Roman empire, however, 
redistribution was more dominant; Byzantium inherited this pattern, albeit 
in a much more complex form (Bang, 2007). In imperial China, despite 
the frequently held misconception, redistribution existed alongside highly 
developed exchange systems. The ratio between them changed from time to 
time depending on prosperity levels and periodic attempts by the government 
to tighten economic regulation (Feuerwerker, 1984; Li, 2000; Deng, 2003; 
Shiue, Keller, 2006). China also was involved in exchange networks that 
existed in Eurasia (Zurndorfer, 2004). In the Aztec empire, an extensive 
market system co-existed with redistribution mechanisms (Sinopoli, 1994), 
whereas in the Inca empire (Berezkin, 1991) and many other tributary states 
redistribution systems were more dominant (Patterson, 2005). The situation 
in ancient Egypt developed in the same way (Balatsky, Yekimova, 2006). 
As a rule, in the international-agreements model, the main focus is on 
supporting markets by jointly removing barriers to trade (in other words, 
granting access to each other’s markets). It is very difficult to maintain a 
long-term redistribution coalition between several states; however, such 
examples do exist. The dominant-player model can be used equally for 
redistribution or for maintaining open markets (the latter often turns out 
to be a system of redistribution in favour of the dominant player). All three 
informal integration models are by implication compatible with exchange 
systems, but can also serve to redistribute, provided that the key players 
occupy monopolistic positions. Throughout the Middle Ages, guilds would act 
either as agents of market integration or as monopolies which supported 
redistribution, depending on the period. The early involvement of colonies in 
world markets was principally a result of the emergence of redistribution 
systems within them (Latov, 2003), and chartered corporations in many 
cases acted as monopolists seeking rent (Jones and Wille, 1996; Carlos 
and Nicholas, 1996; Adams, 1996). Finally, the internal corporate markets 
of international corporations can be considered as a form of informal 
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integration serving both redistribution (if transactions between branches 
are purely formal and are made solely to optimise their tax position) and 
exchange (if internal prices act as a stimulus).
According to Polanyi, all methods of integration promote the division of 
labour, and are thus sources of economic growth. However, their 
comparative efficiency, especially in terms of market exchange and 
redistribution, is not uniform. Redistribution is required for implementing 
large projects, but any government interference limits opportunities for 
a spontaneous search for optimum solutions (“competition as a method of 
learning”) and creates many opportunities to seek rent. Excessive geographic 
redistribution can reduce the efficiency of an economic system (Rosselo, 
2003). On the other hand, the need for integration itself may be caused 
by redistribution (Rehme, 2006), and redistribution may prove to be the 
only integration tool available in a given institutional environment (although, 
in reality, defining an institutional framework can be a very complex task). 
Finally, the negative effects of large-scale redistribution may automatically 
diminish as the size of an economic space increases (Salmond, 2006).
The characteristics of the post-Soviet space
The need to create a larger economic space in order to speed up growth is 
an argument common to every discussion of the integration of post-Soviet 
countries. Meanwhile, a number of regional integration models have evolved in 
these countries during the two decades of independence, and all these models 
are functioning more of less successfully (see Table 3.2). 
Model Example Efficiency
Common centre Certain countries in the region Comparatively low in the 1990s, generally high at present
International agreements CIS Low
Dominant player
The “rouble zone” in the beginning of the 
1990s; EurAsEC and the union state 
of Russia and Belarus with unequal 
redistribution of powers can be viewed as 
a transitional phase between this model 
and the international agreements model 
(Hancock, 2007)
Low
Informal trade
Informal trade networks in Central Asian 
and Caucasian countries and border 
regions
Comparatively high in certain 
sub-regions of the CIS
Corporate investments
International financial and industrial 
groups in the 1990s, expansion of 
Russian, Kazakh, Azerbaijani and 
Ukrainian international companies
Increasing (since 2000)
Informal regulation Eurasian Transport Union, International Association of Stock Exchanges of the CIS Medium
Тable 3. 2.  
The efficiency of 
various integration 
models in post-
Soviet countries 
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The efficiency of a particular model should not be used to assess its impact 
on economic growth, and researchers’ opinions on this issue diverge 
greatly (Libman, 2007). In this section we will describe the simplest method 
of evaluating the effect of the size of a potential country pair in the CIS on 
these countries’ economic growth. Our assessment is based on the method 
proposed by Spolaore and Wacziarg (2005) and examines only two 
consequences: the elimination of barriers to trade and influence on trade 
flows to or from third countries. Therefore, it is less informative than more 
complex models such as CGE or inter-industry balance which have been 
employed in a number of studies dedicated to the post-Soviet space 
(Klotsvog, Sukhotin, Chernova, 2008; Silamaa, Wildgren, 2003) but is quite 
satisfactory for approximate estimates. This method is based on simultaneous 
comparison of a system of equations (in our case, having a limited sample, we 
assess the so-called “seemingly unrelated regressions” (SURE), thus ignoring 
the issue of endogeneity:
Oat = α0 + α1 log(Sat) + α2 Wat + vat              (1)
Gat =β0 + β1 log(yat) + β2 Oat + β3 log(Sat) + β4 Oat log(Sat) + β5 Zat + εat  (2),
where 
• a = a country 
• t = time period for panel data (due to the limited observable period we 
assess regression based on cross-sectional data) 
• y = per capita GDP
• O = openness of the economy (share of trade in GDP)
• S = size of a country (in our case, population)
• G = GDP growth rate
• Z and W = vectors of control variables (in our case, ‘W’ includes the 
geographic area of a country, initial per capita GDP, a dummy variable 
for exporters of oil and gas (Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan) and a dummy variable for landlocked countries (not 
including Caspian and Aral countries), and ‘Z’ includes initial per capita 
GDP, share of public expenditure in GDP, share of investments in GDP and 
a dummy variable for exporters of oil and gas)
• v and ε = error terms. 
Therefore, the increase in the rate of growth of country A after integration 
with country B (in percentage points) can be calculated as:
Δ = log(Smt / Sat)( β3 + β2 α1 + β4 α0 + β4 α1 log(Smt Sat) + β4 α2 Wat)  (3),
Institutions of Integration 
and Economic Space
Alexander Libman, Leon Zevin “Integrating Regional Space:  
New Opportunities for Economic Growth”
78 Eurasian Development Bank
EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook 2009
where ‘m’ – the index of an “integrated” region, i.e., includes all countries. In 
other words, we are able to calculate, for example, by how many percentage 
points the GDP growth of, say, Russia will increase (or decrease) after its 
integration with Ukraine (the effect of creating a larger market being the 
only criterion considered). We use average figures between 1995 and 2003 
taken from the following sources: openness, share of public expenditure in GDP 
and share of investments in GDP (%) – from Penn World Tables; population 
(‘000 people) and initial per capita GDP ($, 1990) – from Groningen Growth 
and Development Centre Total Economy Database. Our analysis includes 
ten post-Soviet countries (no data on Turkmenistan is available, and Georgia 
left the CIS). Average growth rates for 1990-2007 were taken from the 
EBRD Transition Report. The results are summarised in Table 3.3.
Country B
Country A
Azerbaijan –1.2 –0.08 –0. –0.9 –0.83 –0.01 –0.37 –0.13 –0.02
Armenia –0.1 –0.09 –0.23 –0.0 –0.9 –0.01 –0.28 –0.07 –0.01
Belarus –1.27 –1. –0. –0.9 –0.8 –0.02 –0.3 –0.1 –0.02
Kazakhstan –1.8 –1.2 0.07 –0.1 –0.78 –0.02 –0.22 –0.1 –0.01
Kyrgyzstan –0.8 –1.2 –0.10 –0.33 –0.73 –0.01 –0.3 –0.09 –0.01
Moldova –0.79 –1.21 –0.10 –0.31 –0.0 –0.01 –0.33 –0.09 –0.01
Russia –0.8 2.09 3.37 0.2 2.9 2.71 3.0 1.1 0.90
Tajikistan –0.98 –1.3 –0.10 –0.0 –0.7 –0.80 –0.01 –0.11 –0.02
Uzbekistan –1. –1.18 0.33 –0.7 –0.3 –0.2 –0.03 0.07 0.02
Ukraine –1.7 –0.3 1.09 –0.8 0.9 0.29 –0.0 0.93 0.0
All countries in the 
region
0.2 .0 .0 1.11 .8 .3 0.0 .30 1.90 1.11
Тable 3. 3.  
Change in GDP 
growth of country 
A after integration 
with country B (in 
percentage points) 
As we had anticipated, integration mainly benefits small and slow-growing 
countries. Integration with Russia is beneficial for all countries except 
Azerbaijan which is growing exceptionally rapidly. Desirable partners 
for Belarus are Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan; for Kyrgyzstan, 
Uzbekistan and Moldova – Ukraine; for Tajikistan – Ukraine and Uzbekistan; 
and for Ukraine – Uzbekistan. Russia does not benefit from integration, and 
shows a slight slowing in the rate of growth of its GDP. 
The inability to demonstrate any benefit using the above model should in no 
way be viewed as a demerit. Firstly, we take into account a very limited range 
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of growth factors; secondly, we ignore all other objectives of integration even 
though these may also be desirable; and, thirdly, we do not analyse integration 
of many countries. Russia derives a 0.06 percentage point increase in its GDP 
growth as a result of integration with all nine countries in the region (and this 
is beneficial to all the stakeholders). It would appear that, in order to generate 
significant growth, the vast Russian market needs a relatively large partner, 
and this role is now being assumed by the whole region. The results of 
our analysis lead us to question the advantage of bilateral initiatives over 
multilateral ones. The former may seem more realistic, but will they really 
provide Russia with the desired return in the longer term? In our calculations, 
however, the whole region represents a “fake” partner for Russia; if it were 
“real”, the regression coefficients and, accordingly, the results, would be 
different.
* * *
In this paper we attempted to study the effects the size of an economic 
space has on its economic growth. These effects are not uniform: large 
economic spaces have their advantages and disadvantages. Globalisation 
does not necessarily limit the advantages of large economies; it changes the 
nature and range of opportunities available to both large and small regions 
to accelerate their economic growth. We have analysed here only the overall 
economic dynamics, ignoring the effect that integration has on the rate of 
growth in particular areas of an economic space, or in particular industries. 
We have also ignored the problem of convergence. The performance of an 
economic space is determined not only by its size, but also by the way it is 
organised. We have defined here six organisational models which can be 
found in different parts of the world, including the post-Soviet countries. The 
efficacy of each model depends on its ability to support a full-scale integration 
project, avoid the trap of quasi-integration, and maintain the required balance 
between market exchange and redistribution. Finally, we attempted to 
provide a quantitative assessment of the size effect produced by the 
integration of particular pairings of post-Soviet countries. The latter, of 
course, is a simple statistical exercise and not a tool to be used to formulate 
recommendations; however, we believe that such a preliminary assessment 
may be of interest. 
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Introduction
Regional cooperation has long been seen as an instrument for promoting 
economic growth and political stability around the globe. The successful 
integration of Europe under the umbrella of the European Union (EU) after 
centuries of wars on the European continent has been a great beacon of hope 
for many developing countries and regions that have sought to avoid regional 
conflict and to exploit the opportunities to create prosperity through regional 
cooperation and economic integration.1
In the early decades after World War II much of the regional cooperation 
among developing countries was driven either by efforts to protect regional 
markets from international competition or by the need to grapple with the 
fallout of decolonisation, which led to the disintegration of integrated colonial 
economic regions, especially in Africa. In recent decades, in contrast, regional 
cooperation efforts have more commonly followed the premise of “new 
regionalism”, which postulates that regional cooperation should be designed 
to help countries not only integrate with each other, but also with the rest of 
the world. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990, the newly independent 
republics of the Former Soviet Union faced problems of political and economic 
disintegration on a huge scale. While early efforts were made by the new 
countries to maintain cooperative arrangements to prevent economic 
disintegration, these were not successful, most notably the failure of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to maintain open borders, trade, 
 The Experience with Regional 
Economic Cooperation 
Organisations:  
Lessons for Central Asia
* This paper draws on Linn J. and Pidufala O. (2008) The Experience with Regional Econom-
ic Cooperation Organisations: Lessons for Central Asia, Wolfensohn Centre for Development 
Working Paper 4, October. The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC. Available at http://www.
brookings.edu/papers/2008/10_carec_integration_linn.aspx 
1 We refer to “regional integration” as the process of establishing economic linkages (trade, 
capital flows, migration, etc.) among countries, while we use the term “regional cooperation” to 
refer to governmental (and where appropriate non-governmental) institutional mechanisms 
that support the integration process.
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transport and capital mobility. Since then, various efforts have been made in 
different parts of the Former Soviet Union to forge improved economic links 
through sub-regional cooperative arrangements. Among these the most 
notable for Central Asian countries are the Eurasian Economic Community 
(EurasEC), the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the Central Asia 
Regional Economic Cooperation Programme (CAREC).
The purpose of this note is to survey the experience with regional 
organisations in developing countries and to draw lessons which can be 
helpful for Central Asia, and specifically for the participants in CAREC. We 
found that the literature on regional organisations is quite limited. There 
appear to be few thorough evaluations of specific regional organisations that 
are publicly available. Our note does not purport to fill this gap in the literature. 
It represents a brief summary of lessons from the experience based on the 
limited information that we were able to access.
A Typology of Regional Organisations
Regional organisations differ by the focus they have, the functions they are 
mandated to carry out, their form of organisation, the operational modalities 
that they employ and their membership. We briefly describe each of these 
dimensions, which together define a typology of regional organisations. 
Focus: Most regional organisations have a mandate to support regional 
integration, but this is not always the case. They may focus on preservation of 
mutual security or on support for the development in each country.
Function: Regional organisations pursue specific functions, including 
cooperation in security and political aspects, trade, infrastructure, finance 
and socio-economic aspects (including health, education and science), or they 
can be comprehensive in pursuing groups or all of these functions. 
Organisational form: Regional organisations are either formal, i.e., treaty-
based or based on other formal legal agreements, or they are informal 
programmes and forums where participants cooperate on the basis of looser 
understandings. They may operate as financial institutions with their own 
financial resources and instruments. Finally, they function at a level of heads-
of state, at ministerial level or at the level of senior officials.
Operational modalities: Regional organisations may operate in an advisory 
capacity, and they may carry regulatory and financing responsibilities. They 
can have arbitration or enforcement mechanisms that allow them to ensure 
disagreements among members are arbitrated or binding commitments are 
complied with. 
Membership: The membership consists only of countries belonging to a 
particular region, or it may include members from outside the region as 
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GMS     Informal Summit/ Ministrial
Adv./fin./
reg.
 regional 
countries, ADB
MRC  Water Envi-ronm. Informal Senior Off. 
Adv./fin./
reg.
 regional 
countries
ASEAN       Treaty Summit Adv./reg. 10 reg. coun-tries
EU       Treaty Summit Adv./fin./reg. 
 27 region. 
countries
Stab. Pact     Informal Ministerial Adv./fin./reg.
 9 regional 
coutries 31 
countr. 
/ intern. orgs.
IIRSA   Informal Senior Off. Adv./fin. 12 regional countries
MERCOSUR   Treaty Ministerial Adv./fin./reg.
  full,  assoc. 
reg. coutries
CAF   Treaty Senior Off. Financing
1 reg.,  
1 non-reg. 
countries
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SCO      Treaty Summit Adv./(reg.)   regional countries
EurAsEC    Treaty Summit Adv./reg.    regional countries
EDB     Treaty Senior Off. Financing   regional countries
ECO    Treaty Ministerial Adv./reg.  10 regional countries
CAREC     Informal Ministerial
Advisory/ 
financing/ 
regulatory
8 regional 
countries, 
 multilat. 
institns.
SPECA     Informal Senior Off. Adv./reg./(fin.)
  regional 
countries, 2 
UN agencies
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Тable 4. 1. Key Dimensions of Regional Organisations Involving Central Asian Countries
Source: Authors’ compilation
Тable 4. 2. Key Dimensions of Regional Organisations in Other Regions
Source: Authors’ compilation
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well as supra-regional, multilateral institutions. Many regional organisations 
allow observers. 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show how various regional organisations in Central Asia, 
South-East Asia, Europe and Latin America compare across these multiple 
dimensions. For membership of each organisation listed see the text box. 
Performance of Regional Organisations in Central Asia
As noted earlier, thorough evaluations of individual organisations are rare, 
with the exception of analyses of the performance of the EU. Therefore, a 
summary evaluation of the performance of regional organisations by necessity 
has to be tentative. 
In presenting such an assessment it is important to bear in mind the 
different goals, functions and instrumentalities that characterise the regional 
organisations we have reviewed above. No regional organisation is like 
another. Each has its own combination of characteristics and needs to be 
evaluated on its own terms. 
In Central Asia, SCO has succeeded in providing a forum for regional leaders 
to discuss common border, security and (less so) economic issues. Progress 
with settling outstanding disputes over border alignment was one area of 
clear success. For China and Russia SCO provided a forum for developing a 
common position on non-intervention by outside powers in the region. For 
China it also provided reassurance that separatist movements in its Western 
province of Xinxiang would not receive shelter and support in neighboring 
countries. Common military exercises may have strengthened the military 
readiness of members of SCO. On the other hand, in the economic area, and 
also in the area of coordinated control over drug trafficking, SCO so far has 
had little impact.
EurAsEC provides a forum among the leaders of its member countries to 
discuss and build trust around potentially contentious and disruptive issues, 
including water resource sharing, visas and treatment of migrants from 
member countries. However, overall EurAsEC has not so far managed to 
develop into a strong organisation promoting regional cooperation. One 
of its main goals, the creation of a customs union among its members, has 
not been accomplished. EurasEC also has had little impact so far in creating 
regional infrastructure or in addressing key regional water issues. With the 
recent creation of the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB), which has grown 
quickly as an organisation and acquired considerable technical expertise 
in its management and staff, EurAsEC may have acquired the financing 
instrument it needs to become more effective.
The track records of the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) and the 
Special Programme for the Economies of Central Asia (SPECA) have been 
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weak. ECO’s goals for regional trade integration and trade facilitation have 
shown virtually no progress, at least as far as Central Asian countries are 
concerned. SPECA, over its wide range of functional areas, has also had no 
significant impact according to an evaluation carried out on behalf of its own 
governing body, but it has since made an effort to reform and increase its 
effectiveness. 
Finally, CAREC has made progress in a number of areas, including the 
development of a Comprehensive Action Plan, a regional transport and 
trade facilitation strategy, an active electricity regulators’ forum, and the 
implementation of a number of cross-border infrastructure projects funded 
by the multilateral institutions that participate in CAREC. CAREC is unique 
among regional organisations reviewed here, since it fosters not only 
cooperation among participating countries but also has been a mechanism 
for facilitating coordination among the multilateral institutions, which 
traditionally have not cooperated closely in most of their operational activities. 
Nevertheless, at this stage CAREC’s success depends critically on the 
effective implementation of its new sector strategies and of the newly 
established “CAREC Institute”, which is to support training, research and 
outreach on regional cooperation in Central Asia.
In sum, in the economic sphere Central Asia so far lacks a strong regional 
cooperation mechanism although the strengthening of EurasEC with the 
creation of EDB, the progress made by CAREC and efforts to rejuvenate 
SPECA hold some promise of improved regional cooperation. However, as 
we will discuss further below, the multiplicity of regional organisation with 
overlapping, but differing memberships creates its own problems and will 
require cooperation among regional organisations.
Performance of Regional Organisations in the Rest  
of the World
The most successful regional organisation in recent history no doubt is 
the European Union, in terms of creating political cohesion and stability, 
developing organisational capacity and financing instruments, and fostering 
economic prosperity overall and convergence in living standards among 
member countries. The EU has been remarkably successful in expanding 
its membership while also expanding the range of functions over which 
cooperation takes place and for which common laws and standards apply, 
including borderless travel, a common currency, etc. However, the process 
has taken a long time and many observers, and indeed many citizens in the 
member countries, feel that there remain significant weaknesses. Not only 
do some of the common features (borderless travel, common currency) not 
apply to all members, but an EU constitution remains elusive, the EU lacks a 
common foreign policy, its decision making process is cumbersome, 
and its executive body, the European Commission, is seen by the public 
Institutions of Integration  
and Economic Space
89Eurasian Development Bank
overwhelmingly as an intrusive, cumbersome and unaccountable 
bureaucracy.
The Stability Pact for South East Europe, which was formed after the Balkan 
wars of the early 1990s, has been reasonably successful measured against 
the mandate it was given: building trust within the region, helping countries 
prepare for eventual EU accession, coordinating among international donors 
and among governmental and non-governmental organisations, especially 
in regard to trade and trade facilitation. One of the major reasons for the 
success of the Stability Pact was the pull exerted by the expectation of 
progress towards EU membership among the participating countries; other 
factors were the financial and technical support provided by the EU and by 
the International Financial Institutions, and the dynamic leadership by the 
successive heads of the Stability Pact.
In Asia, Greater Mekong Subregion Programme (GMS) and the Mekong River 
Commission (MRC) have on the whole successfully delivered on their narrow 
mandates (respectively, investment in regional infrastructure development 
and water resource development and protection). The Asian Development 
Bank’s lead role in GMS, supported by China, was certainly a factor in keeping 
the programme on track. 
The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has a much broader 
membership and mandate and a long and somewhat uneven history. In its 
early years it pursued a regional programme of large industrial projects for 
South East Asia that was not successful and was eventually abandoned. In 
contrast, its trade liberalization efforts were more successful and were 
one factor contributing to the rapid export growth of its member countries. 
The Asian financial crisis of 1997/98, during which ASEAN was not able 
to provide effective remedies, led to a reassessment of its governance 
and organisational structure, and to a broadening of its regional coverage 
for certain aspects (especially financial crisis prevention) in the context of 
the ASEAN+3 framework. The Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) was organised in 
2000 to allow for regional multilateral swap arrangements with which to 
supplement other international financial crisis management mechanisms. 
A lack of a strong secretariat, of own financial resources and of a dispute 
settlements process have limited ASEAN’s ability to pursue a strongly 
proactive regional cooperative agenda. However, ASEAN none-the-less was 
able to serve as a forum for discussion and negotiation among the member 
countries and helped sustain regional stability and trust among member 
countries.
In Latin America, the Andean Development Corporation (CAF) is generally 
regarded as a great success story, not only because of its phenomenal loan 
growth over the last ten years, but also because it excels in the simplicity, 
low administrative burden and speed with it processes loan applications. This 
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in turn may be linked to the fact that CAF is principally owned and managed 
by countries from the region itself and that it has been led by a very dynamic 
president. The Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America 
(IIRSA) also contributed to the development of regional infrastructure in South 
America. In contrast to the generally successful performance of CAF, the 
Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) has a more ambiguous record. 
It has failed to make sustained progress in regional trade liberalization and 
macroeconomic policy coordination in the face of political and economic 
uncertainties and tensions in the region. 
In Africa, many sub-regional organisations have been created since 
independence, with the goal of creating more efficient and competitive 
economic spaces in the fractured post-colonial patchwork of African 
countries’ borders. With some exceptions these efforts focused principally 
on trade, and only secondarily on infrastructure and financial integration. 
However, progress has been at best modest, and more often very limited. 
There are however some notable exceptions of successful regional 
cooperation in specific areas, most notably the River Blindness Eradication 
Programme in West Africa, the Africa Hydropower Development 
Programme involving three countries in the Senegal River Basin and the 
Lake Victoria Environmental Management Programme. 
The Arab experience of decades of regional cooperation efforts has been 
characterized by the creation of many overlapping bodies (similar to what 
has more recently happened in Central Asia), by political tensions among 
members and by volatility of financial resource flows (often linked to volatile 
oil revenues). Its principal development banks and funds, moreover, were 
focused less on supporting integration in the region, but more on supporting 
development in Islamic countries generally. As a result the benefits from 
regional cooperation and integration in the Arab world were much less than 
might have been possible, as successive UNDP Arab Human Development 
Reports have pointed out.
In South Asia regional integration efforts have been very limited to date, 
with the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and 
the South Asia Preferential Trade Agreement the only examples worthy of 
note involving more than two countries. However, the results of these two 
initiatives have been modest. One special case, particularly of relevance for 
Central Asia is the Indus River Treaty in 1960 and establishment of the Indus 
River Commission with the support of the World Bank. The treaty led to a 
durable sharing of Indus River waters between the otherwise hostile neighbors 
India and Pakistan. 
In sum, the EU is clearly an outlier of success among regional cooperation 
efforts around the globe, but there are a handful of other success stories of 
regional cooperation in the developing countries, esp. in Southeast Asia and in 
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Latin America. The question for Central Asian regional cooperation efforts in 
general, and for CAREC in particular, then is what are the key lessons that can 
be learned from the worldwide experience with regional cooperation.
Seven Key Lessons on Regional Economic Cooperation
Lesson 1: Regional cooperation is not easy and implementation of stated 
intentions is frequently weak. 
International experience shows that despite their leaders’ often stated 
ambitions to develop regional cooperation schemes, few countries are willing 
to share sovereignty, and that it is not easy to develop the sense of trust that 
is needed to embark on and stick with serious cooperation efforts. As a result, 
many regional organisations are weak and regional cooperation initiatives are 
poorly implemented. It helps if: 
• countries have clearly shared interests and clear ownership of the;
• an external or third-party honest broker assists with the cooperation 
process;
• countries have come out of a shared crisis or conflict that drives home the 
need to cooperate for future conflict avoidance;
• financial resources are available to help provide incentives for cooperation;
• arbitration or enforcement rules can be agreed on to ensure that 
agreements are actually implemented; 
• regional strategies are effectively linked with national strategies.
Lesson 2: Effective regional cooperation and integration take time to 
develop, and require incremental, gradual and flexible implementation 
with visible payoffs.
The EU experience shows that regional cooperation and integration is a 
slow and gradual process. Other cases of relatively successful cooperation 
initiatives similarly show that success is measured in decades, rather than 
years. Some important ingredients make for success along the way:
• Patience and sticking with the process are essential;
• Setting ambitious, but clear and realistic intermediate targets with visible 
payoffs along the way will help keep the process on track;
• When progress in one area is not feasible, it helps pursuing others where 
progress is possible, as a way to show that cooperation can work, to build 
trust and where possible build coalitions and develop win-win deals across 
issues;
• Starting with a limited functional focus, rather than burdening the 
cooperation process with too many issues at the outset, is critical;
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• Finally, it can help to let some countries in a regional grouping go ahead, 
while others at least temporarily go slow.
Lesson 3: Successful cooperation requires leadership.
Cooperation initiatives can benefit from strong leadership in three ways: 
• At the country level, one or more countries may push the process of 
cooperation and are willing to commit their own prestige and resources, 
perhaps disproportionally so, to make the initiative a success. When the 
lead country is a regional power it needs to show respect for the sensitivities 
of the smaller countries, otherwise its efforts can easily backfire; 
• At the institutional level, it helps if a strong organisation takes a lead, or 
members support the development of a strong organisation over time;
• At the individual level, visionary, effective organisational leadership is 
required at the top of the regional organisation or among key advisers and 
supporters of the initiative. 
Lesson 4: Keep the membership of the regional organisation 
manageable.
Successful regional organisations attract the interest of other neighboring 
countries which want to join. This creates an unavoidable tension between 
the goal of inclusiveness and a focus on effective cooperation among the core 
countries of a region with shared geography and common regional interests. 
On balance it is better to start with fewer members and expand only when the 
capacity of absorb additional members is clearly established. 
Lesson 5: Avoid the “spaghetti bowl” effect, where possible.
One of the complicating factors in regional cooperation is that various regional 
initiatives and organisations often overlap in membership and functions. 
Multiple bilateral free trade agreements are notorious in their detrimental 
effects by creating potentially distortive trading incentives as well as 
burdensome ad opaque customs rules at the borders. But similarly costly 
and confusing overlaps can also occur in other areas (transport, water, 
energy, etc.), not least by placing great costs in time and travel on the limited 
governmental and leadership capacity in each of the countries. Various 
solutions can reduce the problem:
• Replace bilateral with regional trade agreements and/or join the WTO: 
Consolidating or replacing multiple bilateral trade agreements is one of the 
great potential benefits of regional cooperation and of joining WTO;
• Consolidate regional organisations: In practice this is rare, as it is generally 
difficult to abolish an institution once created, but examples show that it 
can be done;
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• Work towards an explicit division of mandates;
• Collaborate and share information.
Lesson 6: Ensure financial resources and instruments are available to 
support regional investments and cooperation.
Financial resources can help in various ways, including:
• Facilitating investment in regional infrastructure (transport, water, energy, 
border facilities, trade facilitation, etc.);
• Create incentives for cooperation among governmental and non-
governmental players; 
• Provide resources for helping backward regions to catch up with the more 
advanced regions, or to assist sectors suffering negative consequences 
from regional competition in their adjustment.
Lesson 7: External actors should assist wherever possible.
External support can be very helpful for the success of regional organisations, 
as the experience of GMS, CAREC and the Stability Pact of South East 
Europe demonstrate. In each of these cases, larger regional and international 
agencies provided technical, financial and trust-building support. However, 
CAF (and the EU) demonstrates that regional organisations can also 
succeed without substantial external support, provided enough of the other 
success factors are in place. In any case, International Financial Institutions 
should play a more active role in supporting regional organisations.
In conclusion, international experience is highly relevant for Central Asian 
regional economic cooperation in general and for CAREC in particular. The 
core message is that regional cooperation underpinned by effective regional 
organisations is possible and brings considerable benefits to the participants. 
The existing regional organisations present a number of strengths and 
opportunities, but also weakness and challenges that can and should be 
addressed in a cooperative spirit among the countries, together with the 
multilateral organisations and other partners, as well as among the various 
regional organisations themselves.
Membership of Regional Organisations
Central Asia
SCO: China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
EurAsEC: Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan; Uzbekistan 
announced suspension of its membership in 2008.
ECO: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Turkey and Uzbekistan.
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CAREC: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, People’s Republic of China (PRC), 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan; EBRD, IMF, 
Islamic Development Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB), UNDP and World 
Bank.
SPECA: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
Southeast Asia
GMS: Cambodia, PRC, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam, ADB.
MRC: Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand and Vietnam are full country members, 
China and Myanmar are “dialogue partners”.
ASEAN: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.
Europe
EU: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.
Stability Pact for South-East Europe: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia and The Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia; EU members states, the European Commission, 
various international and regional partner organisations, including UN 
agencies, EBRD and World Bank.
Latin America
IIRSA: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, 
Peru, Surinam, Uruguay and Venezuela.
MERCOSUR: Core members are Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay; 
associate members are Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and 
Venezuela.
CAF: Its main shareholders are Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela; 
associated countries are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay , Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, 
and Uruguay; 15 private banks from the Andean region are partners.
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1. Introduction
Regional cooperation and integration remains among the main topics of 
international discourse in Central Asia. In fact, though the issue of the 
regional integration is perceived differently for different regions of the former 
Soviet Union, the overall consensus is that increasing regional cooperation 
could be helpful for Central Asia or the Caspian Sea region from the point 
of view of economic development and overcoming common problems 
(Bartlett, 2001; Gleason, 2001). The literature, however, focuses on the 
top-down integration based on intergovernmental interaction. This form of 
integration seems to be extremely limited in the region. This paper, however, 
considers a different perspective on regional integration in Central Asia. It 
is generally accepted that the areas of relatively less effective regionalism 
could happen to be quite successful in terms of regionalisation (bottom-
up integration), i.e. interaction of economic and political actors beyond the 
formal intergovernmental cooperation across national borders. The main 
elements of the regionalisation usually include stable trade networks and 
cross-border investments, linking the countries through international chains 
of production and migration. 
It is possible to distinguish between two models of bottom-up integration. 
The first model (“investment integration”) is based on FDI of large 
multinationals and implies relatively high levels of development of the leading 
countries of the region. The second model (“informal trade”) is of a more 
archaic nature and is related to emergence of informal cross-border trade 
networks, mostly operating illegally. Some regions combine both models: 
for example, in East Asia the main drivers of integration are investments of 
Japanese multinationals and cross-border business networks of Chinese 
ethnic communities (Peng, 2000; Kawai, 2005); the relations between US 
and Mexico are similarly influenced by American multinationals (macuiladoras) 
and the informal network of Hispanic migrants. For example, the informal 
trade model is present in West Africa (Meager, 1997), and to a lower extent 
in South Asia (Taneja, 2001; Rafi Khan, 2007).
Regionalisation  
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Central Asia: The Role of Institutional Complementarities in Reform Process”. The author thanks 
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of the data. All mistakes remain my own.
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This paper aims to analyse the role of regionalisation in Central Asia. Breslin 
(2000) presents two important caveats with respect to the comparative 
analysis of informal regionalisation. First, the borders of regions become fuzzy. 
If one defines a region as a cluster of economic and social ties, it obviously 
does not have any well-defined borders, unlike formal regionalism projects. 
Moreover, the choice of region of analysis may depend on mental maps, 
producing and reproducing “imagined” or even “invented” regions (Shenk, 
2001; Miller, 2002). If the analysis of regionalisation is focused on qualitative 
data (e.g. because the quality of statistics is low, what is quite likely to be the 
case for the post-Soviet space – as well as in the developing and transitional 
world in general), the “mental maps” of researchers are likely to create biases 
for the research outcomes and especially for the claimed causal links. On 
the other hand, mental maps of actors (indirectly influenced by academic 
discourse) not only have an impact on the perception of regions, but also can 
indeed influence the processes of regionalisation and regionalism (through 
real or “invented” psychological distance, for example). Second, defining 
regions in terms of nation-states is not always productive for the analysis 
of informal integration – in particular, the so-called “microregionalism” and 
“microregionalisation”, based on the integration of subnational entities, can 
be very important. 
In this paper, I define “Central Asia” as five former Soviet republics (Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan). On the one hand, this 
approach is reasonable because countries of the region share a relatively long 
period of common economic and political history and closed interconnections, 
which in fact determined the process of nation- and border-building in Central 
Asia (see e.g. Hirsh, 2000; Abashin, 2007). However, on the other hand, 
Central Asia is still an “emerging region” (Kazantsev, 2005), i.e. its very 
concept, as well as structure of economic and political relations can be subject 
to re-definitions and turbulences. The second caveat is also ambiguous; all 
Central Asian countries are politically highly centralised (Ufer and Troschke, 
2006; Leschenko and Troschke, 2006), while the Chinese experience 
(Breslin, 2000a) and the paradiplomacy of Russian regions (Magone, 2006) 
shows the need for decentralisation as a driving force of microregionalisation. 
But on the other hand, geographical dimensions (especially in Kazakhstan) 
and poor quality of transportation, as well as internal differences (like those 
between northern and southern Kyrgyzstan) could theoretically contribute to 
the clustering of economic activity on the subregional level. 
2. Regionalisation in Central Asia
2.1. Post-Soviet regionalisation and Central Asia
In spite of extremely weak intergovernmental cooperation in the post-Soviet 
space, the region currently exhibits a substantial degree of the bottom-up 
integration. Basically, there are four factors contributing to this process. 
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First, since the early 2000s, Russian corporations have been increasingly 
present in the post-Soviet countries through takeovers, joint ventures, and – 
recently – greenfield investments (Heifetz and Libman, 2008; Deloitte, 2008). 
The investment expansion of Russian business is only partly registered by 
official statistics, since informal channels and offshore schemes are actively 
employed. Traditionally, three main sectors of expansion are oil and gas, metals 
and mining and telecoms, although currently a much larger diversification is 
observed. Second, post-Soviet countries are closely linked by migration flows 
(Ivakhnyuk, 2006; Ryazansev, 2008). Third, the post-Soviet space is still 
connected through a unity of infrastructure, e.g. in railroad and power utilities 
sectors, created in the Soviet times. Finally, there is still a significant (though 
permanently declining) degree of social integration in the post-Soviet world, 
manifesting itself in interpersonal networks and, above all, Russian as lingua 
franca for communication (Nasledie Evrazii, 2007). Hence, the regionalisation 
in the post-Soviet space seems to be driven partly by the Soviet heritage 
(which may happen to be a “disappearing reality”), and partly by the logic of 
regionalisation common for a typical geographical strategy of emerging 
multinationals (Davidson, 1980; Bell and Pennings, 1996; Kuznetsov, 
2008). The post-Soviet regionalisation seems to be extremely asymmetric 
and clearly centreed around Russia as the key market and key source of FDI 
in the region. Interestingly enough, there is no evidence of informal trade 
regionalisation in the CIS (unlike, e.g., Africa), what can be attributed to the 
specifics of industrial structure of post-Soviet economies, where (mostly 
global) trade in commodities dominates the trade structure, and to the 
overall level of economic development. The investment model seems to be 
much more important. Nevertheless, after significant decline of the 1990s 
the share of intraregional trade in the CIS reached a stable level; there is also 
evidence that the intraregional trade is still “too high” as opposed to gravity 
models predictions – a kind of inverted border effect (Fidrmuc, Fidrmuc, 2001; 
Djankov, Freud, 2002; Elborg-Voytek, 2003, de Sousa and Lamotte, 2007).
What does this highly asymmetric regionalisation imply for Central Asia? 
Theoretically, extraregional actors (like Russian corporations) could act as a 
driving force in the regionalisation process. For example, in East Asia Japanese 
and (partly) U.S. multinationals seem to contribute to the development of 
informal regional structures (Dobson and Yue, 1997). However, it requires 
two additional conditions: first, companies are present in several countries 
of the region, and second, their businesses are linked to each other. To 
our knowledge, there are extremely few areas where both conditions are 
satisfied. Two fields where Russian FDI could potentially increase the degree 
of regional interdependence in the Central Asia are telecommunications, 
where the “Big Three” Russian mobile service providers actively explore the 
regional markets, and power utilities, where the key player is INTER RAO UES. 
Given the fact that the energy systems of the post-Soviet countries are still 
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intervened, common actors in energy sectors can significantly contribute 
to regionalisation. However, one should be aware of the fact that the energy 
trade in the post-Soviet space decreased in the last few years, and that the 
modes of organisation of power utilities in individual Central Asian countries 
differ substantially. A third field where Russian extraregional actors could 
potentially become agents of regionalisation is oil and gas; however, currently 
the presence of Russian corporations in this sector is quite limited. 
Finally, regionalisation through external actors – like in the “Greater China” 
area – is sometimes explained by the “intermediary function” accepted by 
certain regions and countries “canalising” foreign investments and trade in the 
region (Breslin, 2004). However, developed bilateral ties between Russia and 
post-Soviet countries make the use of these “intermediaries” less important. 
The situation is not unambiguously clear; for example, in October 2006, the 
president of the Association of Kazakh investors in Kyrgyzstan Bakhtybek 
Zheldibaev claimed that, as opposed to foreign investors from other countries, 
companies from Kazakhstan “… are in a more attractive position. First of all, 
Kyrgyz and Kazakhs have similar language, traditions, beliefs, psychology, 
reason and think in a similar way. Second, we do not need intermediaries. This 
is our advantage as opposed to European, Chinese and Russian investors. 
Actually, the latter also feel quite good [in the Kyrgyzstan], but we do not feel 
their pressure now” (Kuz’min, 2007).
Hence, Russian investors are probably not as close to Kyrgyzstan, as those 
from Kazakhstan, but the “distance” is still relatively small. However, as I will 
show below, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan seem to develop deep economic 
relations, which are not present elsewhere. In Tajikistan, Russian investors 
are more important than those from Kazakhstan. One could of course 
speculate as whether increasing presence of Chinese investors will contribute 
to establishment of the “gate regions” to support regionalisation through 
external forces, but the outcome is yet to be seen.
2.2. Foreign Direct Investment
Let me now consider the actual intraregional factors of regionalisation. Unlike 
other subregions of the CIS, where the role of mutual investments is limited 
(for example, there is only vague evidence of some Ukrainian investment 
activity in Moldova – in particular, in Transdniestria and of Azerbaijan – in 
Georgia), Central Asia is quite different, mostly because of the activity of 
private and semi-private businesses from Kazakhstan, which actively explore 
the Central Asian countries. Though the main direction of investments for 
Kazakhstan is still Russia, it is increasingly present in the Central Asian region. 
As of September 30, 2007, Kyrgyzstan ranks 13th in the overall outward 
investments of Kazakhstan with about 1.3% of total foreign investments of 
the country ($481 million, including $240 million FDI). Uzbekistan ranks 20 
with $199 million (FDI: $109 million), and Tajikistan ranks 21 with $188 
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million (FDI: $ 24 million). Hence, the countries seem to be of minor importance 
for the outward investment activity of Kazakhstan, with Russia, US, UK and 
British Virgin Islands (BVI) being the main targets for outward investments. 
However, one should take into account, that the Central Asian economies are 
relatively small, and hence even limited investment activity of Kazakhstan can 
become crucially important. Indeed, according to the investment statistics 
of the Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan is currently the dominant source of FDI for 
Kyrgyzstan, accounting for about 50% of the total investment inflow (see 
Figure 5.1). Unfortunately, there is no data on the FDI structure for Tajikistan 
and Uzbekistan available. However, applying the Kazakhstan data on FDI 
and total investments and national data from the balance of payment, one 
could establish, that for Q1-Q3 2007 Kazakhstan accounted for about 21% 
of total investments and about 4% of FDI inflow in the economy of Tajikistan 
(with Russia being the main investor accounting for about 40% of capital 
inflow).2 One should, however, be aware of the presence of indirect investment 
channels (e.g. via the BVI investments), which have not been captured by the 
statistics above.
Figure 5.1.  
Share of Kazakhstan 
in the FDI inflow to 
Kyrgyzstan
Source:  
governmental  
statistics of the 
Kyrgyzstan
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2 This indicator is extremely questionable. Generally direct comparison of outward and inward 
investment flows data from different statistical authorities of the CIS yields substantially differ-
ent results (Vahtra, 2005); moreover, one faces the challenge of separating balance of payment 
statistics and methodology of statistical authorities, which also happen to be different.
The low quality of statistical data makes the discussion of case studies of 
investment activity in the region necessary. In what follows, I list the main 
investment projects of Kazakhstan in other countries of the region. Most 
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projects I am aware of are implemented in Kyrgyzstan; it could represent 
the quality of data bias, however, from our point of view, reflects the true 
predominance of Kyrgyzstan-Kazakhstan connection in the regionalisation 
processes in Central Asia.
While distinguishing among the areas of FDI activity of Kazakhstan in the 
region, one should point out the banking sector. Successful economic reforms 
fostering market discipline and high standards allowed Kazakhstan to establish 
a well-functioning banking sector outperforming that of most other CIS 
countries (including, to a certain extend, Russia), allowing the banking sector to 
pursue an active expansion strategy abroad. Currently the main holdings of the 
banks of Kazakhstan in Central Asia include Nacional’nyi Eksportno-Importnyi 
Bank (Kyrgyzstan) owned by TuranAlem (originally purchased by Temirbank), 
Kazkommerzbank Kyrgyzstan (Kyrgyzstan) and Kazkommerzbank Tajikistan 
(Tajikistan) owned by Kazkommerz, ATF Bank Kyrgyzstan (Kyrgyzstan) 
owned by ATF Bank, FinanceCreditBank (Kyrgyzstan) owned by the Seimar 
Alliance Financial Corporation and Halyk Bank Kyrgyzstan (Kyrgyzstan) 
owned by Kazakhstan People’s Bank. The state-owned Development Bank 
of Kazakhstan has a representative office in Uzbekistan. Investments from 
Kazakhstan account for about 30% of the capital of the banking system of 
Kyrgyzstan being the sole major foreign investor (Abalkina, 2007:43), and the 
share of the banks controlled by Kazakh banks may reach 50% of the market 
for banking services (Kuz’min, 2007). Nevertheless, the presence of Kazakh 
banks in other countries of Central Asia seems to be fairly limited. 
There are several other sectors where investors from Kazakhstan achieved 
relative success. In Kyrgyzstan, one should definitively mention the tourist 
industry – in particular the recreation facilities in the Issyk-Kul region (UNDP, 
2006:28). The data regarding this sector is fragmentary at best; however, 
the number of objects controlled by Kazakhstan could be significant. The most 
well known deal is the agreement to hand over four facilities to Kazakhstan 
signed in 2001 and ratified in 2008. Nevertheless, it probably only covers the 
tip of the iceberg. In March 2008, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan announced its 
plan to construct a new road connecting Almaty and Cholpon-Ata at Issyk-Kul, 
which, however, is still very far from implementation. It is certain that a clear 
advantage is the geographic proximity of the region to Almaty, increasing the 
potential market for the tourist services for customers from Kazakhstan.
Further sectors of the investments from Kazakhstan include mining, 
construction and media industries, as well as real estate. In Kyrgyzstan, 
Kazakh companies control the Kant Cement and Slate Plant, maize syrup 
plant, two concrete plants, Tokmak Brick Plant, Kadamjai Stibium Plant, 
Tokmak Wool Processing Plant, Kyrgyzenergoremont in Bishkek, and 
participate in the development of gold deposits at Jeruy (Visor Holding) and 
Taldy Bulak (Sammergold). In Tajikistan, KazInvestMineral acquired the 
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Adrasman mining complex in 2006 for $3.2 million In the field of gas supply, 
Kazakhstan’s state owned KazTransGaz and Kyrgyz Kyrgyzgaz established a 
joint stock company, KyrKazGaz, in 2004 to operate the gas pipelines to the 
North of Kyrgyzstan and the South of Kazakhstan. As in the CIS in general, the 
dominant instrument is still the acquisition of existing assets, though there is 
an increasing presence of greenfield investments (like the recently initiated 
project of a ferrosilicoaluminium plant in Tash-Kumar (Kyrgyzstan) for $100 
million). BRK-Leasing, a subsidiary of the Development Bank of Kazakhstan, 
provided €7 million for financing the development of textile production in 
Bishkek. In December 2008, the ambassador of Kazakhstan in Uzbekistan 
Zautbek Turisbekov proposed to provide finance to farmers from the banks of 
Kazakhstan, as well as to establish joint food processing plants in the border 
zone. Finally, Kazakhstan seems to be extremely interested in power utilities in 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (in January 2008, Kazakhstan declared its plans to 
participate in the reconstruction of the Kambarada Power Plant in Kyrgyzstan, 
and in February – in the reconstruction of the Rogun Power Plant in Tajikistan); 
however, any perspectives in this field are still vague, especially given active 
position of Russian business in the area. The investment activity seems to be 
driven by both relatively cheap labour (compared to Kazakhstan) and access 
to natural resources. Access to markets seems to be less important in this 
sector (unlike banking services). 
The opposite direction of investments from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan to Kazakhstan seems to be insignificant. In the first 9 months 
of 2007, Uzbekistan accounted for about 0.004% of total FDI inflow to 
Kazakhstan (or 11% from the CIS),3 and Kyrgyzstan for 0.008% (or about 
22% from the CIS). There is no data on the investment activity of Tajikistan, 
as well as cross-border investments in Central Asia beyond Kazakhstan. To 
conclude, it looks like the Central Asian regionalisation is as asymmetric, 
as the regionalisation process in the CIS in general, with Kazakhstan as the 
main source of outward investments and Kyrgyzstan as the main recipient 
of FDI. In Tajikistan, investments from Kazakhstan are important, but less 
active, than those of Russia (in the Kyrgyzstan the situation is exactly the 
opposite). Uzbekistan and (especially) Turkmenistan are much less active in 
the development of intraregional investment ties. 
2.3. Intraregional trade and migration
In case of the formal intraregional trade, the situation is similar to the CIS in 
general. Regional concentration of exports is characteristic to a certain extent 
3 There are currently 96 enterprises with Kazakh investments functioning in Uzbekistan, includ-
ing trade, construction, light industry, metals and food industry, and 715 small and medium en-
terprises with Uzbek investments in Kazakhstan, including trade, manufacturing, food industry, 
construction materials, glass, services and real estate operations (RIA Novosti, 2008, April 21). 
However, the quality of these data is very low and is hardly helpful for understanding the scope of 
international cooperation.
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for the Kyrgyzstan, mostly because of its closed economic ties to Kazakhstan. 
On the other hand, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan experience a certain degree 
of concentration of imports in the region (see Table 5.1). However, a slightly 
different result follows from the cluster analysis based on dissimilarity matrix 
(Figure 5.2). While Kazakhstan seems to have higher degree of market 
integration with Russia than with the rest of the CIS, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
indeed belong to one cluster. An additional factor potentially supporting the 
regionalisation is that Central Asian countries share a number of common 
problems of infrastructure, in particular for energy trade and water supply, 
where their economies are closely linked to each other (Vinokurov, 2007). Even 
if the value of trade is small, its importance for the development is crucial.
From  
(exports),  
to (imports)
Indicator
Exports and imports
Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Turkmenistan Tajikistan Uzbekistan
Total  
Central Asia
Kazakhstan Share of  total exports 0.700% 0.0% 0.12% 1.00% 2.171%
Kazakhstan Share of CIS exports .80% 0.371% 2.82% .902% 1.901%
Kazakhstan Share of total imports 0.87% 0.0% 0.117% 1.38% 2.11%
Kazakhstan Share of CIS imports 1.2% 1.199% 0.20% 2.88% .89%
Kyrgyzstan Share of total exports 20.7% 0.2% 3.010% 3.13% 27.2%
Kyrgyzstan Share of CIS exports 2.902% 0.% .30% 7.31% 7.12%
Kyrgyzstan Share of total imports 11.28% 0.10% 0.13% 3.783% 1.79%
Kyrgyzstan Share of CIS imports 20.11% 0.182% 0.283% .9% 27.18%
Tajikistan Share of  total exports 1.987% 0.801% 0.007% .818% 7.13%
Tajikistan Share of CIS exports 1.938% .018% 0.0% 3.217% 7.227%
Tajikistan Share of  total imports 10.838% 1.31% 3.01% 10.223% 2.193%
Tajikistan Share of CIS imports 1.97% 2.% .83% 1.012% 1.02%
Table 5. 1.  
Structure of 
interregional and 
intraregional trade in 
Central Asia, 200
Source:  
CIS Statistical  
Committee, 2007
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Uzbekistan is relatively small and practically equivalent to the intranational 
price variation between individual regions (Grafe et al., 2005) . It, however, does 
not imply that internal markets are integrated – only that the border effect 
for disintegration is less relevant. Therefore, one could probably assume that 
the integration on the level of small business networks is much higher, than 
for commodities (which play the crucial role in determining the structure of 
trade statistics presented above). Spechler (2000:7) claims that; “with all the 
problems, informal trade among the Central Asian countries appears to be 
working reasonably well”. Informal trade seems to be important for countries 
like Tajikistan (Olimova et al., 2006) and even Turkmenistan in spite of strong 
trade restrictions (in particular across the border with Uzbekistan) (Badykova, 
2006). One should bear in mind, however, that the emerging informal trade 
networks often span outside the Central Asian region over the whole Eurasian 
continent (Evers and Kaiser, 2000; Kaiser, 2002).
Finally, the last issue to be considered is the labour migration in Central Asia. 
Once again, although Russia still remains the most important partner for the 
majority of the countries from the migration point of view, Kazakhstan plays 
an increasingly important role, partly competing with Russia. As in the case of 
the FDI activity, increasing labour migration in Kazakhstan is also a relatively 
recent phenomenon, directly related to the economic success of the country 
in the last half decade. The main countries of origin for labour migration to 
Kazakhstan are Uzbekistan (with a significant ethnic Kazakh minority) and 
Kyrgyzstan. Although Kazakhstan implements a policy of privileged ethnic 
Figure 5.2.  
Clusters of 
intraregional trade  
in the CIS, 200
Notes: cluster 
analysis using Ward 
clustering method. 
Dissimilarity matrix 
defines dissimilarity 
as 1 minus share 
of trade turnover 
between countries 
i and j in the overall 
trade turnover of 
the country i in the 
CIS, prices of export 
applied
Source: own  
calculation based  
on CIS Statistical  
Committee  
database, 2007
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immigration of the oralman (ethnic Kazakhs), there seems to be a significant 
flow of illegal labour migration exceeding the official migration. The number of 
labour migrants from Uzbekistan in Southern Kazakhstan (which seems to 
be the most attractive region for migration inflows) varies between 200,000 
and 1 million; however, the any data is likely to be extremely biased and is to 
be considered with great caution. Some authors point out the existence of 
labour migration from Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan, generating a remittance 
flow, but it seems to be relatively small (Mogilevsky, 2004:27). The migration 
flows have a heavy impact on both legal and illegal monetary flows of migrant 
remittances (Sadovskaya, 2005, 2006). In case of Tajikistan, Russia remains 
the absolutely dominant country from the point of view of labour migration. One 
can argue that for informal trade and migration, the “microregionalisation” 
involving selected regions and areas of the countries is probably relevant.
3. Regionalisation and institutions: channels of interdependence
However, the most important problem is not just to establish the existence 
and forms of regionalization, but also to understand its interconnection with 
the institutional development in the region. Regionalisation often occurs at 
the corners of the development spectrum: it can become crucially important 
for economies at the low level of development, substituting for the deficit 
of the rule of law, but it can also follow from high development, with high 
governance capacity of non-governmental agents. In both cases, the effects 
of regionalisation on institutions can differ. In Medieval Europe, for example, 
merchant guilds effectively supported the de-facto integration of the economic 
space and overcame the low development of formal institutions (Greif, 2006), 
but also engaged in redistributive activities and market monopolisation (Ogilvie, 
2007). In what follows I am going to consider three channels of interaction 
between institutions and corporate integration.
3.1. Regionalisation and reform strategies
The first issue to be considered is the impact of models of institutional 
development in Central Asia on regionalisation. The countries of Central Asia 
experienced a variety of different reform strategies, and hence, economic 
outcomes and institutions. It is especially relevant for the two largest 
countries of Central Asia – Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. As already mentioned, 
Kazakhstan is currently the centre of the process of regionalisation, especially 
within the framework of “investment model”, and significantly outperforms 
Uzbekistan. But why did Kazakhstan, and not Uzbekistan, generate the first 
regional multinationals?
From the point of view of formal institutions, Kazakhstan implemented a more 
consequent model of liberal reforms and high levels of openness for foreign 
investors (which recently was replaced by less favourable conditions for 
investors, who lost control of some important assets, and more important 
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industrial policy, say, within the framework of the cluster initiative). On the 
other hand, the structure of informal institutions, as in Russia and Ukraine, 
created a set of privileged business groups with strong economic and political 
ties (Libman, 2006). Uzbekistan did not implement any large-scale reform 
programme, maintaining significant public sector and public investments in the 
economy. Uzbekistan actually outperformed Kazakhstan in the early 1990s, 
giving rise to the discussions of the nature of an “Uzbek paradox” (Spechler 
et al., 2004). However, since the early 2000s, Kazakhstan has performed 
significantly better than Uzbekistan in terms of economic growth. 
It is possible to claim that these differences to a certain extent explained the 
leadership of Kazakhstan, and not Uzbekistan, in the structure of investment 
integration. First, as part of liberal reforms of the banking system, Kazakhstan 
successfully transformed its banks into powerful players, which actually 
dominate in the process of regionalisation. Second, in a political-economic 
environment like that of the Central Asian countries, successful regionalisation 
basically requires two contradicting conditions. On the one hand, one of the 
problems of the state-led economies in a region with a very low level of political 
cooperation is that political difficulties actually prevent the development of 
economic ties. So, if the connection between economic and political actors is 
formal and too strong – like in case of the state-owned economy of Uzbekistan 
– political differences can effectively block any economic cooperation. On 
the other hand, an environment with poor protection of property rights is 
problematic for small private companies with substantial public support. The 
model of large privileged business groups implemented in Kazakhstan seemed 
to be quite successful from this point of view. Moreover, the businesses of this 
group are large enough to successfully establish their presence in neighboring 
states, but also have experience of turbulent economic environments, which 
gives them a unique advantage vis-à-vis multinationals from developed 
countries. Third, the timing of development seems to be crucial. Gradual reforms 
are likely to reduce pressure at the stage of recession, but rapid reforms and 
development of market institutions could lead to better performance after 
the recession stage. However, any regionalisation in the post-Soviet space 
became possible only after a certain period of time, when the initial problems 
of nation building preoccupying political elites became weaker. From that 
point of view, Kazakhstan also had better chances to become leaders of the 
regionalisation in Central Asia, than Uzbekistan.
The models of reforms and outcomes of economic development in other 
countries of the region also played a certain role in influencing the process 
of regionalisation in Central Asia. In some cases, the link is straightforward: 
for example, strict public control over all aspects of economy and society 
in Turkmenistan makes any active participation of this country in the 
regionalisation impossible; Russia’s position in the resolving the civil war in 
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Tajikistan obviously supported the domination of large Russian multinationals 
in this country, although the current stabilisation of political regime has an 
ambiguous effect on status of Russian investors (Abalkina et al., 2007). 
Substantial informal trade and development of large migration flows is to a 
certain extend an outcome of economic problems of most countries in the 
region (with the exception of Kazakhstan) and strict public restrictions for 
formal trade (especially in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan). Although the political 
instability in several countries of the region (in particular, in Kyrgyzstan) had a 
negative impact on FDI inflow (generally speaking, as well as from Kazakhstan), 
it is possible to claim that the Kazakh investors were relatively less affected 
by the problems than multinationals from developed countries (because of a 
general ability to act under weak institutions, as well as similarities in reform 
strategies between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, see Olcott, 2002; Spector, 
2008). Hence, the instability, while having an absolutely negative effect on the 
investors from Kazakhstan, increased their relative weight. It is not impossible 
that there is also some absolutely positive effect; for example, in several 
regions of the CIS several groups of Russian investors were able to enter the 
markets because of low quality of institutions, but our analysis is limited to 
speculations.
3.2. Impact of Regionalisation on Economic Institutions
The opposite causal link – from the structure of regionalisation to the quality 
of institutions – is more difficult to study. The effects of regionalisation can 
be both strengthening the market-enhancing institutions and conserving the 
inefficient institutional structure. However, these effects also differ for the 
“investment driven” regionalisation and “informal trade” regionalisation. From 
the point of view of the investment driven regionalisation, two arguments 
should be mentioned. First, investment driven regionalisation (as well as 
developed labour migration) strengthens institutional competition, i.e. 
competition between countries for mobile factors of production by establishing 
legal environment and economic policies. Institutional competition is often 
considered to be an efficient tool of taming the Leviathanic rent-seeking 
government and of revealing the preferences for institutions through the 
evolutionary learning process (Vaubel, 2007). Secondly, multinationals are 
likely to act as channels of transmission of best practices and knowledge 
between countries; thus supporting the diffusion of efficient institutions. In 
a similar way, the best practices can be important through the networks of 
labour migration.
Unfortunately, both positive effects are not unambiguous. On the one hand, 
institutional competition is not necessarily driven by demand for good 
institutions. In fact, the literature on the post-Soviet transition established a 
variety of factors leading to inefficient equlibria supported by the demand for 
weak institutions (for a survey see Libman, 2007). This is definitively related 
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to the emergence and stability of the “clan capitalism” (Kosals, 2006) in the 
post-Soviet world. The main question is actually not whether demand for weak 
institutions really exists, but rather whether it is permanent (i.e. constitutes 
a stable equilibrium) or temporary (and after a certain period of development 
should be replaced by demand for good institutions). Havrylyshin (2007:17) 
refers to this discussion as “transition inevitable” and “transition frozen” school 
of thoughts and claims, that “the debate … will certainly go on for some time to 
come”. From the point of view of regionalisation in the CIS space, the results 
are ambiguous: both factors of demand for good institutions and demand for 
weak institutions seem to be present (Libman, 2007). 
From the point of view of the Central Asian countries the problem is as 
ambiguous as in the CIS in general. Actually, it receives an additional dimension 
given relatively high degree of political instability in several countries of 
the region (like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan). It is clear that the increase of 
investments from Kazakhstan and Russia does not necessarily coincide with 
stronger demand for transparency and general rules in the Hayekian sense. In 
fact, the demand for privileged relations with regional authorities may be more 
important, and the “threshold level” of demand for institutions necessary 
to enter the market for the post-Soviet companies is not so high anyway. 
Hence, foreign investments may well support inefficient equilibria. Certainly 
they support the semi-authoritarian regimes in the countries of Central 
Asia, which, in turn, are one of the main factors of the existing low quality of 
governance (Libman, 2007a). Moreover, as already noticed, strengthening 
these regimes can effectively result in a hold up of foreign assets and decline 
of regionalisation in general. However, the alternative to this support may be 
not market-enhancing reforms (like in the countries of the Western flank of 
the CIS), but chaos and disorder. 
Similar reasoning is applicable for the second channel of impact of 
regionalisation on the quality of institutions. In fact, in spite of its own 
institutional deficits, Kazakhstan can become an important source of “good 
practices” for the countries of the region. Once again, unlike the Western 
flank of the CIS, there are hardly any viable alternatives (like investments of 
multinationals from developed countries). Nevertheless, this transmission of 
good practices is per se limited by the quality of institutions in the country 
of origin of investments, making the very issue of institutional advancements 
crucially dependant from reforms in the leading country. Given the extremely 
brief experience of investment led regionalisation in the region, it is still difficult 
to make any conclusions. Moreover, effects can be different for different 
business groups with their own strategies of business-government relations.
The effects of informal trade regionalisation are also not unambiguous. As 
already mentioned, most forms of the informal regionalisation appear in an 
environment of weak formal institutions; to a certain extent, they serve as an 
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instrument of overcoming this problem. From this point of view, informal trade 
networks serve as a natural instrument of establishing an order for economic 
transactions. However, in this case their advantages and disadvantages 
are similar to the general discussion on the role of informal economy: on 
the one hand, it overcomes the deficits of formal rules and makes economic 
transactions possible, but on the other hand, informal rules are less efficient 
(e.g. because of their personalised nature vis-à-vis formal abstract rules) and, 
more importantly, they establish behavioural patterns preventing introduction 
of formal rules in the future. A possible strategy in keeping with the ideas of 
Hernando de Soto is to develop formal rules consistent with informal rules, but 
it is always a difficult task (also from the point of view of incentive-compatibility 
for political decision makers). Therefore, the existence of informal trade 
regionalisation may constitute a constraint optimum in a given environment, 
but is able to become an obstacle for the development of efficient reforms in 
the future.
3.3. Regionalisation and regionalism
The last point I address in this paper is the relation between regionalisation 
and regionalism. As already noted, there have been numerous attempts of 
top-down integration in Central Asia, mostly without any visible results. Even 
the most basic form of regional cooperation – the Free Trade Agreement 
(FTA) – is quite problematic. Although there exists a (highly incomplete) 
network of bilateral trade agreements in Central Asia (Kort and Dragneva, 
2006:9), there are huge implementation problems; countries quite often act 
unilaterally, restricting the trade relations in case of economic or political 
turbulences. However, regional integration, both in the context of larger 
regional agreements like EurAsEC or SCO and specific structures for Central 
Asia (Kuz’min, 2008) remains part of the agenda in the region. Once again, 
investment led and informal trade regionalisation can have different influences 
on the regionalism in Central Asia. 
From the point of view of the former, the most oft stated argument is that the 
economic dominance of Kazakhstan, based on the investment expansion of its 
corporations, can become a factor supporting formal regionalism in its current 
form (once again, with Kazakhstan as the main perpetrator). Regionalisation 
can become an additional leverage mechanism. The increasing attention of 
the Kazakhstan government to the FDI activity in the Kyrgyzstan confirms 
that at least these expectations are present at the level of the political decision 
makers. Nevertheless, international experience shows that asymmetric 
regionalisation can have different impact on regionalism: while in Mexico the 
development of maquiladoras actually supported the formation of NAFTA, in 
the CIS significant presence of Russian investors in Ukraine did not support 
any formal integration between these two countries. 
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Considering the link between investment-led regionalisation and regionalism, 
one should not forget the potential importance of political institutions in 
the regional integration processes. As noted, most countries of the region 
are semi-authoritarian regimes, where governments use the design of 
economic institutions to restrict potential opposition. It is well known in the 
literature on international integration, that non-democracies are less likely to 
participate in the regional economic integration than democracies (Mansfield 
et al., 2002). In fact, that is what one can observe in Central Asia: the less 
democratic countries of the region (Turkmenistan and – to a lesser extend 
– Uzbekistan) are also less likely to become part of integration agreements. 
The main problem is the issue of commitment: in a political system based on 
informal power balances, it is extremely difficult to provide any commitment 
to an external actor, yet alone to give up part of the sovereignty (what is per 
definition implied by the regionalisation). The question is, of course, whether 
regionalisation can overcome these obstacles. Basically, there are two factors 
to be taken into consideration. First, regional cooperation can take form of 
the development of international hierarchies (Lake, 2007), and in this case 
is less dependent from the issue of democracy. An important aspect from 
this point of view is not just the existence of asymmetries, but also the scope 
of asymmetries. Weak asymmetry can in fact be even quite dangerous for 
regionalism: it increases mistrust, but does not provide any instruments for 
leverage. In fact, the political elites in Kyrgyzstan have been quite cautious with 
respect to any potential integration with Kazakhstan. However, high levels of 
political instability is a clear factor increasing the asymmetries and also the 
demand for international hierarchies. Second, the question is whether there 
is a clear link between investment expansion and governmental policies. Once 
again, in the case of Russian investments in Ukraine, businesses basically 
ignore the regionalism dimension. However, given a relatively high influence 
of consolidated political leadership in Kazakhstan on its business groups, 
one could in fact expect that the government will be able to influence the 
investment decisions following the logic of international politics. Hence, one 
can actually expect that in case of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan regionalisation 
could support formal regionalism.4 
Obviously, the scope of these projects mostly covers Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan, and maybe Tajikistan (where the position of Russia is crucial). 
Uzbekistan has been quite reluctant to support regionalism in Central Asia 
(Bohr, 2004; Kuz’min, 2008), and in the current situation seems to prefer 
Russia to Kazakhstan as the main source of FDI, designing its investment 
4 It is important to notice, that the main players in the economy of Kazakhstan are, though highly 
connected to the government, still private businesses. There is no trend towards wide-scope 
nationalisation in Kazakhstan, as it was observed in Russia. This is an additional argument in fa-
vour of the regionalism projects: in case of dominance of state-owned enterprises regionalisa-
tion can effectively become just another form of intergovernmental contacts (Vinokurov 2008).
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policies respectively (Abalkina et al., 2007; Heifetz and Libman, 2008). The 
latter fact raises an important issue of competition between Central Asian 
regionalism projects and broader projects (with participation of Russia – 
EAEC – or China – Shanghai Cooperation Organisation). And in this context, 
the development of regionalisation can also be quite important: on the one 
hand, strong economic interconnections can make regional integration within 
Central Asia a priority; but on the other hand, it is possible, that at least some 
actors try to off-balance economic influence of Kazakhstan by the political 
influence of other actors (e.g. Russia). Theoretically, it is also reasonable to 
claim that the development of Central Asian regionalism is able to reinforce 
the regionalisation, reducing the degree of political uncertainty and removing 
existing borders. The crucial factor is here whether the regionalism will move 
from rhetoric to implementation. The effects of pure rhetoric (as it has been 
so far in the field of regionalism in Central Asia) are ambiguous: it can both 
create necessary framework for public support of investment expansion (as 
seems to be the case for Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan dyad (Kuz’min, 2008), but 
also introduce political tensions in purely economic relations.
From the point of view of informal trade one can hardly expect any clear 
effects of regionalisation on regionalism and vice versa. Informal trade 
supports the persistence of social integration and cross-border interpersonal 
networks, necessary for any integration project. On the other hand, increasing 
intergovernmental cooperation could theoretically shift the patterns of 
informal trade to formal trade by creating well-protected property rights and 
restricting rent-seeking of public officials through removing additional options 
for their decision-making (it is actually implied by any economic liberalisation). 
From this point of view the very existence of informal trade is based on the 
lack of formal framework for cooperation – once again, very similar to the 
issue of the informal economy in general. Whether this degree of cooperation 
(and of quality of governance in general) can be achieved is questionable. A 
reasonable point often mentioned by sociologists is that the real puzzle is 
not why some people prefer informal structures, but why there are people 
choosing the formalisation of their transactions (Paneyakh, 2008). In a region 
with decades-old traditions of informal economy (in fact, flourishing even under 
late Soviet regime) even changes of formal institutions may have no effect on 
behavioural patterns for the actors.
4. Conclusion
In this paper I tried to show that there are at least some elements of 
regionalisation present in Central Asia, though their role is still relatively 
limited. The businesses of Kazakhstan have recently significantly increased 
their presence in the economy of Kyrgyzstan, particularly in the banking 
sector. Currently, state-owned structures (KazTransGaz, Kazyna) and 
the government of Kazakhstan increase their attention to the support of 
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investment expansion: Kazyna participates in the development of a mutual 
investment fund of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan; a similar institution was 
established for Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. However, the investment expansion 
of Kazakhstan is a very recent phenomenon of the last years – even opposed 
to Russia’s business expansion starting in the early 2000s. Moreover, a 
complex network of informal trade, which is only partly captured by statistics, 
links Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. This is a very old phenomenon, 
which is based on traditional economic ties in the region and which exhibits a 
higher level of development than in the CIS in general (with the only exception 
of unrecognised republics, where informal trade is also important). Given the 
significant size of the shadow economy in Kazakhstan (Schneider (2007) 
estimates it at 44.6% of official GDP for 2004/05), Kyrgyzstan (40.6%) and 
Uzbekistan (35.4%), the role of informal trade should not be underestimated. 
Less reliable estimates of shadow economy in Tajikistan exceed 60% of official 
GDP (Lenta.ru, 2007, June 27); this country is also involved in the structure of 
informal trade, but generally is to a greater extend connected to Russia than to 
the subregional regionalisation processes. The role of Turkmenistan seems to 
be negligible. Probably, it is more justified to consider the informal integration 
of Central Asia as a network of areas of microregionalisation, which may have 
relatively limited ties between each other.
The patterns of regionalisation seem to be heavily influenced by the 
development of institutions in Central Asian countries. In particular, the model 
of more liberal reforms combined with still-persistent links between influential 
business groups and politics seems to be a “success combination” for the 
multinationals from Kazakhstan (as opposed to Uzbekistan). The impact of 
regionalisation on institutional development is, however, ambiguous: on the one 
hand, it can serve as a link for transmission of “best practices” and reinforce 
better property rights, but on the other hand, the positive impact is limited 
by institutional deficits for the economy of Kazakhstan. Finally, regionalisation 
could potentially support the regionalism development in Central Asia, though 
the expectations are also unclear. The informal trade model seems to be 
relatively stable; it is hardly possible to expect qualitative shifts in the design of 
formal institutions reducing the attractiveness of informal channels.
Since the investment integration in Central Asia (a relatively recent process), it 
is difficult to make clear predictions regarding the future of the regionalisation. 
It is probable that the investment and migration flows crucially depend on 
economic performance of Kazakhstan. Recent turbulences related to the 
global financial crisis 2007-2009, which seems to have had a significant 
impact on the banking system of Kazakhstan (the driving force of FDI 
regionalisation!), raising some questions regarding the viability of the model. 
Therefore, the coming few years could be quite interesting from the point of 
view of informal regional integration in Central Asia.
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Having emerged from the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the former 
Soviet republics are once again moving towards integration. This trend is 
demonstrated with a number of integration initiatives in the post-Soviet 
states: the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), established in 1991; 
GUUAM2 (1997); the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) (2000); the 
Central Asia Economic Cooperation Programme (CAREC) (2002); and the 
Common Economic Space (CES) (2003). However, of all these projects, only 
the CIS has been notified a free economic zone (1994) in the list of regional 
trade agreements (RTA) maintained under the World Trade Organisation’s 
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT). The list also includes bilateral 
agreements between the former Soviet republics3. 
These multi-lateral and bilateral agreements have helped partners to break 
down some of the trade barriers between them; however, certain major 
obstacles and disagreements continue to exist with regard to integration 
projects. According to a UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) 
paper entitled Building Trade Partnership in the CIS Region, “this has led to 
scepticism as to the participants’ genuine commitment to regional integration 
and the debate continues on what form and direction this could take“ (ECE, 
2005b: 1).
At the end of 2006, there were 367 RTAs in existence worldwide. The rapid 
growth of regional economic integration in the world began in the 1990s. In 
the last decade, 243 new ones were notified, compared with 124 in 1948-
1995 (Fiorentino, Verdeja and Toqueboeuf, 2007: 3). Economic integration 
has the potential to improve the economic efficiency and welfare of countries 
which elect to create regional blocs, but not all these countries succeed in 
realising this potential fully: only 214 RTAs are actually effective. 
Regional Trade and Trade 
Integration in the CIS1  irina gurova

1 This paper is based on a survey financed by the Russian Humanitarian Scientific Fund under 
project No.08-02-00313a, Regional Trade and Economic Integration in the CIS.
2 According to the names of the countries: Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and 
Moldova.
3 Armenia-Russia, Kyrgyzstan-Russia (1993), Georgia-Russia (1994), Kyrgyzstan-Armenia, 
Kyrgyzstan-Kazakhstan, Armenia-Moldova (1995), Georgia-Ukraine, Armenia-Turkmenistan, 
Georgia-Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan-Moldova, Armenia-Ukraine (1996), Kyrgyzstan-Ukraine, 
Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (1998), Georgia-Kazakhstan (1999), Georgia-Turkmenistan (2000).
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The progress of regional integration is influenced by political and economic 
forces. The aim of this article is to provide an insight into the economic 
characteristics of regional trade in the CIS, to highlight changes in the 
geographic and commodity composition of foreign trade engaged in by these 
countries and to identify trends in the trade integration of the CIS4.
Although the relationships between the former Soviet republics are complex 
and varied, the international community recognises the CIS as an organisation 
of nations which takes its place in the global economy alongside regional blocs 
such as the European Union (EU), the North American Free Trade Agreement, 
the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), the Association of South 
East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and others.
The CIS has overcome its severe transformational crisis of the 1990s. A 
steady growth of GDP has been recorded since 1999 (see Figure 6.1). At 
present, the CIS’ GDP, compared by purchasing power parity (PPP), exceeds 
the pre-crisis level of 1991 (see Figure 6.1). At 2006 exchange rates and 
prices, it exceeds the GDP of the former Soviet Union, which was $928,352 
million in 1980 and $776,920 million in 1990 (UNCTAD, 2007a: 398) (see 
Figure 6.1).
Figure 6.1.  
The CIS’ GDP in 
1991–2009
Source:  
UNECE (2008), 
UN (2008b: 12), 
UN (1999: 1), UN 
(2008a), World 
Bank (2008a). 
Note:  
* calculation based 
on World Bank data;  
** UN forecast.
Socioeconomic indicators also show positive changes: unemployment rates 
fell and per capita income increased in practically all CIS countries (see Table 
6.1). In 2006, average per capita income in the CIS (PPP at 2005 prices), 
was $9122, compared with $8871 in 1991 (UNECE , 2008). However, after 
a period of systemic economic crisis, not all the republics have reached the 
4 Sale of services is not discussed in this paper.
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per capita income levels of the former Soviet Union, which were $3498 in 
1980 and $2685 in 1990 (at current exchange rates and prices) (UNCTAD, 
2007a: 399). 
The socioeconomic picture varies across the CIS. According to World Bank 
country classification, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, 
Turkmenistan and Ukraine are lower middle income countries. Three countries 
– Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan – remain in the low-income group of 
countries. The socioeconomic situation is somewhat better in Russia and 
Kazakhstan. These two countries have considerably improved their position in 
the world economy in the last two or three years, moving into the upper middle 
income group (World Bank, 2007: 333). 
The most notable feature of the CIS economy is the presence of a major player 
whose national economy dwarfs those of its partners: Russia accounts for 77-
78% of the Commonwealth’s GDP. This explains the heavy influence Russia 
exerts on the CIS economy, and particularly on foreign trade. 
GDP ($ million)
Population 
(thousand 
people)
Per capita  
GDP ($)
GDP 
growth 
rate (%)
Per  
capita 
GDP 
growth 
rate (%)
Unemployment 
rate (%)
1995 2007 2007 1995 2007* 1995-2005
1995-
2005 1997 2007
Armenia 1287 9177 3001 399 308 8. 9.1 11.0 .
Azerbaijan 3079 3128 871 39 3 10.7 9.9 1.3 1.2
Belarus 138 771 9702 139 1 . 7.1 2.8 1.0
Georgia 2721 1017 39 1 231 .7 7.0 7. 13.3
Kazakhstan 207 103,80 181 1291 708 .8 7. 12.8** 7.3
Kyrgyzstan 192 30 23 32 9 . 3.2 3.1 3.2
Moldova 17 39 3792 03 119 2. 3.7 8.** .1
Russia 399,1 1,291,011 11,3 277 911 . .8 10.8 .1
Tajikistan 1230 3712 70 213 1 .3 .0 2.8 2.
Turkmenistan 2188 12933 93 22 20 . 3.2 - -
Uzbekistan 13 22308 288 88 830 . 3.0 0.3 0.2
Ukraine 808 10,8 383 93 3029 3.8 .7 11.** .
Table 6. 1.  
Macroeconomic 
indicators of CIS 
countries
Source:  
UNCTAD (2007a: 
398-399, 08-
09), UN (2007: 
13), World Bank 
(2008a), UN (2009: 
139) 
Note:  
* calculation based 
on World Bank data;  
** 2000 data.
The collapse in the former Soviet republics’ foreign trade in the early 1990s 
was followed by steady growth of both imports and exports. This positive 
dynamic allowed the CIS to increase its share in world commodity exports and 
imports from 1.5% to 3.6% and from 1.2% to 2.3% respectively in 1993-
2006 (WTO, 2007: 10-11). By comparison, in 1983, the former Soviet 
Union’s share of world exports and imports was 5% and 4.3% respectively 
(WTO, 2007: 10-11). It had been expected that by 2009, the CIS’ foreign 
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trade including merchandise exports and imports, would total $1.4 trillion, 
thus accounting for 4.2 % of the world’s trade in value terms (UN, 2008a). 
However, the global crisis has necessitated an adjustment to this forecast: in 
2009, the CIS’ share in world exports may drop by 4.2%, whilst global exports 
may fall by 4.4% (UN, 2009: 37). 
The CIS as a regional bloc has a high degree of variation and imbalance in its 
trade patterns, which can be explained by the inclusion of a member country 
the size of whose economy vastly exceeds that of all the other members. As 
a rule, the share in regional trade of large economies is relatively small. Trade 
with other CIS countries accounts for only 14-15% of Russia’s total foreign 
trade revenues, whereas in countries such as Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and 
Kyrgyzstan the ratio may be about 40% (CIS Executive Board, 2008). This 
situation is typical of other RTAs which include a large economy, for example, 
NAFTA: regional trade accounts for about 30% of total foreign trade in the 
United States, compared with over 70% in Canada and Mexico.
Intra-regional trade is more balanced in blocs which have no distinct leader, 
for example, the EU. 
The uniformity of trade in a bloc is measured by comparing two indices, namely 
the total share of intra-regional trade in the bloc’s total foreign trade, and its 
average share, which is calculated as an arithmetic mean of the foreign trade 
of the member states. If the first index exceeds the second one, this suggests 
that the trading bloc includes economies of different sizes. Again, this may be 
explained by the presence of a large member. In 2007, the average share of 
intra-regional trade in the CIS’ total foreign trade was 36%, whereas the total 
share was 24%.
The CIS has chosen to integrate itself into the global economy. Member 
states’ economies have been liberalised and as a result are opened up to 
world trade. The most commonly used indicator of an economy’s integration 
into international trade and the global economy is the ratio of the country’s (or 
region’s) foreign trade to its GDP. All CIS countries have seen a considerable 
increase in the openness indicator (see Figure 6.2). At present, it averages 
50% across the CIS, i.e., in line with the average world index and even 
exceeding that of some regional blocs (see Table 6.2).
During the period of economic recovery, the rapid growth of foreign trade in 
CIS member states was accompanied by an increase in intra-regional trade. 
Merchandise trade in the bloc increased from $60 billion in 1995 to $192 
billion in 2007 (CIS Executive Board, 2008). However, although volumes 
increased, there was a steady relative decrease, i.e., a decline in intra-regional 
trade’s share of total CIS foreign trade. In 1990, merchandise trade between 
the former Soviet republics accounted for 77% of all trade, falling to 34% 
in 1994 (UNCTAD, 2007b: 101) and 24% in 2007. This may be the result 
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Figure 6.2.  
Openness of CIS 
economies in 199 
and 200
Source:  
calculation based 
on data from the 
UN ECE (200a: 
10-10), World 
Bank (199: 210-
211, 21-217), 
World Bank (1997: 
218-219) and 
World Bank (2007: 
30-33).
of changes in the geographic structure of the foreign trade of CIS member 
countries. Many of them are playing a more active role in international trade 
and establish trading relations outside the CIS. Regional imports remain 
important for most of them (see Figure 6.3), whereas markets beyond the CIS 
are taking a greater share of exports. The EU is becoming the main trading 
partner for most CIS countries, accounting for a major share of exports 
from Armenia (45%), Azerbaijan (57%), Belarus (46%), Kazakhstan (45%), 
Moldova (51%), Russia (59%) and Ukraine (32%) (WTO, 2008b).
Figure 6.3.  
Trade between CIS 
countries* in 2007
Source:  
calculation based on 
CIS Executive Board 
data (2008).
Note:  
* no data on 
Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan available.
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The expansion and diversification of CIS countries’ export markets is reflected 
in changes in the export market concentration index, which is calculated as:
EMC = 100* 
where:
EMCij = export market concentration index;
Xij = exports of country ‘i’ to country ‘j’;
Xi = total exports of country ‘i’.
The value of this index can vary from 0 to 100 – the maximum indicating that 
only one trading partner exists. This index is influenced by cyclical fluctuations 
and changes of relative prices on international markets. Therefore, in 
order to understand the dynamics of this index, average values for a given 
period are normally used. During the period of economic reform, export 
market concentration decreased considerably in most CIS countries except 
Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Uzbekistan (see Figure 6.4).
Figure 6.4.  
CIS export market 
concentration in 
199-200*
Source:  
World Bank (2008b)
Note: data on 
Tajikistan and 
Turkmenistan 
incomplete; no 
data on Uzbekistan 
available.
Intra-regional trade as a share of total foreign trade is an important indicator of 
trade integration on a regional level, but not the only one. Another quantitative 
indicator is the regional trade intensity index, i.e., the ratio of intra-regional 
trade’s share of the region’s total foreign trade to the region’s share of total 
world trade (UNCTAD, 2007b: 93). This index is calculated as:
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where: 
RTI = regional trade intensity index;
ХАА and МАА = intra-regional exports and imports of region A;
ХА and МА = total exports and imports of region A;
XW and MW = world export and import.
The value of this index is 1 where the countries of a regional grouping trade 
with each other at the same intensity as with other world markets. If the 
threshold value is exceeded, this indicates that some regional preferences 
exist within the geographic structure of foreign trade. In 2007, trade between 
CIS countries accounted for 24% of the CIS’ total foreign trade, and the CIS’ 
share in the world trade was 3.6%. Although it has decreased to some extent, 
intra-regional trade in the CIS is of a high intensity comparable to that of other 
regional blocs (see Table 6.2). 
CIS* ASEAN EU MERCOSUR NAFTA
Share of total foreign trade 
to GDP (%) 0 139 3 22 28
Share of total foeign trade in 
the world trade** (%) 3. . 1.9 1. 21.
Share of intra-regional trade 
in total foreign trade (%) 23.1 2.2 8.2 1.8 1.
Regional trade intensity index . 3.7 1.12 11.2 1.9
Table 6. 2.  
Trade integration  
of regional blocs  
in 200
Source:  
calculated using 
data from the CIS 
Executive Board 
(2008), WTO 
(2007: 2-2, 
212-213), UNCTAD 
(2007a: 8-9), 
WTO (2008a) and 
Eurostat (2008: 
10, 188).
Note:  
*2007 data;  
**excluding total 
foreign trade
The nature of the goods being sold abroad by CIS countries is also changing. 
The range of products manufactured in the CIS which can compete on world 
markets is shrinking. This is reflected in the growth of the export product 
concentration index. Based on the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index, the following 
index can be calculated:
EPC = 
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where: 
EPC = export product concentration index; 
Xij = export of product ‘i’ by country ‘j’;
Xj = total exports of country ‘j’;
n = total number of exports, which may not exceed 261 according to three-
digit Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) system. For any one 
country, the goods taken into account are those which account for at least 
0.3% of its total exports (not less than $100,000).
A maximum value of 100 indicates that a country exports only one product. 
Like the export market concentration index, this index is affected by cyclical 
fluctuations; therefore, calculations are based on average values for several 
years. 
During the period of economic reform, export product concentration increased 
considerably in all the CIS countries except Moldova and Uzbekistan (see 
Figure 6.5). The concentration is especially strong in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. 
Figure 6.5.  
CIS export product 
concentration in 
199-200
Source:  
World Bank 
(2008b).
Another unfavourable trend is that CIS exports are dominated by raw materials 
and low-value-added products. The major exports for CIS countries are: 
•  Armenia: ferroalloys (31%), diamonds (27%), alcohol (10%), copper (6%) 
and jewellery (4%); 
•  Azerbaijan: oil (82%), nuts (2%), fruit (1%), cotton (1%) and polyethylene 
(1%);
•  Belarus: fertiliser (19%), tractors (5%), wood (4%), lorries (3%) and iron 
bars (3%);
Expanding Mutual Trade, 
Investment and Finance
Ar
m
en
ia
Az
er
ba
ija
n
Be
lar
us
Ge
or
gia
Ka
za
kh
st
an
Ky
rg
yz
st
an
M
old
ov
a
Ru
ss
ia
Ta
jik
ist
an
Tu
rk
m
en
ist
an
Uk
ra
ine
Uz
be
kis
ta
n
1995–99 2004–04 2005–06
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
80
123Eurasian Development Bank
•  Georgia: scrap iron (15%), oil (11%), vine (8%), soft drinks (7%) and 
ferroalloys (6%);
•  Kazakhstan: oil (56%), copper (6%), ferroalloys (5%), coal (2%) and iron ore 
(2%);
•  Kyrgyzstan: iron scrap (11%), cotton (9%), glass (7%), electric power (7%), 
non-ferrous metals (4%);
•  Moldova: vine (20%), iron bars (13%), iron wire (8%), shoes (4%) and 
alcohol (3%); 
• Russia: oil (44%), gas (6%), aluminium (3%), coal (3%) and steel ware 
(2%);
•  Tajikistan: aluminium (64%), cotton (19%), fruit (3%), men’s cloths (2%) 
and cotton fabric (2%);
•  Turkmenistan: gas (84%), oil (5%), cotton (2%), cotton yarn (2%) and 
polypropylene (1%);
•  Uzbekistan: cotton (20%), gas (16%), cars (9%), copper (9%) and gold 
(6%); 
•  Ukraine: steel blanks (10%), steel-rolled stock (5%), sheet steel (4%), 
ferroalloys (3%) and fertiliser (3%) (World Bank, 2008b).
The product composition of the CIS’ foreign trade is uneven: exports are 
dominated by raw materials and imports by finished goods (see Figure 
6. 6). The structure of exports, of which fuel accounts for about 56%, differs 
significantly from global trade structure, where both exports and imports 
are dominated by manufactures (70%), with fuel accounting for 15%. This 
indicates that fuel is the CIS’ niche in world markets, and that the CIS has a 
comparative advantage in this niche (according to the Balassa approach) 
(Gurova I.P., 2008: 25). 
Figure 6.6.  
World and CIS trade 
product structure  
in 200
Source:  
WTO (2007: -7).
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CIS countries can be divided in two groups: net oil exporters (Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) and net oil importers 
(Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan and Ukraine) (UN, 
2008b:142). The first group has a stable positive trade balance, whereas 
most net oil importers have a persistent trade deficit (see Figure 6.7). On the 
whole, the CIS has a stable export surplus, which totalled $141.7 billion in 
2007, or 43% of total CIS imports (CIS Executive Board, 2008). This creates 
favourable conditions for advance of regional integration and, in particular, for 
establishing a regional reserve currency zone.
Figure 6.7.  
CIS trade balance  
in 199-200
Source:  
UNCTAD 
(2007a:).
Prior to the global financial crisis, the CIS had emerged from the economic 
recession caused by economic reforms and had managed to restore its main 
macroeconomic indicators (GDD and per capita GDP) and regain its position 
in world trade. Following the reforms, the CIS opened up to world markets, 
and CIS countries were integrated into world trade. They expanded their 
trading relationships outside the Commonwealth, diversifying the geographic 
structure of their foreign trade. The relative decrease in intra-regional trade 
has not resulted in any decrease in trade volumes. Intra-regional trade 
remains strong, which has helped the CIS establish itself as a trading bloc of 
nations aiming towards regional and global integration. However, this bloc 
has its peculiarities, above all, the differing size of its constituent economies, 
and the effect that Russia’s vast economy has on the macroeconomic and 
trade indicators of the Commonwealth. During a period of economic recovery, 
Russia’s heavyweight influence is to be welcomed, since it supports a stable 
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export surplus and strengthens the bloc’s position in the global economy. 
However, in crisis conditions, the slowing down of Russia’s economic growth 
may trigger recession in other CIS countries. Despite the success achieved 
by the former Soviet republics in regaining their pre-reform economic status, 
the global crisis has now revealed the key weakness of this trading bloc – its 
reliance on raw materials for export trade. 
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The Heads of EurAsEC member countries have stressed on many occasions 
that the development of investments is one of the main tasks for this 
integration group. This primarily concerns Russia’s investment policy. In the 
1990s and early 2000s, the main recipients of Russian investments were 
European countries. However, the portion received by EurAsEC countries has 
increased significantly over the last few years. 
This increase in Russian investments in EurAsEC has been facilitated by a 
number of factors. 
First, EurAsEC obviously has become a priority in Russia’s economic policy 
in the post-Soviet space. The political convergence of Russia and other 
EurAsEC countries also helps to promote investments. Russia supports the 
political regimes of those countries that she understands well, while the West 
accuses them of being undemocratic and abusers of human rights, and a real 
threat to the national security of some EurAsEC countries. 
Second, the first Russian transnational corporations have matured and 
built financial muscle, and now they are turning their attention to attractive 
assets in Central Asian countries, which are less familiar to them compared 
to the European members of the CIS. Small and medium-size businesses are 
realising their foreign trade ambitions on an increasing scale, as competition in 
Russia becomes tougher. These types of businesses always tend to expand to 
neighbouring markets, and many Russian regions border EurAsEC countries 
with which they have had close economic, cultural and family links since the 
Soviet era. 
Third, EurAsEC countries possess vast deposits of oil, gas and other fossil 
minerals. A realistic assessment of the prospects of the world hydrocarbons 
market and Russia’s domestic demand and export obligations urges Russian 
companies to develop the production of oil and gas in these countries. 
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Fourth, privatisation is still under way in many EurAsEC countries, and 
there are attractive opportunities that would be much cheaper for Russian 
businesses than elsewhere. Russian investors understand the mentality of 
the local population and the particular features of doing business in these 
countries. 
Fifth, EurAsEC countries are a promising internal market with a rapidly 
growing population and gradually rising income, and this makes them 
attractive for Russian production and service companies. In particular, these 
countries may have the highest demand for Russian mechanical engineering 
products. This in turn will improve the general structure of Russian exports 
and provide new opportunities to set up assembly factories, and develop or 
restore cooperation in production. The region’s vast labour resources allow 
labour-intensive production to be launched there with a view to exporting 
products back to Russia. 
Sixth, strengthening links with EurAsEC is in line with the general trend 
towards the geographic diversification of Russia’s external links, first of all in 
the direction of Asia. In doing so, EurAsEC members would become a bridge 
enabling Russia to establish links with remote Asian countries. 
Seventh, the increasing economic expansion by Western powers, China and 
some CIS countries in this geopolitically important region requires an adequate 
economic response by Russia. 
The financial and economic crisis of 2008-2009 strengthened EurAsEC 
countries’ enthusiasm for mutual cooperation even further. As a real 
step towards this cooperation, the Anti-crisis Fund was established. 
The resources of this Fund will be disbursed in the form of stabilisation 
loans at arm’s length basis in the event of a cash gap or a lack of 
funds for urgent welfare payments. To provide support to EurAsEC 
countries, bilateral channels will also be used. Large loans were extended 
by Russia to Belarus and Kyrgyzstan. For example, the main portion of the 
Russian loan to Kyrgyzstan ($1.7 billion) is to be invested in the construction 
of the Kambar-Ata-1 hydropower plant.
This state support is very important for those Russian companies that now 
suffer from a lack of investment. It enables them to continue the projects they 
have already started and make new investments to speed up recovery after 
the crisis and promote economic modernisation of EurAsEC countries.
Investment volumes 
It is quite difficult to assess the volume of Russian direct investment 
in specific EurAsEC countries, as the various ministries use different 
calculation methods. For instance, the Russian statistics service records only 
gross investments by non-financial organisations and disregards withdrawals 
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from foreign companies, whereas the Central Bank records real cash flows as 
reflected in a balance of payments.
Considerable deviations take place because the Central Bank assesses 
reinvested income, which makes up a major portion of the increase in 
investments. 
This is not the point, however. Russian investments are often masked with 
foreign, mostly offshore names. In these cases, a foreign company located 
outside EurAsEC is often taken as the investment entity for statistical 
reporting, although the main assets of such a company are located in a 
EurAsEC country. This practice was exemplified by one of the major 
transactions by a Russian company in EurAsEC: in 2005 LUKoil via LUKoil 
Overseas Holding Ltd. purchased Nelson Resources Ltd., a company 
registered in the BVI. The new owner is Caspian Investments Resources 
(CIR), a 100% subsidiary of LUKoil Overseas Holding Ltd. The cost of this 
transaction exceeded $2.1 billion, which is 2.5 times the cumulative direct 
and portfolio investment, according to the Russian statistics service, and 
nearly 30% of such investments according to the Central Bank1. Another 
example is the purchase of the gold company Celtic Resources (Ireland) by 
Severstal for about $330 million, which was completed in January 2008. 
The main assets of the Irish company are located in Kazakhstan (100% of 
the Suzdal gold mine, 75% of the Zherek gold mine, and 50% of the Shorsky 
molybdenum mine) and Russia (74.5% in the Tominskoye copper and gold 
deposit development project and 100% of the Mikheyevskoye copper and 
gold deposit in Chelyabinsk Oblast). There are some other notable examples. 
According to the Russian statistics service, the breakdown of Russian 
investments in EurAsEC countries and EurAsEC investments in Russia is as 
follows: 
1 In 2007, 50% of shares in CIR was sold to Mittal Investments, an Indian company owned by 
Lakshmi Mittal.
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Russia’s investments  
in EurAsEC
EurAsEC investments  
in Russia
2000 2008 2000 2008
All All Direct and portfolio All All
Direct and 
portfolio 
Belarus 90.2 10.0 1323.3 2. 193. .9
Kazakhstan 2.2 17.3 79.2 .7 10.7 380.0
Kyrgyzstan 0.0 39.8 0.1 0.1 . 27.3
Tajikistan 0.0 28.1 1.1 0.0 8.9 0.1
Uzbekistan 0. 38.1 20.8 3. 11. 10.1
Total EurAsEC 92.8 2132.3 1. 11. 13.9 72.
Total CIS 555.6 4084.9 3067.6 19.3 1758.9 756.3
Table 7. 1.  
Cumulative mutual 
investments by 
Russia and EurAsEC 
countries, as at the 
end of the year  
($ million)*
Note: * excluding 
monetary regulation 
bodies and 
commercial and 
savings banks.
Source: Federal 
State Statistics 
Service.
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As can be seen from the above table, in the beginning of 2009 EurAsEC 
countries accounted for 53.9% of all Russian investments in the CIS (and 
49.1% of direct investments). Belarus has advanced to a leading position in 
EurAsEC due to a single long-term transaction (Gazprom purchased 50% 
shares in Beltransgaz for $2.5 billion, which will be transferred in 2007–
2010 in equal installments 12.5% each, i.e. Gazprom will annually invest 
$625 million). Kazakhstan with its rapidly growing economy has long ranked 
second, but in 2007 it was surpassed by Uzbekistan due to a number of new 
Russian projects. 
Russia accounts for 76.5% of all investments in the CIS and 62.5% of direct 
cumulative investments by EurAsEC countries. 
Notably, in all EurAsEC countries Russia falls significantly behind other foreign 
investors in terms of direct investments. For example, in Kazakhstan in the 
beginning of 2007, Russian investments accounted for as little as 3% of all 
foreign direct investment, whilst investments by the US, the Netherlands and 
the UK accounted for 29%, 15% and 11%, respectively. In terms of direct 
investments in Kazakhstan, Switzerland, France, China and Canada also 
surpass Russia2. In Kyrgyzstan, Russian investments in 2007 accounted 
for 3.3% of foreign direct investments, whilst Kazakhstan’s investments 
accounted for 46.6%. 
Interestingly, the balance of investments by Russia and some EurAsEC 
countries is not in favour of Russia. This can be explained, first of all, by 
investments by Kazakhstan, which is second only to Russia in post-Soviet 
countries. 
Investments in joint hydrocarbons production 
The main targets for Russian investments in EurAsEC countries are the fuel 
and energy sectors. It is natural, since the region possesses vast resources, 
and EurAsEC countries desperately need investments. Some oil and gas 
production projects are closely associated with joint reconstruction of existing 
pipelines or construction of new ones for exporting fuel and raw materials. 
One of the most active Russian players in EurAsEC is LUKoil. It has participated 
in eleven oil projects in Kazakhstan since 1995, when a contract for the 
development of the northern part of Kumkol was made. Since that time LUKoil 
has invested in Kazakhstan’s economy over $4.5 billion. LUKoil is a stakeholder 
in the Karachaganak project (15%) and has a 50% share in the Tyub-Karagan 
and Atashsky blocks located on the Caspian shelf (both of them are parts of the 
Dostyk project). LUKoil Overseas Holding Ltd. holds 54% of shares in LukArco, 
which in turn owns 12.5% in the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC)3 and 5% 
2 Exclusive, October 2007.
3 The other members of CPC are the Government of Russia (CPC-R, 24%) and the Government 
of Kazakhstan (CPC-K, 19%).
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in Tengiz, a major oil and gas deposit. In conjunction with Kazakh companies, 
LUKoil and Rosneft will explore and develop three more large deposits on the 
Caspian shelf. 
In 2004, LUKoil founded the operating company LUKoil Uzbekistan Operating 
Company through LUKoil Overseas Holding Ltd. In June 2004, a PSA was 
made with the state company Uzbekneftegaz, under which LUKoil Uzbekistan 
Operating Company obtained the rights to commercial development of the 
Kandym, Khauzak and Shady deposits in southwest Uzbekistan for 35 years, 
and exploration of the promising Kungradsky areas in the Ustyrt plateau in 
west Uzbekistan, which hold about 300 billion m3 of gas and 7 million tons of 
gas condensate in total. LUKoil will invest about $1 billion. 
These deposits have been developed since 2007; during phase one, production 
will total 2.5 billion m3 annually, which will require $200 million in investments. 
In 2007–2010, LUKoil will invest another $500 million to boost annual 
production to 8 billion m3 starting from 2010. During the initial phase, the 
produced gas will be divided among the parties on an equal basis, but in the 
future the shares may change depending on the project’s profitability. This 
project also includes the construction of a natural gas chemical complex with 
an annual capacity of 6 billion m3 (total cost $250 million), two compressor 
plants and a 200 km main gas pipeline by 2010. 
Jointly with KazMunaiGaz of Kazakhstan, Rosneft will develop the Kurmangazy 
deposit on the Caspian shelf in accordance with a PSA made for 55 years. The 
total cost of this project is estimated at $23 billion. The first exploration well 
was drilled there in 2006. 
Gazprom also seeks to expand its presence in EurAsEC countries. In 
Kazakhstan, this Russian gas monopoly founded the joint venture KazRosGaz. 
In 2006 Gazprom and the Government of Kyrgyzstan agreed to form a joint 
venture that will consist of the assets of Kyrgyzgaz and Kyrgyzneftegaz. In 
Belarus, Gazprom strives to secure safe conditions for gas transit to Europe. 
A long-term strategic approach towards the development of contacts 
with EurAsEC countries is vital for joint investments in the production, 
transportation and processing of hydrocarbons. Considering this, it is 
important to consider the strategic agreements that Gazprom has secured 
with Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan since 2000. 
In December 2002, Gazprom made an agreement on strategic partnership 
in the gas sector with Uzbekneftegaz. It provides for long-term supplies of 
Uzbek gas in 2003–2012, Gazprom’s participation in natural gas production 
projects in Uzbekistan on the terms set forth in PSAs, and cooperation in the 
development of Uzbekistan’s gas transport infrastructure and transit of gas 
via the country’s territory. 
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To further this agreement, Gazprom and Uztransgaz executed a medium-term 
agreement on transportation of natural gas in 2006–2010 in September 
2005, and the Agreement on the Basic Principles of Geological Exploration 
of Investment Blocks in the Ustyurt Region, the Republic of Uzbekistan in 
January 2006. As part of this strategic partnership, Gazprom recommenced 
gas production at the Shakhpakhty filed on the PSA terms, and intends to 
produce 500 million m3 of natural gas annually. Gazprom’s investments in this 
project totals $21 million. 
In December 2006, Uzbekneftegaz granted Gazprom licences to carry 
out geological exploration in seven investment blocks in the Ustyrt region: 
Aktumsuksky, Kuanyshsky, Agyinsky, Nasambeksky, West Uzginsky, 
Akchalaksky and Shakhpakhtinsky. These blocks have a total area of 
38100 km2, and hold about 1 trillion m3 of natural gas. 
In accordance with existing agreements, Gazprom had to come up with 
a phased geological exploration programme for these blocks and, in the 
event of a commercial discovery, will have the exclusive right to negotiate 
with Uzbekistan the development of these reserves on the PSA terms. 
To implement this agreement, a Managing Committee will be established. 
Gazprom will have invested about $1.5 billion in this project, including 
$260 million in 2006–2008. 
Geological exploration and seismic surveys by Gazprom specialists 
revealed insignificant hydrocarbons reserves in three blocks (Akchalaksky, 
Kuanyshsky and West Urginsky), and Gazprom abandoned the project. 
Experts comment that this decision was in line with Gazprom’s efforts to 
reasonably reduce its investment programme in the face of the crisis. As 
a result, the Government of Uzbekistan ordered the State Committee on 
Geology and Mineral Resources and Uzbekneftegaz to revoke these 
licences4. 
Gazprom and KazMunaiGaz founded a joint venture on the basis of the 
Orenburg Gas Processing Plant (OGPP), which will process Kazakh gas 
from Karachaganak and the North Caspian. Thus, additional workload will 
be provided to the OGPP to make up for the depletion of the Orenburg gas 
condensate field. Production by this facility dropped from 34.6 billion m3 in 
1993 to 18.3 billion m3 in 2005, whereas its annual capacity is 28 billion m3. 
The proposed joint venture has been under negotiation since the mid-1990s, 
but positive decisions, particularly, in respect of gas prices and supply volumes 
in 2006, were achieved only as a result of personal agreement between 
President Putin and President Nazarbayev. 
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In 2006, Gazprom and the Government of Tajikistan executed a memorandum 
on cooperation in the energy sector, which creates a legal framework for 
the creation of a joint venture to explore, produce and sell natural gas, and 
other projects in this sector, including reconstruction, modernisation and 
construction of gas pipelines. 
Transport infrastructure 
Investment cooperation of EurAsEC countries on infrastructure projects has 
not developed on a large scale. On the other hand, there is an urgent need to 
rehabilitate and expand infrastructure in EurAsEC countries, which in many 
cases seriously impedes their economic development. 
Bearing in mind the long payback periods and capital intensity of infrastructure 
projects, EurAsEC countries show enthusiasm for cooperation, especially 
for projects relating to transit infrastructure and facilities located near 
borders. Many EurAsEC countries are planning considerable investments in 
infrastructure projects. For example, investments in transport infrastructure 
in Russia may total $600 billion by 2015, and government investments will 
account for 50%5. 
The construction of the Caspian gas pipeline and other gas transportation 
facilities in the region will be critical for the development of the oil and gas 
sector in EurAsEC. The presidents of Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan agreed to this in May 2007. A declaration signed by the 
presidents will allow up to 90 billion m3 of gas to be transported via Russia. 
The Caspian gas pipeline will be laid along the coastline through Turkmenistan 
(360 km), Kazakhstan (150 km) and Russia. The pipeline will be constructed 
by the Kazakh party in Kazakhstan and by the Turkmen party in Turkmenistan; 
then it will join the old Central Asia–Centre system at Aleksandrov Gai on the 
Kazakh-Russian border. In addition, Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan 
agreed to reconstruct the existing gas transportation system and increase 
the annual capacity of the two old branches of the Central Asia–Centre pipeline 
to 12 billion m3. One more project is being discussed – to construct an East–
West trans-Turkmen pipeline for transporting natural gas from northwest 
Turkmenistan to the Caspian pipeline system. Thus, additional workload for 
the Caspian pipeline will be secured. The East–West pipeline will have a length 
of 600 km, and the project cost will exceed $1 billion.6
Cooperation in the construction of cross-border motorways is also expanding. 
A new motorway to Lake Issyk-Kul (Almaty–Cholpon Ata) is in the pipeline. This 
commercial road will be 200 km shorter than the existing one. Its length will 
be 88 km, including 62 km in Kazakhstan. The construction cost will be about 
5 Vedomosti, 19 February 2008.
6 Russia and Turkmenistan to Construct New Gas Pipeline and Transcontinental Motorway 
(http://site.securities.com/doc.html?pc=RU&print=1&doc_id=214).
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$3.5 million per km, and the expected traffic intensity will be up to 10000 cars 
per day. This new road will provide easier access to the Kyrgyz resort facilities 
on the shore of Issyk-Kul, which were transferred to the Kazakhs. 
Turkmenistan has invited Russian Railways to participate in a project to 
launch a ferry line between Turkmenbashi and Makhachkala, and also to act as 
general contractor in the project to construct the eastern part of the North–
South transport corridor (the Kazakhstan–Turkmenistan–Iran railway). This 
railway will be laid along the Caspian Sea and have a length of 697 km.
The power sector
One of the largest investment projects in the CIS in which the Russian public 
and private sectors are participating is the completion of Sangtudinskaya 
Hydropower plant 1 (project capacity 670 MW). The construction of this plant 
started in the late 1980s, but was soon discontinued due to a lack of funds. 
Negotiations over completion of Sangtudinskaya between Russia and Tajikistan 
started in 2003, and in September 2004, Iran joined these negotiations. 
In January 2005, Russia, Tajikistan and Iran signed a memorandum on the 
completion of Sangtudinskaya HPP 1 and 2. In accordance with this document, 
Plant 1 will be fully completed by the Russian and Tajik parties. The Iranian 
party, on the other hand, will fully complete Plant 2 in conjunction with the Tajik 
party. To construct Plant 1, the joint stock company Sangtudinskaya HPP1 
was founded, in which Russia and Tajikistan are represented by INTER RAO 
(75%) and the Tajik Ministry of Energy (25%), respectively. 
Sangtudinskaya Hydropower plants 1 and 2 will satisfy Tajikistan’s domestic 
demand and also export electric power to Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan and 
some power-starved oblasts of Russia. In addition, these plants will play a key 
role in regulating the region’s water balance. 
In 2009, INTER RAO will commence construction of three medium-capacity 
hydropower plants. Total investment in these plants is estimated at $1 billion.7 
In the future, the programme of building small hydropower plants for remote 
towns in mountainous areas may be expanded, as this need exists all over 
Tajikistan. By 2025, over 60 small hydropower plants will be constructed in 
the country. There is also a project to modernise the Nurekskaya hydropower 
plant.
Also of note is the long-standing cooperation between INTER RAO UES and 
Kazakhstan in power production using coal from the Ekibsatuz coal deposit 
in Kazakhstan (Severny and Bogatyr open pits). In 2005, on the basis of 
Ekibastuz GRES-2, a joint venture was founded in which INTER RAO UES 
received 50% of the shares. Thus, the debt of the National Electric Grids 
Kazakhstanenergo to INTER RAO for power supplied in 1993–1996 for a 
7 Half of all investments in Tajikistan are Russian // Finance, 28 March 2009.  
(http://www.finansmag.ru/news/9033).
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total of $239 million was settled. Ekibastuz GRES-2 is a major power plant in 
North Kazakhstan. Its share in the total volume of power generated in 
Kazakhstan is 10-12%. 
In the end of 2007, Rusal and the Kazakh holding company for state assets 
management, Samruk, founded the joint venture Bogatyr Komir through 
which they participated in the development of the coal and power industries 
in Kazakhstan. Bogatyr Komir produces coal at the Ekibastuz coal deposit 
(Bogatyr and Severny open pits). In accordance with the signed agreements, 
Rusal assigned 50% of its shares in Bogatyr and Severny to Samruk, which 
were received under the agreement on merging the assets of Rusal, SUAL 
and Glencore. Bogatyr Komir will supply coal to satisfy demand in Russia and 
Kazakhstan, and the parties will also consider building new power plants on 
the basis of supporting the development of the metal industry8. Notably, this 
cooperation has not lost momentum despite the crisis. At present, Rusal 
and Samruk-Energo are implementing a programme to modernise Bogatyr 
Komir with a total of €390 million9 in investments.
In February 2008, INTER RAO UES offered to buy 48% of Uzbekistan’s 
shares in Syrdaryinskaya Thermal Power Station (which generates about 
32% of all electricity in the country) and invest up to $170 million in its 
modernisation. The Government of Uzbekistan will retain the controlling block 
of 51%. This offer indicates that INTER RAO UES has revised its strategy, 
as previously it considered privatising power plants in Uzbekistan to be 
uneconomic if the Government retains control over them10.
In the beginning of 2009, Russia and Kyrgyzstan signed an agreement which 
will allow their cooperation in constructing and operating Kambar-Atinskaya 
hydropower plants 1 and 2, and the Verkhne-Narynsky and Sary-Dzhazsky 
chains of hydropower plants to be optimised, and investments to be made 
in power distribution companies – Severelektro in particular. INTER RAO is 
implementing this project; this company wishes to acquire a number of assets 
such as Severelektro, Bishkekteploset and the Bishkek Thermal Power Plant, 
which are due to be privatised. 
The cooperation of EurAsEC countries in the nuclear sector is of strategic 
importance. At present, the production of natural uranium in Russia barely 
satisfies 20% of the needs of Russian reactors, which, according to the 
Federal Agency of Subsoil Use, will increase by 1.6-1.7 times by 2020. 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have large uranium deposits. 
Russia holds 5% of the world uranium reserves, whereas Kazakhstan holds 
17%, being second only to Australia (24%). 
8 http://www.relcom.ru/Right?id=20071129155429.
9 Y. Dorokhov. Time to Unite Countries // Ekspert. 2009. No.12 (30 March). 
10 http://www.quote.ru/fterm_comment/index.shtml?2005/10/11/1205451.
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In 2006, a programme of strategic partnership of Russia and Kazakhstan 
in nuclear fuel production was drawn up, and Tekhsnabeksport, 
Atomstroieksport and Kazatomprom executed respective memoranda. In 
accordance with this programme, the founding documents of three Russian-
Kazakh nuclear joint ventures were signed: 
• Akbastau (development of the South Zarechnoye and Budennovskoye 
deposits in Kazakhstan to supply nuclear fuel to Russian-built reactors); 
•  Uranium Enrichment Centre (isotopic enrichment);
•  Atomic Plants (development of a nuclear reactor with new type VBEP-300 
power generating units and its promotion in Russia, Kazakhstan and other 
countries). 
The signed documents of these three joint ventures provide that Russian and 
Kazakh companies will participate in them on a parity basis. 
For example, the Uranium Enrichment Centre will be created on the basis of 
the Angarsk Electrolysis Chemical Works. Kazatomprom and 
Tekhsnabeksport paid in its charter capital of 43 million roubles on a parity 
basis. The Uranium Enrichment Centre will supply its products to Russia, 
Kazakhstan and external markets. Ukraine was invited to participate in the 
Uranium Enrichment Centre, and other CIS countries expressed interest in 
its activities. In April 2007, Rosatom and the Ministry of the Environment 
of Armenia signed a letter of intent in respect of uranium exploration, 
production and processing. 
Early on, the Russian-Kazakh joint venture Zarechnoye was founded to 
produce uranium at a deposit of the same name in the Otrarsky District, 
South Kazakhstan Oblast. The total reserves of this deposit are estimated at 
19000 tons of uranium. Zarechnoye produced its first uranium in December 
2006, and is expected to reach its design capacity of 1000 tons per annum 
in 2009. 
In March 2009, all uranium assets of the Russian group in Kazakhstan were 
consolidated. The Russian uranium holding company Atomredmetzoloto, 
member of Rosatom, acquired a 50% share in Karatau LLP and 25% of 
shares in the joint venture Akbastau, which it controls via Effective Energy 
N.V. After completion of this transaction, Atomredmetzoloto consolidated all 
Russian uranium assets in three joint ventures created with Kazatomprom: 
Zarechnoye, Akbastau and Karatau (50% in each). This consolidation of 
assets by Atomredmetzoloto was part of an intergovernmental 
programme between Russia and Kazakhstan. The acquisition of these 
assets places Atomredmetzoloto second among the foreign uranium 
companies operating in Kazakhstan. Atomredmetzoloto announced its plan 
to boost uranium production by its three joint ventures to 6000 tons by 
Expanding Mutual Trade, 
Investment and Finance
137Eurasian Development Bank
2020. At present, Atomredmetzoloto’s production in Russia slightly 
exceeds 3000 tons.
Cooperation with Kyrgyzstan in the uranium sector has also been successful. 
In 2007, Ural Platina Holding, a member of Renova, won an auction for the 
privatisation of EurAsEC’s largest uranium processing facility, the Kara-
Baltinsky Ore Mining Works. Renova offered Kyrgyzstan a project to process 
the accumulated uranium dumps. These tailings will be used to produce 
valuable minerals, which could not be extracted with older technology. 
Technical modernisation of the facility will require $200 million; Renova will 
contribute $50 million, and $150 million will be provided by the EDB.
Cooperation in implementing innovative alternative energy projects has 
also been gaining momentum. For example, the Russian research and 
production company Kvant and the Research Institute Gidropribor (Uralsk, 
Kazakhstan) plan to jointly manufacture equipment capable of producing 
world-class solar cells. Kvant is a leading Russian company that develops 
methods of direct transformation of different types of energy (chemical, solar, 
thermal, etc.) into electricity, self-contained power supply, and diagnostic 
tools that are widely used in research and production. The construction of 
a new Kazakh-Russian facility for manufacture of solar cells with a capacity 
of up to 50 MW per annum will significantly reduce the cost of solar energy, 
and expand its use in the economy.
Key problems 
The investment cooperation of Russia and other EurAsEC countries 
encounters a number of problems; the most important of them are discussed 
below. 
1. Political opposition to investment expansion 
The role of political factors in the development of links between EurAsEC 
countries is becoming more and more important, because any significant 
project needs formal or informal approval at the highest level. 
Sometimes Russian companies encounter the manifestations of the so-
called economic nationalism, or the aspiration to tighten control over natural 
resources. This trend is universal, and can be observed in Russia itself. For 
example, the mass media may publish hostile papers or even statements 
by state officials aimed against Russian companies11. In some cases, the 
situation may lead to an open conflict; this was the case with the completion of 
the Rogun HPP, when the Government of Tajikistan terminated the respective 
agreement with Rusal in August 2007. 
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to privatise not only certain enterprises, or grab them for free. They want to privatise the whole 
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EurAsEC countries often set their national interests against the goals of 
regional integration. They wish to pursue an independent policy and diversify 
their foreign trade. The policy of Western powers plays a prominent role in 
this game, and political investments are being readily made in order to prevent 
Russia’s expansion in EurAsEC. 
2. Lack of flexibility in Russian company policy 
When acquiring assets in EurAsEC countries, Russian companies believe that 
control over property will secure stability and achievement of the set goals, 
e.g. making transit cheaper or enhancing the reliability of supplies. However, in 
practice, the conditions of operating an overseas asset may deteriorate (for 
example, raising rent for land occupied by oil and gas pipelines, introduction of 
new fees, taxes or duties, termination of benefits, environmental claims, etc.)12. 
As a result, all the benefits of possessing an overseas asset may disappear or 
even turn into losses. There is also the risk of the nationalisation of assets in 
the event of change of power. 
3. Increasing competition 
Competition increases at different levels: competition with national 
companies, third country companies, and other Russian companies. In 
contrast to European members of the CIS, national elites and their affiliates 
in EurAsEC countries so far do not mount any significant opposition to the 
Russian expansion. The most serious competitors are the US, Canada, China, 
India, South Korea, Malaysia, the UAE and other countries which have more 
resources and powerful political support at their disposal, pursue a more 
flexible policy, and can offer better terms of cooperation. For example, when 
Gazprom announced its intention to abandon a number of blocks in Uzbekistan 
it considered unpromising, Petronas of Malaysia immediately took over, and 
production will commence there in 2009.
As for competition between Russian companies, it is more pronounced in 
sectors that can provide fast payback such as telecommunications or the 
food industry, rather than in the fuel and energy sector, which requires large 
investment. Consolidation of assets occurs more frequently in the latter 
sector. For example, LUKoil has acquired Soyuzneftegaz Vostok Limited, a 
company with Russian capital that is a party to the PSA on the Southwest 
Gissar and the Ustyurt region in Uzbekistan. 
Recently, competition increased between Russian companies and businesses 
from Ukraine and other post-Soviet countries13. 
12 In 2007 Belarus deprived Beltransgaz of a portion of its profit by cancelling the 18% premium 
on sale of gas to end users. In 2008 Beltransgaz and other Russian assets in Belarus (e.g. Mo-
zyrsky Refinery) were required to pay 19% of their turnover to the Innovation Fund of the Ministry 
of Energy of Belarus. The amount involved is about $70 million annually (Nezavisimaya gazeta, 24 
March 2008).
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4. There was no progress in multilateral cooperation, which would allow 
additional resources to be employed and new areas of common interest to be 
identified. Participation of non-EurAsEC countries is also possible. 
5. Governmental support for the investment expansion of Russian companies 
and investment cooperation in EurAsEC is inadequate. Many Russian 
officials voiced this problem. Some positive developments in this issue were 
observed recently; particularly, it is planned to establish a special agency to 
support Russian overseas investments. This support may include provision 
of information, risk insurance, assistance in receiving export loans, etc. 
New public corporations that have considerable financial resources at their 
disposal will play a more active role in projects of cooperation with EurAsEC 
countries.
Conclusions and proposals 
1. The investment cooperation of companies from Russia and other EurAsEC 
countries is becoming increasingly diverse, and is covering new areas of 
business. This is the manifestation of so-called upward integration, which is so 
far more successful than the formal integration projects being implemented 
in post-Soviet countries. 
2. On the other hand, a number of problems have accumulated in this area; 
these are associated with increasing competition in EurAsEC markets and 
their particular role in modern geopolitics, and many other factors. 
3. All these observations suggest that the authorities in Russia and other 
EurAsEC countries should pay closer attention to the private sector’s efforts 
to expand cooperation, and formulate a sound policy of supporting these 
efforts. Large companies have many tools to exert pressure on governments 
with a view to securing political and administrative support for their investment 
projects. However, the governmental policies of EurAsEC countries need to be 
better aligned with the investment policy of large companies, which should be 
involved in the implementation of strategic projects in the region on a larger 
scale. In line with that, medium and small-size businesses and regions should 
also be involved actively in investment cooperation. State support is vital 
for capital-intensive long-term projects, especially in the energy, power and 
infrastructure sectors. The importance of this type of support will increase as 
many businesses in EurAsEC countries face major financial difficulties. 
13 After negotiations with the Tajik President Rakhmon in March 2008, Ukrainian President 
Yuschenko commented that Ukraine is interested in participating in an international consortium 
for finalising the construction of the Rogun hydropower plant in Tajikistan: “Two Ukrainian-built 
turbines are already installed at this plant. It would be logical to expect that, on completion of the 
plant, the other six turbines will also be Ukrainian-built, provided that the Ukrainian party acts 
deftly”. Yuschenko also stressed that 82% of all equipment installed at hydropower plants in Ta-
jikistan was imported from Ukraine (http://ru.proua.com/news/2008/03/07/123017.html). 
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4. In this context, Russia should play a special role; it should abandon its 
imperial ambitions and build equal partnerships with EurAsEC countries, 
taking their interests into account. It should be realised that EurAsEC 
countries are no longer the same, and the “elder brother” approach, which 
can be disastrous for Russia’s interests, should be abandoned. Paradoxically, 
the crisis provides good opportunities for Russia to do so, and Russia has 
managed to preserve the major portion of its financial resources.
5. Proposals on cooperation by Russian companies should be mutually 
beneficial and competitive compared with other economic players’ projects. 
The main consideration may be the strategic importance of a project, not only 
its financial aspects. Russia should use and strengthen its positive image in 
EurAsEC – the image of a country that is always ready to come to its friends’ 
aid and one that imposes no political conditions. Actions by Russian companies 
should be well coordinated, so as to avoid unreasonable competition in EurAsEC 
countries, and Russian companies should be encouraged to cooperate and 
combine in implementing joint projects.
6. Investment cooperation can provide serious support for Russia’s policy 
by creating a more reliable basis for integration projects in the post-Soviet 
space, both economic and political. More efforts should be made to develop 
and implement multilateral integration initiatives relating to investment 
cooperation in EurAsEC. In doing so, the priority should be to enforce an 
agreement on encouragement and mutual protection of investments in 
EurAsEC countries. This agreement would be an important practical step, 
which would secure long-term stability and predictability of the legal framework 
of investments. It would also serve to improve the mutual investment climate 
and create a common capital market in EurAsEC, which would become a vital 
element of the common economic space. 
7. Formulation of a common policy for EurAsEC countries towards the use 
of energy resources and transport services and cooperation in this area are 
priority economic goals for EurAsEC. It is in line with the main tasks set in the 
anti-crisis programmes of the EurAsEC countries. To complete these tasks 
and expedite development and modernisation after the crisis, it will be critical 
to ensure that the private sector actively participates in these processes, as 
it can introduce the necessary flexibility and efficiency.
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Investor company  
or its affiliate
Asset
First 
transaction 
year1
Price of  
“entry ticket”2, 
$ million
Gazprom
Shakhpakhty (Uzbekistan)
0% of shares in KazRosGaz (Kazakhstan)
0% of shares in Beltransgaz (Belarus) 
200
2002
2007
…
…
200
Gazpromneft
Over 100 petrol stations in Kyrgyzstan
Gazpromneft Tajikistan
Gazpromneft Kazakhstan
200
2007
2007
…
…
…
LUKoil
1% in the Karachaganak PSA (Kazakhstan)
0% in Kumkol (Kazakhstan)
2.7% in Tengiz (Kazakhstan)
0% in Karakuduk (Kazakhstan)
2% in North Buzachi (Kazakhstan)
2% in JV Arman (Kazakhstan)
2% in Kazakhoil-Aktobe
0% in the Tyub-Karagan PSA (Kazakhstan)
0% in Atashsky (Kazakhstan)
12.% in the South Zhambai and South 
Zaburunye PSAs (Kazakhstan)
0% in JV Turgai Petroleum (Kazakhstan)
0% of shares in Nelson Resources 
(Kazakhstan)
90% in the Kandym-Khauzak-Shady PSA 
(Uzbekistan)
20% in the Aral PSA
100% in SNG Holding (Uzbekistan)
1997
199
1997
200–200
200
200
200
200
200
2007
200
200
200
200
2008
…
…
129.1
…
2.130
…
…
803
Rosneft 0% in the Adaisky area (Uzbekistan)RN Kazakhstan (Kazakhstan)
2001
2003–200
…
…
INTER RAO UES
0% in Ekibasruz GRES-2 (Kazakhstan)
7% of shares in Sangtudinskaya hydropower 
plant 1 (Tajikistan)
2003
2003
…
…
Rusal 0% in a JV founded with Samruk (Kazakhstan) 2007
Atomredmetzoloto 0% in Karatau LLP and 2% in JV Akbastau (Kazakhstan) 2009 0-80
3
Renova Kara-Baltinsky Ore Mining Works (Kyrgyzstan) 2007 …
1 The year of first acquisition of an overseas asset or any part of it by a Russian company.
2 The volume of investments which has secured the initial acquisition of assets in a CIS country, 
without obligations to pay their debts (if such information is available, it is given in brackets); later 
on the size of these assets (shown in the second column) would increase or decrease as a result 
of purchase or sale of shares.
3 Estimate.
4 In 2007-2010, 12.5% of shares will be assigned to Gazprom annually.
Table 7. 2.  
Direct Russian 
investments in the 
energy sector and 
infrastructure in 
EurAsEC countries
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Stock markets are an important element of any modern market economy. 
Along with banking systems, they facilitate the efficient distribution of 
resources between borrowers and lenders. As EurAsEC countries made the 
transition to market economics, they had to create new stock markets. 
Prior to the current economic crisis, significant differences in the level of 
development of stock markets across EurAsEC had become apparent 
(see Tables 8.1 and 8.2). Russia and Kazakhstan were the clear leaders (in 
2007, the capitalisation of their stock markets1 was 111.8% and 39.2% of 
GDP, respectively; Kazakhstan’s performance deteriorated in 2007 as the 
economic crisis in that country began to take hold. Russia’s stock market 
not only has a higher level of capitalisation, but also demonstrates higher market 
liquidity: trade in all types of securities on leading national stock exchanges2 
in 2007 totalled 84.1% of GDP, compared with 19.2% in Kazakhstan. 
By comparing the levels of development of the stock markets and banking 
systems of Russia and Kazakhstan, we are able to conclude that in recent 
years Russia has adopted the Anglo-Saxon financial model which is oriented 
towards the stock market, whereas Kazakhstan has adopted the continental 
European model which is focused upon the banking system. However, this is 
only a very basic characterisation. 
Outlook for the Joint 
Development of Stock Market 
Infrastructure in EurAsEC 
Countries
MichaEl golovnin
8
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Belarus 3. .1 2.9 - - - - - -
Kazakhstan 1. 7. . . 7.7 8.7 18.9 .7 39.2
Kyrgyzstan 0. 0.3 0.3 0. 1. 1. 1.7 3.1 3.1
Russia 1.2 1.3 2 3. 1.1 . 71.9 10. 111.8
Uzbekistan 1.9 1 0. 0. 0.2 0 0.3 .3 -
Table 8. 1.  
Stock market 
capitalisation in 
EurAsEC countries, 
1999-2007  
(% of GDP)
Source: EBRD 2008 
Transition Report.
1 We use the term “stock market” in the narrow sense, i.e., a share market.
2 The Moscow Inter-bank Currency Exchange (MICEX) and the Russian Trading System (RTS).
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The stock markets of other EurAsEC countries are significantly 
underdeveloped compared with those of Russia and Kazakhstan. In Tajikistan, 
there is no organised stock market. In Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, stock 
markets are very weak, although some positive developments were seen 
there prior to the global economic crisis (see Tables 8.1 and 8.3). Belarus has 
a robust government stock market3, but so far there has been no significant 
progress in the development of a non-government securities market.
 Shares Government 
stock
Corporate 
bonds
Regional 
bonds
Total Trade 
(% of DP)
Russia  
(MICEX and RTS)
188.2 373. 107137 201.7 108897 8.1
Kazakhstan (KASE) 892. 722. 302. 0.2 1999. 19.2
Belarus (BCSE) 3.7 3. 12.1 0 2.3 10.
Uzbekistan  
(Toshkent NSE)
89.2 0 0. 0 89. 0.
Kyrgyzstan (KSE) 1.1 0.0 0 0 1.1 3.9
Table 8. 2.  
Stock exchange 
trade in EurAsEC 
countries in 2007  
($ million)
Source: 2007 Stock 
Exchange Statistics 
Bulletin. International 
Association of Stock 
Exchanges of the CIS 
(http://mab.micex.
ru/papers). GDP 
data: EBRD 2008 
Transition Report; 
www.gks.ru.
 Shares Government stock Corporate bonds
2007 2006 2007 2006 2007 2006
Russia  
(MICEX and RTS)
.2 2.1 1. 12.2 9. 110
Kazakhstan (KASE) 121. 287 2.9 38. 2.7 7.7
Belarus (BCSE) 1133.3 -78. 38. -2. 8273.3 -
Uzbekistan  
(Toshkent NSE)
-19. 212. - - -0 1.7
Kyrgyzstan (KSE) 2.3 20 … - - -
Table 8. 3.  
Increase in trade on 
the stock markets of 
EurAsEC countries  
(% of the 
corresponding 
period in the 
previous year), ($). 
Source: 2007 Stock 
Exchange Statistics 
Bulletin. International 
Association of Stock 
Exchanges of the CIS 
(http://mab.micex.
ru/papers).
The financial crisis has affected all EurAsEC countries to some extent, but has 
had a significant impact upon the more developed financial systems of Russia 
and Kazakhstan, causing much greater fluctuations in their stock markets. 
The MICEX and KASE indices dropped by 67% and 65% respectively in 2008. 
In the same year, share trade on MICEX and KASE (denominated in $) fell by 
15.7% and 42.8%, respectively. The distribution of EurAsEC stock markets 
in terms of their level of development has not changed significantly, but the 
Russian market is still slightly ahead, albeit in conditions of overall decline. 
Given the outbreak of the financial crisis, the prospects for interaction between 
the stock markets of EurAsEC countries must be reviewed. Whereas the 
main problem for developed EurAsEC stock markets before the crisis was the 
3 Trade on this market in 2007 totalled about 10% of GDP. 
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“drain” of activity from these markets to overseas markets (the London Stock 
Exchange)4, and less developed markets were principally concerned with 
their own development, now their main preoccupation is one of maintaining 
stability. Although it might be assumed, therefore, that the task of increasing 
interaction in this sector is now less urgent, the strategic importance of this 
goal has not diminished. 
Two factors which favour this interaction are, firstly, that countries with 
developed stock markets (Russia and, to some extent, Kazakhstan) would be 
able to assist the other countries in this respect. Secondly, there is still scope 
for diversifying stock-market operations. If we examine the structure of trade 
on organised markets before the crisis (see Table 8.2), we see that only Russia 
had achieved a relatively balanced structure, whilst in the other countries 
trade was dominated by individual segments (shares or public bonds). But the 
issue of diversification is no less urgent for Russia: at the end of 2007, 5% of 
companies whose shares were traded most actively accounted for 94% of 
the total trade on MICEX and for 86% on RTS5. 
In addition, the crisis itself creates opportunities to broaden financial 
cooperation. It should not be forgotten that major financial integration 
initiatives in post-Soviet countries were conceived in the wake of the 1998 
crisis. In the current climate, foreign stock exchanges are becoming somewhat 
less attractive, and opportunities to utilise the region’s own potential are 
emerging, even though the size of the latter has shrunk in material terms. 
The interaction of the infrastructural organisations of EurAsEC stock 
markets would go some way to addressing the aforementioned problems, 
given the support of the regulatory authorities in the relevant countries. The 
participation of state bodies in this process is critical, since their role becomes 
more significant as the crisis continues. Just as importantly, these bodies are 
also shareholders in infrastructural organisations. For example, the principal 
shareholder of MICEX is the Central Bank of Russia (which owns nearly 30% 
of shares), and the National Bank of Belarus holds the controlling block of 
shares in the Belarusian Currency and Stock Exchange. 
Such interaction will be driven not only by the need to address common 
problems, but also by the players’ mutual penetration of each other’s markets, 
which had intensified prior to the crisis. This is especially true of the Russian 
and Kazakh stock markets. For example, two of Russia’s largest investment 
companies – KIT Finance and Renaissance Capital – are now listed on the 
Kazakh stock market. Russia’s Troika Dialog investment bank also purchased 
Kazakh company ALMEX Asset Management.
4 Thus, in Russia in 2007, 44% of total IPO proceeds were generated on national stock exchang-
es, whilst Kazakh companies executed all their IPOs on the London Stock Exchange.
5 2007 Stock Exchange Statistics Bulletin. International Association of Stock Exchanges of the 
CIS.
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Similarly, on the Russian stock market, there are a number of investment 
companies which are owned by, or affiliated with, Kazakh banks. For example, 
the Russian companies TuranAlem Finance, BTA Finance and BTA Capital are 
members of the TuranAlem group of Kazakhstan; NBK Finance is owned by the 
Narodny Bank of Kazakhstan; Kazkommertsbank acquired 50% of shares in 
East Capital (now renamed East Kommerts); and Centras Capital is a member 
of the Kazakh investment group, Centras. However, the only prominent player 
is East Kommerts, which in 2007 was Russia’s seventh largest investment 
company in terms of trade in securities.
Before the crisis, Russian and Kazakh companies had started to penetrate 
the stock markets of other EurAsEC countries, but this process has not yet 
gained momentum and there are few significant deals to cite. East Capital 
founded an affiliate in Uzbekistan, East Capital Invest; and Centras Capital, a 
member of the Kazakh investment group Centras, entered the Kyrgyz stock 
market, some of whose key companies are owned by Kazakh banking groups, 
namely Halyk Bank Kyrgyzstan, East Capital Management and Kazinvest. 
There are also a few examples of cross-border provision of stock market 
services. In May 2007, Polesye Trading House, an affiliate of Pinskoye 
Promyshlenno-Torgovoye Obyedineniye Polesye (Brest Oblast, Belarus), 
placed bonds on the Russian market with a total nominal value of 500 million 
roubles6; Russia’s Sudostroitelny Bank and the All-Russia Bank for Regional 
Development acted as underwriters.
It would appear that the global financial crisis has slowed down these trends 
as market size has shrunk and investment companies are faced with financial 
problems. In this context, however, infrastructural organisations can take the 
lead. 
In CIS countries, stock market infrastructural organisations have acted 
as the main driving force of integration. They have set up associations to 
promote cooperation between their members and the stock markets of other 
countries; the most prominent associations are the International Association 
of Stock Exchanges of the CIS (CIS IASE) and the Association of Central 
Depositories of Eurasia (ACDE). Objectively, we would expect that the Moscow 
Inter-bank Currency Exchange (MICEX), Russia’s largest stock exchange 
holding company, will make the most significant contribution to the financial 
integration process.
The International Association of Stock Exchanges of the CIS was founded 
on 20 April 2000. It comprises twenty infrastructural organisations (stock 
exchanges and depositories) in nine CIS countries, including thirteen EurAsEC 
stock exchanges (all the major national stock exchanges, the Uzbek National 
6 Prime-TASS, 17 September 2007.
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Commodity Exchange and certain regional Russian stock exchanges) and the 
Central Securities Depository of Kazakhstan. 
At the beginning of the 2000s, a number of significant integration initiatives 
were proposed under the aegis of the CIS IASE. At a meeting on 29 
September, 2002, in Bruges, its members discussed progress towards the 
implementation of a financial integration programme which would create 
unified operating mechanisms for currency and stock exchanges in CIS 
countries7. At present, no such far-reaching proposals have been taken up, 
and cooperation continues at a basic level of interaction. At a CIS IASE meeting 
on 3-5 March 2008, the Committee on Technical Policy was established to 
promote the development of information technology8. 
The Association of Central Depositories of Eurasia was founded on 22 
December 2004, in order to create a common “depository space”. It 
comprises eleven depositories from CIS countries, including six from EurAsEC 
countries.
Bilateral cooperation relies mainly on memoranda of understanding and 
cooperation between stock exchanges and EurAsEC depositories. There are 
a few notable examples, in fact, of such memoranda being entered into by 
MICEX and a EurAsEC stock exchange, or the National Depository Centre and 
a EurAsEC depositary:
•  in December 2000, MICEX and the Belarusian Currency and Stock 
Exchange (BCSE) signed a memorandum of understanding and cooperation 
on developing stock exchange infrastructure;
• on 28 February 2001, in Moscow, MICEX and the Kazakhstan Stock 
Exchange signed a memorandum on cooperation on the creation of an 
integrated stock exchange space; 
•  on 14 November 2001, in Moscow, MICEX and the Toshkent National 
Stock Exchange (Uzbekistan) signed a memorandum of cooperation on 
the creation of an integrated stock-exchange space using advanced stock-
exchange technology; 
•  in December 2005, MICEX, the MICEX Stock Exchange and Tashkent 
National Stock Exchange signed a trilateral memorandum of 
understanding;
• on 9 February 2006, the National Depository Centre and the Central 
Depository of Securities (Uzbekistan) signed a memorandum of 
cooperation; 
•  on 11 April 2007, the National Depository Centre and the National Central 
Depository of Securities (Belarus) signed a memorandum of cooperation. 
7 http://rus.mab-sng.org/activity/actiondetail.php?id_action=72.
8 http://rus.mab-sng.org/news/detail.php?id_news=796&date=3_2008.
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To date, stock exchanges in EurAsEC countries have not interacted on a 
deeper level. The only example of a EurAsEC stock exchange buying up capital 
in another stock exchange is the Kazakhstan Stock Exchange, which has 
become a shareholder of the Kyrgyz Stock Exchange. Meanwhile, the largest 
shareholder of the latter is an infrastructural organisation from a third country 
– the Istanbul Stock Exchange. A Kazakh subsidiary of Russia’s Sberbank owns 
1.3% of the capital of Kazakhstan Stock Exchange.
One very significant event has been the launch of the Eurasian Trade System 
(ETS) of Kazakhstan – a stock exchange founded jointly by RTS (60%) and the 
Regional Financial Centre of Almaty. ETS uses equipment supplied by RTS. 
Currently, ETS is a commodity exchange and did not form part of our study, 
but trade in futures and stock-index futures are to begin there9 in the near 
future. This may in turn prove an impetus to the development of the Kazakh 
derivatives market. 
There are a number of formal integration agreements which define differently 
the objectives and mechanisms of financial integration in EurAsEC. 
In the Agreement on EurAsEC Member Country Cooperation in the Securities 
Market, signed on 18 June 2004, the main goal of integration (Article 1) is 
to create a common international securities market, which is understood as 
being one in which all the securities markets of EurAsEC operate according 
to unified principles and state regulation. This goal requires a high level of 
integration, but the Agreement provides no mechanisms to achieve it. 
In the Agreement on the Customs Union and a Common Economic Space 
(signed on 26 February 1999), one of the practical measures to develop 
financial cooperation between EurAsEC countries is to provide mutual access 
to each others’ services markets (Article 37) based on national treatment 
systems. In the 2004 Agreement, this measure became a most-favoured 
nation system for other EurAsEC members (Article 7). 
Likewise, in many other documents adopted so far on financial integration, 
long-term goals and the practical mechanisms to achieve them diverge 
greatly.
In Russia and Kazakhstan, projects are being implemented at national level 
to expand internal stock markets by attracting foreign investors and issuers. 
In Kazakhstan, such a project has already come to fruition with the launch of 
the Regional Financial Centre of Almaty, which is now the major shareholder 
of the KASE. In Russia, plans to create a regional financial centre have been 
drawn up and the first step towards their implementation have been made. In 
December 2006, the federal law On the Securities Market was amended to 
introduce a new type of security, Russian depository receipts (RDR). RDRs 
9 Respublika (Kazakhstan), 3 April 2009. 
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will enable foreign issuers to place their securities on the Russian stock 
market using a simplified procedure. In addition, some amendments are being 
discussed that will provide direct access to the Russian market for foreign 
securities listed in an OECD or FATF country. 
A draft concept to create an international financial centre in the Russian 
Federation envisages that by 2010, this centre would act as the local centre 
for the CIS which, as a result of economic integration in the region, will attract 
securities issued by CIS issuers to Russian stock exchanges. However, this 
document does not specify how Russia should attract other post-Soviet 
countries to participate in this project. If Russia fails to link this project to 
financial integration in the CIS, other potential players may fear that their 
interests will not be properly taken into account, and that the “securities drain” 
will be diverted to Russia rather than to western stock exchanges. 
So far, these projects are essentially “national”, their purpose being to open 
national markets to the global market; they do not provide any significant 
support to financial integration in EurAsEC, and in fact, on the contrary, 
compete with integration projects.
Another threat to joint development of stock markets in the region comes 
from third countries which are becoming increasingly active in the region. 
Close attention should be paid to infrastructural organisations, since these 
largely determine how national markets function. In the CIS context, Armenia 
is a significant example: the Scandinavian operator OMX acquired the 
Armenian Stock Exchange. Besides OMX, NASDAQ and the German, Vienna, 
Warsaw and Istanbul Stock Exchanges are showing interest in CIS markets. 
The current crisis can only serve to heighten this interest, as confirmed by the 
by the German Stock Exchange declaration that, in an effort to strengthen its 
competitive position, one of the Group’s key tasks in 2009 will be to enhance 
its interests in the investment infrastructure of the CIS, Russia and Central 
and Eastern Europe.
Russia’s sometimes dismissive approach to the poorly developed stock 
markets of Belarus, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan and the practically non- 
existent stock market of Tajikistan, also gives cause for concern. In this 
connection, it should be remembered that ownership of practically all 
sectors of global and regional stock markets is widely distributed, and stiff 
competition exists where this is not the case. A key example of this is the 
Istanbul Stock Exchange which has become the principal shareholder of the 
Kyrgyz Stock Exchange and thus acts as one of the founders of the Federation 
of Euro-Asian Stock Exchanges, which comprises most of the stock 
exchanges in CIS countries. 
In the light of the above, we have identified the following four potential scenarios 
for the development of stock markets in EurAsEC:
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•  retaining the status quo, which means that these countries will focus upon 
the development of national stock exchanges and therefore competition 
within the region will increase (between Russia and Kazakhstan in Central 
Asia, for example), especially once the financial crisis begins to ease. In the 
post-crisis period, large issuers will continue to move to global financial 
markets, whilst medium and small issuers will be able to operate on national 
or regional (in fact, expanded national) stock exchanges. National financial 
infrastructure may be acquired by global or foreign regional players; 
•  building an integrated financial infrastructure: i.e., creating conditions to 
allow securities from one EurAsEC country to be traded on the stock 
exchange of another country. This will require the harmonisation of 
regulations and standards. Since this process is most likely to be initiated 
by Russia, the latter should devise measures to develop national stock 
markets early on, rather than attract issuers by introducing Russian 
depository receipts. In so doing, Russia may find it has a competitive 
advantage: knowledge of local conditions and willingness to invest in 
projects which will not pay back in the near future. Some advances in this 
direction have taken place during the crisis, in particular the launch of the 
Eurasian Trading System in Kazakhstan (which should be counterbalanced 
by the launch of a similar entity in Russia), and the development by MICEX 
of a trading system for Ukraine’s largest stock exchange, the First Stock 
Trading System10. Accordingly, this model of cooperation should be 
expanded to other EurAsEC countries;
• acquiring other countries’ stock exchanges and playing by local rules. 
Most probably, MICEX will act as the consolidating player. This scenario 
is largely based on the “cost-benefit” approach and, if a large block of its 
shares is put up for sale, the most likely first candidate for acquisition is 
the Kazakhstan Stock Exchange. However, this model of cooperation may 
be viewed by national regulatory bodies as a threat to national security. 
In addition, under this scenario, Russian stock exchanges will have fewer 
competitive advantages compared with many western (and, possibly, 
eastern-hemisphere) players who are able to secure access to larger 
markets and advanced technology (e.g., OMX). This limitation will be 
especially pronounced during the crisis, which has had its strongest impact 
on the Russian stock market; 
• gradual movement towards cooperation between stock markets: from 
information exchange to cross listing. This is a “softer” version of the third 
scenario, which takes into account all the stakeholders. However, as this 
scenario is based on purely practical considerations, it does not guarantee 
that this cooperation will be favoured by EurAsEC stock exchanges 
10 Interfax Ukraine, 2 March 2009. 
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themselves, for the aforementioned reasons. Moreover it would appear 
that the financial crisis will serve to prolong the implementation period of 
such a scenario. 
Each of the above options has its advantages and disadvantages, and the 
selected scenario will determine EurAsEC’s future financial integration as a 
whole and the development of cross-border financial infrastructure. 
Stronger cooperation between infrastructural organisations may become 
one of the first successful integration projects in EurAsEC, prompting 
countries to assume more active roles in regional economic integration. 
Meanwhile, cooperation between stock markets can provide a basis for 
regional economic integration in general, and the development of cross-
border financial infrastructure. The crisis is temporary and does not in any 
way obviate the need to develop stock markets and even to explore new 
opportunities. The integration of stock markets allows the substantial 
reserves of some countries to be efficiently invested in other countries. The 
expansion of markets enables issuers to minimise their borrowing costs, and 
investors to reduce their risks by diversifying their financial portfolios. Finally, 
the resources of integrated stock markets can be used to finance cross-
border infrastructure development projects in different sectors. 
Expanding Mutual Trade, 
Investment and Finance
11Eurasian Development Bank
Emerging cross-border activities 
The banking landscape in the CIS is extremely uneven, as Kazakhstan and 
Russia possess the most developed banking sectors. As of January 1, 2009, 
assets to GDP ratio stood at 67.5% in Russia and 74.7% in Kazakhstan. Other 
countries’ banking sectors are significantly less developed, both in relative 
and absolute terms. Kazakhstan’s banking sector grew extremely rapidly 
until the third quarter of 2007, when it started to struggle as foreign credit 
sources ran dry. Russia lags one or two years behind Kazakhstan in terms 
of regulation, concentration, and the development of banking services and 
products. However the absolute size of its banking sector is understandably 
much higher. 
Mutual Investments  
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The previous years witnessed a number of formal integration initiatives in the 
post-Soviet ‘Eurasian’ space. These have yet to bear fruit. At the same time, 
the largest economies (Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan) enjoy acceptably 
open economic regimes, concerning cross-border investments in the financial 
sector. Neither existing quotas on foreign capital, nor restrictions on the 
staffing policies, represent substantial obstacles for big players. While it is too 
soon to talk about a formal integration of financial sector in the CIS, market 
players used the favourable conjuncture of the recent years, in order to take 
the first steps in boosting their cross-border activities. 
Table 9. 1.  
Banking sector 
indicators in the CIS 
member states as of 
1 January 2009 
Source: 
National and Central 
Banks of respective 
countries.
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Number 
of banks
1 172 31 37 30 22 12 22 20 18  1
Assets  
($ billion)
1 12. 8. 98.8 . 1. 1.8 3.3 . 120. 3.7
Capital
($ billion)
13.2 . 1.2 1. 0. 0.3 0.8 1.0 1.8 0.7
Assets/
GDP (%)
7. 9.2 7.7 2. 29.7 3.0 28.1 3.0 97. 38.7
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Kazakh Pathfinders 
It is not accidental that Kazakh banks were the first to begin expanding 
abroad; the Kazakh banking system is the most advanced in the CIS, due to 
early regulatory reforms and advanced regulatory supervision. In addition, the 
banking system is more concentrated and technologically advanced. Until the 
beginning of 2009, there were no state-owned banks, and the two largest 
institutions, BTA-Bank and Kazkommertsbank, were also largest private 
banks in the CIS (acquisition of BTA by the state has changed the banking 
landscape significantly; the largest Russian private banks, Alfa and the 
newly merged MDM and URSA may also challenge the lead of their Kazakh 
counterparts). Kazakh banks were ready to go abroad, following their clients, 
a few years before other CIS banks were established enough to follow suit. 
The natural direction of foreign investments was in other Central Asian 
states and Russia, with the latter taking the lead due to the huge economic 
potential and relatively open economy. Kazakh banks had also ventured into 
Ukraine, Georgia and other CIS states. In 2005-2007, practically all of the 
largest banks opened foreign operations. The leading BTA operates through 
four subsidiary banks in Russia, and also owns banks in Belarus, Ukraine, 
Georgia, Armenia, and Tajikistan. Kazkommertsbank entered the Russian soil 
through its subsidiary, Moskommertsbank, which was particularly active in 
financing real estate and mortgages. To characterise its activities in Russia, 
it is sufficient to state that Moskommertsbank possessed the third largest 
mortgage portfolio in the country at the end of 2007. 
In 2007, the assets base of these banks grew by 30%; however, 2008 saw a 
significant contraction of portfolio, as the banks faced the impossibility of funding 
activities abroad and started transferring money back home to support their 
core operations. Other Kazakh banks also went abroad, albeit on a smaller 
scale. The more conservative Halyk Bank has subsidiaries in Chelyabinsk as 
well as in Moscow. Alliance Bank bought the small Starbank in Russia in 2007, 
after unhappily rejecting plans to absorb the much larger Petrokommerts. 
ATF-Bank and Bank Centrecredit, also established subsidiaries in Russia. 
…The Russians are Coming, Finally
There are two reasons why the Russian banks were slow in following suit. First 
of all, the resurgence of the Russian economy provided ample opportunities 
at home, and the banks were busy expanding their retail networks and 
building local portfolios at an unprecedented speed. Secondly, Russia lagged 
behind Kazakhstan in the regulatory and structured qualities of its banking 
system. Nonetheless, by 2007, a handful of Russian banks were also 
prepared for foreign expansion. These were the largest banks: Sberbank, VTB, 
Gazprombank, Bank of Moscow, Alfa-bank, and Rosbank. The directions of 
expansion were quite natural: Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Belarus, and Armenia, i.e. 
the countries with significant Russian economic interests. 
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The Russian presence in Kazakhstan demonstrates this. Sberbank bought 
a small Texaka-Bank as early as 2006. After a period of inaction, the bank 
was strongly recapitalised and started rapidly building its assets portfolio. The 
long-term goal of the bank is to enter the top ten of the Kazakh banking 
system. This mission would seem achievable for Sberbank. On the contrary, 
VTB, for which the expansion in the CIS makes a vital part of the bank’s mid-
term strategy, has yet to enter the Kazakh market. The bank’s initial strategy 
centred on buying an active business in the country, however, despite the 
deteriorating conditions, Kazakh bankers are unwilling to part with their 
controlling stakes at a low price, while VTB was not ready to pay 2.5-3 book 
values (for instance, it negotiated over Temirbank). Finally, exasperated, VTB 
declared its intention to build the business from scratch. Presumably, buying 
a bank as a strategy option is still on the cards for later. Finally, Alfa-bank has 
a subsidiary in Almaty, which is rather well established (it was the first of the 
Russian banks to enter the market) and pursues a conservative policy. 
Russian banks are the main foreign banking presence in Belarus, where there 
are subsidiaries of Gazprombank, Bank of Moscow, Rosbank and others. 
In 2007, the role of Russian banks in the Belarusian banking system grew 
as a result of several acquisitions. For example, Vneshtorgbank bought out 
Belvnesheconombank, while Mezhtorgbank was taken over by Alfa Bank. 
Ownership of Slavneftebank, formerly controlled by a Russian oil company, will 
also be transferred to Russia’s VTB. 
…Cornered by Competition from East and West 
It is not safe to assume that Kazakh and Russian players are the only ones 
interested in expanding in the CIS area. The CIS countries’ are hugely under 
banked and are considered among the most attractive in the world to enter. 
Russian, Ukrainian, and Kazakh banks (the most open and largest) were 
aspired until 2008, with prices overreaching four book values. These markets 
remain attractive in the long term. Again, the Kazakh banking system provides 
a great example. As a matter of fact, the laurels for the largest purchases go 
not to Russia but to the West (Italian UniCredit having bought ATF-Bank) and 
East (Korean Kookmin gradually acquiring control over Bank CentreCredit). 
The Ukrainian banking system provides a similar picture. Perhaps the only 
market where Russian financial players do not face any substantial foreign 
competition is Belarus.
… And Interrupted by Crisis
The CIS banks were not given much time for uninterrupted investments in 
the neighbouring countries. The 2007-2008 crisis largely limited the 
potential to invest abroad and compelled the banks to concentrate on core 
markets. In addition, the deteriorating quality of assets became a worrying 
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issue for M&A. We discuss the near- and mid-term prospects of mutual 
investments in the last section of this article. 
The Scale of Cross-Border Investments is still Low 
The patterns of mutual investments in the CIS banking sector have been 
consistent with world experience. The first reason behind setting up foreign 
subsidiaries was servicing mutual trade and investments in other sectors 
(‘follow your client’ strategy). Only later did a handful of banks adopt a more 
embracing approach, targeting the full-scale expansion and universal 
banking with retail and SMEs as viable business sectors. For Kazakhstan’s 
BTA Bank and Russian VTB, such expansion is a strategic centrepiece; 
Sberbank and Kazkommertsbank are also serious about this strategy. 
Another characteristic is the visible asymmetry of mutual investments, 
with Kazakhstan and Russia in the lead and other countries serving as mere 
recipients. What is perhaps more unusual is the speed at which the CIS 
banks developed their foreign networks: after all, the whole story took place 
within three to four years. 
As a result, the cross-border investments in the authorised capital of the 
CIS banks grew approximately threefold within 2005-2008. However, 
their relative weight and role is still negligible. In the EurAsEC space, foreign 
capital is a dominant presence in the banking system only in Kyrgyzstan, 
while its role in other EurAsEC countries is minimal1.
Prospects 
Looking into 2009 and 2010 is an exercise in forecasting through an obscure 
glass. The scope of the world recession and the dynamics of oil price (on which 
the overall prosperity of Russia, Kazakhstan and a few other CIS countries 
strongly depend) will have a decisive impact on the health of local banks, 
including the quality of assets as well as the M&A stories. 
Nevertheless, with a certain degree of moderation, we can sketch a few 
trends for 2009, suggesting that the cooperation and penetration in the 
banking sector will slowly increase even in the difficult times, driven by 
the logic of mutual trade and economic efficiency. Our considerations are 
supported by the observation that institutional integration has not stopped. 
E.g., in December 2008, Russian and Kazakh counterparts established a new 
commodity exchange platform, which was christened the Eurasian Trade 
System (ETS). The newcomer foresees substantial trade volumes in grain and 
petroleum-based fuels in 2009. 
1 Abalkina, Anna (2008) Preconditions and Prospects for Banking Integration in the Eurasian 
Economic Community, in: Vinokurov, Evgeny (ed.) EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook, EDB: Al-
maty, p. 109. Available at http://www.eabr.org/eng/publications/IntegrationYearbook/
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• Let us begin with the two most active players, Russia and Kazakhstan. 
Russian banks will continue looking abroad, albeit on a modest scale. 
Potential directions are Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine. In Kazakhstan, 
Sberbank’s subsidiary plans a 40% growth of assets into 2009. 2008 
witnessed an extremely rapid growth and, as of November 1, Sberbank 
Kazakhstan’s assets amounted to $800 million, with its own capital 
standing at $283 million. The effect of the 2007 capitalisation by 
Sberbank still leaves ample room for asset growth. Its association with 
the well-respected Russian state bank has helped the Kazakh subsidiary 
actively attract local depositors and grow its deposits base from virtually 
zero to almost $200 million within a year. In our opinion, Sberbank’s 
operation in Kazakhstan is well positioned to deliver promised growth and 
enter the top ten of Kazakh banks in the foreseeable future. 
 While Sberbank actively builds up its assets and expands the branch 
network, VTB still needs to set up a subsidiary in Russia’s southern 
neighbour. Buying a bank at a sensible price still remains a strategic option. 
The newly merged MDM and URSA banks (forming the second-largest 
private banking institution in Russia with stronghold in the Urals and Siberia) 
would naturally benefit from presence in the southern neighbour. Tsesna-
bank might serve as a particularly attractive take-over target due to its 
strong presence in Northern Kazakhstan. Alliance, as well as Temirbank, 
remains on the radar screens as potential takeover targets with extensive 
retail networks. BTA, after its nationalisation, may also be sold to a foreign 
investor. 
• The foreign expansion of Kazakh banks faces two contradictory pressures. 
On the one hand, in the time of severe crisis the Kazakh authorities are 
keen to see their banks concentrating on Kazakhstan, not elsewhere. In 
any case, there are substantial barriers to the outflow of capital. On the 
other hand, where banks go, there trade goes, and there is a substantive 
economic rationale behind expanding service capabilities in the CIS 
countries and China. Thus, we expect Kazakh banks to lower their foreign 
presence in terms of assets while simultaneously continuing organisational 
activities such as setting up rep offices, creating necessary infrastructure 
etc. Again, let us mention that along with the CIS state West China will stay 
high on the priority list. 
• 2008 witnessed an unprecedented level of state support action in 
the banking sector of the CIS countries, most importantly Russia and 
Kazakhstan. Governments rightly identify banks as providers of blood in the 
veins of national economies and support them subsequently by injecting 
necessary liquidity, taking care of distressed assets and also by direct 
intervention. It is evident that, at the time of economic contraction, banks 
will be actively discouraged to channel the state assistance funds into other 
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countries through foreign expansion, however tempting it might be in the 
long term. 
• There is a distinctive trend of going beyond the tight boundaries of the 
post-Soviet space. As trade flows expand, there is a pressure to set up 
subsidiaries in China, Mongolia, India and other non-CIS Eurasian states. It is 
likely that we see the development of this nascent trend even in the difficult 
times, as it demands organisational capabilities and can be accomplished 
without substantial injections of capital. Sistema-controlled MBRR-Bank 
going to India (where Sistema is building a big mobile network) and Khalyk-
Bank setting up subsidiaries in Western China and Mongolia (where the 
bank’s clients do business) are vivid illustrations.
• Out of the larger CIS markets other than Russia and Kazakhstan, three 
larger countries demonstrate various threats and opportunities. First, 
crisis provides major players with an opportunity to buy into Ukrainian 
banking sector at very distressed prices. Of course, only players who can 
sustain losses in the short term can afford such investment in 2009, 
notwithstanding potential long-term gains from the second-largest CIS 
market for financial services. One of the first instances of the sort is VEB 
rescuing the Ukrainian Prominvestbank. Secondly, the partial opening of the 
lucrative Uzbek market is to be expected in the medium-term perspective 
(not necessarily in 2009). Russian and Kazakh banks are eyeing this 
opportunity. They possess fair chances to succeed in the challenging 
environment of the state-controlled economy. Third, Russian financial 
institutions are likely to build up their weight in the Belarus banking sector, 
thus strengthening economic and political ties between the two countries. 
• Last but not least, the CIS banks do not operate in an international vacuum. 
The crisis has reduced – but not wiped out – the attractiveness of the CIS 
market for larger international players from both West and East. By buying 
banks in various countries, international players can gain their place among 
the principal providers of inter-state financial services in the CIS.
To sum up, the story of cross-border investments in the CIS banking sector 
remains unfinished. The banks are compelled to halt their foreign expansion 
and, in some cases, partially retract in terms of assets. At the same time 
they do not stop non-capital-intensive cross-border activities. The process of 
setting subsidiaries and rep offices as well as creating necessary infrastructure 
abroad goes on, while the banks wait for better times to achieve substantial 
growth of capital and assets. We will see the next chapter of the story rapidly 
unfold as soon as access to the international financial market eases up. 
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The EDB’s Strategy for 2008–2010 incorporates environmental 
responsibility in the Bank’s investment policy. The Bank’s mandate is to foster 
economic growth in the member states and support sustainable development 
and regional integration. In selecting and implementing investment projects, 
the Bank takes measures to prevent any deterioration of the environment or 
the social, working or living conditions of the population. 
The Bank’s approach must be effective for environmental security of the 
Bank’s member states. In the regional context, these measures address the 
problems of transboundary transfer of water- and airborne pollutants, and 
promote the efficient use of natural resources based on resource-saving and 
environmentally friendly technologies. The structural reorganisation of any 
economy poses economic and environmental problems which governments 
and institutions must address in the best possible way, adhering to the highest 
standards of environmental protection and eliminating natural and manmade 
disasters.
Any investment project which affects the environment of neighbouring 
states is subject to thorough environmental impact assessment (EIA) and 
notification procedures in accordance with international regulations and 
recommendations governing environmental protection. The Bank conducts 
the compulsory EIA, taking into account economic risks which can result from 
changes in the environment and the management of natural resources with a 
potential transboundary effect.
Sustainable development and economic growth are closely linked with 
environmental protection. The Bank, as an international financial institution, 
adheres to multilateral and regional agreements on environmental protection 
and sustainable development. These include the UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, the Kyoto Protocol, the Convention on Biodiversity, 
the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in Transboundary 
Context, and the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation 
in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters. Each of 
these documents provides the Bank and its clients with the main 
requirements and mechanisms which underpin their approach UN (1997) to 
the environment in the implementation of their investment projects (UNECE, 
1992).
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Assessing Regional Environmental Problems as a Key Phase 
of Investment Project Planning in Central Asia
Contemporary Central Asia is situated at the heart of Eurasia; it encompasses 
the territories of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan and borders Russia in the northwest, Iran and Afghanistan in the 
south and Russia and China in the east. The region covers about 4 million km2 
of the vast Aral-Caspian drainage basin, which extends from the subtropical 
zone to the southern margin of the mid-latitudes. The region’s desert location, 
its remoteness from seas and oceans and its orographic structure all shape 
its continental climate and hydrography. Climatic conditions in mountainous 
areas directly influence cyclical river flows and the utilisation of water. High 
temperatures during the growing season and a saturation deficit result in a 
high evaporation capacity. Therefore, irrigation, which is vital to this region, 
has the greatest influence on water utilisation and international relations in 
transboundary river basins.
The Central Asian region is a new geopolitical structure within the modern 
global political system and consists of five independent states. The term 
“Central Asia” traditionally denotes a geographical area which extends far 
beyond the borders of these states. However, in a political context, this region 
is understood as being confined to the territories of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Its natural and geographic unity 
has been forged in the basins of its transboundary rivers. This in turn has 
determined the historic and cultural homogeneity of Central Asian nations, 
and is a key factor in strengthening their economic integration. Given their 
economic and social interdependence, resolving the region’s environmental 
problems, which are generally transboundary in nature, and ensuring the 
sustainable development of Central Asian countries, will depend upon 
accelerated integration based on the joint management of water resources 
in transboundary river basins. Whilst the geographic location of Central Asia 
bestows certain advantages, the region is nevertheless disadvantaged by its 
remoteness from major transport routes and sea ports, the scarcity of water 
resources and irrigable land, and its sparse population density in certain parts 
of the region. 
Common environmental problems in Central Asia
Central Asia’s fragile ecosystem, its water shortages and arid climate act 
as serious impediments to the socioeconomic development of the region’s 
countries. 
Transboundary atmospheric pollution in industrial and urban areas is one of 
the most acute environmental problems in Central Asia. The main causes of 
air pollution are the metallurgical, chemical, building, energy and transport 
industries. Wastewater from farms and industrial facilities contaminates 
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transboundary rivers. Runoff water contains pesticides, nitrogen and 
phosphates, which threaten river ecology and water safety. Neither an efficient 
recycling infrastructure nor an adequate waste management strategy is 
in place. There is also a potential threat from radioactive and toxic metallic 
waste disposal sites. Eventually, a considerable percentage of waste disposed 
of within the drainage basin reaches the rivers.
Another serious problem for the region is desertification. For example, more 
than 66% of Kazakhstan’s land is desertified. About 40% of pasture land 
in Kyrgyzstan is depleted. In Tajikistan, the cultivation of steep slopes and 
deforestation of the mountains has destabilised the natural mountain habitat. 
About 80% of Uzbekistan’s territory is desert or semi-desert. Mountainous 
ecosystems are especially sensitive to external influences. Anthropogenic 
effects are felt even in the scarcely populated Pamir and Tien Shan mountains, 
resulting in deterioration of ecosystems, loss of biodiversity and soil erosion. 
The cumulative effect of anthropogenic load on mountainous ecosystems 
accelerates desertification and the loss of biodiversity. Other negative 
consequences of this process are changes in the hydrological cycles of 
renewable water resources and an increased risk of natural disasters (OECD, 
2005).
The region is widely exposed to natural disasters, including earthquakes, 
floods, mudslides and landslides. These pose a huge threat to the safety of 
dams, water reservoirs, villages and towns along the rivers. Any major dam 
burst threatens the population of all countries in the region. This threat is 
especially pronounced in the mountainous areas of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan, where most of the region’s runoff is generated, and where the risk 
of destructive flood tides is highest. 
In addition to the problems mentioned above, there are several large-scale 
environmental crises which threaten all the Central Asian countries: the 
drying up of the Aral Sea, the unstable rock-dammed Lake Sarez, etc1. 
According to statistics, about 36.1 million people (64% of the region’s 
population) have access to centralised water supply. In Kazakhstan, Tajikistan 
and Turkmenistan, water supply systems in cities are better than in rural 
areas. Access to sewage systems is restricted to 22% of the population 
(11.4 million people), mainly in cities (UNESCO, 2000).
The absence, inefficiency or poor state of repair of water supply and sewage 
systems are the main obstacles to improving public health and quality of life 
standards, especially in rural areas. All these problems in turn impede the 
sustainable development of the region. Most oblast centres have no sewage 
1 The Executive Committee of the International Aral Rehabilitation Fund (2008) 2002-2008 
Operations Report of the International Aral Rehabilitation Fund. Dushanbe. 
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treatment systems, and untreated wastewater is being discharged directly 
to filtration fields or storage ponds. The existing treatment facilities are 
overloaded, and there is a permanent threat of dam breakage. 
The construction of many hydraulic environmental protection facilities has 
been discontinued or never planned due to a lack of funds. The generally 
accepted “polluter pays” rule is barely applied, and no fee is charged for the 
use of freshwater resources, which is required to encourage efficient natural 
resources management. Common pollutants are oil products, phenols, heavy 
metal salts, fertiliser, and pesticides. As a result, cities and other areas 
are unable to supply drinking water that complies fully with public health 
requirements.
The existing water supply systems in Central Asian countries do not meet 
requirements for reliability and drinking water quality, nor do they have all 
the required treatment facilities; protective sanitary zones are not in place 
at many water collection sites. Up to 70% of water distribution networks are 
obsolete, and this figure is increasing, which results in frequent accidents 
and contamination of water. Over 20-30% of water is lost due to leakages 
in household water supply systems and pipe corrosion or obsolescence. 
Existing pipeline capacity is not sufficient to provide an uninterrupted water 
supply because of its poor state of repair and the obsolete water treatment 
technology in use. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that a large 
proportion of wastewater from industrial facilities is being directed to municipal 
treatment works which are not designed for such wastewater. Most cities have 
no storm drainage able to treat excess water; as a result, large quantities of 
contaminated water end up in water bodies. Contamination of drinking water 
sources and the inefficiency of treatment facilities lead to the deterioration 
of the quality of drinking water consumed by the public.
In rural areas, people sometimes have no choice but to drink water which 
does not meet health standards, and the majority of the population uses 
decentralised water sources which do not always meet public health 
requirements for salt content, hardness and chemical composition; 
surface water sources are not protected against bacterial and chemical 
contamination. The water companies themselves are financially weak, for 
a number of reasons: overstated individual water consumption makes 
extensive capacity development essential; there is a lack of actual consumption 
records; data is misstated; pricing is disproportionate; customer service is 
poor; and there is no clear allocation of rights and responsibilities for both 
consumer and supplier. 
The safety of drinking water has to be a key element of a comprehensive 
environmental policy for Central Asian countries. A package of urgent legal, 
economic and organisational measures must be implemented to protect 
water resources from contamination, increase the use of properly protected 
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underground freshwater, reduce the load on water treatment plants, minimise 
drinking water losses, and improve water treatment technology.
To conclude, it is clear that Central Asia’s environmental problems all relate 
directly to the stability of river ecosystems (UNECE, UN ESCAP, UN, SPBEC, 
2004). If these countries fail to take concerted action to stop the depletion and 
contamination of water resources, these trends may have a negative impact 
on socioeconomic development, environmental protection and security in 
Central Asia (UN, 2003).
The availability and adequacy of water resources is an essential precondition 
for the stable functioning of all economic sectors. The efficient regulation of 
shared water utilisation, especially in agriculture and the hydraulic power 
industry, is key to international cooperation between Central Asian countries. 
Environmental safety at mining waste sites 
Waste from uranium production facilities poses a serious threat to the 
population and the environment in Central Asia. The waste has accumulated 
over many decades but is no longer reliably maintained, and there are insufficient 
funds to ensure that necessary land reclamation measures are being taken 
at uranium tailings sites. There is a high risk that any accident would have a 
severe transboundary impact and this situation calls for concerted action to 
ensure the safety of these sites. 
In Belarus, the most urgent environmental problem is the radioactive 
contamination of about one quarter of its territory following the Chernobyl 
disaster.
In Kazakhstan, there is a high level of contamination from mining and uranium 
processing waste sites. 
In Kyrgyzstan, there are many complex and radioactive ore processing 
dumps concentrated in river basins (of the 35 dump sites, 30 contain uranium 
processing waste and five contain non-ferrous metal wastes). 
Box 10.1.: Between 1946 and 1968, a uranium deposit was exploited in the floodplain 
of the Mailuu-Suu (a tributary of the Syrdarya), 26 km from the Uzbek border (Madaniyat, 
Pakhtaabad District). A total of 23 tailing storage facilities were constructed to hold 2 
million m3 of radioactive waste, and 13 dump sites contained a total of 845,600 m3 of 
radioactive overburden. The total area of the Mailuu-Suu tailings storage is 432,000 m2. 
In Mailuu-Suu city itself there are 14 tailings storage facilities and 12 dump sites. As well 
as the Mailuu-Suu deposit, the nearby Shakaftar, Kyzyl-Dzhar and other mines were also 
developed.
Kyrgyzstan’s uranium tailings sites pose a major threat to human health, the 
environment, and the security of Central Asia. They are a particular threat 
Expanding Mutual Trade, 
Investment and Finance
Vladimir Yasinskiy, Alexander Mironenkov “The Eurasian  
Development Bank’s Investment Policy and the Environment”
12 Eurasian Development Bank
EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook 2009
to the Fergana valley. The risk of an environmental catastrophe is high, and 
its potential impact may spread to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. 
Therefore, securing the environmental safety of the Syrdarya and Chu basins, 
which are exposed to the transboundary impact of mining wastes and dump 
sites, is viewed as a key regional priority. 
The VNIPIpromtekhnologiya Institute (Moscow) has prepared a report 
entitled An Assessment of the Radiation and Environmental Situation and the 
Feasibility Study for the Rehabilitation of Areas Affected by Uranium Production 
in the Republic of Kyrgyzstan. The report includes a brief assessment of 
radioactivity at uranium tailings storage facilities and reclaimed radioactive 
waste storage sites in the Mailuu-Suu area. It also includes the Institute’s 
engineering and environmental surveys and the results of previous studies 
by Kyrgyz and Uzbek specialists. The Institute’s proposed project comprises 
an assessment of the present condition of the tailings storage facilities and 
surrounding areas, their effect on the environment, safety aspects, and 
technical solutions to rehabilitate these facilities and ensure safe working 
conditions. The project is intended to stabilise the radiation affecting the city 
of Mailuu-Suu and prevent the spread of radioactive materials to other parts 
of the valley along the alluvial cone of the Mailuu-Suu as a result of landslides, 
riverbed obstruction or flushing-out of tailings sites.
In Tajikistan, areas where dangerous radioactive waste has accumulated 
are a serious threat to health. In Sogdiyskaya Oblast there are large storage 
sites for radioactive tailings and low-grade ores. The oblast is also home to 
the Anzob Mercury and Antimony Works and two gold mining facilities. Most 
tailings sites are situated close to cities and rivers. Close to Khudzhand and 
Chkalovsk, 9 km from the Syrdarya, is the 70-ha Digmai storage facility, which 
contains radioactive tailings and the waste of rare-earth metal processing. 
Digmai is the largest facility of its kind in Tajikistan; it holds 20 million tons of 
uranium processing waste and 5.7 million tons of vanadium processing waste. 
The site has not been maintained since ore processing there was abandoned. 
Although the site was partly sown with reeds, its surface has dried out and 
radioactive dust is being carried by the wind to the surrounding area. Several 
radioactive tailings sites are located near the cities of Chkalovsk, Gafurovo 
and Taboshar, and the village of Adrasman; all of them are major sources of 
environmental pollution. Dumps and open pits at these sites have not been 
rehabilitated and waste is being spread by wind and rain.
A dangerous situation has also developed at the Anzob Ore Mining and 
Processing Works on the Yagnob river, an upper tributary of the Zeravshan. 
Temporary waste storage facilities are overloaded and there is a serious 
threat that waste will no longer be contained.
The transboundary industrial waste site near Bekabad in Uzbekistan also 
requires attention. The Bekabad Metal Works waste heaps, which are 
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5-20 m high and cover an area of 15 ha, are located in the territory of 
Tajikistan. Bekabad’s large household landfill site is located nearby. The 
storage facilities there do not meet the environmental protection regulations 
of either country.
The most serious direct threat to health and the environment is posed by 
the Kanibadam toxic waste storage facility near the district’s administrative 
centre, the Great Fergana Canal and the Kairakum reservoir. This contains 
toxic chemicals and biological preparations whose shelf life has expired or 
which have been banned from use. Between 1973 and 1990, a total of 4000 
tons of toxic waste accumulated there. The site has no waterproof ground 
membrane or drainage system. Underground aquifers are not protected 
against toxic chemicals, and the state of the toxic waste storage area is not 
monitored. 
Under the aegis of EurAsEC, the Concept for an international programme 
entitled Rehabilitation of Areas Affected by Uranium Production in EurAsEC 
Member Countries is being drafted; this Concept is aimed at eliminating the 
risks of radioactive contamination.
Box 10.2: In EurAsEC member countries, a total area of 80 km2 is affected by radioactive 
contamination from uranium production facilities total. This includes 51.7 km2 in Kazakhstan, 
16 km2 in Russia, 6.5 km2 in Kyrgyzstan, 3.0 km2 in Tajikistan and 2.8 km2 in Uzbekistan.
Tailings storage and mining waste sites in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan pose the most serious 
transboundary threat to the environment, as these can contaminate river basins.
The state corporation, Rosatom, prepared a draft Concept for the EurAsEC international 
programme entitled Rehabilitation of Areas Affected by Uranium Production in EurAsEC 
Member Countries. This Concept proposes a unified system for radiation safety and 
rehabilitation of areas contaminated by radiation to international standards, in order to 
prevent transboundary environmental disasters; trials of certain elements of this system 
will be carried out at the most dangerous sites in Kyrgyzstan (Kadzhi-Sai and Minkush) and 
Tajikistan (Taboshar). 
According to a preliminary estimate (2008), this programme will cost 446 million roubles; 
it will be implemented in 2010-2015. 
It is envisaged that the programme will be financed by EurAsEC, international organisations, 
private investors and by the governments of EurAsEC member countries. 
Environmental Problems in the Caspian Region
As international demand for oil and gas increases, the vast oil and gas 
reserves of the Caspian region have attracted the attention of international 
energy companies and individual countries.
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The proven oil reserves owned by Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan and Iran are estimated at 17-49 billion barrels, which is 
3-5% of the world’s oil reserves. Natural gas reserves total 6.5 trillion m3, 
comparable to those of Saudi Arabia, whilst probable reserves are estimated 
at 9.3 trillion m3. As at the end of 2006, proven oil reserves totalled 39.6 
billion barrels (3.3% of the world’s reserves) in Kazakhstan and 0.5 billion 
barrels in Turkmenistan.
In 2006, oil production in the region totalled 2.3 billion barrels per day, almost 
equal to oil output in Brazil, the second largest oil producer in South America. 
It is expected that, in 2010, the Caspian region will produce 2.9-3.8 million 
barrels of oil per day, surpassing Venezuela’s output. The region’s natural gas 
production in 2005 reached 147 billion m3. This almost equals the total gas 
production of South and Central America and Mexico. 
The economy of the region’s post-Soviet states is heavily dependent on the 
production and export of fossil fuels. The economic importance of coastal 
areas, national economies, living and environmental conditions in the region 
have all changed accordingly. 
The Caspian Sea is the world’s largest inland water body. Its size and its 
ecology largely depend on the water quality of the rivers that empty into it. The 
effects of human activity in the region are augmented by climate change and 
extreme weather conditions. As a result, the ecosystems of the Caspian basin 
bear an excessive anthropogenic load, detrimental to the environment and 
the living conditions of the population. Mismanaged industrial development, 
pollution and the exploitation of valuable resources (oil, gas, uranium, 
sturgeon and other fish, etc.), all harm the environment. There is an inevitable 
social and economic price to pay both nationally and internationally. Rising 
Caspian Sea levels in 1978-1996 were a huge environmental problem for 
the region’s countries which were faced with the associated problems of 
flooding, salinisation of pasture and other agricultural land and degradation of 
infrastructure. Intensive fishing and contamination have decimated the sea’s 
biological resources.
Of all the economic activity undertaken in the eastern Caspian region, 
intensive oil and gas exploration and production have the worst impact on 
the environment. Pollution of the sea, air and soil is being recorded in many 
offshore and onshore areas. To date, desertification, soil consolidation and 
soil contamination resulting from the production and transportation of oil 
have affected a total area of 500,000 ha. Severe soil degradation resulting 
from spillages of oil and oil products has been recorded over 5000 ha in the 
Atyrau and Mangistau Oblasts. Data on soil contamination in Turkmenistan 
is incomplete but, according to preliminary estimates, may affect 1000 ha.
A boom in offshore and onshore oil exploration and production and the 
expansion of the pipeline network create risks for the environment. The Volga 
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alone carries several thousand tons of oil products annually from onshore 
facilities to the Caspian Sea. The rivers that fall into the Caspian Sea are 
responsible for over 50% of its total oil contamination. Future development 
of onshore and shelf deposits is expected to increase this pollution. Currently, 
the northern part of the sea, mainly the Volga delta, has a high content of 
phenols and oil products, which may affect plant and animal life. Depletion of 
fish stocks, damage to the beauty of the landscape, the deterioration of water 
quality and other negative influences may undermine prospects for future 
development, especially of fisheries and tourism. Oil from certain Caspian 
deposits has higher natural radioactivity. The long-term exploitation of these 
deposits, especially in Mangistau Oblast, has resulted in the accumulation 
of 10000-15000 tons of low-radiation, oil-bearing waste and scrap metal 
in temporary storage facilities close to the oil deposits. These sources of 
radiation are an additional threat to environmental safety. 
In Turkmenistan, oil production in the Cheleken peninsula, and the 
transportation of oil and gas by tanker and pipeline, have harmed local 
biodiversity and ecosystems. Several specialised chemical plants are also 
located in Cheleken. This high concentration of oil and chemical facilities 
raises particular environmental protection issues, since not only is there an 
increased risk of water and air contamination, but the rising Caspian sea 
level could also cause industrial sites to flood. Offshore oil production in the 
Turkmen sector of the Caspian, near the Cheleken peninsula, is based on 
dozens of platforms producing 350,000 tons of oil annually. Before the oil 
boom in Cheleken, flat pits formed by saline soil on the shore (takyrs) served as 
natural water reservoirs. These takyrs provided fresh water to some 10000 
people, farm animals (camels, sheep and goats) and migrating birds. When oil 
production began, many takyrs were used as evaporation ponds for oily fluids 
and became contaminated with oil products, surface reagents and heavy 
metals. Oil spills and other emergencies continue to threaten the environment 
and public health.
Given the need to preserve the ecosystem and natural resources of 
the Caspian Sea as oil reserves are being developed, Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan must keep a close eye on environmental protection and safety. 
For example, Kazakhstan banned the flaring of gas and discharge and burial 
of waste at sea. Environmental standards and industrial safety in both 
countries have been brought up to international levels. In addition, these 
countries implemented a package of measures to ensure prompt reaction to 
oil spills, including the formation of a special offshore rescue team. A National 
Plan of Action was developed to prevent and respond to oil spills in the sea and 
inland water bodies. Under the Tehran Convention (Framework Convention 
for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Caspian Sea), several 
protocols to tackle the region’s most acute problems were drafted and 
forwarded to other Caspian countries for discussion and ratification. 
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In order to secure the environmental safety and sustainable development of 
the Caspian region, a review of the defence industry is also needed, particularly 
the production, processing and storage of uranium. Projects to assess 
the threats posed by such facilities and to reclaim land must be planned 
and implemented, and information on any hazard to human health and the 
environment around such facilities must be made public. 
The expansion of the energy sector in the region over the last decade has 
had a significant impact upon the socio-economic climate, changes which are 
often linked to the increasing burden on the environment. Political stability and 
security in the Caspian basin is a critical prerequisite for future development. 
In order to reduce actual and potential threats to security, Caspian states 
should continue to build mutual trust and take steps to promote regional 
cooperation and integration. This will enable them to respond more efficiently 
to new challenges such as climate change. 
Industries in all the coastal oblasts of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are 
highly specialised, and increases in their gross regional product is attributable 
mainly to the energy sector, while agricultural production in the same areas 
is declining.
Caspian cities have become strategic centres for the energy sector – 
concentration of financial services, transportation, housing, etc. – and this 
attracts many migrants from rural areas, other regions and even other 
countries. At present, more than half of the region’s population lives in urban 
areas close to oil and other raw material deposits. This widens the social and 
economic divide between these cities and the agricultural areas located at 
some distance from the sea. 
Development of these areas is seriously impeded by a shortage of drinking 
water. Over the next decade, the availability of fresh water will be the key 
factor in the sustainable development of the region’s cities. 
One of the signs of the growing human impact on the sea is the dramatic 
shrinkage in the population of Caspian seals – from one million a century ago 
to 350,000-400,000 animals in the 1960s and 110,000 at present. Until 
recently, the decline in the seal population was attributed to excessive hunting 
and poaching, but the main reason for the decline of this species are now 
thought to be environmental pollution, scarcity of food, ecosystemic change, 
global warming and disease.
It is believed that fluctuations in the Caspian Sea level are mainly due to 
climate change, especially in the Volga basin, which contributes about 80% of 
total run-off to the sea. Rising seas and natural events such as storm surges 
have led to the flooding of oil wells and infrastructure. This in turn has resulted 
in the contamination of vast areas of land and the deterioration of scarce farm 
land. Earthquakes can also have a devastating effect on the region’s energy 
infrastructure, population and environment. 
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The rapid development of the fishing industry in the 1950s, and other factors 
such as the degradation of spawning grounds in the Volga and Ural deltas, 
dam building, intensive fishing, poaching and pollution, have all resulted in 
the dramatic depletion of Caspian fish stocks. The process was accelerated 
by predation by non-native fish species introduced to the Caspian Sea. The 
catch of sturgeon, the Caspian’s main commercial fish, fell from 16800 tons 
in 1981 to 8000 tons in 1991 and 200 kg in 2007. In 2001, a temporary 
ban on the export of sturgeon caviar was introduced under the Convention 
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora. The 
depletion of the sea’s natural resources has had serious economic and 
environmental consequences (Martino, Novikov, 2008). 
Achieving a balance between the development of energy resources and the 
prevention of excessive depletion of resources and harm to the environment 
is a complex challenge for this region. A study of the environmental and 
socioeconomic problems that may provoke conflict in the region should lead to 
the formation of a coordinated policy to ensure environmental and industrial 
safety in the Caspian region. It will also encourage cooperation in the utilisation 
of transboundary water resources.
A Comprehensive Approach to Environmental Problems
In all Central Asian and Caspian economies, almost every sector is dominated 
by resource-intensive production. This has a significant environmental 
impact. Efforts being made at the national level to ensure environmental 
safety are inadequate. Rates of morbidity attributable to environmental 
pollution are rising or remain high. The urgent problem of industrial waste 
processing is unresolved. Areas affected by radioactive contamination or 
in which dangerous industrial waste is stored face intolerable risk to health 
and the environment. The problems of soil erosion and loss of soil fertility 
are escalating. A considerable proportion of fixed industrial assets do not 
meet environmental safety standards. Water quality in most transboundary 
watercourses does not meet statutory requirements. The supply of fresh 
drinking water is becoming critical in all these countries. 
Transboundary pollution poses numerous threats to the environment. In 
many cases, contamination spreads to neighbouring countries, with severe 
economic and social consequences. Air and water are particularly exposed 
to contamination. Accumulated industrial waste threatens public health 
and ecosystems, particularly in border regions. However, efforts to solve 
transboundary environmental problems lack coordination. The environment 
is not often seen as priority in international relations (UNDP, 2003), and there 
are no institutionalised procedures for transboundary environmental issues 
settlement (Kondratyev, Krapivin, 2005). 
The contamination of very scarce water resources is a serious obstacle to 
sustainable development and environmental protection in Central Asian 
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countries. Their economies are seeing immense structural change, involving 
upheaval in the ownership of land and the means of production. In many cases 
this brings with it a change in water consumption patterns and, subsequently, 
a redistribution of investment between economic sectors. High energy costs 
restrict the profit that can be generated from available resources, making 
investors reluctant to invest in the water sector. 
The lack of effective distribution of water across borders, the conflicts which 
arise from this, poor communication regarding the quality and utilisation 
of water, and restricted common access to information, all threaten the 
progress of regional cooperation. It is notable that states concerned tend to 
share out the benefits of access to water, rather than the water itself. This 
complicates the problems associated with joint use of transboundary rivers. 
Declining water quality and quantity and the risk of flooding are huge threats to 
sustainable development. This situation requires the creation of effective and 
authoritative cooperation organisations and the implementation of regional 
security measures. Until now, there has been no integrated management of 
the utilisation and protection of river basin water resources (UNEP, 2002).
The higher frequency of natural and manmade disasters causes 
disproportionate damage to the region’s poorest countries. All countries 
prone to natural disasters suffer economic losses, but they strive to adapt to 
such loss rather than change their approaches radically.
All these inter-related problems are dealt with separately at the national and 
regional levels, reducing the effectiveness of the response to environmental 
challenges. Therefore, regional cooperation must focus on formulating a 
comprehensive environmental security policy. 
Integrating Environmental Standards into the Investment 
Policies of International Financial Institutions 
Environmental considerations are of increasing importance to international 
institutions, especially those operating in the transboundary context. In June 
2003, the ten largest international banks declared that their investment 
decisions would be governed by the Equator Principles. These principles are 
so called because a project must comply equally with the requirements of 
national and international laws pertaining to environmental protection and 
industrial safety. The number of major lending institutions which have adopted 
the Equator Principles has reached sixty, and altogether they control 80-85% 
of the global project financing market.
The Equator Principles are based on the environmental protection and social 
standards adopted by the International Financial Corporation, a member of 
the World Bank. When a bank adopts the Equator Principles to assess the 
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environmental and social impact of a project, this means that it assumes 
responsibility for the environmental safety of the project as early as the pre-
investment phase. Thus international financial institutions are changing their 
policy of non-intervention to one of joint responsibility for efficient natural 
resources management and environmental protection. Unfortunately, 
the Equator Principles have not yet been adopted by banks in post-Soviet 
countries. 
The Equator Principles apply to new project financing in all sectors with 
total capital costs of at least $10 million. They form a benchmark against 
which financiers assess all the project’s risks, including environmental, 
social and socio-economic issues. Recipients who do not meet these criteria 
must either repay their loans with a risk premium or review their business. 
Normally, these criteria apply to sizable, complex or costly projects such as 
power plants, chemical facilities and mines and transport, environmental and 
telecommunications infrastructure. 
Financial institutions adopting the Equator Principles must develop their 
own project financing procedures covering various aspects of corporate 
social responsibility and sustainable environmental management. In so doing, 
these institutions undertake to lend only to projects where there is a proven 
ability and willingness to comply with social and environmental protection 
requirements. The bank must designate each project as either Category A, 
B or C (i.e. high, medium or low environmental or social risk). For Category A 
and B projects, the borrower is required to carry out a special environmental 
impact assessment. This approach enables the bank to eliminate or minimise 
the project’s potential negative impact on ecosystems and the population. 
Since the Equator Principles constitute a new approach towards investment, 
they should be explained in more detail:
Principle 1: Review and Categorisation
Projects are categorised according to the magnitude of their potential impact 
and risk in accordance with the following environmental and social assessment 
criteria:
Category A – projects with potentially significant adverse social or 
environmental consequences that are diverse, irreversible or unprecedented;
Category B – projects with potentially limited adverse social or environmental 
consequences that are few in number, generally site-specific, largely reversible 
and readily addressed through mitigation measures; and
Category C – projects with minimal or no social or environmental 
consequences.
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Principle 2: Social and Environmental Assessment
For each project assessed as either Category A or Category B, the borrower 
must carry out a Social and Environmental Impact Assessment and propose 
mitigation and risk management measures that are relevant and appropriate 
to the nature and scale of the proposed project.
Principle 3: Applicable Social and Environmental Standards
Standards applied fall into the following categories: social and environmental 
impact assessment and management systems; working conditions; 
prevention and elimination of environmental pollution; public health and 
safety; acquisition of land and forced migration; preservation of biodiversity 
and comprehensive management of natural resources; indigenous people; 
and cultural heritage.
Principle 4: Action Plan and Management System
For all Category A and B projects the borrower must prepare an Action Plan 
which addresses environmental protection, industrial safety and social activity. 
Borrowers will build on, maintain or establish a Social and Environmental 
Management System that addresses the management of these impacts, 
risks, and any remedial action required in order to comply with applicable host 
country social and environmental laws and regulations. 
Principle 5: Consultation and Disclosure
For all Category A and, as appropriate, Category B projects, the government, 
borrower or third party expert must consult with the communities affected by 
the project in a structured and culturally appropriate manner.
Principle 6: Grievance Mechanism
For all Category A and, as appropriate, Category B projects, consultation, 
disclosure and community engagement must continue throughout 
construction and operation of the project, the borrower will, commensurate 
with the risks and adverse impacts of the project, establish a grievance 
mechanism as part of the management system. 
Principle 7: Independent Review
For all Category A projects and, as appropriate, Category B projects, an 
independent social or environmental expert not directly associated with the 
borrower will review the Social and Environmental Impact Assessment, Action 
Plan and consultation documentation in order to assess compliance with the 
Equator Principles.
Principle 8: Covenants
For Category A and B projects, the borrower will include in financing 
documentation covenants to comply with all relevant host country social and 
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environmental laws, regulations and permits; to comply with the Action Plan 
(where applicable) during the construction and operation of the project; and to 
provide periodic reports in a format agreed with the banks. 
Principle 9: Independent Monitoring and Reporting 
To ensure ongoing monitoring and reporting over the life of the loan, the banks 
will, for all Category A projects, and as appropriate, Category B projects, 
require the appointment of an independent environmental and/or social 
expert, or require that the borrower retain qualified and experienced external 
experts to verify its monitoring information.
***
Through the EDB Technical Assistance Fund (EDB TAF), the Eurasian 
Development Bank offers financial assistance for pre-investment and 
innovative studies at international, country and industry levels. The EDB 
TAF is designed to enhance the flow of knowledge, skills, ideas, technology 
and methods that demonstrate best international practice and adhere to 
international standards of corporate governance.
The EDB’s TAF programme is being developed in accordance with the Bank’s 
mission and strategic objectives. 
The Technical Assistance Programme for investment project participants is 
aimed at accelerating and enhancing the efficiency of project implementation; 
it includes support for feasibility studies, marketing surveys, personnel 
training and qualifications (on-the-job training, preliminary training, distance 
education, seminars, training sessions, etc.), administration, project 
monitoring and project assessment on completion.
The Regional Integration Studies Programme focuses on financing 
research and educational projects. Priority is given to national, international 
and industry studies of regional integration. These studies may relate to 
reform in various economic sectors and any accompanying legislative 
changes, including model legislation, or to integration problems. Grants 
may be provided for educational projects with an integration element and 
for seminars, round tables and conferences dedicated to various aspects of 
economic integration.
The Programme of Support for Innovative Economy is designed to 
encourage innovation and economic diversification in the member states 
and the manufacture of competitive, higher-value-added, hi-tech products in 
non-raw-material sectors. Assistance may be provided for applied studies of 
innovative industries, clusters and producers, feasibility studies of innovative 
projects, marketing surveys related to innovative technology, the publication 
of specialised periodicals and creation of websites.
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The Programme of Support for Inter-regional and International 
Programmes is aimed at inter-regional and international programmes, 
including those being implemented under the aegis of EurAsEC. Eligible 
programmes include those relating to cooperation between the border regions 
of the Bank’s member states and other countries in the region. Support may 
also be provided for applied studies, open seminars, round-tables, forums, 
conferences, publication of periodicals and creation of websites dedicated to 
inter-regional and international cooperation.
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The focus of this overview is on the activities of the main international financial 
institutions in eight states – five Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) and also Russia, 
Armenia, and Belarus. The selection of countries is determined by the 
expanding geography of the Eurasian Development Bank activities – Russia 
and Kazakhstan founded the Bank and Armenia, Belarus and Tajikistan joined 
EDB in December 2008. The rest of the Central Asian states were the focus 
of the first EDB Yearbook and continued review of these countries illustrates 
the consistent interest of EDB in the development of this region. The overview 
covers the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the World Bank (WB), the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Eurasian 
Development Bank (EDB), and the Islamic Development Bank (IDB). 
These international and regional development banks play a significant role in 
economic development. Notably, their relative standing is growing in the times 
of economic difficulties. They are also important actors in promoting global 
and regional integration through large infrastructure investment, relevant 
technical assistance, and research. 
This report is based on information from public sources, including the websites 
and annual reports of these development banks. Direct comparison is not 
always possible due to objective reasons. For example, the banks use different 
classifications of their activities, and their reporting format and periods vary. 
It is nevertheless possible to identify common trends and gain an insight into 
the areas and scope of operations of the international financial institutions 
(IFIs) in the region. 
1. International Financial Institutions’ Role in Global Economic 
Crisis Response
In 2008, the operations of international financial institutions were heavily 
affected by the global economic crisis. In these circumstances, the main 
efforts of the World Bank Group, EBRD and ADB were aimed at the provision 
of more assistance to developing countries. 
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The November 2008 meetings of leaders and representatives of the Group of 
Twenty (G-20) economies made important advances toward re-establishing 
financial stability, supporting global growth, and ensuring that adequate official 
flows (including aid) are mobilised and delivered. 
Crucially, the G-20 recognised the important role of the major IFIs in achieving 
these goals and underlined the need to ensure that they have adequate 
resources to meet the challenge. IFIs can help their Developing Member 
Countries face the challenges brought about by the crisis in the following 
ways:
•  Stabilising financial and private sectors. IFIs can be part of a coordinated 
and rapid programme of action to avert the collapse of the banking and 
private sectors in developing countries. They can offer advisory services to 
help countries prepare for and respond to financial sector crises, assess 
vulnerability, and strengthen policy and regulatory frameworks. They can 
also provide short-term finance (including trade finance) and provide capital 
to vulnerable banking systems (either directly through private sector 
operations or indirectly via government programmes supporting bank 
recapitalisation). IFIs can also support developing countries by providing 
guarantees to foreign banks and/or private investors to encourage them 
back to emerging markets;
•  Managing fiscal challenges. Through budget support, IFIs can help partner 
countries finance their deficits and adjust their expenditure and revenue 
policies to take account of the priorities and pressures emerging from the 
crisis (in particular ensuring that fiscal adjustment takes into account the 
needs of the poor). This work can be supplemented by technical assistance 
to help strengthen management, transparency, and accountability in public 
finances to ensure that scarce resources are used efficiently;
•  Securing long-term development. One of the most important roles for 
IFIs over the coming years will be to help developing countries minimise 
disruption to ongoing development programmes and projects. This 
includes helping governments to prioritise their own resources and ensure 
sustained external financing of ongoing and planned development projects 
and programmes. Given the increased pressure on government resources 
and the importance of fiscal stimulus, IFIs may in some cases need to 
support additional programmes and projects in infrastructure and human 
development.
Currently, the IFIs are responding by providing policy advice and balance-of-
payments support, increasing lending levels, and supporting recapitalisation 
of banks and the expansion of trade financing facilities.
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What the World Bank is Doing
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) has 
indicated that it is prepared to make new commitments of up to $100 billion 
over the next 3 years, and to almost triple 2008 lending to more than $35.0 
billion (compared with $13.5 billion in 2007) to meet additional demand 
from developing country partners. On 9 December 2008, the World Bank 
announced the creation of a $2 billion International Development Association 
(IDA) Financial Crisis Response Fast-Track Facility to speed up grants and 
long-term, interest-free loans to help the world’s poorest countries cope with 
the impact of the global financial crisis. The facility will utilise IDA 15 funds 
and finance expenditures to maintain economic stability and sustain growth, 
address volatility, and protect the poor, through funding for infrastructure 
services, education, and health and social safety nets. The World Bank will also 
provide technical analysis and advice to help countries respond to potential 
difficulties in banking systems.
The International Finance Corporation (IFC) is planning to expand support to 
the private sector through the following initiatives, to be implemented over a 
3-year period: 
•  A doubling of the Global Trade Finance Programme to $3.0 billion and the 
issuance of up to $18 billion in guarantees for short-term trade finance, 
benefiting participating banks based in 66 countries;
•  The launch of a global equity fund to recapitalise distressed banks, with $1 
billion provided by the IFC and $2 billion by Japan; 
•  The creation of an infrastructure crisis facility, to provide rollover financing 
to help recapitalise existing, viable, privately-funded infrastructure projects 
facing financial distress, with $300 million provided by IFC and $1.5 billion 
from other sources; 
•  A refocusing of advisory services programmes on banking for small and 
medium-sized enterprises, leasing, micro finance, housing, investment 
policy and promotion, and business operation and regulation for an 
estimated financing of $40 million.
The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) is providing 
guarantees to foreign banks to help inject liquidity and bolster confidence in the 
financial systems of the Russian Federation and Ukraine. Similar guarantees 
are expected for countries in Eastern Europe and Africa.
Also, the World Bank is calling for developed countries to pledge 0.7% of their 
stimulus packages to a vulnerability fund for assisting developing countries 
that can’t afford bailouts and deficits. The idea is for the 0.7% of countries’ 
stimulus packages to be channelled to help the poor and vulnerable through 
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bilateral organisations, UN organisations, multilateral development banks 
(including the World Bank Group) as well as non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs). For its part, key priority areas for the World Bank Group include 
expansion of safety nets, an emphasis on infrastructure, and finance for small 
and medium enterprises and micro finance institutions. 
The EBDR Adopts Crisis Response Package 
The EBRD Board of Directors has approved the 2009 Business Plan and 
Budget which allows for an increase of the Bank’s annual business volume in 
2009 of about 20% to approximately €7 billion. Half of the €1 billion in extra 
spending are earmarked for Central and Eastern Europe. 
The increase will be financed from EBRD’s reserves. The extra investments 
in 2009 will be spread across EBRD’s countries of operations, with a special 
focus on the western Balkans and less developed countries in the Caucasus 
and Central Asia. 
The EBRD’s response will initially focus on the banking sectors in countries 
where EBRD invests to ensure that financing flows continue, in particular 
to small and medium-sized enterprises. EBRD will also extend its support 
to the broader corporate sector. The crisis response package also includes 
an expansion of EBRD’s Trade Facilitation Programme, and intensified 
engagement with existing clients and with governments to address key policy 
issues.
The Asian Development Bank’s response to global economic crisis 
According to the ADB 2008 Asia Economic Monitor (AEM), economic growth 
in developing Asia will slow to 5.8% in 2009, down from a likely 6.9% in 
2008 and 9% in 2007, as the impact of the global financial crisis spreads to 
emerging markets.
The shortfall in internal and external financing in ADB developing member 
countries to support development expenditure related to ADB operations can 
be estimated in the order of at least $7.4 billion ($5.6 billion, excluding the 
larger countries such as China and India). ADB intends to assist its developing 
member countries to cushion the social impact of the economic crisis, and to 
complement the role played by other IFIs through support for:
•  Public investment programmes in infrastructure and social sectors; 
•  Trade financing facilitation; 
• Where ADB is already engaged in the financial sector, policy-based advice 
and support to address weaknesses in financial systems. 
Where required, ADB will participate in emergency response programmes 
in coordination with other IFIs, including the International Monetary Fund 
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and the World Bank. In addition to direct support at the country level, ADB 
proposes to strengthen monitoring and support for regional approaches to 
the crisis. ADB plans to respond to its developing member countries’ requests 
and to the mandate from the international community by increasing its role in 
regional cooperation and increasing 2009 levels of operations, in spite of the 
present resource constraints.
2. Activities of IFIs in the Eurasian region
In 2008, international development banks continued regional activities 
in priority areas of an each institution. In doing so, they had to respond to 
emergency requests of their member countries due to global food and fuel 
prices increase.
ADB WB EBD EBRD IDB
Armenia 200 1992 December 2008 1992 -
Belarus - 1992 December 2008 1992 -
Kazakhstan 199 1992 June 200 1992 199
Kyrgyzstan 199 1992 - 1992 1993
Russia - 1992 June 200 1992 -
Tajikistan 1998 1993 December 2008 1992 199
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan 199 1992 1992 2003
Table 11. 1.  
Eurasian countries’ 
IFI membership 
Source: 
Web sites and 
Annual Reports  
of IFIs
Asian Development Bank
During 2008, the Asian Development Bank approved a number of Central 
Asian countries initiatives aimed at the development of cooperation in the 
region. In particular, ADB decided to provide a technical assistance grant 
to assist with exchange of knowledge and information on water resources 
in the region as well as for capacity building of water resources governance 
institutions. The envisaged assistance aims to support initiatives in river 
basins of Amu Darya, Syr Darya, Chu and Talas. 
Another important area of ADB activities is the provision of support to 
the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) initiative. Eight 
countries (Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, 
Mongolia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) and six multilateral organisations 
(ADB, EBRD, IMF, IDB, UND and WB) participate in CAREC. In 
November 2008, countries participating in CAREC had adopted 
strategic documents aimed at deepening regional economic 
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cooperation in transport, trade support, trade and energy policy 
 in Central Asia and neighbouring states. An action plan for implementation 
of the Strategy for Transport and Trade Promotion envisages investments to 
the tune of $21 billion for the improvement of six CAREC transport and trade 
corridors to meet international standards up to 2017. It is expected that in 
2008, regional investments in priority areas of CAREC – transport, energy 
and trade – will amount to about $2.4 billion. 
Another initiative is the approval by the government of Japan of a technical 
assistance grant in amount of $0.9 million for improvement of the trade policy 
development and strengthening institutional capacities within the Asia and 
Pacific region. 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
According to EBRD, growth in the EBRD region was likely to fall sharply in 
2009 in the face of global economic slowdown and financial market 
turbulence. The institution urged its member states to place high priority on 
the stabilisation of their banking systems.
The EBRD’s Transition Report 2008, which tracks the economic performance 
and progress on reforms across EBRD countries, predicted that overall 
growth would fall to 6.3% in 2008 from 7.5% in 2007 and drop further to 
3.0% in 2009. The EBRD sees growth in the CIS and Mongolia, slowing to 
7.3% in 2008 from 8.5% and a drop to 3.4% in 2009.  
The Transition Report said there was a risk of even slower growth in the 
region in 2009 if external funding suddenly fell away. In a separate chapter 
on the impact of the global credit crisis on the region, the report said the 
deterioration in the overall financing environment could now result in a lasting 
and substantial slowdown in credit expansion. 
However, the report also noted that several factors could help the region avoid 
this worsening scenario or at least help it cope with the effects. It pointed out 
that government debt levels had been falling continuously since 2000, the fact 
that provides respective governments with more policy flexibility. Business 
conditions had generally improved in recent years and labour markets were 
relatively flexible, which would allow for a faster recovery to potential growth.
The report also noted the continued progress over the past year in market-
oriented reforms, especially in Southeastern Europe and in parts of the CIS 
and Mongolia. Some of the least reformed countries, such as Belarus and 
Turkmenistan, have taken positive steps to open up markets and reduce 
the role of the state. Given the strong link between reforms and growth, this 
bodes well for the region’s resilience to short-term fluctuations and prospects 
for long-term growth.
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Eurasian Development Bank 
EDB is an international financial institution founded by the initiative of 
Presidents of Russia and Kazakhstan in January 2006, with authorised 
capital of $1.5 billion. The mission of the EDB is to promote sustainable 
economic growth of its member states as well as their mutual trade and 
investments. EDB should become one of the key elements of the regional 
financial infrastructure and a catalyst of integration processes in Eurasia. 
Following the Bank’s mission, the strategic directions of EDB’s investments are 
electric power sector (generation and distribution), transport infrastructure, 
high technology and innovations. 
As of 31 December 2008, the project portfolio of the EDB amounted to 
$ 1.2 billion. The total cost of projects considered by the Bank for possible 
investment is about $4.2 billion. EDB’s envisaged share is about $2.1 billion. 
EDB’s presence in the region is expanding and the integration of cooperation 
is becoming more real. In June 2006, the EDB started its operations in 
Almaty. At the end of 2006, EDB opened its representative offices in Moscow 
and Astana, and at the end of 2007, the St. Petersburg branch office was 
launched. In December 2008, EDB’s Council had made a decision of accepting 
Armenia, Belarus and Tajikistan as member-countries of the Bank. The 
following ratification of the agreement by the national parliaments will allow an 
opening of representative offices in capital cities of these states in the course 
of 2009. 
Islamic Development Bank 
The Islamic Development Bank is a development institution established in 
1975 with an authorised capital of 30 billion Islamic dinars ($46 billion) to 
promote economic development and cooperation between its member states. 
In 2008, it approved 183 development projects and technical assistance 
amounting to $2.7 billion, and 82 trade operations for $2.8 billion.
In 2008, the Islamic Development Bank was primarily concerned with the 
food crisis in its least developed member countries. In response to this 
challenge, IDB allocated $1.5 billion to support efforts to meet immediate, 
medium and long-term food constraints. The programme, known as Jeddah 
Declaration, will go over a 5-year period and will target needy countries via 
various short-term programmes. These would include building strategic 
inventory of food security, providing agricultural inputs, pesticides, fertilisers to 
assist countries in the coming agricultural season. Moreover, the programmes 
will support provision of fodder, agricultural machinery and equipment. The list 
of countries that will be targeted includes Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. 
The IDB Group is expected to invest up to $20-25 billion in the infrastructure 
sector over the next 10 years. This investment is expected to target mainly 
power, transport and water projects. Climate change adaptation and 
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mitigation is likely to stimulate further demand for investment in cleaner 
energy, energy efficiency as well as water storage infrastructure and flood 
protection. In 2007, the IDB Group provided around $2 billion of financing for 
infrastructure projects in more than 30 countries in Africa, Asia, Europe and 
the Middle East.
IDB has signed a landmark co-financing agreement with ADB, which will 
allow them to work together on projects in common member countries 
(Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Maldives, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). The agreement 
calls on both institutions to provide up to $2 billion equivalent each over the 
next three years to finance projects in their common member countries. 
The agreement – which is the first of its kind – is based on a 3-year business plan 
that includes a common vision, strategic framework, and best practice ideas 
in development financing. The co-financing will mainly target transactions in 
the infrastructure (including irrigation), utilities, and urban sectors. However, 
it may also cover education, health and other sectors in selected countries.
The IDB Board of Executive Directors approved $2.47 billion for its 2009 
Operational Plan to finance various development projects, technical 
assistance projects and food security in member countries. The approved 
Operations Plan includes $2.09 billion towards regular funding and $381 
million to be allocated towards programmes and projects in member countries. 
Additionally, $357 million in loans will be allocated under the Islamic Solidarity 
Fund for Development in order to fight poverty. The 2009 Plan was a 15% 
increase in the rate of growth from the 2008 Operational Plan. 
The World Bank Group
During fiscal year 2008, the World Bank Group committed $8 billion in loans, 
credits, equity investments and guarantees to its members and to private 
business in the Europe and Central Asia (ECA) Region. The World Bank Group 
commitments in ECA grew in fiscal year 2008 (ending June 30) by 33% 
as finance was rapidly approved to help the poor in the food price crisis and 
support grew for private sector development.
World Bank Group (FY) 08* (FY) 07*
IBRD $3.71b $3.3b
IDA $7m $22m
IFC $2.8b* $1.79b*
MIGA $1.2b $30m
TOTAL $8b $6b
Table 11. 2.  
World Bank Group 
Commitments in 
Europe and Central 
Asia Fiscal Years 
2008 and 2007 
(year ends June 30)
Note: 
*Own accounts
Source: 
2008 Annual 
Report.
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IDA commitments in ECA were $457 million, and IBRD commitments totalled 
$3.71 billion in fiscal year 2008. IDA/IBRD lending increased in response to 
the food price crisis, and four ECA projects were approved in record time for 
the Global Food Crisis Response Programme – two in the Kyrgyzstan and two 
in Tajikistan. Lending was provided across all sectors, including governance, 
infrastructure, roads and highways, trade, and railways. Examples of IDA 
assistance in Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 include credits for Uzbekistan ($68 
million) and Kyrgyzstan ($31 million).
The Bank extended several loans for infrastructure in the Region’s middle-
income states. Among these were $200 million to improve housing in the 
Russian Federation. The Bank also continued strengthening the institutional 
framework and social services in ECA: the Health Sector Technology Transfer 
and Institutional Reform Project to Kazakhstan have helped introduce 
international standards in health sector.
Fiscal year 2008 saw strong growth in IFC’s new investment commitments 
with corresponding expansion in advisory work. IFC committed $2.68 billion 
for its own account (a 50% increase over FY07) and mobilised an additional 
$1.09 billion in financing for its clients. As of June 2008, IFC’s portfolio in the 
region’s financial institutions was $3.5 billion, of which $2.2 billion is in 86 
institutions focusing in micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs). This 
represented 37% of IFC’s total global investments in the sector. IFC’s priorities 
in the region include more investment in infrastructure and agribusiness, 
increase access to finance for MSMEs, efforts to mitigate climate change, 
promote sustainable development and encourage intraregional investments.
During the fiscal year 2008, MIGA supported nine projects with $1.2 billion 
in political risk insurance or guarantee coverage in the region. Among them 
was the agency’s support for a bank in Kazakhstan that is expected to 
help strengthen the leasing sector and facilitate medium- and longer-term 
financing in the country. The agency’s support for these projects is critical 
not just for encouraging the growth of financial markets, but also for building 
market confidence in these emerging economies.
In the 2009, World Development Report, issued in November 2008, World 
Bank maps local and global economic geography and calls for a greater 
integration. History shows that severe crises can cause nations to become 
inward looking, often with negative consequences. The World Development 
Report 2009 argues that the most effective policies for promoting long-term 
growth are those that facilitate geographic concentration and economic 
integration, both within and across countries. Integration should be the pivotal 
concept in the policy discussions involving the location of production, people 
and poverty–in particular, the debates on urbanisation, regional development, 
and globalisation
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The World Bank launched a $1.2 billion rapid financing facility to help poor 
countries cope with the food crisis. Since then, around $850 million has been 
committed to finance seeds, plantings, and feeding programmes.
Reforms to business regulation reached record numbers in 2008, with 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia leading among world regions for a fifth 
consecutive year, according to Doing Business 2009 – the sixth in an annual 
series of reports published by IFC and the World Bank. According to this study, 
four of the ten economies making the most regulatory reforms in the world 
are in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The top ten are, in order, Azerbaijan, 
Albania, the Kyrgyzstan, Belarus, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Botswana, Colombia, 
the Dominican Republic, and Egypt. In Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 23 
of the region’s 25 countries implemented 62 regulatory reforms, accounting 
for more than a quarter of the worldwide total. Doing Business 2009 ranks 
181 economies on the overall ease of doing business based on 10 indicators 
of business regulation that record the time and cost to meet government 
requirements in starting and operating a business, trading across borders, 
paying taxes, and closing a business. The rankings do not reflect such areas 
as macroeconomic policy, quality of infrastructure, currency volatility, investor 
perceptions, or crime rates.
3. Activities of IFIs in Countries of the Region
Armenia
During 2008 World Bank, EBRD as well as ADB had approved several projects 
in various economic sectors of Armenia. 
The Asian Development Bank decided to provide $18 million for implementation 
of projects in transport sector. 
The World Bank expanded the scope of the Municipal Water and Wastewater 
project through provision of additional $20 million to an on-going WB project 
in this sector.
EBRD remains one of the largest investors in Armenian economy. The EBRD 
had approved 10 projects aimed at financial and property sectors as well as 
at agriculture, infrastructure and energy. The total amount approved by the 
EBRD is $179.5 million. 
Belarus
The World Bank approved $60 million for Water Supply and Sanitation project 
in Belarus. The EBRD decided to provide $55 million mainly for development of 
small and medium enterprises by lending to Belarusian banks. 
Kazakhstan 
In 2008, all reviewed financial institutions provided funding to Kazakhstan in 
order to support development of this country. 
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The World Bank approved two projects in areas of technology 
commercialisation and health sector totalling $131.1 million.
The ADB focused on transport area and approved four projects costing over 
$1 billion.
The EBRD’s financial assistance to Kazakhstan was concentrated in transport, 
telecommunications, agriculture, energy, banking and SME support and 
amounted to more than $1.2 billion. 
According to information on the IDB web site, the bank approved financing of 
six projects in Kazakhstan at a cost of over $15 million. 
During 2008, the EDB approved funding for 7 projects in Kazakhstan totalled 
$308.1 million. While electric power and transport stand out as priorities, the 
bank provided loans also in mining, industry, agriculture, and financial sector. 
Kyrgyzstan
In Kyrgyzstan the World Bank approved eight projects in the areas of water 
and transport infrastructure, agriculture, health, and public administration 
including energy and food emergency initiatives. In 2008, the total amount of 
WB approved funding to Kyrgyzstan was more than $51 million. 
The Asian Development Bank decided to provide financial assistance to 
Kyrgyzstan through approval of eight projects in areas of transport, water 
supply and sanitation as well as multisector initiatives. The approved assistance 
amounted to more than $69 million. 
The EBRD approved four projects for Kyrgyzstan in total for $ 8.4 million.
The IDB approved one loan for Kyrgyzstan for $11.2 million aimed at financing 
the reconstruction of Taraz-Talas-Suusamyr road (Phase II).
Russia
The World Bank approved two projects for Russian Federation in areas of 
housing and communal services and gas flaring reduction to a total of $350 
million. 
The EBRD’s financial support to Russia was aimed at a broad scope of 
economic sectors such as agribusiness and municipal services, banking and 
transport, natural resources and power and energy. This assistance was to 
the tune of $5 billion. 
In 2008, the IDB for the first time held an investment conference in Russia, 
which has an observer status in the Organisation of the Islamic Conference 
since 2005. 
It is to be noted that IDB has been active in the Russian Federation since 1991. 
Over this time span it approved an amount of $6 million for 30 projects in 
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various sectors including education, health and awqaf1 properties in addition 
to emergency relief and reconstruction operations.
In 2008 EDB had approved funding of five projects in Russian Federation at a 
cost of $553.8 million. 
Tajikistan
In 2008, Tajikistan was among the least developed economies not only in the 
region, but also globally. 
The World Bank approved energy and food emergency grants and additional 
financing for health and Pamir projects totalling $54 million. 
ADB approved five projects for Tajikistan amounting to more than $62 
million. 
The EBRD’s lending to Tajikistan was approved through eight projects totalled 
$23.7 million.
As Tajikistan only joined the EDB in December 2008, the Bank has yet to build 
up its presence in the country. 
Turkmenistan
In 2008, Turkmenistan did not receive any financial support from reviewed 
IFIs, except $0.39 million for a Statistical Capacity Building project from the 
World Bank. 
Uzbekistan
In 2008, Uzbekistan benefited from the financial support of the following IFIs. 
The World Bank approved one project supporting rural enterprises for about 
$68 million. ADB approved $136 million for eight projects in the areas of 
agriculture and water supply. The EBRD approved six projects totalling $21.5 
million. IDB approved two projects totalling $94.7 million in the areas of water 
supply and power generation.
4. IFIs funding in the Eurasian Region in Year 2008
The direct comparison of IFIs operations in the reviewed countries is not 
always possible due to objective reasons such as different classifications of 
their operations and currencies in which institutions provide funding. However, 
using the average annual exchange rate for various currencies and adopting 
review period of 1 January – 31 December 2008, it is possible to present 
funding trends in the reviewed region. In accordance with this approach, 
the total funding provided by the ADB amounted to $1325.9 million; EBRD’ 
1 Awqaf is an inalienable religious endowment in Islam, typically denoting a building or plot of land 
for Muslim religious or charitable purposes. 
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Country
ADB* EBRD EDB IDB** WB
$ million
Armenia 18.32 179. - - 20
Belarus -  - - 0
Kazakhstan 100.3 1210.1 308.1 1.3 131.1
Kyrgyzstan 9.1 8. - 11.3 1.1
Russia - 878. 3.8 - 30
Tajikistan 2.1 23.7 - 0 
Turkmenistan 0 0 - 0 0.39
Uzbekistan 13 21. - 9.7 8
approved lending comprised $6.8 million. The Eurasian Development Bank 
approved funding for $861.9 million, IDB for $121.7 million, and the World 
Bank for $734.6 million.
Table 11. 3.  
Approved IFIs 
Funding in 2008
Note: 
* – Belarus and 
Russia are not ADB’ 
member states. 
** – Armenia, 
Belarus and Russia 
are not IDB’ member 
states,
Source: 
Information from the 
IFIs press releases 
and web sites.
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Executive summary
1. The geographic and geo-economic location of EurAsEC countries gives 
them significant strategic potential for freight transit. Analysts estimate 
that the region’s total potential transit capacity is about 220 million tons at 
present. This figure is expected to increase to 400 million tons by 2020, 290 
million tons of which will originate in EurAsEC countries for transport on to 
third countries. EurAsEC has motorway and railway corridors running east-
west and north-south, and a number of new corridors are being constructed. 
However, to handle such huge volumes of cargo, the region’s existing transport 
infrastructure must be modernised.
2. EurAsEC states are not making the most of their transport potential. 
At the moment, these countries are handling only half their potential cargo 
flow. The main limiting factor is EurAsEC’s current inability to become the key 
cargo transit route between the mainland’s two macroregions – the European 
Union and the Asian-Pacific Region (APR), principally China. Trade between 
these two regions will reach $1 trillion within the next few years. Only 1% of 
the cargo transported between the EU and the APR utilises the EurAsEC 
international transport corridors (ITC). Meanwhile, sea freight companies 
are earning billions of dollars. According to available data, of the 17.7 million 
TEU transported from Europe to Asia in 2008, only 74551 TEU were 
transshipped via Dostyk (0.42%), including 0.35% from Europe to Asia. 
3. Sea vs land: 2:1. Transportation of transit cargo by sea (transoceanic 
service) has some strong advantages, such as low delivery cost, established 
relationships with customers and high standards of service. This leads 
us to conclude that sea transit will prevail in the near future. Land transit 
routes offer only one competitive advantage – speed of delivery, which 
is two to three times faster compared with the sea routes linking East Asia 
with Europe. This advantage must be exploited. A considerable proportion of 
“time-sensitive” transit (some 16 million tons annually, according to the most 
conservative estimate) can be redirected to ITCs operated by EurAsEC.
4. There are a number of physical and non-physical barriers to the realisation 
of the EurAsEC’s transit potential. Physical barriers include the poor state of 
motorways and railways and their related infrastructure, i.e. obsolete rolling-
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stock, which prevents any increase in transportation speeds and volumes; 
existing roads do not meet international standards; border crossing points 
and logistics centres have a low throughput capacity. Non-physical barriers 
include cumbersome permit systems, unreasonable delays in crossing 
borders, various charges and additional taxes imposed by regulatory and 
local authorities, scheduled and spot-check inspections of cargo weight, 
etc. The non-physical barriers are the most significant obstacles to the 
development of cargo transit in the region and cause serious delays in 
cargo delivery. Time lost does not only result in loss of money and customer 
trust, but also the loss of the main (in fact the only) competitive advantage land 
transit has over sea transit.
5. There are two complementary ways to reduce physical and non-physical 
barriers:
a) integrating national transport systems, which we consider to be key to 
overcoming barriers by introducing well-coordinated transport policies and 
by harmonising and fine-tuning national legislation, etc.;
b) well-coordinated investment policy for priority national projects 
is required in order to realise transit potential and foster mutual trade 
between EurAsEC member countries, including projects to construct 
priority railway and motorway routes, develop logistical and border 
infrastructure, and renew existing rolling-stock.
Together, the above factors should enable the physical and non-physical 
barriers to be minimised and encourage joint investment in the renewal of 
transport infrastructure and construction of service and logistics centres. 
Ultimately, these will have a positive impact upon economic integration. 
6. Projects to construct or modernise transport infrastructure are 
exceptionally capital-intensive. Therefore, the region’s countries must 
identify the priorities for their concerted action in order to develop 
transit flows and support integration. In order to maximise transit potential, 
the most important ITCs are the northern corridor of the Trans-Asian 
railway (which connects to the Trans-Siberian railway) and the 10000-
km Western Europe – West China motorway corridor. The transport 
capacity of the Trans-Asian railway is not fully utilised, whilst the TRACECA 
(Europe-Caucasus-Asia) international transport corridor, with its numerous 
transshipments, ferry ports (Turkmenbashi and Baku on the Caspian and 
Poti, Batumi, Varna and Odessa on the Black Sea) and high capital intensity is 
unlikely to be competitive in the Europe-Asia direction. According to preliminary 
estimates, all other conditions being equal, the freight tariffs charged by 
Russian railways (RZD) for grain, cotton and containers are 1.7 times lower 
than those of TRACECA, and for oil and non-ferrous metals this ratio is 1.2. In 
addition, transportation via Russia is 1.8 times faster. 
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7. Given their geographic position and national economic interests, Russia, 
Kazakhstan and their neighbours have a direct interest in the Eurasian 
integration process that extends beyond the boundaries of the post-
Soviet space and involves the region’s most important countries. Projects 
implemented in certain economic sectors provide a reliable basis for regional 
economic integration. Transportation is undoubtedly among these priority 
sectors.
1. Scope of this report
Transport is at the heart of an efficiently functioning economy, 
since it provides an infrastructural basis for sustainable 
development. In modern times, when individual economies are joining 
together to form a global production network, access to efficient 
transportation and communications systems is an essential precondition for 
integrating into this network (Lakshmanan, 2001). 
For EurAsEC members – Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia 
and Tajikistan – whose mutual trade turnover and, accordingly, cargo 
transportation have been rapidly increasing recently (by 2020, their cargo 
transportation may total 490 million tons, a four-fold increase compared with 
2000), the development of transport infrastructure is vital in sustaining the 
rapid expansion of mutual trade and economic integration. 
Today, analysts estimate the transit potential of EurAsEC at around 220 
million tons. By 2020, this may increase to 400 million tons, with about 290 
million tons of cargo potentially being transported from EurAsEC to third 
countries. In order to be able to handle these enormous volumes of cargo, the 
region’s existing transport infrastructure needs to be modernised. 
However, EurAsEC does not fully utilise its transit capacity, handling only half 
of its potential cargo flow. The main reason for this is its failure to become a 
key transit route between the two global commodity-producing centres, the 
EU and the APR. Trade turnover between these regions will reach $1 trillion 
in the next few years. Only 1% of the cargo generated is being transported 
via the ITCs of EurAsEC. In this paper, we will attempt to identify measures 
that need to be taken to make the region’s ITCs a realistic source of transit 
revenue for EurAsEC countries.
The purpose of this review is to provide an insight into the diverse problems 
associated with transit via EurAsEC. Firstly we examine competition in the 
transit transportation industry and the structure of competitive advantage 
in sea and land freight transit. Secondly, we identify specific cargoes which 
can be transported via the ITCs of EurAsEC. Thirdly, we analyse physical 
and non-physical barriers to the realisation of the region’s transit potential, 
and propose measures to eliminate these barriers. We also discuss various 
potential targets for investment and the progress of transport integration in 
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EurAsEC. Finally, we provide detailed information on existing and emerging 
ITCs in EurAsEC countries, and highlight the most promising and efficient ITCs 
which are already helping the region to achieve its transit potential and further 
the integration of EurAsEC countries.
2. The transit and transport potential of EurAsEC
2.1. Review of cargo flows between EurAsEC member countries 
The foreign trade turnover of EurAsEC has been increasing steadily in recent 
years. Between 2005 and 2008, total turnover from trade between EurAsEC 
countries almost doubled in monetary terms (see Table 12.1). This is largely 
attributable to the trends and structure of economic cooperation inherited 
from the Soviet era, the region’s relatively rapid economic growth, the 
development of industries producing raw materials and semi-finished goods 
(so-called commodity cargoes), and expansion of internal and foreign trade. 
Table 12. 1.  
Trade turnover  
between EurAsEC 
member ountries  
($ million)
Source: state 
statistics agencies 
of EurAsEC member 
countries
Trade  
turnover by country pair
2005 2006 2007 2008
Russia–Belarus 183.0 199.0 207.0 3188.9
Russia–Kazakhstan 9 79.0 12807.0 17.0 19731.7
Russia–Kyrgyzstan .0 7.0 1 19.0 1802.9
Russia–Tajikistan 33.0 0.0 772.0 1002.8
Kazakhstan–Belarus 23. 3.3 2.3 7.0
Kazakhstan–Kyrgyzstan 3.1 0.7 17.0 08.
Kazakhstan–Tajikistan 17. 18.1 198.9 29.
Belarus–Kyrgyzstan 10.8 21. 2.8 7.8
Belarus–Tajikistan 12.0 18.0 3.0 7.1
Kyrgyzstan–Tajikistan 2.9 2.7 30. 3.2
Total commodity  
turnover 272.8 3023.3 922 832.
In tandem with the increase in revenues generated by trade between EurAsEC 
countries, volumes of cargo transported within EurAsEC have also grown at 
a rapid pace. According to the EurAsEC Integration Committee, total cargoes 
will reach 490 million tons by 2020, i.e., four times the volume transported in 
2000. Even allowing for the expected slowdown, cargo flows between EurAsEC 
countries will continue to grow by more than 15% annually (see Figure 12.1).
Integrating Eurasian 
Transport Systems
Evgeny Vinokurov, Murat Jadraliyev, Yuriy Shcherbanin  
“The EurAsEC Transport Corridors” EDB Industry Report
190 Eurasian Development Bank
EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook 2009
Figure 12.1.  
Potential cargo 
flows between 
EurAsEC countries
Source: EurAsEC 
Integration 
Committee
Clearly, this rapid growth of cargo flows between EurAsEC member countries 
will soon necessitate an overhaul of the existing transport infrastructure, and 
capacity expansion, above all in railways, motorways and logistics centres.
2.2. Cargo transportation potential in the context of the global crisis
The UNECE’s Inland Transport Committee defines an international transport 
corridor as part of a national or international transport system which maintains 
considerable international cargo and passenger transportation between 
certain geographic regions and includes the rolling-stock and immovable 
structures of all modes of transport working on the respective route, and 
all technological, organisational and legal conditions for such transportation. 
Using this definition, and in order to understand the urgency with which the 
EurAsEC must develop its ITCs, it is essential first to evaluate existing levels 
of cargo1 transportation in the region and the potential for transit via these 
countries. 
ITCs in this region are uniquely important because of the region’s geographic 
and geo-economic location between two macroregions, the European Union 
(EU) and the Asian-Pacific Region (APR). Trade between the EU and the APR 
totalled $700 billion in 2007 and is set to reach $1 trillion by 2010. 
Evidently, given the global financial and economic crisis, certain adjustments 
will have to be made to any estimates of future trade between Europe and 
Asia. The recession-stricken countries of Western Europe are experiencing a 
considerable contraction in domestic demand and, as a result, have reduced 
1 This report discusses only cargo transportation (leaving aside passenger transportation) 
based on its importance in realising the region’s transit and transport potential.
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the volumes they import from Asia, especially of cheap commodities from 
China. The latter, being an export-oriented economy, responded with a 
package of anti-crisis measures aimed at stimulating domestic demand and 
reducing its reliance on exports. However, we believe that exports to richer, 
developed countries (primarily the US and Europe) will remain a priority for the 
developing Chinese and APR economies (the traditionally high level of savings 
in these countries will preclude any significant increase in domestic demand, 
and during the crisis their governments will focus on subsidising exports as a 
more immediate and proven policy). 
In addition, drawing our conclusions from the fundamental scenario of cyclical 
crises, by the end of 2009/early 2010, the world will move into a period of 
economic growth once again, leading to an increase in commodity turnover 
between the world’s main production and consumption centres. Therefore, 
despite a relatively small contraction in EU-APR trade in 2008-2009, the 
forecast level of $1 trillion can be achieved, albeit somewhat later – by 2013-
2015, we estimate. Thus, in spite of the global crisis, the enormous transit 
potential of EurAsEC countries is undiminished, especially in the East-West 
direction. 
2.3. Review of Eurasian cargo flows from Asia to Europe
When analysing the cost indicators of Eurasian cargo flows and the load on 
inland freight transit systems, the three major cargo centres that should 
be examined are China, South Korea and India. China and South Korea are 
Europe’s main partners in the Far East. India is a source of cargo that could 
potentially be transported to Europe along North-South routes.
Figure 12.2.  
Exports to the EU  
from China, South 
Korea and India  
($ billion) 
Source: WTO, 2008
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In 2007, China was the world’s second largest exporter ($1217.8 billion) and 
third largest importer ($956 billion) in monetary terms (WTO, 2008:39). 
The table below shows China’s trade with Europe and the CIS by main 
commodity group.
Table 12. 2.  
China’s trade  
with Europe and  
the CIS in 2007  
($ billion) 
Source:  
WTO, 2008
Commodity
Total trade Europe CIS
Export Import Export Import Export Import
Agricultural  
produce
38.9 . . . 1. .9
Fossil fuel  
and minerals
1.9 210. . 9.0 0.7 17.3
Finished goods 113.8 77. 21.8 10.9 .7 .7
Including:
   Metals 1. 2.1 10. 3.8 1. 1.2
   Chemicals 0.3 107. 11.2 1.7 2.2  3.0
   Office equipment 37.8 22. 8.1 9.7 .3 0.0
   Transport  
   equipment
9.1 1.7 13. 18.1 3. 0.1
   Textiles .0 1. 8. 1.2 2.8 0.01
   Clothing 11.2 2.0 2.8 0. .9 0
TOTAL: 1217.8 9.0 23.9 120.0 8.0 28.0
China’s main exports to Europe are finished goods – accounting for about 
95% in monetary terms (see Figure 12.3). These include office equipment 
(31%), transport equipment (about 19%), textiles (nearly 10%), chemicals 
(over 4%) and other items (see Table 12.3). These commodities are suitable 
for containerised shipment. 
China imports mainly finished goods from Europe. These account for 87% 
of total imports and fall into two main commodity groups: machinery and 
equipment – 57.2%; and power and electrical equipment – 34%. These are 
also containerised cargoes.
Agricultural produce   Fuels and minerals   Finished goods
Figure 12.3.  
Structure of Chinese 
exports to Europe, 
2007 
Source: WTO, 2008
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The structure of China’s trade with the CIS is somewhat different. China’s 
main exports to the CIS are finished products. Textiles account for 28.5% of 
total exports, power industry equipment for more than 12%, household items 
for nearly 10%, office equipment for 9% and cars for 6%. 
China’s main imports from the CIS are fuel and energy products (over 61%), 
agricultural raw materials (16%), chemical fertilisers (nearly 11%) and metals 
(4%). These bulk cargoes have to be shipped in on flat-trailers rather than in 
containers.
South Korea has a strong export bias. Data on South Korea’s foreign trade is 
summarised in Table 12.3.
Commodity
Total trade Europe CIS
Export Import Export Import Export Import
Agricultural  
produce
.32 22.0 0.3 1.8 0.3 0.7
Fossil fuel  
and minerals
33.82 12.8 1.39 2.30 0.09 .
Finished goods 330.1 20.09 9.0 3. 10.87 1.72
Including:
   Metals 18.82 21. 2.3 1. 0.18 0.99
   Chemicals 37. 32.3 2.9 .9 1.1 0.37
   Office equipment 92.9 .2 1.79 2.70 1.23 0.02
   Transport  
   equipment
78.99 13.8 21.1 .2 . 0.0
   Textiles 10.37 .1 1.13 0. 0.22 0.02
   Cloths 1.91 .32 0.29 0.8 0.02 0
TOTAL: 371.8 3.8 1.7 0.70 11.31 8.01
Table 12. 3.  
South Korea’s 
commodity trade 
with Europe  
and the CIS in 2007  
($ billion) 
Source: WTO, 2008
South Korea’s exports and imports may seem modest compared to China’s 
trade with Europe and the CIS; however, the structure of commodities traded 
must be taken into account. 
As shown in the above table, finished goods dominate Korean exports to Europe, 
accounting for 97% of the total. The main commodity group, machinery and 
equipment, accounts for 73% of total exports in monetary terms. Breaking 
this group down further, cars are the main machinery export (over 34%), 
followed by spare parts and components for overseas assembly of certain 
car makes (about 15%). Another large commodity group is office equipment 
(24%). Power industry and electric equipment account for 7% of total exports. 
This makes it likely that practically all South Korean exports are containerised 
and shipped to Europe by sea. This is logical, since the country needs to 
ensure optimal use of the loading capacity of its sea ports. The transshipment 
statistics of the country’s main sea port confirms this conclusion. 
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In addition, South Korea imports some finished goods. Mechanical engineering 
goods account for 51% of all imports, mainly comprising European equipment 
which Korean companies are as yet unable to manufacture, such as printing 
industry equipment, instrumentation, etc. 
Chemicals account for about 16% of Korea’s imports. Various goods make up 
the rest of the total, including fuel and raw materials for Korean industry.
Trade with CIS countries totals $19.3 billion, with Korean exports totalling 
$11.3 billion. The export structure is basically the same as for Europe: cars 
and spare parts account for 57.2%, but the share of office equipment is 
much smaller ($1.2 billion or 11%). Chemicals account for about 10%. Fuel 
and energy products dominate South Korea’s imports from the CIS (68.3%). 
Another large imports group is metals and iron ore (12.5%); the remaining 
imports are insignificant.
Analysis of cargo flows between China and South Korea on the one hand and 
Europe and the CIS on the other has enabled us to identify the following specific 
features: 
• these Far Eastern countries trade with Europe principally in finished goods 
which can be containerised. This suits both parties, since they each have 
the capacity to:
a) employ multimodal technology, including door-to-door delivery;
b) ship by sea, which enables them to simplify formalities, use uniform 
waybills, and easily track the movement of cargoes; 
c) apply transparent tariffs which can be announced in advance and remain 
stable. This is discussed in more detail below.
•  It is important not to overlook other Southeast Asian countries2 that 
supply commodities to Europe. However, for technical reasons, Eurasian 
land transport corridors can potentially be used only by China and 
South Korea. Japan uses Russian ports in the Far East for trade with 
Russia, otherwise all Japanese exports to Europe are shipped by sea. In 
recent years, the transit of Japanese cargoes via Russia has been almost 
totally abandoned, for reasons which we discuss below.
India’s foreign trade has expanded considerably over the last few years with 
an annual increase in exports of around 19% each year since 2000. In 2007, 
India earned $145 billion from the export of various commodities, including 
$34 billion from sales to Europe, and $2 billion from the CIS. Indian shippers 
may be persuaded to use India–Iran–Russia–Europe routes. Traditionally, 
2 Southeast Asian countries also include Brunei, East Timor, Vietnam, Indonesia, Cambodia, Laos, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan and the Philippines. 
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shipments from India and Iran to Europe have been transited via Russia. 
Volumes carried via Belarus are insignificant. 
Currently there is no Indian freight transit via the Caspian along the North-
South ITC. All cargo flow is through the Suez Canal. The port of Mumbai is 
expanding rapidly. Indian, European and Asian shipping companies are 
successfully transporting cargo to Eurasia by sea using established systems. 
Notwithstanding the North-South ITC Agreement of September 2000, 
freight forwarders are showing little interest in the proposed new routes. In 
2007, the Caspian Sea port of Olya, which is assigned a key role in servicing 
the North-South ITC’s cargo flow, transshipped only 435,000 tons at its 
terminals. When the ITC Agreement was signed in 2000, Olya was expected 
to be handling 3 million tons annually within five years. 
2.4. Review of potential cargo flows along China-Western Europe 
overland routes via CIS countries
Practically all the goods traded between the EU and the APR are being shipped 
by sea. Therefore it is important to assess the potential volume of cargo flows 
along the CIS overland routes. 
In 2007, 17.7 million TEU were transported from Asia to Europe, and 10 
million TEU from Europe to Asia. The difference of 7.7 million TEU represents 
empty containers returning to their point of origin. However, container 
shipment via the Suez Canal is limited. According to UN ESCAP (2007:39), by 
2015 containerised transportation from Asia to Europe and from Europe to 
Asia will reach 26.1 million TEU and 17.7 million TEU respectively, and the Suez 
Canal is expected soon to reach its maximum capacity for container vessels. 
Using the alternative sea route via the Cape of Good Hope is more expensive. 
In 2005, Kazakhstan received 142,000 TEU of import and transit cargoes 
and shipped 25,000 TEU of exports. In 2015, these figures will increase to 
126,000 and 138,000 TEU respectively (UN ESCAP, 2007:40).
Containerised shipments from China to EurAsEC or Kazakhstan are 
essentially transit cargoes. They enter via the Dostyk-Alashankou border 
crossing point. According to the Kazakh press, in 2008, the daily throughput 
at Dostyk-Alashankou was 520-550 rail cars, although a high of 620 rail cars 
has been recorded recently. Some 70% of this freight is containerised. Most 
trains consist of 48-50 rail cars, including container wagons. We estimate 
that Dostyk can transship about 306,000 TEU annually. However, this figure 
has not yet been achieved. According to Kaztransservice, the official container 
operator owned by Kazakhstan Temir Zholy (KTZ), Dostyk transshipped 
109,677 TEU in 2007, including 74,551 TEU from China and 35126 TEU to 
China. Compared with 2006, these figures were up by 37%, 40% and 31% 
respectively (SPECA, 2007).
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Kaztransservice forecasts that by 2015 the transshipment of containers 
at Dostyk’s railway terminal alone will reach 730,000 TEU, i.e. 2.5 times 
the current throughput (see Figure 12.4). The Kaztransservice forecast is, 
however, much more optimistic about the future of container transportation 
than UN ESCAP. Nevertheless, there is a consensus that transshipment 
volumes will grow considerably in the medium term, which justifies the 
development of overland transport systems.
The port of Lyanyungang (the destination point of the railway line via Dostyk) 
transshipped 2 million TEU in 2007 and 3 million TEU in 2008. Therefore, it is 
safe to assume that cargo flows from China will merit investment to increase 
capacity at Dostyk and construct a new border crossing point at Khorgos.
Figure 12.4.  
Transshipment of 
containers at Dostyk 
(thousand TEU*)
Source: *forecast by 
Kaztransservice
Analysts estimate that revenue from freight transit between Europe and Asia 
exceeded $50 billion in 2007 and could reach $80 billion in 2015 if current 
increases in cargo turnover continue. However, sea-shipping companies 
earned nearly all this revenue, since 98% of transit cargo is transported 
between the EU and the APR by sea through the Suez Canal. 
In other words, transit potential is not being utilised. In this paper we will 
attempt to identify the measures that must be taken in order to make the 
region’s ITCs a viable source of transit revenue for EurAsEC countries. This 
problem has become even more pressing since the startup of China’s Go West 
The Xinjiang Uigur Autonomous Region (XUAR) development programme, 
which is designed to increase the manufacture of goods for export to Europe, 
potentially using EurAsEC overland routes (see Box 12.2).
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Box 12.1. Main commodity groups that can be transported by Eurasian routes 
(China–West Europe)
Export and import shipments between China, Russia and Western Europe are largely 
transported by sea. China’s export-orientated industries are concentrated in coastal 
areas. For example, nearly all industrial output from Guangdong, Fujian and other provinces 
around Shanghai is transported by sea, with export logistics designed accordingly. Most 
home electronics brands are manufactured in Hong Kong, and members of the Russian 
Association of trading companies and manufacturers of consumer electronic and 
computer equipment, such as Skarlett, Binatone and Vitek, transport these products from 
Hong Kong only by sea. These goods are then distributed throughout the CIS.
China’s main shipping centres are in the south of the country, the Pearl river delta, and 
the Shanghai region. None of these regions has a particular specialisation, although 
there are differences between them. For example, South China produces more shoes and 
electronics, whilst Shanghai produces more clothes and toys. Northern provinces are 
historically home to many heavy industrial facilities, and local railways there mainly serve 
this sector. Therefore, opportunities to increase container transportation from these 
regions to EurAsEC are extremely limited. This problem applies even for backhaul loading: 
CIS exports to China are such that there is simply nothing that can go by container. Metal 
goods are no longer an option, since China itself has started to export them.
Commodities which can be transported by road and rail from China (including the XUAR) 
to Kazakhstan and Russia include:
•  chemicals, including hazardous loads;
•  foodstuffs (perishable) and other restricted cargoes; 
•  instrumentation;
•  stereo, video and audio systems;
•  mobile communications equipment;
•  TV sets;
•  electrical goods;
•  electric cables; 
•  furniture;
•  clothes and shoes; 
•  cosmetics.
The following commodities can be considered as possible backhaul road transport cargoes 
moving from Europe to China, 
•  industrial and agricultural equipment;
•  metals (high-value non-ferrous metal goods, higher-purity metals and other high-value 
goods which are usually purchased in small quantities); 
•  integrated circuits; 
•  various fine chemical products and polymers;
•  consumer goods;
•  foodstuffs (e.g., meat).
Certain cargoes, such as bearings, are not suitable for sea transportation without 
expensive specialised and costly packaging to protect them from the sea air.
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Box 12.2. The XUAR and transit to Western Europe
The XUAR is one of China’s largest regions; it borders eight countries. Its population 
exceeds 19 million. Economic growth averaged 11.2% per annum in the last decade. The 
XUAR produces gas, oil, coal, cotton, fruit, vegetables and fertiliser. Over 60 large facilities 
are now under construction costing more than $100 billion. 91000 km of new roads and 
4070 km of new railways have been built. The administrative centre, Urumqi (population 
2 million), has become a major transshipment centre, receiving consumer goods from all 
over China and shipping them to Central Asia, Russia and Europe. Over 90% of these goods 
are manufactured in inland China.
The XUAR exports textiles, shoes, mechanical engineering products and electronics 
(industrial goods account for 67% of all exports), and imports oil, iron ore and copper ore. 
According to Chinese statistics, the XUAR’s own production accounts for less than 10% 
of its exports, and the region consumes around 20% of its imports. Trading with the XUAR 
means trading with the whole of China through its western gate.
The People’s Government of the XUAR and the ADB have signed an agreement under which 
the bank will extend a $100-million loan to fund the development of transport infrastructure 
in Altay, Kuitun, Changji, Turfan and Hami. Prior to this, in April 2006, the ADB had loaned 
the XUAR government $150 million to develop transport in the cities of Tacheng and Yining 
and around the Alashankou border crossing point. 
Special economic zones (SEZ) are being established to encourage trade; these zones offer 
advantageous terms to businesses. The construction of roads is an important part of the 
creation of SEZs. To date, the XUAR has 16 border motorways with a total length of 1676 
km. Border SEZs are all connected to railway networks such as Dostyk, the only Sino-Kazakh 
railway border crossing point. Motorways and road transport are used increasingly.
It is estimated that, by 2025, the Urumqi–Yining–Sary-Ozek railway will have an annual 
freight capacity of 25 million tons.
In the first quarter of 2008, the foreign trade transactions of the XUAR totalled $13.7 
billion – an increase of 90.4% compared with the previous year. 
Trade with Western Europe accounts for 7.3% (about $1 billion) of the total commodity 
turnover. According to our estimates, XUAR’s share of foreign trade between China and 
Western Europe will increase by 1-2% annually. The pace of growth is slow because it 
is exceeded by demand for XUAR products from its neighbouring countries. The dollar-
denominated monetary value of trade with XUAR’s immediate neighbours will grow faster 
(about 15-17% annually) and reach $2.1 billion within five years and $4.4 billion in ten 
years, according to Chinese estimates.
A few years ago the Chinese Government adopted a resolution on the industrial development 
of the XUAR. Its intention was to strengthen the region’s economic position by bringing in 
plentiful and cheaper labour, reducing political tensions and relocating low-cost production 
facilities from other successful industrial regions to this relatively poor region.
Beijing believes that many consumer goods intended for Europe can be manufactured in 
the XUAR, which is geographically closer to Europe. However, only a part of this vast volume  
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of exports will be manufactured by the XUAR itself, and it is understood that the lion’s share 
of goods will have to be shipped to Europe by sea from other more established zones of 
production. Nevertheless, a certain proportion will be shipped directly from the XUAR. The 
Chinese Government hopes to bolster XUAR’s industries and enhance trade with Central 
and Eastern Europe and the Russian Federation. 
China’s Leap Forward unified transport strategy and Go West programme to develop its 
western provinces will have the effect of increasing cargo flows to Europe via Kazakhstan 
and Russia. 
The Go West programme may lead to an increase in freight transit via the region’s ITCs, as 
is discussed below.
A new network of logistics centres is being planned for the XUAR, which will simplify cargo 
transportation to Central Asian countries. By 2015, 21 logistics centres, with a total area 
of 2.12 million m2, will have been built in the XUAR, including in the cities of Urumqi, Hami, 
Korla, Kashgar, Kuitun and Yining and the Khorgos border crossing point. In addition, by 
2015 the XUAR will have around 280,000 lorries of its own.
Some commodities manufactured in the XUAR will be shipped via Kazakhstan. Delivery from 
China to western parts of Russia will take about ten days – one fifth of the journey time by 
sea. It is expected that an international border cooperation centre will be opened in 2009. 
We believe that the volume of land trade between the XUAR and Western Europe will 
be dictated by the technical capacity of border crossing points. Based on the optimistic 
forecast by Kaztransservice that transshipment will reach 730,000 TEU in 2015, and 
assuming that shipments to Europe will remain at the current level of 70% of the total 
volume, we expect that about 500,000 TEU will be transited to Europe annually.
There can be no doubt that the vast transit potential of EurAsEC is, at present, 
very much underused. The current and potential transit cargo flows of non-
CIS countries are negligible compared with transit from and through EurAsEC 
countries to third countries, in quantitative terms (see Figure 12.5). This is 
explained principally by the geographic locations of the main trading countries 
within EurAsEC. For example, Russia, a major trading partner of the EU, mainly 
uses the territory of Belarus for export to, and import from, the EU. 
We believe that, although the current volume of transit originating outside 
EurAsEC is insignificant, fulfilling the transit potential of EurAsEC in this 
regard is an urgent priority. As the figures in Figure 12,5 show, the EurAsEC 
Integration Committee forecasts that in 2020, transit from and through 
EurAsEC countries to third countries and back will total 300 million tons, i.e., 
six times more than in the year 2000. In parallel with this, transit from third 
countries via EurAsEC will increase by 16 times compared with 2000 to 16 
million tons. Not only is the rate of growth of external cargo flows expected to 
be much more rapid, it should also be remembered that the main purpose of 
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EurAsEC as a regional organisation is to create a customs union, which will 
mean a reduction in and, in the longer term, abolition of the customs duties on 
imports to member countries. Transit of external cargo flow, however, could 
become a stable source of revenue for them.
Figure 12.5.  
Existing and potential 
cargo flows via 
EurAsEC  
(million tons).
Source: EurAsEC 
Integration 
Committee 
estimates
3. The existing and emerging international transport corridors 
in the region
3.1. The role of international transport corridors in EurAsEC
Any study of the role of transport corridors in transport systems (especially 
those which span more than one country) should take into account the 
following: 
•  transport corridors are trunk routes which, because of their comprehensive 
infrastructure and communication links, permit the use of multi-modal 
technology, multiple modes of transport and multi-function terminals and 
transshipment facilities in a particularly advantageous location;
• the operations of the transport corridor must be protected by a continually 
evolving legal framework and by international agreements (e. g., those 
pertaining to the use of standardised waybills which allow equal access to 
terminals and other infrastructure); 
• parties to the various conventions on ITCs agree to adopt modern customs 
technology to expedite cargo and passenger transportation procedures; 
•  parties to conventions agree to develop transport infrastructure in their 
respective territories and support the provision of services to users which 
meet international standards.
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Experience from elsewhere in the world should also inform policy. For 
example, the EU is currently working towards ensuring interoperability 
and interconnectivity of different modes of transport along its transport 
corridors. 
Interoperability is dependent on the use of standard and compatible 
infrastructures, technology, utilities, equipment and vehicle dimensions. 
This ensures technical and operational uniformity which can be vital to the 
provision of door-to-door delivery services. This uniformity, just as importantly, 
can help to eliminate the various barriers (institutional, legal, financial, physical, 
technical, cultural or political) between transport systems.
Interconnectivity is the horizontal coordination of various modes of transport 
in order to provide integrated door-to-door delivery services. An essential 
prerequisite for such coordination is the provision of transshipment/cargo 
transfer technology and equipment, complex surveillance and management 
systems, and well-trained personnel.
There are several Eurasian trunk routes in EurAsEC member countries, but 
few of them actually correspond to the definition of a “transport corridor”. 
In many documents, all Eurasian routes are referred to as “corridors”; by 
contrast, in the EU, where plans to create and develop transport corridors 
have all been finalised, this term is used more carefully. Thus, the EU adheres 
to the definition of transport corridors adopted at the First and Second 
Pan-European Conferences on Transport (in Prague in 1993 and in Crete 
in 1994): an international transport corridor consists of main transport 
communications (existing or under construction) with related equipment and 
infrastructure which connect large traffic junctions, and employ various modes 
of transport for international transportation of cargoes and passengers at 
the points of their maximum concentration.
Cargo transportation along the region’s inland waterways is technically 
difficult to implement on a viable scale. For example, in accordance with the 
2003, Russian inland waterways code, any such transportation under the 
flag of a foreign state is subject to permits granted by the Russian Ministry 
of Transport. In addition, many hydraulic works on Russian rivers do not meet 
safety standards because of channel silting, which makes the cost-effective 
transportation of cargo unfeasible. 
Therefore, only railways and roads have decisive importance for transit in 
Eurasia. We discuss below the main Eurasian overland transport corridors.
3.2. Pan-European corridors
In this study we focus on the Pan-European corridors, since these routes, 
which extend to the Urals, are an easy way for Asian (primarily Chinese) 
commodities to reach Western Europe via regional transport networks.
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Figure 12.6. Pan-European corridors. Soure: European Union
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The origins of these international transport corridors can be traced back to 
the 1980–1990s, when Western European countries identified an urgent 
need to improve the EU’s internal and external links in response to a rapid 
growth in traffic. In 1994, following the First and Second Pan-European 
Conferences on Transport, ten major transport routes, “the Pan-European 
corridors”, were created; these corridors provide optimum transport links 
between Western European countries, the Baltic, the European part of 
the CIS (Moscow, St. Petersburg, Minsk, Lviv, Kiev), the Black Sea ports 
(Odessa, Constanta, Varna) and Turkey (Istanbul):
I. Helsinki – Tallinn – Riga – Kaunas – Warsaw;
II. Berlin – Warsaw – Minsk – Moscow – Nizhny Novgorod;
III. Berlin – Dresden – Wrocław – Lviv – Kiev;
IV. Berlin / Nuremberg – Prague – Budapest – Constanta / Thessaloniki / 
Istanbul;
V. Venice – Trieste / Koper – Ljubljana – Budapest – Uzhgorod – Lviv;
VI. Gdansk – Warsaw – Katowice – Zilina;
VII. the Danube; 
VIII. Durres – Tirana – Skopje – Sofia – Varna;
IX. Helsinki – St. Petersburg – Moscow – Pskov – Kiev – Chisinau – Bucharest 
– Dimitrovgrad – Alexandroupolis;
X. Salzburg – Ljubljana – Zagreb – Belgrade – Nis – Skopje – Veles – 
Thessaloniki.
Three Pan-European corridors extend into Russia and one into Belarus. These 
corridors can therefore be linked with other EurAsEC countries. In 1997, they 
were all extended through Russian territory linking the following destinations:
• Baltic (St. Petersburg) – Centre (Moscow) – Black Sea (Rostov-on-Don, 
Novorossiysk);
• Moscow – Astrakhan;
• West (Berlin–Warsaw–Minsk) – Centre (Moscow) – Nizhny Novgorod – the 
Urals (Yekaterinburg–Chelyabinsk);
• Northern Sea Route (St. Petersburg–Murmansk and further eastwards by 
sea);
• Waterway from the Black Sea–Azov region through the Volga-Don Canal 
to the Caspian. 
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Of special interest in the EurAsEC context is the II Pan-European Transport 
Corridor which extends 1830 km from Berlin to Nizhny Novgorod via Warsaw, 
Minsk and Moscow. It will be fully operational by 2010. Presently, the East 
Wind container service links Berlin with Moscow.
The II Pan-European Corridor is important not only to Russia and Belarus, but 
also to other EurAsEC countries involved in cargo transit between the APR 
and Western Europe. Using this corridor, Kazakhstan and Russia can offer 
transport services in the China–West Europe direction (these services can 
be used by Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand and 
others as well as China). For many years, shipments in that direction have 
been made along the Moscow – Yekaterinburg – Omsk – Novosibirsk – Irkutsk 
transport corridor which provides access to the ports of Nakhodka and 
Vanino and to China via Zabaikalsk, Grodekovo and Naushki. With the opening 
of the Druzhba-Alashankou Sino-Kazakh railway border crossing point in 
1992, journeys in this direction were shortened dramatically: for example, 
the journey from Moscow to the port of Lianyungang (China) is now 670 km 
shorter, and from Moscow to Hong Kong 860 km shorter than the previous 
route via Naushki. In addition, this route can be used for shipments from 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to Moscow and beyond 
through the II Pan-European corridor to Europe. Cargoes include cotton, 
the staple export commodity of these countries, and oil from Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. 
3.3. Railway corridors
Thanks to the extensive railway network spanning the territory of the former 
Soviet Union, railway transport corridors have always played a key role in 
plans to maximise the transit potential of EurAsEC. International shipments 
account for 90% of Russia’s total railway cargo revenues and 72% of those 
revenues in Kazakhstan.
The general opinion today, reflected in the declarations of the 1998, 2000 
and 2003, St. Petersburg Eurasian Conferences on Transport which were 
attended by ministers of transport from many European and Asian states, 
is that, technically, the following railway routes are suitable for cargo 
transportation in Eurasia:
•  The Trans-Siberian Railway (TSR) (Brest – Minsk – Finnish border – 
Ukrainian border – Moscow – Yekaterinburg – Novosibirsk – Vladivostok – 
Ulan-Bator – Beijing);
•  The Northern Trans-Asian Corridor (Chop – Kiev – Moscow – 
Chelyabinsk – Dostyk – Alashankou – Lianyungang);
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•  The Central Trans-Asian Corridor (Kiev – Volgograd – Almaty –  
Aktogai – Dostyk – Alashankou – Lianyungang);
•  The Southern Trans-Asian Corridor (Istanbul – Ankara – Tabriz – 
Tehran – Mashad – Seraks – Tashkent – Almaty – Aktogai – Dostyk – 
Alashankou – Lianyungang); 
•  TRACECA (Constanta – Varna – Ilyichevsk – Poti – Batumi – Baku – 
Tashkent – Almaty – Aktogai – Dostyk – Alashankou – Lianyungang).
The multi-modal North-South ITC which links northwest Europe and 
Scandinavia with Central Asia and the Persian Gulf has also become much 
more important as a result of the rapidly expanding trade between Europe and 
India. This route relies on the extensive transport networks of Russia, Iran, 
Kazakhstan and other countries. 
The corridor running from the port of Bombay to St. Petersburg is 7200 
km long. In the Caspian region, several routes are open to cargo transit: the 
trans-Caspian sea route, the inland Caspian-Volga-Baltic waterways which 
extend to the Volga-Don Canal and the Black Sea, and a number of railways 
and motorways. The Russian Ministry of Transport estimates that, in the long 
term, up to 10 million tons of cargo could be transported via these routes 
annually, excluding oil products (Russian Ministry of Transport, 2002).
Below we discuss cargo traffic along these ITCs in more detail.
1. For decades, the Trans-Siberian Railway has been the principal railway link 
between European Russia and its industrial regions to the east (Siberia, the 
Urals, etc.). The TSR is 9288 km long; it was completed in 1903, and fully 
electrified by 2002. It has a number of branch lines in its far eastern section 
which link to Chinese, North Korean and Mongolian railways, central Eurasia 
(i.e., to Central Asian railways via Kazakhstan) and Europe (to Western 
European railways via Belarus). Currently, the TSR is technically capable of 
carrying 250,000-300,000 TEU of international transit cargoes per annum. 
Once the modernisation of the TSR is complete, and if the Baikal-Amur 
Mainline (BAM) railway is used, this figure may increase to 1 million TEU per 
annum. RZD has pledged to invest about 50 billion roubles ($1.5 billion)3 in the 
modernisation of the TSR up to 2015, primarily to allow it to handle special 
container traffic.
The TSR has the technical capacity to carry up to 100 million tons annually, 
which would include about 200,000 TEU of international container transit 
from the APR to Europe and Central Asia. Currently, the TSR is used by fifteen 
container services (see Figure 12.7).
3 Hereinafter, at the exchange rate of 01.01.2009.
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Figure 12.7.  
Journey times  
of Trans-Siberian 
Railway services
Moscow, 12 days
Smolensk, 13 days
Zabaikalsk
Brest, 12.5 days
Buslovskaya, 9.5-11.5 days
Berlin, 14.5 days
Chop, 13.5 days
Lokot, 8 days
Naushki, 5 days
Nakhodka Vostochnaya
Avtovo, 9.5 days
Container freight trains can travel about 1200 km per day on the TSR. As 
a result of the simplification of customs procedures at ports and border 
posts, transit containers wait just a few hours for clearing compared to 3-
5 days in the past. The TSR’s simplified customs and checking procedures 
for containerised commodities also apply to all containers shipped to third 
countries, regardless of destination. 
2. The northern trans-Asian corridor is viewed as the second most developed 
corridor after the TSR. In some UN ESCAP documents, this corridor is referred 
to as “the second Eurasian overland bridge”. It runs from Lianyungang through 
central and northwest China, Kazakhstan and Russia to Western Europe. 
The distance from Lianyungang to Rotterdam is 10900 km. The corridor is 
being developed on an ongoing basis. It is 2500 km shorter than the TSR and 
10500 km shorter than the sea route.
After 1992 the Chinese section of this railway (some 4150 km) was partially 
modernised. To date, 89% of its total length is double track, and 29% of 
the line is electrified. It is expected that, with the industrial development of 
northwest China, this route will be made double track along its entire length, 
and electrification will be extended. 
China and Kazakhstan use different gauges – 1435 mm and 1520 mm, 
respectively. This poses a major problem for the development of freight 
transportation, since containerised cargoes have to be reloaded by crane.
At present, the Dostyk rail freight terminal in Kazakhstan, at the Sino-Kazakh 
border, is capable of handling a maximum of 620 rail cars per day. Until 
recently, maximum capacity barely exceeded 500-550 rail cars per day. The 
Integrating Eurasian 
Transport Systems
207Eurasian Development Bank
depot’s current throughput is 12 train pairs per day on the Chinese narrow-
gauge line. According to preliminary estimates, the depot handled a total 14 
million tons scheduled cargo in 2008. Now, new handling terminals are being 
constructed and eight of them are already complete. Each of these terminals 
is designed to handle certain cargoes: heavy machinery and equipment and 
packaged, bulk or containerised cargoes. Dostyk services container shipments, 
which constitute about 70% of all cargo traffic. It has been calculated that 
this border crossing point must be capable of handling over 300,000 TEU 
annually. Compared with 2007, container traffic in 2008, was up by 30%. 
Typically, containerised cargoes are shipped to the Baltic, CIS and European 
countries. 
3. The central trans-Asian corridor runs from the Sino-Kazakh border via 
Dostyk to Almaty and on to Ukraine. This is the shortest route from Asia to 
Central Europe. It is double-track and electrified within the former Soviet Union 
and it provides access to Poland via Jagodin and Mostiska and to Slovakia and 
Hungary via Chop. 
4. The southern trans-Asian corridor incorporates only one EurAsEC 
member country – Kazakhstan. However, this railway is enlisted here as 
a potential competitive route. It also starts from Lianyungang, and passes 
through Dostyk, Almaty, Tashkent, Iran and Turkey before reaching the 
Mediterranean and Black Sea ports. But this railway also has the problem of 
different gauges. Transshipment is required at two points, which increases 
delivery costs and slows down traffic; hence the key advantage of overland 
trans-Eurasian routes over sea shipment, i.e., speed of delivery, is lost. The 
Iranian part (2010 km) is single track and not electrified. In Turkey, trains 
have to cross lake Van by ferry. Along the branch lines to Istanbul (i.e., the 
Mediterranean) and Samsun (Black Sea), only 46% of the railway is electrified, 
and only 10% is double track.
5. TRACECA. This project includes the Dostyk – Tashkent – Ashgabad – 
Turkmenbashi – Baku – Tbilisi – Poti section and ferry lines to Odessa, Varna, 
Constanta and Istanbul. Despite the EU’s enthusiasm for this project at an 
early stage, TRACECA failed to achieve its design capacity during the fourteen 
years after relevant documents were signed. We discuss the reasons for this 
below.
Parties to TRACECA signed a number of documents relating to certain 
benefits and reduced tariffs, e.g. a 50% discount on rail freight and ferry 
transportation of empty wagons. In addition, taxes and fees on transit cargoes 
were abolished, and measures were taken at national level to enhance the 
safety of passengers, cargoes, carriers and vehicles. 
However, despite all these measures, the economic efficiency of this route 
is in doubt. According to preliminary figures, all other conditions being equal, 
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the tariffs charged by RZD for transporting grain, cotton and containers are 
1.7 times lower than those of TRACECA, and 1.2 times lower for oil and non-
ferrous metals. In addition, transportation via Russia gives 1.8-fold journey 
time advantage. Cargo is shipped mainly from west to east, with mostly empty 
wagons travelling in the opposite direction. This has a negative effect on the 
efficiency of Caspian and Black Sea ferry lines.
At the moment, some sections of TRACECA are used to transport oil and oil 
products from Turkmenistan, cotton and grain from Uzbekistan, etc. At the 
port of Poti, a grain terminal with an annual capacity of 1.5 million tons, a 
container terminal with an annual capacity of 200,000 TEU, and large storage 
facilities are all under construction.
According to experts, the potential capacity of the Batumi – Poti – Ilyichevsk 
ferry line is 15-20 million tons per annum. However, its annual throughput at 
the moment is no higher than 0.9 million tons (using two ferries). The Baku 
– Turkmenbashi ferry line handles up to 2 million tons annually (five ferries).
Box 12.3. The TRACECA Programme 
This Programme was adopted at a conference held by the EU in Brussels in May 1993, 
which was attended by representatives from Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (Ukraine and Mongolia joined later). 
This Programme aims to develop a transport corridor from Europe to Central Asia through 
the Black Sea, the Caucasus and the Caspian. It incorporates the Poti (Georgia) – Varna 
(Bulgaria), Poti – Burgas (Bulgaria), Poti – Odessa (Ukraine) and Baku (Azerbaijan) – 
Turkmenbashi (Turkmenistan) ferry lines. In addition, the new ferry routes of Poti – Constanta 
(Romania) and Batumi (Georgia) – Novorossiysk (Russia) will be opened and a new Kars 
(Turkey) – Tbilisi (Georgia) railway section is to be built. Nine railway ferry complexes will be 
operated in the Black Sea region. The design capacity of TRACECA is up to 40 million tons 
per annum.
Currently, TRACECA is used to transport oil and oil products from Turkmenistan and cotton 
and grain from Uzbekistan. It is expected that Chinese freight transport will also access this 
route from the Trans-Asian mainline.
TRACECA distances (sections in use):
Tashkent – Brest – 4200 km;
Tashkent – St. Petersburg – 4000 km;
Tashkent – Bandar Abbas – 3900 km;
Tashkent – Odessa – 4230 km;
Tashkent – Batumi – 2900 km.
The main advantage of this corridor is that it begins at the Black Sea ports where several of 
the Pan-European corridors end. The countries through which it runs were keen to be used 
for freight transit. To implement the TRACECA Programme, the countries involved signed 
the Multilateral Agreement on the Development of TRACECA on September 8, 1998, in 
Baku. The reasons that the Programme failed to achieve target capacities are discussed 
above. 
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Box 12.4. Outlook for the development of container traffic
Belarus has two major railway links with Europe: Minsk to Brest, and Minsk to Vilnius, 
Kaunas and Klaipeda. The Smolensk – Vitebsk – Daugavpils – Riga – Ventspils railway also 
runs through Belarus. From Ukraine, this railway follows the Bakhmach – Gomel – Bobruysk 
– Minsk route before entering Lithuania.
Belarus’ railways have a total length of 5500 km. The following east-west-east, high-speed 
services operate there:
•  East Wind (Berlin – Minsk – Moscow); In 2007, the railway carried 7580 TEU freight, 
and was 1.9-times faster than in 2006;
•  Mongolian Vector (Brest – Naushki – Mongolia – China); 657 TEU handled in 2007 (1.4 
times faster than in 2006);
•  Kazakhstani Vector (Brest – Iletsk – Arys), 9320 TEU carried in 2007 (1.2 times faster). 
In the near future this service will be extended to Dostyk and China.
In 2007 the Belarusian railway carried 2179 containers from east to west (100.6% of the 
2006 figure) and 16782 containers from west to east (133.8% of the 2006 figure). 
However, these statistics alone do not give the complete picture. Although container traffic 
undoubtedly increased, it remains insignificant compared with the “traditional” raw material 
cargo traffic, which still predominates in this region.
Railway transportation between Russia and Kazakhstan (the key players in the proposed 
EurAsEC transit project) is growing steadily: in the first nine months of 2008, export and 
import shipments totaled 77.2 million tons, an increase of 17% (11.1 million tons) compared 
with the same period of 2007. This figure includes exports to Kazakhstan (18.3%), imports 
from Kazakhstan (53.5%), goods in transit to Kazakhstan (4.1%) and goods in transit from 
Kazakhstan (17.5%). Container traffic between Russia and Kazakhstan during the first nine 
months of 2008 totaled 137,400 TEU (a 6% increase compared with the previous year). 
By extrapolating these figures to the end of 2008, we estimate that in 2008 container 
traffic in both directions totalled about 180,000 TEU. According to preliminary estimates, 
about 39000 TEU will be transited in both directions. About 31000 TEU will be transited 
from Kazakhstan to Russia. Since this is cargo coming in from Dostyk, containerised Chinese 
cargo is expected to account for around 20% of total freight transit via Kazakhstan to 
Russia (Kaztransservice is expected to handle 200,000 TEU at Dostyk in 2008, i.e., twice 
the 2007 total).
3.4. Motorway corridors
Public and private road transport services carry between 59% and 80% of 
all freight shipments in EurAsEC countries. The following intercontinental 
motorway routes are particularly important for this traffic:
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1. Asian Highways are international routes which pass through more than 
one sub-region, e.g., East and Northeast Asia, South and Southwest Asia, 
Southeast Asia, and North and Central Asia. Internal sub-regional routes link 
neighbouring sub-regions. Internal roads in each country provide access to 
capital cities, major industrial and agricultural centres, airports, sea ports and 
river ports, major container terminals or depots and tourist attractions.
Russia’s economic and transport links with Kazakhstan and other EurAsEC 
countries, and transit links from Europe to Asia, rely principally on the following 
motorways which, according to UN ESCAP classification, are parts of the 
Asian Highway network:
•  AH7 (Yekaterinburg – Chelyabinsk – Troitsk – Kostanai – Astana – 
Karaganda – Burubaital – Merke – Chaldovar – Kara-Balta – Osh – Andizhan 
– Tashkent – Syrdarya – Khavast – Khudzhand – Dushanbe – Lower Pyandzh 
– Shirhan – Polekhumri – Jebul – Sarej – Kabul – Kandahar – Spinboldak 
– Chaman – Quetta – Kalat – Karachi);
•  AH60 (Omsk – Cherlak – Priirtyshskoye – Pavlodar – Semipalatinsk – 
Taskesken – Ucharal – Almaty – Kaskelen – Burubaital);
•  AH61 (Kazakh border – Ozinki – Saratov – Borisoglebsk – Voronezh – 
Kursk – Krupets – Ukrainian border);
•  AH63 (Samara – Kurlin – Pogodayevo – Uralsk – Atyrau – Beineu – 
Oasis – Nukus – Bukhara – Guzar);
•  AH64 (Barnaul – Veseloyarsky – Krasny Aul – Semipalatinsk – Pavlodar 
– Shiderty – Astana – Kokchetav – Petropavlovsk);
•  AH70 (Ukrainian border – Donetsk – Volgograd – Astrakhan – 
Kotyayevka – Atyrau – Beineu – Zhatybai (– Aktau) – Bekdash – 
Turkmenbashi – Serdar – Gudurolum – Inche-Boroun – Gorgan – Sari – 
Semnan – Damghan – Yazd – Anar – Bandar Abbas).
The following roads link China with the borders of EurAsEC countries:
•  AH5 (Shanghai – Nanjin – Sinyuan – Siang – Urumqi – Kuitun – Jinghe – 
Khorgos). This two-lane motorway is 4815 km long. 
It has two branches:
•  AH67 (Kuitun – Baketu), a 390 km long, two-lane motorway; 
•  AH68 (Jinghe – Alashankou), 94 km long.
2. The Western Europe–West China project (a proposal involving EBRD, 
ADB, WB, IDB, UNDP and others) is 8455 km long. About one quarter of the 
highway will be laid in Kazakhstan, and will allow transit not only to Russia and 
China, but also to South Asian countries via Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. The 
project is expected to cost around $2.3 billion. 
3. NELTI (New Eurasian Land Transport Initiative) will facilitate the 
movement of cargo to the CIS, the EU and the United States along the Beijing 
– Urumqi – Bakhty – Astana – Moscow – Riga – Vilnius – Warsaw – Berlin 
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Figure 12.9. Main railways in Eurasia. Source: Kazakhstan transport and communications 
research institute (NII TK), International freight forwarding company Transsystem.
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– Brussels route. This project is expected to increase cargo transit along the 
international motorways of Kazakhstan and Russia to 5.2 million tons per 
annum.
The NELTI is receiving wide media coverage. We believe, however, that its 
significance may be overestimated, and explain our reasons below. 
In Russia, international road transport is increasing steadily and now accounts 
for up to 26% of all foreign trade shipments (transportation of high-value 
cargo). Russia’s international road transport market is estimated to be worth 
roughly $3-3.2 billion.
Analysis of the international road transport market by direction of travel 
reveals some interesting statistics. Taking the EurAsEC member countries 
of Belarus and Kazakhstan, the ratio by direction will be 3.5 to 1. This is 
unsurprising, since most trucks arriving in Belarus head for Western Europe 
and the Baltic countries. Freight moving from Russia to Kazakhstan by road 
does not exceed 1.3 million tons.
Foreign haulage firms operating in Russia account for a substantial percentage 
of Russia’s road transport market, as follows: Belarus – 15%, Finland – 8% 
(mainly timber), Ukraine – 7%, Poland – 7%, Lithuania – 6%, Latvia – 4%, 
Germany – 0.2%, Italy – 0.03%.
In our view, there are significant obstacles to the development of road transit 
through EurAsEC to Western Europe. Firstly, it is very expensive for vehicle 
owners to operate in EurAsEC countries. For a journey to be profitable, a truck 
must be able to cover up to 1000 km during daylight hours. This requirement 
applies in Europe, therefore if a European carrier is contracted to undertake 
a transit shipment, special tracking systems will not allow it to travel at night 
for safety reasons. This is because of the poor state of road surfaces and the 
road network in general.
The high cost of operating in EurAsEC countries is also due to the following: 
•  road transport is extremely inefficient in these countries. According 
to experts, its average efficiency is four times lower than in developed 
countries;
•  the road transport fleet consists mainly of old and obsolete vehicles, which 
do meet specific requirements for cargo or other operations;
•  logistics systems are not sophisticated enough to coordinate multi-modal 
shipments efficiently; 
•  cargo handling centres on long-distance routes lack the technology to 
handle large vehicles, and there has been a disproportionate increase in 
the operation of smaller vehicles in this sector. In addition, there is no spot 
freight system in place which could ensure that empty vehicles do have 
loads to transport.
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4. Key issue affecting cargo transit on EurAsEC ITCs
Despite the transit potential of EurAsEC member countries (primarily, Russia, 
Kazakhstan and Belarus), and the existence of a system of international 
transport corridors (including railways and motorways), the fact remains 
that transit is not taking off: in the context of annual traffic from Northeast 
and Southeast Asia to Europe of over 17 million TEU, the several tens of 
thousands containers being shipped via the ITCs of EurAsEC are insignificant. 
Table 12. 4.  
Aggregate transit 
potential of EurAsEC 
member countries 
(million tons)
Source: EurAsEC 
Integration 
Committee 
estimates
2006
Use  
in 2006
2020
Belarus 100  0 (0%) 10
Kazakhstan 3  10 (28%) 100
Kyrgyzstan 3.8  1.9 (0%) .
Russia 80   (8%) 10
Tajikistan 0.2  0.18 (90%) 0.
Aggregate  
potential  
of EurAsEC
220  11.8 (1%) 70
The EurAsEC Integration Committee’s estimate of aggregate4 potential transit 
capacity (see Table 12.4) shows that EurAsEC countries are, in some cases, a 
long way from utilising this capacity to the full. Since total potential capacity in 
2006 is expected to double by 2020, the most urgent question is whether or 
not EurAsEC will be able to exploit this opportunity properly. What are the real 
causes of the huge gap between current usage and full capacity?
4.1. Sea vs land: 2:1
The competitiveness of any freight route is commonly calculated using the 
“trio” of commercial indicators: “time–service–tariff”. The key reason for 
the failure to attract transit business to overland EurAsEC corridors is the 
undeniable commercial benefits of using sea freight from the eastern and 
southern provinces of China and other Southeast Asian countries. 
The main competitive advantages that sea transit routes have over overland 
routes are:
• Cheaper tariffs: international shipping companies with an extensive and 
cost-efficient fleet at their disposal can keep their port charges and freight 
4 Aggregate transit potential means the aggregate potential of the railway, motor, sea, inland 
water and air transport. 
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rates low (over the past decade, sea freight volumes have increased by half). 
In many cases, shipping cost is the main consideration for consignors as they 
strive to minimise the transportation component of the price of commodities 
in order to keep them competitive in the destination country. Following the 
recent 90% drop in the Baltic Dry Index, which is used in pricing raw material 
ocean freight rates (oil, metals, grains, etc.), the tariffs charged by shipping 
companies, at least in the near future, will be much more competitive than 
other modes of transport. 
Box 12.5. Sea and rail container freight tariffs in Eurasia (ATC AIR Service data)
Destination port
USD/container Delivery time, 
days20’DC 40’DC 40’HC
Hamburg 17 200 20 2
Kotka 120 2700 2800 32
Tallinn 192 320 31 32
Riga 192 3300 37 32
Klaipeda 192 3300 37 32
Novorossiysk 202 370 387 32
St. Petersburg 1980 3170 3270 32
Vladivostok 130 190 190 10
These ocean freight rates can be compared with the rail freight rates offered to the same 
company. Transportation is by TSR; destination Moscow: 
Destination
USD/container Delivery 
time, days20’DC 40’DC 40’HC
Moscow 38 10 10 1
The insurance surcharge is $300-550 per container (depending on the customs code of 
the commodity). These tables show that sea shipping costs are around 50% lower than 
rail freight. 
Loading port:  
Shanghai
However, the above appears to be true only for east–west transit. For north-
south traffic, which is the other main direction for transit through EurAsEC 
countries, analysts believe that overland transportation costs can compete 
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with sea freight. According to estimates, it costs $3500 to deliver one tonne 
of cargo from Germany to India through the Suez Canal, and takes 40 days. 
Container freight along the North-South ITC will cost $2500 and take 15-20 
days (Eurasian Transport Union, 2003). 
• Customer service and compliance with international quality standards: 
in addition to their competitive rates, sea shipping companies offer a high 
standard of service, including cargo tracking, sophisticated logistics networks 
and guarantees of on-time and secure delivery. They use state-of-the-art 
technology, offer discounts to regular customers, etc.
However, overland transit has an important competitive advantage – it 
reduces delivery times. The shortest cargo delivery time from eastern China 
and other Southeast Asian countries to Western Europe by railway or 
motorway via EurAsEC countries is 2 to 2.5 times shorter than sea shipment 
via the Suez Canal. This advantage is less apparent, however, where delivery 
time is calculated on a cumulative basis for large shipments. For example, 
the average container capacity of vessels working on Asia-Europe routes 
increased by 30% to 7100 TEU between 2004 and 2007. According to KTZ, 
in 2007, an average container train was able to carry up to 270 TEU. 
However, simple calculations alone are not sufficient in demonstrating the 
advantages of overland transit. Shorter delivery time is a critical factor for 
certain cargoes (perishable goods or urgent door-to-door shipments). 
In addition, faster delivery means quicker receipt of cash from the bank, 
shortening transaction times. In certain cases, each day that payment is 
delayed is critical, and consignors prefer shorter delivery time to lower shipping 
cost. Expediting delivery releases considerable financial resources, which are 
effectively frozen throughout the cargo’s journey time. Therefore, we view 
the time factor as an unquestionable competitive advantage that overland 
routes can offer for certain commodities, customers and even regions (e.g., 
China’s rapidly developing XUAR, which has no viable alternative to rail and 
road transit). 
4.2. Barriers to fulfilling the region’s transit potential
Given their geographic location and national economic interests, Russia, 
Kazakhstan and their neighbours have a direct interest in the Eurasian 
integration process extending beyond the boundaries of the post-Soviet 
space and involving the most important countries in the region. Projects 
being implemented in certain economic sectors provide solid foundations 
for regional economic integration, which begins in key sectors and eventually 
extends outwards to the institutional level. For this reason, the electricity and 
transport industries must be considered as economic priorities (Vinokurov, 
2008).
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Increasing the volume of freight transit using EurAsEC ITCs is made difficult 
in a number of ways. However, the issues are different for each mode of 
transport used in transit operations.
Below we discuss the main impediments to the full-scale integration of road 
and rail transport in EurAsEC member countries which are relevant to this 
report.
These problems are either physical or non-physical, with the following identified 
as the most acute: 
Non-physical barriers are those non-technical barriers to trade, which, to a 
large degree, are “man-made”; these are:
• protracted customs procedures at border crossing points, which 
significantly increase waiting times for vehicles and rolling stock;
• random inspections, often requiring sealed transit containers to be 
opened;
• non-harmonised transit tariffs across the CIS – despite the signing 
of international agreements, transit tariffs still vary from country to 
country5; 
• migration rules – the time drivers are allowed to stay in EurAsEC differs 
from country to country. 
Physical barriers include:
• obsolescence and shortages of rail cars, containers and locomotives; 
• non-compliance of existing infrastructure and technology with international 
quality standards (route handling capacities, etc.);
• inadequate processing capacity at border crossing points;
• poorly developed logistic and communications networks and motorway 
service facilities;
• different rail gauges – throughout the CIS, the 1520-mm gauge is used, 
whereas in Europe and Asia (China, Iran, Southeast Asia, etc.) the gauge is 
1435 mm. This poses additional problems which compound the shortage 
of transshipment centres and insufficient handling capacity at border 
crossing points (see Table 12.5); 
• insufficient capacity for cargo handling, consolidation and deconsolidation.
5 Expert opinions on the importance of this barrier differ. For example, the Commission on 
Transport Tariffs and the Transport Policy Council of the EurAsEC Integration Committee did not 
include the “tariff” problem in the List of Non-Physical Barriers in EurAsEC.
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Shipping 
point
Route
Dis-
tance, 
km
Number  
of border 
crossing 
points
Number 
of bogie 
change 
points
Lianyungang 
(China)
Via Kazakhstan and Russia 9200  2
Shenzhen 
(China)
Via Mongolia and Russia 1100  2
Via Kazakhstan and Russia 10300  2
The  
Tumannaya 
river
Via China, Mongolia and Russia 8900  2
Via China, Kazakhstan  
and Russia
9900  2
Via China (Manchuria)  
and Russia
9000 3 2
Via Russia 10300 2 1
Nakhodka 
(Russia)
Via Russia 10300 2 1
Rajin  
(North  
Korea)
Via China (Manchuria)  
and Russia
8900  2
Via Russia 10300 3 1
Pusan (South 
Korea)
Via North Korea  
and Russia
1100  2
Via North Korea, China,  
Mongolia and Russia
10780  2
Table 12. 5.  
Physical and non-
physical barriers to 
trade
Source: Trans-
Asian Railway Route 
Requirements: 
Feasibility Study 
on Connecting the 
Rail Networks of 
China, Kazakhstan, 
Mongolia, the 
Russian Federation 
and the Korean 
Peninsula (UN 
ESCAP, 199) 
In our discussion of the most significant physical and non-physical barriers 
to the use of EurAsEC’s transit potential, we examine road and rail transport 
separately. 
Initially, we focus on the legal and administrative problems that persist in 
relations between Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan. The problems are even 
more acute for those engaged in freight transit in other EurAsEC countries. 
According to an agreement between Russia and Kazakhstan on road haulage, 
Chinese hauliers are practically banned from transiting cargo through Russia, 
and Russian trucks can travel no further than 50 km into China. 
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, all former republics inherited 
the same legal framework that had existed in Soviet times. As national 
institutions developed, each country adopted laws to protect and assist its 
own transport services market. There was, of course, nothing unexpected in 
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this process. However, certain national laws started to conflict with similar 
laws in other CIS countries. For example, after independence, freight carriers 
in Russia and Belarus had no legal problems working together, but by 2000, 
these two countries (which had been the first to declare the creation of a 
Unified Transport System) had adopted 28 incompatible laws pertaining to 
international road transport shipments alone, and in just three years there 
were 31 such laws. 
It is also important to highlight developments that have had a positive impact 
in creating a unified transport system and encouraging transit: 
•  the full-scale commercialisation of the road transport sector, which is now 
dominated by private owners; 
•  equal access to domestic freight services markets for private and public 
carriers; 
•  unrestricted (or almost unrestricted) access to foreign cargo facilities 
(notably, however, each member country bans foreign operators from 
engaging in coastal freight transport ); 
•  the freedom to select a carrier for the purposes of export and import 
contracts; 
•  the absence of legal restrictions on foreign ownership of road transport 
companies;
•  the abolition of permits for return journeys between certain member 
countries.
The most significant differences in the development of national road transport 
sectors are: 
•  the varying potential of each country’s road transport sectors: for example, 
Belarus is a net exporter of road transport services, and Russia is a net 
importer. The road transport capacities of other EurAsEC countries 
(Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) prevents them from fully satisfying 
demand for external transport services;
•  the unequal pace of modernisation of the vehicle fleet to current European 
standards; 
•  variation between countries in the legislation governing the road transport 
sector6; 
6 The most comprehensive legal framework covering relations between road transport operators 
is in Belarus. By contrast, there are still notable omissions in Russian transport law. Legislation 
that had existed under the Soviet Union (charters, regulations and rules) were retained practically 
intact as the basis for governing road transport operations until the summer of 2008, despite all 
documents being no longer in force. Progress in developing a new legal framework is slow. 
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• differing tax regimes and currency regulation for carriers and forwarding 
agents; 
•  unresolved incompatibility in customs procedures for cargo transported 
by road, especially in the time taken to clear customs and undergo transit 
cargo inspection; 
•  differences in the regulations governing transit in different countries 
(including those which have signed up to bilateral agreements on 
international road traffic); 
•  incompatible road tax and road pricing systems7; differing regulations 
governing access to the road transport market and shipping services 
(including licensing, professional permit systems and other methods of 
state regulation). 
In order to improve the physical functioning of the transport system, a number 
of issues must be addressed:
•  a joint agreement on multi-modal shipments should be drafted to improve 
the coordination of river, road and railway carriers, reduce waiting time 
and increase the utilisation of vehicles by introducing modern technology to 
organise and service cargo flows;
•  transport logistics must be improved, information on the location and 
status of cargoes being transported via different ITC sections must be 
made transparent, and an up-to-date network of logistics centres must be 
built;
•  a GLONASS-based cargo-monitoring system must be introduced;
•  a unified, automated system must be created to regulate transportation 
and transit processes in the different ITC sections in EurAsEC. This 
should be integrated into nation- and industry-wide automated transport 
regulation systems;
•  a uniform, intergovernmental electronic document management system 
must be introduced as part of the international standards system. 
Electronic documentation must be granted appropriate legal status;
•  a universal glossary and package of supporting documents must be 
introduced;
•  information on and commercial security of carriers operating on ITCs must 
be enhanced; and
7 At present, there is no consensus on charges for the use of infrastructure. Most parties to the 
Agreement have no laws on toll roads. Belarus is the only country which has laws governing the 
operation of toll roads and a road-pricing mechanism.
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•  fuel compatible with Euro 3 and Euro 4 emissions standards must be 
made available in Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, along with the building 
of necessary infrastructure; in addition, countries must introduce a fuel 
quality control system and impose stricter penalties for selling low-quality 
fuel. Vehicle weight is also an important issue in international transport 
law.
The above list includes realistic measures that EurAsEC countries could take 
to encourage transit by road along its ITCs. However, as discussed earlier, 
these countries account for only a very small part of transit shipments. Many 
of the problems listed are critical and must be eliminated in those ITC that 
provide access the western parts of EurAsEC countries. 
We discuss below the problems that are preventing the development of rail 
transport along ITCs.
Firstly, there have been positive achievements: EurAsEC member countries 
benefit from an extensive railway infrastructure; regular traffic is properly 
administered; modern IT systems are being employed to a satisfactory level; 
freight technology is continually improving; and the railways are achieving 
significant time gains.
On the other hand, according to analysts, container traffic in EurAsEC 
member countries is not increasing as it should. Despite the unified tariff 
policy being applied across the CIS, variations in the funding of railways and the 
different methods used to calculate freight tariffs have resulted in significant 
fluctuations in transport costs. Moreover, container transport operators 
resent the manipulation of their profit margins. The reduction in transport 
tariffs, notably the cut in Russian railway tariffs in January 2007, did not have 
the anticipated effect of stimulating transit operations. In fact, in 2007, the 
volume of railway transit dropped by two times compared with 2006 levels, 
and was 17 times lower compared with 2004. This decrease is attributed to 
the growth of other freight transport services handling transit cargo.
Achieving stability in the journey times and cost of freight transit is another 
problem for the industry. Some analysts suggest that non-discriminatory 
conditions (compared with those of foreign competitors) should be introduced 
in documenting transit shipments. Up to now, the relatively poor standards and 
high cost of services provided by other operators in the transit chain (shipping 
companies, port services, railway administration in transit countries) have 
resulted in a continual increase in transit tariffs.
Deficiencies in container freight infrastructure also serve to alienate transit 
operators. There are few terminals capable of handling large containers; 
specialist transshipping equipment is in short supply; vehicle access to 
terminals located within cities is problematic; and the network of container 
depots has become smaller in recent years. Transshipment of containers 
Integrating Eurasian 
Transport Systems
Evgeny Vinokurov, Murat Jadraliyev, Yuriy Shcherbanin  
“The EurAsEC Transport Corridors” EDB Industry Report
22 Eurasian Development Bank
EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook 2009
between different modes of transport causes significant time delays, and there 
is a permanent shortage of flat container trailers and vehicles and of large 
containers themselves. Protracted customs procedures at border crossings, 
inconsistent investment in different sectors of the transport chain and the 
sometimes poor state of major roads conspire to prevent this sector offering 
an integrated and high-quality logistics service to its potential customers. 
The combination of all these factors explains the general reluctance among 
operators to use these routes for transporting freight. 
In August 2008, the Russian Ministry of Transport introduced a special 
transit tariff for 40-foot containers being transported from Europe to China. 
The transit of each container from Europe via Brest (Belarus), Chop (Ukraine), 
Naushki and Zabaikalsk to China, would cost $400. This tariff applied from 
August 10, to December 31, 2008, and was then extended into 2009. The 
ministry thereby virtually equalised the tariffs for loaded and empty containers 
being transported from Europe to China. Previously it had announced that the 
2007 tariffs for loaded and empty 40-feet containers would be $900 and 
$400, respectively. We have no information on the effects of this measure 
so far. 
Independent analysts and shipping agents have also identified issues which 
they see as disincentives to transit operators: cumbersome licensing 
procedures; the need to obtain numerous permits for each shipment; the 
long wait for permits and other documents to arrive from state agencies; 
lengthy procedures at EU border crossing points; the extensive paperwork 
required by customs authorities; lack of coordinated inspection procedures 
at vehicle border crossing points; extortion by inspection officials; compulsory 
escorting of loads, which must be paid for; local charges (related to vehicle 
weight, dimensions, deviation from a route, passing through certain cities or 
areas, etc.); extortion on motorways and in cities; robbery; poor maintenance 
of roads and of vehicles; absent or incorrect signposting on roads and in cities, 
etc.
In our opinion, non-physical barriers are the greatest impediment to the 
expansion of transit operations in the region, since they result in long delivery 
delays. Delays not only cost the operators money, and the trust of their 
customers, they also erode the main competitive advantage land transit has 
over sea transit.
There are two complementary ways to eliminate physical and non-physical 
barriers. Firstly, state transport policies (in the form of strategy documents) 
should focus on the most pressing problems affecting the country’s transport 
sector, which in many cases can be resolved by investing government money 
in transport infrastructure, reforming institutions and eliminating institutional 
“bottlenecks”. Secondly, integration groups can address shared problems in 
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a concerted way by prioritising mutually beneficial cooperation and employing 
common strategies.
In the next section we analyse these possibilities in more detail.
5. Transport strategies and targets for investment
5.1. National transport strategies and ITCs
One of the primary objectives of any government is to create the conditions in 
which the nation’s economy can function effectively. Therefore, development 
of the national transport system, which is a key component of production 
infrastructure, is an essential prerequisite for sustainable economic growth. 
To eliminate the physical and non-physical barriers impeding freight transit 
in EurAsEC, member country governments have adopted national transport 
development programmes aimed at addressing the most urgent problems 
facing the transport sector. 
Russia has adopted two national transport strategies in recent years. On 
May 12, 2005, the Russian Ministry of Transport adopted the Transport 
Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020 (Ministry of Transport of the 
Russian Federation, 2005). Three years later, on November 22, 2008, the 
Russian Government adopted a similar strategy which extends until 2030 
(Government of the Russian Federation, 2008). The amendment of the original 
document became necessary mainly because of the rapid change in the global 
economic situation. The importance of developing the national transport 
system was seen in a new light. Whereas in the original strategy the state 
merely intended to promote economic growth and prosperity by developing 
transport, in the 2008 strategy, the government’s ambition for the transport 
sector is to “create the conditions that will make the national economy more 
competitive and improve the quality of life of the population” (Government of 
the Russian Federation, 2008). In other words, the state has assumed a more 
active role in the development of this critical sector.
The main objectives outlined by the government in its national transport 
sector development initiative are: 
•  to create a unified transport system in Russia based on developed and 
balanced infrastructure; 
•  to integrate the country into the global transport system and utilise spare 
transit capacity; 
•  to ensure that the provision and competitiveness of transport services 
reflect the country’s commitment to innovative economic development.
Various studies are planned into the speed of cargo flows along trunk routes, 
delivery times, commodity structure, the development of transport logistics 
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centres, etc. Russia will participate in international projects and programmes 
aimed at extending inter-regional transport links (e.g. in Eurasia), enhancing 
international corridors and increasing cargo transit.
The export of transport services is an important component of Russia’s GDP. 
The government anticipates that between 2007 and 2030, the measures 
included in the transport strategy will increase the export of transport services 
by 6.8 times in revenue terms to $80 billion. Cargo weight transported 
is expected to increase from 28 to 100 million tons over the same period 
(see Table 12.6).
Mode of transport 2000 2005 2007 2010 2015 2020 2030
Total 21.8 18 27.9 3.2 2.7 0 100
Railways 20 17. 27.2 33.1 0.3 3 7
Motor transport 0. 0. 0. 1 2 2. 3
Inland water transport 1.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0. . 21
Table 12. 6.  
Forecast of cargo 
transit via Russia 
(million tons).
Source: Transport 
Strategy  
of the Russian 
Federation  
to 2030
Given the remit of this report, the integration component of the Russian 
Transport Strategy to 2030 is particularly interesting. The main objective of 
regional transport integration is to create a fully-functioning transport union 
and a unified transport system in EurAsEC. The strategy focuses upon:
•  harmonising the legal framework of the transport sector and ensuring 
that technical and technological standards for transport are uniform 
across EurAsEC. These should also be in line with international standards, 
multilateral agreements and treaties on transport;
•  eliminating discrimination in the provision of transport services and in the 
licensing, certification and registration of freight companies (and their 
representative offices or joint ventures) throughout EurAsEC, i.e., treating 
all companies within EurAsEC in the same way;
•  removing restrictions to freight and passenger transit and utilizing the 
transit and transport capacity of EurAsEC efficiently;
•  applying best practice identified in the CIS to the integration of transport 
systems, especially in the railway sector, civil aviation and the use of air 
space;
•  applying uniform guidelines in the formulation of tariff policies.
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Kazakhstan’s Transport Strategy to 2015 was adopted in April 2006. The 
basic objective of this strategy is to “advance the development of the transport 
and communications sectors in line with the economic strategy of the state”. 
The Kazakh Government identified the following objectives:
•  to integrate the Kazakh transport system into the global transport 
system; 
•  to create a modern national transport infrastructure; 
•  to enhance and realise transport potential;
•  to create a favourable investment climate in the transport sector.
The Kazakh government anticipates that its strategy will allow the country’s 
transport sector to integrate easily and fully into the global transport system. 
The sector’s assets will be modernized, and, it believes, the transport 
element of the price of goods can be reduced to 6.9%. Cargo transit will triple 
(compared with 2005) to 32.2 million tons. The speed of cargo traffic will 
increase by 15-20% on average, and by 20-30% on the main international 
transport corridors.
These ambitious plans will be implemented in two phases. During phase one 
(2006–2010), the state will invest public money and encourage private 
investment in transport infrastructure, tighten the legal framework, apply 
international standards, and further the integration of the national transport 
sector into the global transport system. During phase two (2011–2015), 
efforts will focus on “consolidating the successful implementation of the 
Strategy”: the development programmes and institutional reforms introduced 
during phase one will be reviewed, and recommendations made in order to 
eliminate any remaining or emerging systemic problems. Following this, “the 
creation of an efficient transport system will be completed”. 
Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan do not have comprehensive strategies 
similar to those of Russia or Kazakhstan. However, these countries have 
addressed transport in their national development strategies, identifying 
goals for this sector and the means to achieve them. 
The Belarusian government has formulated a transport policy to 2010, which 
aims to “create a competitive transport system and to develop transport 
and communication services and related infrastructure” (Government 
of the Republic of Belarus, 2005). In accordance with the Programme of 
Development in Belarus to 2010, adopted in 2005, and a number of other 
initiatives approved by the Cabinet of Ministers, the following measures will be 
implemented:
•  the legal framework of the transport sector will be refined;
Integrating Eurasian 
Transport Systems
Evgeny Vinokurov, Murat Jadraliyev, Yuriy Shcherbanin  
“The EurAsEC Transport Corridors” EDB Industry Report
228 Eurasian Development Bank
EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook 2009
•  all social groups and regions will have access to transport services;
•  basic transport infrastructure will meet the needs of industry;
•  management structures will be reformed and enhanced;
•  competition in transport services markets will be encouraged (including 
passenger and freight transportation and rolling-stock repair);
•  the government will create a favourable environment for investment in 
transport, replacement of rolling-stock, reconstruction and modernisation 
of transport infrastructure; 
•  the government will encourage international transportation and the export 
of transport services.
The Kyrgyzstan has adopted a Development Strategy for Kyrgyzstan to 
2010 (Government of the Kyrgyzstan, 2007). Its chief objective in terms 
of the development of transport infrastructure is to “ensure that the 
motorway network operates to higher standards, enabling suppliers of goods 
and services to minimise their transport costs, ensuring that they have 
access to regional and local markets, and that local markets in labour and 
social services can be sustained”. The Government places great emphasis on 
the improvement of motorways, since road transport accounts for more than 
95% of all cargo and passenger transportation. To this end, the Strategy to 
2010 aims to:
•  identify priority sections of road and set up schemes to finance the 
improvement of selected roads jointly with local, self-governing bodies;
•  preserve the existing network of surfaced roads and gradually repair 
damaged roads; 
•  review existing road taxes and charges which pay into the Road Fund, 
and establish a second-generation Road Fund by introducing a tariff for 
accessing and using roads. 
The Republic of Tajikistan’s transport system development programme 
is incorporated into the national Strategy for Economic Development to 2015 
(Government of the Republic of Tajikistan, 2004). The Tajik Government’s 
main objectives for this programme are to create the conditions to accelerate 
the socioeconomic development of the Republic of Tajikistan by increasing 
cargo revenues; to ensure that the demand for transport services from 
different economic sectors and the population is met; and to improve the 
quality of transport services and reduce transport costs. The government 
therefore intends to:
•  create a common transport space in the country which will support a 
unified domestic market;
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•  coordinate efforts to develop transport infrastructure, design and 
implement construction projects (building roads, communications 
infrastructure, airports, etc.), and purchase new vehicles; 
•  integrate the national transport sector into the global transport system 
and create competitive international corridors in the country taking full 
advantage of its geographic location and transit potential; 
•  introduce flexible transport tariffs responding to the needs of the users of 
transport services and the need to renew transport sector assets.
Tajikistan’s emphasis on the improvement of motorways, as in Kyrgyzstan, is 
a response to the country’s geographic location. It is interesting to note that 
the government intends to play a particularly active role in TRACECA.
5.2. Targets for investment
Any country aiming to realise its transit potential must have a comprehensive 
investment policy which addresses all the elements required to ensure the 
effective functioning of its transport corridors. These elements are discussed 
below.
1. Railways and motorways
The construction and modernisation of railways and motorways is an obvious 
focus for investment in the context of transport sector development. Modern 
road infrastructure is an essential prerequisite for increasing the speed of 
cargo and passenger flows, improving traffic safety, etc. 
However, transport sector priorities differ between EurAsEC countries. For 
example, the transport development strategies of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
outlined above focus on the improvement of motorways – a reaction, no doubt, 
to the geographic location and landscape of these countries. In contrast, the 
transportation of transit and other cargoes in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia 
relies principally on railways, and this necessitates continual modernisation of 
railway infrastructure, electrification, and the construction of “straightening” 
sections in order to shorten distances. 
Nevertheless, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia also have plans to improve 
their motorway networks. Given the increase in cargo flows, it is clear that the 
railways will soon be stretched to capacity. Moreover, provision of motorways 
is fully in line with the principles of interoperability and interconnectivity which 
ultimately determine how an entire transport corridor functions. Motorway 
transit requires that the high quality of roads, which facilitates high-speed 
travel, are reflected in standards of road infrastructure (gas stations, 
restaurants, motels, etc.). 
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2. Border crossing points and border infrastructure
Failure to consider transit endpoints – which, as a rule, are border crossing 
points – and ensure that border infrastructure is adequately maintained, can 
cause serious problems. In the case of Burachki in Latvia, for example, truck 
queues can stretch for 50 km. The roadsides are heavily littered and local 
residents are unable to sell their land and houses. 
Experience in China, Finland, Romania and other countries, suggests that 
investment in border infrastructure (motels, restaurants, loading terminals, 
etc.) pays for itself quickly and can generate a significant profit.
In order for an ITC to operate efficiently, which first and foremost depends 
on the ability to transship cargoes to other routes, the corridor must have 
loading terminals, power transshipment complexes, an extensive network of 
access roads, and the ability to transfer cargoes between different modes 
of transport and manage the entire process with minimal documentation. 
Analysis of national transport systems in EurAsEC suggests that they lack 
these key infrastructural elements. Such infrastructure – which is highly valued 
by freight operators and which therefore pays for itself quickly – includes multi-
modal loading terminals which serve both transit and non-transit shipments.
3. Building railcars and renewing rolling-stock
A critical target for investment is the renewal of EurAsEC’s rolling stock, 
since most of the rail cars currently operating in these countries are several 
decades old. According to Russia’s Ministry of Transport and the Kazakh 
Ministry of Transport and Communications, depreciation of the rolling stock 
in these countries is between 50% and 80%. The situation is even worse 
in other EurAsEC countries. However, this is only part of the problem: the 
Integration Committee of the EurAsEC’s analysis of the dynamics of rail 
freight transportation indicates that, given the current growth in cargo flows, 
availability of (obsolete) rail cars will not be sufficient to meet demand (see 
Figure 12.1). The serious shortage of containers and flat container wagons 
may also prevent EurAsEC countries fulfilling their transit potential. The 
shortage of rolling stock is already causing difficulties. Around 95% of all 
containers are made in China. Since it is not economically viable to maintain a 
domestic container manufacturing industry (Chinese supplies are very cheap), 
other countries rarely produce them. China’s supply is practically unlimited; 
many containers are hired out or used elsewhere under other schemes. 
European companies, therefore, have to return large numbers of empty 
containers to China, Korea and other countries, and the United States and 
Europe are keen to do business with anyone willing to take empty containers 
from them. 
Depreciation of Russia’s railway sector assets is estimated at 40-60%. The 
country also has a shortage of flat rail wagons suitable for carrying large 
Integrating Eurasian 
Transport Systems
231Eurasian Development Bank
containers. The demand for flat rail cars is estimated at 2000-5000 units 
per annum. Although a boom in demand is unlikely, it is expected to grow steadily 
in the coming years. The other EurAsEC countries have no facilities to 
manufacture flat rail cars. There are several agreements between CIS 
railway companies under which the use of rail wagons is shared, and this has 
become common practice.Transport corridor projects require thorough pre-
investment studies to plot the potential location of facilities, to predict cargo 
flows and identify customers. This generates a great deal of documentation 
requiring approval by the relevant bodies. The IT and communications 
industries have successfully implemented many efficient investment projects. 
Investment in electronic document management, database administration 
and other equipment at border crossing points would, as a rule, generate a 
steady revenue stream from the start.
Figure 12.11.  
Railway freight 
transportation and 
the freight rail car 
fleet in EurAsEC.
Source: EurAsEC 
Integration 
Committee
6. The integration of the Eurasian transport system
We believe that the integration of national transport systems is key to the 
elimination of most of the obstacles that restrict EurAsEC’s attempts to 
encourage greater use of its international transport corridors for transit. The 
post-Soviet space has a number of integration groups whose main aim is to 
overcome these physical and non-physical barriers.
6.1. EurAsEC initiatives
To address the above problems, the EurAsEC Integration Committee set 
up the Council on Transport Policy (CTP), to bring together the ministers of 
transport of all the EurAsEC countries (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Russia and Tajikistan).
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EurAsEC countries are committed to jointly pursuing the following goals:
• coordination of activities aimed at developing the international transport 
corridors linking European and Asian countries; 
• the development of transport infrastructure and standardisation of 
technical and technological parameters across all EurAsEC transport 
corridors;
• a coordinated policy to attract foreign investment in transport corridors;
• refining the legal framework regulating the crossing of borders in 
EurAsEC;
• a policy of harmonised tariffs and charges for freight and passenger 
transport, crossing borders, use of infrastructure, etc.;
• encouraging the establishment of joint ventures engaged in international 
freight and passenger transportation and forwarding services; 
• coordinating activities to enhance traffic and cargo safety and protect the 
environment;
• identifying opportunities to improve multi-modal shipments; 
• finding the optimal location for and building new international logistics 
centres. 
EurAsEC’s purpose is to develop Unified Transport System (UTS) and a 
Transport Union of its member countries. As work towards these goals 
has progressed, the need for extensive transport-related research has 
become apparent. On January 25, 2008, the Inter-state Council of EurAsEC 
(i.e., heads of government) adopted the UTS Development Concept. On 
December 2, 2008, to ensure that proposals relating to the UTS could be 
implemented, the 15th session of the Council approved the Measures for 
Developing the Unified Transport Space in EurAsEC 2008-2010, which 
include:
1) Developing a common transport services market 
Between 2008 and 2010, in order to eliminate non-physical barriers in 
transport markets, national regulations within the EurAsEC pertaining to 
cargo and passenger transportation, and agreements between EurAsEC 
and third countries, will be fully harmonised. In addition, a shared information 
system for the transport services market will be created, and measures will 
be taken to ensure that the movement of passengers, luggage, freight and 
vehicles, including international transit, is unrestricted.
2) Joint development of transport infrastructure and a system of logistics 
centres in EurAsEC 
In order to eliminate the physical barriers which are restricting transit 
and transport potential of EurAsEC, authorities will address deficiencies 
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in the region’s transport infrastructure (mentioned above) in a consistent 
and effective manner. They will focus on joint priorities, including plans to 
reconstruct national transport route sections and to assess the condition of 
EurAsEC’s motorways by organising car trips along them.
3) Developing the transit potential of EurAsEC. The importance to the region 
of commercial freight transit has prompted ongoing efforts by the CTP to 
refine and harmonise the laws and regulations governing transit operations 
and insurance for transport operators. 
In May 2006, to streamline the procedure of setting tariffs for rail freight 
within EurAsEC countries, member country heads of state approved the Gen-
eral Principles for Setting and Applying Railway Tariffs for the Transportation 
of Cargo between Railway Stations in EurAsEC Member Countries and the 
Procedure for Setting Decreasing Coefficients and Tariffs for Transportation 
of Cargo between Railway Stations. All member countries have completed the 
internal procedures required to put these documents into effect – Kazakhstan 
was the last to do so on December 3, 2008. 
Since January 1, 2007, the international vehicle weight certification system 
has been used throughout EurAsEC; this reduces delays by removing the 
need for trucks to be weighed at every border. 
On April 18, 2007, the Inter-State Council of EurAsEC agreed that member 
state governments would recommend to their national customs and 
transportation authorities the introduction of a universal (AIGTR) waybill. 
This would act as a customs document for the purposes of transit through 
EurAsEC.
The introduction of this form is a provision of the Convention on International 
Customs Transit Procedures for the Carriage of Goods by Rail. The Convention 
applies in Belarus and Russia. Kazakhstan has begun the process of signing 
up to it. 
In December 2006, the CTP drafted a list of international agreements and 
conventions on transport and communications, which EurAsEC member 
countries were recommended to join in 2007-2008 as part of the process 
of integrating their national transport sectors into European and global 
transport systems and fulfilling the transit potential of EurAsEC.
The 14th CTP session on May 22, 2008 in Minsk reviewed the progress in 
implementing these measures. It asked the Commission for Harmonising the 
Transport Laws of EurAsEC Member Countries to prepare a progress report 
as at January 1, 2009 and submit it to the 16th CTP session in May 2009. 
In accordance with the Agreement on Implementing a Joint Policy on the 
Development of Transport Corridors in EurAsEC, an assessment has begun 
of the condition of motorways and railways included in the list of EurAsEC 
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trunk routes, and measures are being taken to eliminate restrictions on 
international road transport.
On January 24, 2008, the Integration Committee of the EurAsEC requested 
that the CTP and the Council of customs authority leaders redouble their 
efforts to ease restrictions on international road transport and present their 
results annually to the Integration Committee of the EurAsEC.
Following this request, the working group coordinating the customs and 
transport authorities of EurAsEC member countries met on September 
2-5, 2008, to discuss the results of monitoring carried out during the first 
half of 2008. The group decided to present their findings on the easing 
of transport restrictions to the next session of the CTP and the Council of 
customs authority leaders.
6.2. CIS integration initiatives
The CIS Executive Committee is coordinating the integration of the transit and 
transport sectors of EurAsEC member countries. The CIS’ transport policy 
identifies the following priorities:
• in accordance with the need to promote liberalisation and economic 
reform, all CIS governments adopt the agreed transport policy. The policy 
aims to create a common market to which all operators have equal access; 
to implement an agreed tariff and tax policy; to preserve and extend 
unified technical and technological standards for the transport sector; 
and to maintain a unified approach to cooperation with third countries and 
international organisations;
• the extension and harmonisation of transport laws by the legislature of the 
CIS (creating a legal basis for international relations in the transport sector; 
encouraging the exchange of views on laws and regulations governing the 
transport sector; conducting a comparative analysis of the transport 
laws adopted and the unification of such laws; and creating a unified legal 
framework for transport). 
On September 15, 2004, the Council of the Heads of Government meeting 
in Astana adopted the Concept of Joint Transport Policy of CIS Member 
Countries to 2010, which outlines the following priorities:
• harmonisation of the transport laws of CIS countries based on international 
standards;
• cooperation on international transportation between various modes of 
transport;
• refinement of the tariff policy;
• development of transport logistics;
• efficient use of transit potential;
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• the drafting and implementation of proposals for joint investment in key 
infrastructure facilities situated along international transport corridors;
• the implementation of an agreed policy on transport safety and 
environmental protection (CIS Executive Committee, 2004).
Clearly the integration initiatives of the CIS differ little from those of EurAsEC. 
Both wish to integrate national transport systems, eliminate restrictions 
to transit and improve the utilization of their transport capacity. These 
priorities were incorporated into the Concept of Future Development of the 
CIS adopted by CIS government heads in October 2007, in Dushanbe. The 
joint action plan formulated in Dushanbe states that every CIS country will 
strive to:
•  create a network of international transport corridors;
•  draft more effective tariff policies, reducing the fiscal and administrative 
burden on international freight traffic; 
•  enhance cooperation between modes of transport engaged in freight 
transit.
In section 6.4, we examine the potential efficacy of these integration initiatives 
in the CIS and EurAsEC. 
6.3. Initiative 1520
Figure 12.12.  
Major 120-mm 
gauge railways.
Source: Official 
website of the 
International 
Railway Business 
Forum 120 
Strategic 
Partnership:  
www.forum120.
ru 
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In May 2006, the first international 1520 Strategic Partnership rail industry 
forum was held in Sochi. An initiative of RZD, the forum was created to discuss 
transport integration in the seventeen countries which use the 1520-mm 
railway gauge (i.e., all the former Soviet republics, together with Finland and 
Mongolia). In these countries there is a total of more than 230,000 km 
of 1520-mm rail track, with 70% of all lines owned by RZD. By the end of 
2008, three such forums had been held in Russia. They are recognised as a 
unique opportunity for discussion, attracting hundreds of rail industry players, 
including public officials and major companies. 
The forums include round-table and panel discussions on a wide range of 
administrative and technical issues, analysts’ reports and potential solutions. 
Various commercial agreements have been struck at these events between 
companies from the participating countries. The forums attract delegates 
not only from the “1520 Area”, but also from Western Europe and the APR, 
who recognise the huge intercontinental importance of the 1520-mm gauge 
network and the investment opportunities that the region’s transport system 
represents. 
For the purposes of debating the issues and opportunities of the 
“1520 area”, the forum divides the railways into two areas – Baltic and 
Central Asia. At the most recent forum in Astana (December 2008), RZD 
and KTZ signed a Joint Action Plan for cooperation between the two 
companies, and discussed opportunities for mutual investment in railcar 
construction and logistics infrastructure.
6.4. Outlook for transport integration
Given the initiatives now under way to integrate their national transport 
systems, it is clear that EurAsEC and CIS member countries are very 
committed to a concerted approach in reforming their transit and transport 
industries. We believe, however, that EurAsEC is more likely to succeed 
in easing restrictions on transit and utilising its transport capacity more 
effectively. There are several reasons for this: 
• EurAsEC member countries are more uniform in approach, whereas 
CIS countries have shown different levels of commitment to a common 
integration policy, in particular, in the transport sector (a number of CIS 
countries are relatively “passive” and have not sought to engage in closer 
international cooperation). The Dushanbe meeting of the Council of the 
Heads of CIS Government in October 2007, revealed a lack of coordination 
in the activities of CIS member states. This meeting approved the 
Concept of Future Development of the CIS, which was designed to revive 
some “dormant” CIS initiatives (among them the integration of transport 
systems). Three of the 12 participating countries (Azerbaijan, Moldova and 
Ukraine) signed this document with the proviso that they can opt-out of 
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any obligations; Georgia and Turkmenistan refused to sign it at all (CIS 
Executive Committee, 2007). 
• Since its inception, the CTP has taken a number of significant steps to 
foster the integration of transport systems in EurAsEC countries. In this 
report, we assess the activities of various bodies from the point of view of 
their relevance to EurAsEC members. The CIS as an organisation of ten 
former Soviet republics has also worked hard to further their integration 
(or at least to prevent disintegration). 
• The Customs Union upon which the EurAsEC focuses represents the 
most efficient mechanism for eliminating non-physical barriers, encouraging 
freight transit, unifying tariff and customs policies, etc. Therefore, it is 
critical that the members of the Customs Union (Russia, Kazakhstan and 
Belarus at a time being) cooperate in the creation of an integrated transport 
system and a common transport policy. Tair Mansurov, Secretary General 
of EurAsEC, commented that all the procedures necessary to establish the 
Customs Union are being completed within the anticipated timescale, and 
the inception of the Customs Union in 2008-2010 is “absolutely feasible”. 
(All-Russia Movement for a Fair Market, 2008). 
• The bilateral agreements between EurAsEC countries, though they 
tend to be somewhat conservative and conventional, have nevertheless 
consistently proved to be an adequate basis for integration. A bilateral 
agreement may be a stimulus for action even where two countries are 
motivated only by self-interest. Even homogenous integration groups 
such as EurAsEC have their differences. Bilateral agreements are not 
a contradiction to the basic principle of integration groups; bilateral and 
multilateral agreements complement each other. 
We also notice that Initiative 1520 provides strong foundations for the 
integration of 1520-mm gauge railway networks, and the business forums 
held under its aegis (including special regional forums in Central Asia) have 
been instrumental in eliminating physical and non-physical barriers to 
transportation in CIS and EurAsEC countries. 
In our opinion, the task of integrating the transport systems of Russia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in the pan-Eurasian context will be 
better served in its initial stages by accelerating internal integration within 
EurAsEC. However, pan-Eurasian integration will not be possible without first 
eliminating barriers within the group. We would stress that the problems 
associated with creating a single economic space in EurAsEC are still not 
adequately resolved.
Although the integration groups have made significant progress in resolving 
the issues discussed in this review, concerted effort is required to remove 
many physical and non-physical barriers to commercial transportation. 
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EurAsEC countries must pursue a joint, well-coordinated investment policy to 
develop and modernise their transport infrastructure in the interests of all the 
member countries. It is clear that members of the group do not share exactly 
the same goals, and each member country’s view of the benefits of increased 
transit will determine its contribution to EurAsEC’s joint infrastructure 
projects. It is also important to take into account each EurAsEC member 
country’s level of economic development and available resources (see Table 
12.7). 
EurAsEC countries
Number of investment 
projects
Approximate project cost 
(in $ billion)
Belarus  1.
Kazakhstan  8.7
Kyrgyzstan 2 0.2
Russia  0.2
Tajikistan 2 0.2
TOTAL: 69 51.76
Table 12. 7.  
Participation of 
EurAsEC countries 
in transport 
infrastructure 
projects until 2020
Source: EurAsEC 
Integration 
Committee
7. Faster, cheaper, smoother: the priorities for the 
development of ITCs in EurAsEC
One of the primary objectives of this report is to identify the most efficient 
international transport corridor routes in EurAsEC. This task is necessary 
because the construction and modernisation of transport infrastructure are 
very capital-intensive, and the region must therefore focus its efforts on the 
most effective and therefore potentially profitable routes. 
The criteria for selecting the best potential ITCs in EurAsEC are:
•  the time factor – selecting the shortest distance between the main points 
of loading (China and Southeast Asia) and freight destinations (Western 
European cities) will maximise the key competitive advantage of overland 
routes, i.e., speed of delivery. Speed of transit via ITCs depends on their 
state of repair, and, just as importantly, the number of border crossing 
points; 
•  the positive, cumulative integration effect – ITCs should preferably pass 
through the territories of EurAsEC countries that are members of the 
Customs Union; this will greatly reduce the non-physical restrictions 
upon commercial transport and could, in the foreseeable future, remove 
them altogether (by reducing tariffs, thereby reducing transport costs 
and increasing the competitiveness of overland Eurasian transit routes). 
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Countries must invest jointly in the renovation of transport infrastructure 
and the construction of service stations and logistics centres.
Given these criteria, the priority transit routes for EurAsEC are the Northern 
corridor of the trans-Asian railway (connecting with the Trans-Siberian 
Railway) and the Western Europe – West China motorway which is nearly 
10000 km long. In addition, the North-South ITC should also be considered as 
EurAsEC’s best potential route to South Asia. 
This is in no way to suggest that alternative international routes should no 
longer be considered. Additional ITCs will be instrumental in realising the 
region’s transit potential and diversifying cargo flows, i.e., serving more loading 
and destination points.
Sources
1520 Strategic Partnership (2008) International Railway Business Forum “1520 Strategic 
Partnership”. About the project. Electronic version: http://forum1520.ru/about/, as of 1 
February 2009. – In Russian.
All-Russia Movement for Fair Market (2008) Creation of the EurAsEC Customs Union 
in 2008-2010 is absolutely feasible. 12 June. Electronic version: http://www.vdcr.ru/
content/view/1032/249/, as of 1 February 2009. – In Russian.
CIS Executive Committee (2004) On the Concept of Agreed Transport Policy of CIS 
Member Countries. Electronic version: http://www.cis.minsk.by/webnpa/text.
aspx?RN=N90400093, as of 1 February 2009. – In Russian.
CIS Executive Committee (2007) On the Concept of Future Development of CIS Countries. 
Electronic version: http://www.cis.minsk.by/webnpa/text.aspx?RN=N90700503#kocep, 
as of 1 February 2009. – In Russian.
EurAsEC Integration Committee (2008) Summary materials of the 15th session of the Council 
on Transport Policy of the EurAsEC Integration Committee. 2 December. – In Russian
EurAsEC Integration Committee (2009) Regulations of the Council on Transport Policy of 
EurAsEC. Electronic version: http://www.evrazes.com/ru/main/infopage/58/, as of 1 
February 2009. – In Russian.
Eurasian Transport Union (2003) Position and Importance of the North – South International 
Transport Corridor in Russia’s Transport Sector. Vestnik Yevroasiatskogo transportnogo 
soyuza, 1 (8). – In Russian.
Government of the Republic of Belarus (2005) Programme of Socioeconomic Development 
of the Republic of Belarus in 2006–2010. Electronic version: http://w3.main.
gov.by/ministry/economy.nsf/00000000000000000000000000000000/
686d98a674831210c225718d00361cb9?OpenDocument as of 1 February 2009. – In 
Russian.
Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan (2006) The Transport Strategy of the Republic 
of Kazakhstan until 2015. April. Electronic version: ru.government.kz/docs/transportstrat.
doc, as of 1 February 2009. – In Russian.
Government of the Republic of Tajikistan (2004) The Strategy of Economic Development 
of Tajikistan until 2015. 1 March. Electronic version: http://www.tajik-gateway.org/index.
phtml?lang=ru&id=4271, as of 1 February 2009. – In Russian.
Integrating Eurasian 
Transport Systems
Evgeny Vinokurov, Murat Jadraliyev, Yuriy Shcherbanin  
“The EurAsEC Transport Corridors” EDB Industry Report
20 Eurasian Development Bank
EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook 2009
Government of the Russian Federation (2008) The Transport Strategy of the Russian 
Federation until 2030. 22 November. Electronic version: www.mintrans.ru/pressa/
TransStrateg_VV.htm, as of 1 February 2009. – In Russian.
Lakshmanan, T.R. (2001) Integration of Transport and Trade Facilitation: Overview. In: T.R. 
Lakshmanan (ed.) Integration of Transport and Trade Facilitation: Selected Regional Case 
Studies, Washington DC: the World Bank Group.
Ministry of the Economy and Finance of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan (2007) The Strategy of the 
Development of Kyrgyzstan in 2007–2010. 19 April. Electronic version: http://www.minfin.
kg/modules/smartsection/item.php?itemid=709, as of 1 February 2009. – In Russian.
Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation (2002) On Measures for Developing 
Infrastructure and Securing the Functioning of the North-South International Transport 
Corridor (memo). 22 October. Electronic version: http://www.mintrans.ru/pressa/Kolleg_
0205su.htm, as of 1 February 2009. – In Russian.
Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation (2005) The Transport Strategy of the 
Russian Federation until 2020. 12 May. Electronic version: www.mintrans.ru/pressa/
Trans_Strateg_12052005.doc, as of 1 February 2009. – In Russian.
SPECA (2008) SPECA 13th Project Working Group Session. Presentation of Kaztransservice 
Electronic version: http://www.unece.org/trans/main/speca/docs/13th_
presentation08_r.pdf, as of 1 February 2009. – In Russian.
Tashimov T. (2007) West – China – Transit. Ekspert Kazakhstan, 5 February, 5 (107). – In 
Russian.
T&C (2008) On 27 March, Belarusian Railway Department Hosted Negotiations of Heads 
of Belarusian and Polish Railway Administrations over Bilateral Cooperation. 31 March. 
Electronic version: http://www.tc.by/exhibitions/Transport/news/63.html, as of 1 
February 2009. – In Russian.
TSR Boosts Momentum (2008) RZhD-Partner. 12 November. Electronic version: http://
rzd-partner.ru/news/2008/11/12/333420-print.html, as of 1 February 2009. – In 
Russian.
UN ESCAP (1996) Trans-Asian Railway Route Requirements: Feasibility Study on Connecting 
Rail Networks of China, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, the Russian Federation and the Korean 
Peninsula. N.-Y.: UN ESCAP.
UN ESCAP (2007) Regional Shipping and Port Development. Container Traffic Forecast 
2007 Update. New York.: UN ESCAP.
Vinokurov, E. (2008) The Common Electric Power Market of the CIS. Industry review No.3. 
Almaty, the EDB. October. Electronic version: http://www.eabr.org/rus/publications/
AnalyticalReports/, as of 1 February 2009. – In Russian.
World Trade Organisation (2008) International Trade Statistics. Geneva: WTO.
Integrating Eurasian 
Transport Systems
21Eurasian Development Bank
There has been a lot written and said about the need for a more effective 
policy in the field of transport, freight and passenger traffic, as well as logistics 
in the EurAsEC member states. As a rule, representatives of EurAsEC 
countries adduce the same fairly trivial arguments while debating over the 
subject. First of all, they speak about the unique geographic position of each 
EurAsEC member state, which automatically defines it as a leading transit 
power. Secondly, they discuss the most convenient overland Eurasian routes 
for freight and passenger traffic to pass through the territory of each and 
every EurAsEC member state. Thirdly, the transportation systems of every 
country are quite suitable for their historic mission of becoming a stronghold 
for Eurasian transit. It must be noted, however, that while the stated claims 
have certain grounds, the present realia are quite different and the goals 
declared are still far from being achieved.
From our point of view, an issue of developing transportation links in the 
Eurasian transport service is not a priority. There are no such policy decisions 
that could become a basis for shaping priorities of transport and economic 
character. This brings up the question of what policy decisions have to do with 
the issue. Let’s try to cast some light upon this aspect.
As reported in January 2008, the EurAsEC Interstate Council at the level of 
Heads of governments reached the decision on implementation of the Strategy 
for shaping a common transportation space. The Community foresees the 
merging of state transportation systems of every member country into an 
integrated system, which is based on the unified principles, standards and 
technical parameters. This concept, at a closer look y doesn’t carry any 
political load. It is about the issues of legislation and investment activities, and 
statement of some economic function.
In the Soviet Era, this territory had a common transportation space, however, 
too many barriers emerged during the last 16 years. All countries gained 
sovereignty and introduced independent regulation of domestic economic 
activities independently, following the strategic and tactical tasks set by the 
country’s leadership.
And again there evolves the need for harmonising the legislation, providing 
the compatibility of transportation systems establishing rules of competition, 
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developing a mutually beneficial and effective use of transit potential, and 
organising a barrier-free movement of passengers, luggage, cargo, and 
transportation vehicles between the EurAsEC member states.
However, the handling of these tasks alone demands that the integration 
grouping unites on new, mutually beneficial terms, improve and modernise 
existing infrastructural facilities, and construct new ones. Over time, some 
qualitative peculiarities appeared.If, in the past, a decision on constructing 
any facility affecting interests of several republics was taken in Moscow, 
nowadays, the process of coordinating investment projects between CIS or 
EurAsEC member states may drag on and be subject to long-lasting expertise 
with the most often explanation being a lack of funds.
Decisions on developing cooperation between transportation systems are 
taken, but they do not take the shape of anything tangible; the means of 
control over the implementation of taken decisions are not visibleand neither 
is the financing of a joint key projects in this area. The progress in completing 
the set tasks is too low. It is hard to cite any specific examples of completed 
joint transport or infrastructural facilities. And I mean exactly the joint ones. 
Well, one may recall the commissioning of the bridge across the river Kigach 
in the near-border Russian-Kazakh zone.
We assume that singling out the special role of one of the EurAsEC member 
states in the part of conducting a transit policy is not justified. In our opinion, a 
transit policy must be streamlined across the territory of the Community as a 
whole. If the goal is to enhance integration processes on the post-Soviet area, 
then the projects must also be formulated with due consideration of common 
objectives.
Let’s look at how transit issues are addressed in Belarus and Kazakhstan, 
that is, how the tasks are formulated in the major transportation documents 
– strategies, concepts and programmes. Kazakhstan’s transport strategy till 
2015 aims at “accelerated development of the transport and communications 
complex in accordance with the economic strategy of the state”. The following 
goals and tasks have been identified:
• The integration of Kazakhstan’s transportation system with the global 
one;
• The creation of a modern promising national transportation 
infrastructure;
• The development and effective usage of a transit potential;
• The shaping of a favorable investment climate in the transportation 
sector.
It is anticipated that Strategy implementation will lead to the “full and 
systemic” integration of the national complex into the world transportation 
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system, the total renewal of assets, and the and reduction of transport 
component in the cost of product to 6.9%. Over 10 years, volumes of transit 
may increase by three times and amount to 32.2 million tons of cargo. The 
transportation speed through communication lines will grow by 15-20% and 
through main international transport corridors by 20-30%.
The Strategy is divided in two stages. During the first stage (2006-2010), 
the state allocates budgetary funds and actively attracts private investments 
in development of transport infrastructure, improves regulatory and legal 
framework, implements international standards and assumes measures for 
deeper integration of Kazakhstan’s transportation complex in the international 
system. The second stage (2011-2015) will focus on “securing a positive 
effect of the strategy’s implementation”, and monitoring development 
programmes and institutional reforms that were carried out during the first 
stage, as well as introducing recommendations of a systemic character. All 
this will result in the “formation of an effective transportation system of the 
country”.
The development of transportation is one of the priority projects of 
Kazakhstan. In accordance with the Strategy, in order to increase railroad 
transit, the authorities mean to widen the traffic capacity of transit corridors 
to 100 million tons per annum to Turkmenistan, Iran, Turkey and European 
countries by 2015.
The plans of Astana and, in particular, the possibility of rapid cargo delivery 
to Russian and European customers, are of interest to Chinese shippers and 
freight owners are willing to pay for this service.
At the same time, the issue of developing transport infrastructure is still 
pressing. We believe this problem must be solved not only in Kazakhstan, but in 
Russia, China, and Belarus as well. Kazakhstan thinks that the current state of 
infrastructure and service that do not fully correspond to the level and status 
of transcontinental transportation links are the major restrictions for transit. 
Freight transportation by railroad has a high prime cost due to undeveloped 
infrastructure, worn-out state of the rolling stock, partial supply of the road 
and rail network with electric traction, etc. Without solving these problems, 
which imply a very heavy spending, it would be very difficult for Kazakhstan 
to create the image of an attractive transit country on the Eurasian space. 
Let’s not forget that China, the neighboring region with Kazakhstan, has quite 
serious problems with the traffic capacity of transhipment facilities, which 
results in transit restriction.
On the other hand, Kazakhstan succeeded in improving the level of servicing 
freight owners, including the handling of container cargoes, customs 
examination procedures, etc. So, when transporting cargoes through Dostyk 
rail station, containers from Chinese railroads pass without significant delays. 
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Transportation of single containers is an exception to the rule, because it takes 
time to form a train. But delays of this kind take no longer than 5-7 days.
Speaking of infrastructure, it must be noted that Dostyk station, which 
borders with China, is being modernised at present (its transport capacity 
should amount to 25 million tons a year). A Zhetigen-Khorgos railroad (near 
the border with China) is planned. Khorgos should handle up to 25 million tons 
of cargo by 2020 and the total capacity of border crossings between the two 
countries should make up 50 million tons per annum.
According to the Strategy, in order to raise the level of railroad transit, regional 
logistic centres in Astana, Almaty, Aktau and Dostyk should be established by 
2015.
The primary target of Belarusian transport policy up to and including 2010 
is “to form a competitive transport system, step up transportation and 
communication services and develop a corresponding infrastructure”.
In order to achieve the set goals the following steps are to be taken:
• Improvement of legal framework for transportation activities;
• Increase in affordability of transportation services, introduction of minimal 
social standards of transportation services to all levels of the population 
and regions of the country;
• Secure the compliance of basic transport infrastructure with the 
development of productive forces;
• Realisation of structural adjustments in transportation field in part of its 
renewal and improvement of management structure;
• Development of transportation services market competition in 
conveyance of passengers, freights and maintenance of rolling stock;
• Arrangement of conditions for attracting investments in transport 
development, implementation of investment projects on renewal of the rolling 
stock, reconstruction and modernization of transport infrastructure;
• Development of transport services’ export and creation of favorable 
conditions for carrying out international transportation.
The aforementioned steps are foreseen by an array of state programmes: 
An “Integrated Programme for Securing Effective Use of Transit Capacity of 
Belarus in 2006-2010”, a “National Programme for Development of Export 
for 2006-2010” and a “Programme for Development of Railroad Traffic 
Control Points at the State Border of Belarus for 2007-2015”. A gradual 
implementation of these programmes will finally lead to stable growth in 
volumes of freight transportation by Belarusian railroad. In 2007, the country 
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transported 140.8 million tons of cargo (5.5% up as compared to 2006). 
Meanwhile, international transportation amounted to 98.2 million tons of 
cargo, including 49.3 million tons of transit. In 2008, Belarusian railroads 
transported 147.2 million tons of freights, including 47.9 million tons of 
local traffic, 50.6 million tons of transit, 33.6 million tons of export and 15.1 
million tons of import. The decline in export volumes was mostly a result of 
decreased export transportation of construction materials, chemical and 
mineral fertilizers, oil and oil products. Approximately 1.6-1.8 million tons of 
cargoes are transported from West to East, but the volume of transportation 
in the backward direction is 4.4-4.5 times higher and makes up about 7 million 
tons.
Transportation through the Eurasian sector forms the basis of transportation 
services’ export of the Belarusian Railway (BRW). They account for 35% of the 
total volume of transportation. The main transit freights are cargo oil, ferrous 
metals, fertilizers, coal, charred coal and iron ore. The bulk of the transportation 
volume falls on Russia (55%), including Kaliningrad area (24.7%); Latvia 
(25%); Lithuania (9.5%); Ukraine (8%) and Kazakhstan (2.5%).
Taking into account the economic development of Asian countries, BRW 
established a representation office in 2007 in Astana, the capital of 
Kazakhstan, aiming at a more detailed market research. 
In order to increase the volume of railroad transportation from China 
to European countries and prove the competitiveness of the overland 
route, BRW took an active part in optimising the technology of container 
transportation by means of China-Mongolia-Russia-Belarus-Poland-Germany 
route. The train covers the distance of 9780 km in 15 days. On the initiative 
of BRW’s official shipping agent, Belintertrans unitary enterprise, the railroad 
launched a regular container train called “Mongol Vector” covering the route 
Brest-Ulan Bator-Hohhot (China). There are more container trains available 
on the following routes: Berlin-Brest-Moscow (“East Wind”); Brest-Arys 
(“Kazakhstan’s Vector”); Odessa/Ilyitchovsk-Minsk (Kolyadichi)-Klaipeda 
(“Viking”); Brest-Kaluga; Zhenishke (Kazakhstan)-Minsk-Klaipeda; Aksu 1 
(Kazakhstan)-Minsk-Klaipeda.
According to Belarus, the tariffs for international freight transportation by 
BRW correspond to the concept of applying a unified tariff policy for railway 
services of CIS member states, approved by the CIS Council of Heads of 
governments in 1996. Regulations and rates of tariff policy are applied 
to transit and export-import transportations by BRW, except for Russia-
Belarus deliveries. Special attention is paid to the improvement of tariffs for 
transportation of the basic range of bulk cargo, including coal, ferrous metals, 
oil products, mineral fertilizers, architectural and timber cargo. Special 
reduction factors and fixed rates for certain routes of transportation are 
applied to the aforesaid cargo.
Integrating Eurasian 
Transport Systems
Yuriy Shcherbanin “EurAsEC: Transport Exchange  
and Positional Constituents”
2 Eurasian Development Bank
EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook 2009
BRW is also engaged in transportation between Scandinavian countries and 
states of the Black Sea through the Ninth Pan-European Transport Corridor 
(Odessa- Ilyitchovsk-Minsk(Kolyadichi)-Klaipeda) serviced by the combined 
transport train Viking.
Despite a growth in the volume of freight transportation, Belarusian transport 
and transportation lanes possess substantial reserves. However, in order 
to attract additional transit cargo traffic, it is required to offer consignors 
competitive tariffs, to secure the safety and reliability of cargo deliveries within 
the stipulated period, as well as implement modern logistics technologies.
The Integrated Programme for securing the effective use of transit capacity 
of Belarus in 2006-2010 foresees the need for establishing logistic 
centres, about 50% of which will be engaged in transportation. Another 
quarter of logistic centres will aim at securing the needs of domestic exporters, 
shipping their production in shot lots. Approximately 20 logistic centres will 
serve the export direction.
Belarusian developers of the programme note that ambitions of freight 
forwarders are not limited only to incorporating the centres into existing 
transportation schemes but overtaking cargo flows to Russia, Central Asia 
and China as well. In such a manner, Belarusian consignors strive to join the 
North-South transportation corridor with the further exit to the Middle East.
However, a concern exists over the feasibility of such a wide-scale idea. The 
EurAsEC member states have a common problem – the issue of land value. A 
method of land value calculation for terminals construction is quite inefficient 
and in many cases leads to an incorrect estimation and lack of bids from 
investors.
New logistic centres will be established on the basis of existing BRW cargo 
sites and freight terminals of several other organisations, and by means of 
constructing a range of modern logistic terminals. Free economic zones play 
a special role in solving this issue, being most attractive for investments in 
this field.
Belarus assumed measures that aim at the further improvement of regulatory 
and legal framework, including the introduction of modified and amended 
Agreement on International Railway Freight Traffic. One more agreement has 
been signed by Belarus and Russia on transit of goods transported between 
the two countries. A certain work has been conducted together with the 
European Commission in part of unifying customs documents, including the 
electronic ones, in order to further adjust to the European Convention on 
common transit procedure.
Russia and Belarus signed several interdepartmental and intergovernmental 
agreements on unified pricing for the railway service. Along with that, the 
Transport Ministries of both countries pointed out to aspects that do not 
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depend on freight forwarders but influence their work – customs and tax 
policy.
Addressing other aspects of transit development, it is necessary to mention 
that growth in freight transportation is also constrained by the absence of 
a common system of logistic centres on the territories of EurAsEC member 
states. In accordance to the draft project of the Strategy for Establishing and 
Developing the System of EurAsEC International Logistic Centres, approved in 
December 2008 by the 15th session of the Council for transport policy under 
the EurAsEC Integration Committee, the EurAsEC member states intend to 
create four basic networks of logistic centres that will be called “EurAsEC 
Transport Gates”.
“West Gates” will be built on the territory of Belarus on the route from Brest 
to Minsk. “East Gates” will be situated in Kazakhstan, in Almaty and at Dostyk-
Khorgos border crossing. “North Gates” will serve as terminals between 
St. Petersburg and Moscow. As for “South Gates”, there are two location 
suggestions – the area of Kurgan-Tube in Tajikistan and the city of Osh in 
Kyrgyzstan.
Logistic centres in other cities of EurAsEC will be established simultaneously. 
In Kazakhstan, the centres will be located in Astana, Aktau and Almaty. 
Kyrgyzstan’s Bishkek, Belarusian Minsk and Vitebsk, and Russian Kaliningrad, 
Nizhni Novgorod, Samara, Volgograd, Murmansk, Yekaterinburg will also 
serve as logistic centres. It is planned to put in operation 27 logistic centres 
by 2012. From 2013 to 2020, another 39 centres will be commissioned. 
These newly constructed centres would not satisfy the need for terminals. 
On the assumption that the planned volume of transportation will make up 
800-820 million tons, 300 centres with the capacity of 2-2.5 million tons of 
handled cargo per year will be required.
In conclusion let’s point out the following:
The implementation of projects within the EurAsEC integration group is 
subject to quite objective laws that are confirmed by the history of economic 
development of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), the 
European Union (EU) and the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). There are real conditions and prerequisites for economic integration 
and the process of establishment of a common economic space, in which 
transportation systems play a vital role, complies with these objective laws.
In order to facilitate economic integration, it is necessary to accomplish at 
least six very important tasks, the mechanisms and instrumentality of which 
will not be discussed in this paper. The first condition or a prerequisite is closely 
connected with the economic development of the integrating countries. And 
the question is not in the size of their economy but in its structure, ratio and 
other similar indicators. That is why the discussion about development of 
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transportation systems should be based on the analysis of needs of domestic 
economy (what is needed, in what volumes, proportions, etc.). Only after 
defining these key conditions is it possible to streamline a national strategy 
with the strategy of the integration group.
In the second place, the process of integration is successful when the 
economies of integrating countries are on the rise. Within the crisis period, 
domestic issues become a priority putting implementation of large-scale 
international projects in question. This principle works for transportation 
systems as well.
The third important factor is the geographic proximity of the integrating 
countries. States have no opportunity to take an active part in international 
exchange and international division of labour if the geography raises an 
obstacle – very high transportation expenses raise the price for goods and 
integration makes no sense in this case. The EurAsEC member states are 
close to each other in terms of geography, but transportation costs are still 
very high.
The next important issue is the political will of the leadership of integrating 
countries. Integration is a kind of an event, phenomenon, process, that closely 
depends on the heads of the nations. It’s them who are able to forward the 
projects, as heads of the European Union do and as Bill Clinton did when he got 
personally involved in NAFTA integration.
Early establishment of organisations, to which the countries gradually delegate 
certain powers, is a crucial, if not the most important, step towards the actual 
economic integration. Are there such organisations in the transportation 
field? No, not yet.
And the last but not least, integration processes run much faster if a special 
initiating centre is established in one of the largest cities of integration group, 
which unites other countries.
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With the current interest of legislative authorities to water-
ways, it would not take us long to see how the navigable 
rivers become connected in a united network 
V. M. Lokhtin, 1914
1. Introduction: background and definitions
Railway monopoly in the post-Soviet Union territory is not natural. It was 
established on the basis of technical and economical ideology, beginning with 
GOELRO (Belyakov, 1998)1 (State Commission for Russia’s Electrification) 
plan. The railway transport originally strived to become a monopoly, and 
its main competitor is water transport. Therefore, in the middle of the XIX 
century, England witnessed railway companies buying shipping canals and 
reducing them to a size unfit for the passing of vessels. 
Competition from water transport compels railways to cut traffic tariffs. 
Absence of competition encourages, overpricing. An observation of the 
American “automobile king” Henry Ford emphasises this point: “the railways 
were known for a good practice of not transporting goods by the most direct 
route. The goods were carried by the most circuitous routes possible for all 
the connecting lines could make some profit out of it. The losses, for sure, 
were passed customers”. (Ford, 1989: 201).
The total transport expenditures, prior to Soviet Union fall, were exorbitant 
and starting from the 1960s were soaring. But the scientific and economic 
research of that time “proved” (with a reference to Friedrich Engels) that this 
fact should not be considered as a bad thing” (Mitaishvili, 1982: 46). 
The strive of the USA and Western Europe railway companies for monopoly in 
the twentieth century was opposed by active state protectionism with regard 
to domestic water transport and waterways development (Agranat, Zhivilova, 
1967).
Physical features determine the economic value of different transport 
modes. The main features of water transport are low energy-output ratio, low 
speed, high carrying capacity and seasonal fluctuation. 
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Currently, the energy-output ratio of technological processes bears prevailing 
importance in technical-economic comparison, with energy saving becoming 
the top priority. 
Relative energy intensity per thousand km of transportation by different 
transport modes comprise: 1 – for railway, 8-10 – for motor (on high quality 
roads; on low quality roads this ratio is 20-30 and over); 4-7 – for gas pipeline; 
0.5 – for oil pipeline; 0.2-0.8 – for domestic water transport.
The energy intensity of water transport goes up with the accelerating 
speed of vessels and drops down with the growth of their load and draught. 
Energy intensity of consist of ships on the move is lower than that of a single 
ship. In other words, energy intensity depends on specific features of route 
(decreases with depth growth) and is subject to regulation (can be maintained 
at a required level) by managing load-draught and speed ratio. 
Lower consumption of other resourses is inherent for water transport, too 
(as opposed to different transport types).
Therefore, the low resources consumption of water transportation 
corresponds to its low speed. 
But in the economic sense it is not the speed which is important but timely 
delivery of a certain amount of goods: early cargo delivery (at higher speed) 
causes additional costs (related to storage costs). It’s not a low speed of 
cargo transportation that ties up material resources, but late delivery that 
evokes the delay of goods realisation. Speed of movement is relative to the 
carrying capacity of the transport. We should remember the terms used by 
economists at the beginning of the current century: cargo has a head (first 
cargo batch) and tail (last batch). Physical transportation speed determines 
cargo’s head delivery terms to the customer, while the tail delivery terms are 
determined by the carrying capacity of used transport. The customer needs 
the whole cargo. Therefore, the terms of its delivery (speed in economic sense) 
are determined by terms of cargo tail arrival. 
In 1914, due to the commencement of the “Volga-Siberia” waterway project, 
the study of both options of Siberian grain transportation by water and railway 
to Petersburg (in real volumes of that time) has shown, that the head of grain 
cargo would reach Petersburg by railway earlier than by water, and the tail 
later. In other words, the speed of the whole cargo by water is higher than that 
of by railway (Borkovskiy, 1914).
For instance, let’s assume that 4000 tons of cargo can be transported from 
point A to point B by water (500 km) or by motor (300 km) transport. In the 
case of the former, one would need the cargo motorship “Volgo-Don”, and the 
cargo would be delivered within 24 hours at one haul. In the latter case, it 
would take 400 rides of a KamAZ-53212 truck. He moves 3-4 times faster 
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than “Volgo-Don” and the first cargo batch (10 tons) would be delivered to 
point B within 4-5 hours, i.e. 20 hours faster than by water. But if there is 
one vehicle, then even making two rides a day (which is 1200 km, which in 
turn exceeds operating standards) would take 200 days to deliver the cargo. 
If there were two vehicles – 100 days, 10 vehicles – 20 days, etc., i.e. it would 
be much slower than by water transport. 
The high carrying capacity of water transport in shipping season surpasses 
its winter idleness. Therefore, the usage of motor or even railway transport 
entails its regular year-round work, whereas the usage of water transport 
sometimes requires just a couple of rides. 
Artificial waterways include not only canals but also (“sluice”) rivers supported 
by dams for deepening. 
Prior to the twentieth century, people only resorted to river sluicing when 
creating a deep waterway. The economic benefit was secured by costs 
reduction for transportation resources as compared to alternative types of 
transport (horse-drawn, railway). The bigger cargo-traffic along the route 
meant faster coverage of sluicing costs on account of resources saving (in 
total for national economy). 
But at the beginning of the 20th century, with proliferation and 
development of electric power, it became possible to use the energy 
generated by damming. The notion of economical efficiency has obviously 
obtained another setting: the sluicing, expenses for which could not be covered 
by improvement in shipping conditions, could be compensated through 
additional benefits from water fall energy (Nikol’skiy, 1917: 43).
In given circumstances, resource-saving in transportations is no longer 
economically determinative. Thanks to hydro energy utilisation, an artificial 
waterway acquires a distinctive feature distinguishing it from other means of 
communication: expenses for construction and operation of technical facilities 
are recovered neither through taxes nor by freight charges, but through usage 
of objectively free and inexhaustible natural productive force (the hydroelectric 
potential of the river).
This was the reason why, for instance, a new system Rhine-Main-Danube 
(through navigation opened in 1992) replaced the old waterway between the 
Rhine and the Danube (“the Ludwig Channel”) when it could no longer stand 
competition from the railways. Revenues from energy sales generated by 57 
hydropower plants’ which were part of the system, provided resources for this 
public-private construction project) (Herboth, Kesseler, 1992). 
And finally, owing to river flow regulation and other factors, the sluiced 
waterway, irrespective of cargo traffic, can solve various hydroeconomical, 
ecological and social tasks. 
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It is worth mentioning that among large-scale state projects in the USA in 
1920-30s, which helped the country to overcome the Great Depression, 
were not only automobile roads and railways, but also projects on integrated 
(transport-energy) reconstruction of the Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio, 
Tennessee, Illinois and many other rivers. As a consequence by the beginning 
of the Second World War, the USA had a united deep waterways network. 
The output of the hydropower plants comprised 140-160 kWh per year. The 
number of large water reservoirs (volume – over 100 million m3) was over two 
hundred.2 
2. Transport-Energy Water System (TEWS) of Eurasia
The concept of a “transport-energy water network (TEWN)” was put forward 
in 1990-91, relating to the USSR, as one would expect, and later to the 
Russian Federation (Belyakov, 1992).
The analysis of transport-energy complex as a united block in the economy had 
shown growth since the beginning of the 1960s of exceptionally unfavourable 
trends pointing at increase of complex resource intensity. Only the uniform 
development of deep waterways and hydroenergetics would allow it to be 
optimised. 
Integration trends on Eurasian territory formulated the international 
willingness for the internal waterways of CIS rivers3 to join the United 
European system, resulting in the present time ideas and developments 
of TEWS gaining relevance in wider sense, which is applicable to the whole 
Eurasian continent (Kozlov, Belyakov, 2008) at the present time.
The tranport-energy water system of Eurasia presupposes that:
•  The main water transport arteries of the continent should be connected 
through canals in a network, and shipping conditions of rivers must be 
enhanced through their reconstruction into sluiced cascades (transport 
component); 
•  Hydropower plants on cascade steps (energy component) must introduce 
into operation the hydroelectric potential of rivers; 
2 At the end of the 20th century the number of such water reservoirs in USA comprised 702, in the 
RF – 104. Given that not all large-scale dams make large-scale water reservoirs and vice versa, 
statistics for water reservoirs is complemented by dams statistics: large-scale dams (over 15m 
in height): in 2000, China had 24119 (over 25 thousand nowadays), 6389 in USA, 2601 in India, 
2467 in Japan, 871 in Spain, 820 in Canada, 554 in France, 540 in Mexico, 502 in Italy, 470 in 
Brazil, 427 in Turkey etc. The Russian Federation has 62 large-scale dams.
3 Resolution of Economic Commission for Europe #258 (Bucharest, 13-14.09.2006), has 
outlined “universal strategic policy in the area of internal water transport, which would include 
all interests of not only EC but also of third countries (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russian 
Federation, Serbia, Ukraine, Croatia)” and defined in particularly the necessity of the Dnepr- 
Vistula-Oder water route creation.
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Besides transport and energy components in TEWS there are also 
hydroeconomic and ecologic components related to river flow regulating 
through water reservoirs and its territorial allocation over interbasin 
navigation channels. 
3. United water transport networks 
These networks – which are essentially transport–energy water systems, 
have been created and are being operated in America (USA and partly Canada) 
and in Eurasia: in the west of the continent (in Western Europe) and in the 
East (in China)4.
In the South of Eurasia, in Iranian territory, a shipping canal will be constructed 
between the Caspian Sea and the Arabian Gulf. 
The development of the water transport network is carried through legislative 
support: for instance, dam construction in China without a navigation pass is 
prohibited by article 17, law on water usage. 
Water transport networks appear to be indispensable components of united 
transport systems, constantly developing, receiving new parts and renewing 
old components. 
Thus, as a result of opening a new through shipping route in the form of the 
Rein-Main-Danube system, the International Intercontinental Waterway 
had been formed. After the reunion of Germany, the territory of the former 
GDR is observing the reconstruction of old shipping systems (the Hanover-
Berlin canal and other). The completion of waterworks facility construction 
“Three Gorges” in China on the Yangzi River, with unique navigation passes for 
crossing water level difference of 180 m (vertical ship’s lift and 2 strings of 
5-chamber sluices) filling the originated by it water reservoir, would connect 
another 1.2 thousand km of waterways with this water reservoir. 
In Russia, on its European territory, an active part of TWES is the Integrated 
Deep-Water System (IDWS): the Volga-Kama Cascade and its connecting 
systems (see Figure 14.1). It’s a complex project that was launched in the 
1930s (but hasn’t been finished). It provides shipping with draught up to 
3.5 m and electricity production around 40 billion kWh per year. It also solves 
issues related to river flow territorial allocation and adjustment, as well as 
irrigation, water supply and other factors. 
4 “All economically developed countries of Europe, as well as the USA and China have united 
shipping systems. Our country’s falling behind time in this regard is clear and must be excluded”. 
(Zachesov, Ragulin, 2001: 361).
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Figure 14.1.  
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The Dnepropetrovsk cascade was a part of IDWS. Now it belongs to Ukraine. 
Yet, the connection of the Dnepr, Don and Oka, scheduled at the beginning 
of the twentieth century by state bodies, has not yet been implemented. The 
dimensions of IDWS waterways make “river-sea” shipping possible, allowing 
sending cargo from river ports of the RF to sea ports of Western Europe, while 
Western Europe waterways and former Soviet Union western waterways 
remain unconnected.
The Asian territory of Russia has no elements of TEWS. Large rivers have 
acceptable dimensions for shipping even without sluicing. The absence of 
navigable passes in hydrosystems of the Angar-Yenisey Cascade, Vilyui, 
Kolyma, Zeya, Bureya and others makes shipping through it impossible. 
Thus, in the west of the continent, although, shipping interrelations between 
Russian and Chinese waterways in the Amur basin are feasible, river basins 
are unconnected and the possibility of direct (without reload) water shipment 
in an east-west direction is unavailable. 
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The inland waterways connection of the whole continent in one interconnected 
network is needed for the establishment of Eurasian water transport network, 
i.e. TEWS formation in Russia, and substantially – connection of new deep-
water lines (cascades on rivers, interbasin junctions) to functioning IDWS. 
Creation of TEWS in Russia will enable in future up to one million km of 
deep waterways, connected with interbasin canals, of both latitudinal 
and longitudinal directions, to be put into operation. 
3. Hydroenergy
The technical hydroenergy potential of the Russian Federation’s rivers 
comprises 1670 billion kWh per year. At the present time, the average long-
term production of all hydropower plants of the Russian Federation makes 
167 billion kWh per year. 
Unused technically available hydroelectric potential comprises 1503 
billion kWh per year, which is 1.4 times higher than the production of all RF 
hydropower plants’ production in peak 1990 (1082 billion kWh)
Establishment of TEWS in Russia will enable in future put into operation 
the river’s hydroelectric potential to the tune of 1.5 trillion kWh/year 
with relevant saving of non-renewable fuel recourses and atmospheric 
oxygen, as well as greenhouse gases emission reduction. 
4. Water resources 
The Russian Federation’s river water resources are huge. They comprise 
9.5% of the world’s river flow. However, a significant territorial and seasonal 
inequality is inherent to large volumes.
So, 48% of Russia’s territory falls under high water supply sufficiency zone, 
and 27% – under low and very low water supply sufficiency zone. In a number 
of regions with extremely low-water periods, the vernal runoff (1-2 months) 
makes 80-95% of annual runoff.
The water deficit grows higher on the territories of Kazakhstan and Middle 
Asia adjacent to Russia. A number of regions in the Russian Federation’s 
natural regimes of water objects are of danger of population and husbandry 
due to possible floods, underflooding, riverbed instability, and other damaging 
effects, which entails protection measures. 
Establishment of TEWS in Russia presupposes the creation of water 
reservoirs systems on rivers and interbasin junctions, which would allow 
the reallocation of river flow through time and territories, as well as 
effectively carrying out protection from waters’ damaging effects.  
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5. Principal Water Mains of Russia
As a basis for TEWS serve principal water mains initiated in 1909 by 
“Joint Committee for drawing out a plan on enhancing and development of 
the Empire’s water means of communication”. (1902-1912) (Belyakov, 
1995). There are 8 mains: three latitudinal and five longitudinal. After the 
Joint Committee stopped its activity in project developments and state plan 
documents, the principal water mains targeted by it gained new names: the 
North-Russian Main was converted into the Middle-Union Main, the Middle-
Russian Main was converted into the Middle Union Main, etc. 
Since the beginning of the 1960s, when the USSR Ministry of river fleet 
obtained the Republican status, principal water mains directions have 
been forgotten. This brought about the realisation of paradoxically single-
functional projects: the shipping function was excluded from the Dnepr and 
the Severski Donets junction project, which was planned to be a part of the 
South-Russian Main (and which is currently a functioning hydrologic system 
Dnepr-Donbass). 
The following list of Russia’s principal mains network has been drawn up with 
a glance to the state plan documents, conceptual and design materials of 
the 1910-1970s, up-to-date socio-economic and political realias, as well as 
possibilities of “dispersed” water diversion of the Northern rivers and the Ob 
to the Volga Basin. The main names remain the same – latitudinal: the North-
Russian, the Middle-Russian and the South-Russian, longitudinal: the Black 
Sea-Baltic, the Caspian-Baltic-White Sea, the Ob, the Yenisei, the Lena (see 
Figure 14.2). 
Figure 14.2.  
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The North-Russian Main was completed in its western part. One of its 
branches goes from the Baltic Sea over the Neva River (just one step of the 
Neva hydropower plant being absent), Ladoga Lake and the Svir River; the 
other branch goes from the White Sea to Onega Lake (the Belomor-Baltic 
canal); both branches get connected in the Vytegra estuary. The main then 
goes over the Volga-Balt up to the beginning of the Northern Dvina sluice 
system (NDSS) where the accomplished part of the main ends. 
Then the main goes over NDSS (reconstruction needed; realignment 
whenever possible), the Sukhona, the Northern Dvina, and the Vychegda 
rivers, then over a canal (included in the planned Kama-Pechora-Vychegda 
Reservoir) across the Vychegda-Pechora watershed to the Pechora, then 
along it up to the Pechora-Ob watershed, and after it to the Severnaya Sosva 
and further to the Ob and the Gulf of Ob. 
Currently, there are no grounds to select a place for the Pechora and 
the Northern Sosva junction. However, this junction might firstly have an 
important meaning for internal water transport access to the Yamal 
peninsula and, secondly, be in service for partial diversion of the Ob basin 
water over the Pechora, the Kama-Pechora-Vichegoda reservoir into the 
Volga basin (one of “dispersed” territorial flow redistribution directions).
The Middle-Russian Main on the territory of Russia begins on the west of the 
Oka river. The development of a main along the Dnepr and further along the 
Pripyat (pours into the Kiev reservoir, Ukraine), the Dnepr-Bug system5, the 
Bug and Vistula rivers must be a subject for international agreements. 
The main might meet the Dnepr as per the South and the West schemes. 
According to the South scheme:
• From the planned Kaluga reservoir on the Oka river;
• Over the Zhizdra river and watershed canal;
• Into the Desna river and further into the Dnepr. 
According to the West scheme:
• the Oka river (the Kaluga reservoir); 
• the Ugra river; 
• watershed canal; 
• the Osma river; 
• the Dnepr (the Dorogobuzh reservoir). 
The West scheme might be preferred due to certain political factors.
5 At present time Belarus is carrying out reconstruction of the Dnepr-Bug system, navigable 
passes adapted to “Eurobarge” – new sluices chamber width reaches 12.9 m).
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The Oka needs transport-energy reconstruction. The main line passes along 
it and falls into the Volga and further into the Kama (it is preferably to fill in to 
the design reference marks of Cheboksarsk and Nizhnekamsk (Lower Kama) 
Reservoirs).
From Kama Reservoir it is required to build the Transuralsk navigable 
waterway along the route: the Chusovaya, junction channel, the Isset, the 
Tobol and the Irtysh.
It is expedient to implement the transition of the main line to the Ob in the 
following direction: the Om (Irtysh affluent) – channel – the Chaya (Ob affluent).6 
This is one of the directions of the “distributive” water diversion from Ob to 
Kazakhstan and Central Asia.
Then the main line passes along the Ob and Ob-Yenissey junction. The latter 
must be built anew; yet at the end of 1950s, the local administrative and 
party-economic bodies applied for its renewal. Earlier, the Ket-Kassk direction 
of this junction was considered preferable, but currently, in view of the KATEK 
development, the Chulymsk direction can become the preferred choice.
Then – the rivers Yenissey and Angara (hydrosystems of the Angarsk Cascade 
are to get navigable passes) and Lake Baikal.
From Baikal the main line passes along the rivers Selenga and Hilku. Then 
it must overpass the watershed (Yablonovy Range) and further – along the 
rivers Ingoda, Shilka and Amur. Against Khabarovsk the main line branches: 
one branch passes along the Amur towards Nikolayevsk; the other passes 
along the rivers Ussuri and Sungache and Lake Hanka, therefrom, having 
passed the watershed leading to the Razdolnaya river (Suyfun), must approach 
Vladivostok. 
At present, the considerable part of the South-Russian main line is outwith 
the Russian Federation (in the territories of Moldavia and Ukraine)
On the way to the Russian Federation, the main line passes along Seversk 
Donets from the border of Ukraine to the Don. Then approaching as the 
branch to Rostov – up the Don and along Volga-Don navigable channel (VDNC) 
it flows into the Volga and Caspian Sea. In this regard it is expedient to proceed 
with the construction of “Volga-Don-2”. 
The Eurasia Canal along the Kuma-Manych valley is planned to be the south 
branch of the main line, but in fact it will have an independent transport 
implication. Moreover, it will discharge the operating VDNC.
In the current political conditions it is expedient to connect the South-Russian 
main line with the Middle-Russian meridian line Oka – Don (as the Class B 
6 This direction was offered by I.A. Volkov in the context of development of “Sibrechput” (“Siberian 
river way”) and complex water problems solving of Ob-Irtysh interfluve – Volkov (1980).
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Main Line) along the route Oka – Pronya – Ranova – Hupta – junction channel 
– Ryassa – Voronezh – Don (Gavrilov, Lavrov, 1934).
The further development of the main line is possible too – in terms of the 
international project of Aral Sea recovery: the channel between Caspian Sea 
and Aral Sea (Akhmedov, Spitsyn, 1991) can be given two functions – water 
transmission from Caspian Sea to Aral Sea and navigation (further the 
navigable waterways could pass along Aral Sea, the Syr Darya and the Amu 
Darya).
At the present time, the state borders separate the Black Sea-Baltic Main 
Line. Its main part is the river Dnepr, which starts on the territory of Russia 
and passes along the territory of Belarus, while the optimal junction place of 
the river Dnepr with the river Zapadnaya Dvina (between Orshey and Vitebsk 
cities) is located in the same place, then as far as the estuary it passes along 
the territory of Ukraine. The junction of Zapadnaya Dvina and the river Lovatya 
is in the borderland between the Russian Federation and Belarus.
On the territory of the Russian Federation, it is expedient to implement the 
transport-energy reconstruction of the river Lovat (as the future part of the 
Black Sea-Baltic water main line). Further to the north the main line would 
pass along the Volhov river, the Ladozhskoye lake and the River Neva to 
St. Petersburg. Prospectively, the reconstruction of the Dnepr on the territory 
of Belarus and RF, the construction of the junctions of Lovat with Zapadnaya 
Dvina and Zapadnaya Dvina with Dnepr and the completion of the main line, 
could become the interstate project (“Dneprovsk agreement” on multipurpose 
utilisation of water resources of Dnepr and Zapadnaya Dvina – Russia, Belarus, 
Ukraine).
A considerable part of the Caspian Sea-Baltic-White Sea Main Line (Volga 
and Volga-Baltic, Kama) is complete. It passes from the Caspian Sea up along 
Volga to the Kama estuary where it divides into two branches:
• One branch passes up the Volga, then along the Volga-Baltic; 
• Further – North-Dvinsk Sluice System (NDSS – reconstruction is required), 
the rivers Suhona and Northern Dvina to the White Sea;
• The other branch of the main line passes up the Kama; transport-energy 
reconstruction of navigable waterways and construction of Kama-
Pechorsk-Vychegodsk junction is required upward the Kama Reservoir. 
The main line passes along it to Pechora or Vychegda and further along the 
routes of the Northern-Russian main line.
Ob main line, as the Joint Committee planned in 1909, in its south part was to 
pass along Irtysh. At the present time, the considerable part of Irtysh is in the 
territory of Kazakhstan. Therefore, the Irtysh gradual reconstruction from the 
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estuary to the city of Omsk is expedient with perspective of the Kazakhpart of 
Irtysh connection to the main line as well. 
(“Irtysh agreement” on Irtysh transport-energy reconstruction and 
multipurpose utilisation of its water resources is expedient – China, 
Kazakhstan, Russia).
In this regard, on the RF territory, it is necessary to build the main line along 
the Ob itself together with the gradual reconstruction of Ob and its basin 
rivers (Ob is higher than the Novosibirsk reservoir, and it is also higher than 
Biya, Katun, Tom, Chulym), and the Ob main line in its south part would have 
two branches (Ob and Irtysh) in the long term.
The Yenissey main line, as the Joint Committee planned in 1909, is to pass 
along the Yenissey from its upper reaches to the Arctic Ocean. The existing 
hydrosystems are to be complemented by effective navigable passes and 
further Yenissey reconstruction must have a complex, transport-energy 
character.
Lena main line. Taking into consideration recent design studies, and also 
the last decade’s socio-economic development on the territory of the Lena 
basin, the source of the Lena main line and its connection with the Middle-
Russian main line is expedient to arrange by means of Angar-Lena connection 
between the rivers Ilim at the pressure head of Ust-Ilimsk reservoir and Kuta 
with the outlet to the Lena in Ust Kut. The problem with this connection is that 
it requires a complex decision: it is necessary to arrange the construction of 
navigable passes in the hydrosystems of the Angar Cascade, reconstruction 
of the Lena upward Ust Kut with subsequent cascade development down the 
Lena until it flows into the Laptev Sea.
6. Class B Main Lines, Access and Local Ways
Besides the main waterlines (Class A main lines) TEWS also includes 
secondary main lines (Class B Main Lines), access and local ways. In other 
words, TEWS must include all rivers, each river in prospect must become the 
waterway of relevant purpose, regulated by the reservoirs, and its hydraulic 
power must be put into operation.
The network of main waterlines and deep waterways of other classes can 
develop independently. 
On the European territory of the RF, inasmuch as all regional centres are 
located along the rivers leading to Class A Main Line, these rivers must 
become Class B Main Lines. Class B Main Lines can be also considered as the 
connections of Suhona river (North-Russian main line) with the Volga. 
In the Uralsk region, Class B Main Lines can be the rivers Pyshma, Miass 
from Chelyabinsk to the estuary, Tura, Tavda and also Ural, together with the 
channel Volga-Ural (perspective Russian-Kazakh project). 
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On the Asian territory of the RF, many rivers can acquire the significance of 
Class B Main Lines: Chulym (if it will not become a part of the Middle-Russian 
main line), Tom, Lower Tunguska and Vilyui with the construction of junction 
channel between them, Kolyma, etc. 
All other rivers of the RF, depending on their transport-energy reconstructions, 
can become access and local ways. 
7. TEWS and Other Transport Types
The transport system of the RF inherited from the USSR is characterized 
by the underdevelopment of the waterways system and, due to the lack of 
interbasin navigable connections, by consequential schemes of combined 
(water-railway) cargo transportation. The routes of the railways and highways 
and gas pipelines are laid everywhere, without regard to the perspectives of 
river reconstruction and transport use. In the course of TEWS development, 
the reconstruction and development of communications of all types must be 
implemented in a complex way:
•  the development of water-railway-motor parallel guides is desirable. This 
will provide differential transportations according to the type of transport, 
cargo and passengers’ requirements, and on the whole it will provide the 
most efficient and economic transportation system;
• the location of river hydrosystems and bridge crossings of land 
communications must be interlinked: bridge crossings, as well as crossings 
of the pipelines across the river, must pass across the dams;
•  in winter, it is possible to organise cargo transportation over the river’s 
(reservoir’s) ice: rolling-stock trains on the slips led by a hauler with the run 
adapted to movement on the snow;
• the appearance of new hydropower plants during TEWS development 
will require the development of power lines (“electron transport” of fuel-
energy resources), which will become a factor of combined and local energy 
systems development.
8. The Primary Projects on TEWS setting up in Russia
Setting up TEWS in Russia must connect to the operating Integrated Deep 
Water System the following new deep-water lines, while the hydraulic 
power of the rivers, put into operation, is sufficient for providing investment 
attractiveness of the projects.
1. The River Oka from Nizhny Novgorod to Orel with the prospect of a 
connection with Dnepr and a further outlet into the waterways system of the 
Western Europe (part of the Middle-Russian main line).
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Figure 14.3.  
The Integrated Deep 
Water System of 
ETR, the Oka and 
the Main Lines of its 
Connection with the 
Dnepr
The project involves the construction on the Oka of a cascade of complex 
hydrosystems: upward the Moskva River estuary with the regulating reser-
voirs (3 or 4 levels), below – the cascade of low-pressure hydrosystems.
The implementation of the project will connect about 1100 km of deep 
waterway to IDWS, and will provide electric power output of 1.6 billion kWh/
year at hydropower plants. This will efficiently increase the Oka water quality 
and environmental situation on the whole. 
The task of the Oka reconstruction and its connection with Dnepr has an 
international importance. In the West, the task of connecting the inland 
waterways of CIS and Western European countries has already been set 
by the Economic Commission for Europe: in particular, the task of opening 
transparent navigation between Dnepr and Visla, further leading to Oder. At 
the present time, Belarus is realizing the reconstruction of the Dnepr-Bugsky 
Canal, and, in addition, the project of a waterway from Riga to the Black Sea 
has been developed in Minsk.
Since the Dnepr joins the structure of the South-Russian, the Middle-Russian 
and the Black Sea-Baltic main lines with its different parts, it is necessary to 
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organize the transport-energy reconstruction of the Oka in Russian territory 
as a part of the Middle-Russian main line connecting the Volga (IDWS) with 
the Dnepr. 
The activities connected with the Dnepr reconstruction and its basin rivers 
must be coordinated, and a “Dnepr agreement” between Russia, Belarus and 
Ukraine is advisable. 
2. The Upper Volga from Tver city to the Upper Volga lakes and Seliger 
lake (Class B Main Line). It is proposed to continue the cascade upward the 
Ivankovo Reservoir (3-4 levels, including Tverskaya, Staritskaya, Rzhevskaya), 
which will extend the Integrated Deep Water System to this part of the Volga 
and will provide access for the ships to the Upper Volga Reservoir and Seliger 
lake. In order to achieve this, reconstruction of the Upper Volga hydrosystem, 
the pressure head of river Selizharovka and lake Seliger will be required. The 
navigable channel, forming one reservoir, connects the Upper Volga lakes and 
Seliger lake.
The project implementation will provide new opportunities for water tourism 
(“ecological” cruises) and will provide electricity production of 0.65 billion 
kWh/year at hydropower plant (HPP), will regulate the Volga flow upward 
Ivankovo Reservoir and enlarge its water resources, which is important for 
Moscow’s water supply.
3. Volga-Severodvinsk waterway from Volga-Balt to the esstuary of the 
Vychegda river (a part of the North-Russian main line).
Figure 14.4.  
Volga-Severodvinsk 
waterway
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Presently, the North-Dvinsk Sluice System (NDSS) starts from Volga-Balt 
(Sheksninsk Reservoir) with Topornin Sluice and ends with the Suhona estuary 
from Lake Kubenskoye (the dam and the sluice “Znamenitye”). The wooden 
constructions of the system are physically and ethically out of date. During 
the system reconstruction, it would be expedient to reroute it by building a 
summit canal directly from Sheksninsk Reservoir to Lake Kubenskoye.
It is proposed that the project also includes the rivers Suhona (5-6 levels) and 
Northern Dvina up to the Vychegda estuary (1 level is to be higher than the 
city of Kotlas), the electricity production will comprise 1.7-1.9 billion kWh/ 
year at HPP.
4. Kama-Pechora-Vychegodsk junction, Vychegda river (the parts of the 
Nothern-Russian and the Caspian-Baltic-White Sea main lines). It is a large, 
capital-intensive project, where there will be marked stages; it should be 
correlated to the railway project “Belkomur”. 
The project of connecting Pechora, Vychegda and Kama in their upper reaches 
has a long prehistory, in the latest developmental works (the end of 1960s) 
the project of uniting the Kama-Pechora-Vychegodsk Reservoir with channels 
was aimed at Vychegda and Pechora water diversion across the Kama into 
the Volga.
While implementing the project, besides the development of the deep 
waterways system, there can be received a considerable electricity production 
at HPP and the possibility of flow redistribution between the basins of Volga, 
Pechora and Northern Dvina. Without taking into consideration the flow 
redistribution the HPP output at hydrosystems of Ust-Kulomsk (r. Vychegda), 
Pokchinsk (r. Pechora) and the Upper-Kama (the Kama) will comprise 1.3-
1.4 billion kWh/year, and the HPP cascade output at Vychegda river below 
the Ust-Kulomsk hydrosystem (3-4 levels) will comprise 2.6-2.8 billion kWh/
year.
Figure 14.5.  
Kama-Pechorsk-
Vychegodsk junction 
and River Vychegda 
(down the Kama – 
the Kama Reservoir, 
IDWS)
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5. The Transuralsk waterway (navigable junction of the Volga and Ob basins 
from the Kama Reservoir (IDWS) to Irtysh – a part of the Middle-Russian main 
line). The main route of the Transuralsk way: Chussovaya river, the junction 
channel, Isset and Tobol rivers. 
Figure 14.6.  
Transuralsk 
waterway  
(the main route)
The construction of the junctions of Volga with Ob between Chussovaya and 
Isset has been started many times. The first was in 1815, the last – within 
the Second five-year plan of 1933-37 years. The project implementation will 
allow for improving the efficiently the water quality in the rivers Chussovaya 
and Isset, providing electricity output 2.3-2.5 billion kWh/year at HPP. 
The rivers adjacent to the Transuralsk line are subject to the transport-energy 
reconstruction as well. 
These rivers are:
• the Tobol upward the Isset estuary (taking into consideration the necessity 
of solving a set of water problems, the reconstruction of Tobol can become 
a joint Russian-Kazakhstani project); 
• Miass, the Isset estuary can become Class B Main Line from Chelyabinsk to 
the estuary; Tura and Tavda (the Tobol estuaries), Sylva, etc. 
The Transuralsk waterway can possibly have additional branches. At 
the eastern slope, this branch is Pyshma river, along which cargo can be 
transported, whose initial station or terminal is Yekaterinburg. At the western 
slope, the additional branch of the main line can pass from the Upper Makarov 
Reservoir along the Chussovaya into the Nyazepetrovskoye Reservoir and 
along the rivers Ufa and Belaya. 
7. The Rivers of the Upper Ob Basin: Tom, Chulym (Class B Main Lines), 
upper Ob up to the estuary of Tom river (a part of the Ob main line), Biya, Katun 
(local ways).
The Ob basin is characterized by a set of water problems: lack of water 
resources, floods, low water quality, etc. It is possible to solve these problems 
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only on the basis of flow regulation with reservoirs, which are most efficient in 
the basin upper reaches and can be created in connection with the transport-
energy reconstruction of the above-mentioned rivers. The work can be 
performed independently as separate projects.
Figure 14.7.  
The Upper Ob Basin 
Rivers Proposed for 
Transport-Energy 
Reconstruction
• The river Tom from the city of Tomsk to the estuary of Mras-Su river can 
provide the deep-water outlet westward to the Kuzbas coal, solve water 
problems of Kuzbas (floods, lack of water, high water contamination rate). 
On completion of the Krapivinsk hydrosystem and construction of Tom and 
Kemerov hydrosystems (the Krapivinsk hydrosystem interrupts the continuity 
of the earlier-planned cascade and 1-2 additional levels may be required for 
recovery of the continuity) there will be received 643 km of deep waterways, 
electricity production of 6.6 billion kWh/year. 
Besides Tom river, other Kuzbas rivers are subject to transport-energy 
reconstruction: affluent of Tom river, of the rivers Kondoma (0.6-0.7 billion 
kWh/year) and Mras-Su (0.6 billion kWh/year), as well as Inya river, which 
provides water outlet from Kuzbas directly to Novosibirsk (160-180 kWh/
year).
• The river Chulym. The development of KATEK brought the considerable 
technogennic pollution of Chulym river, MPC of a number of harmful agents 
exceeds the norm tenfold. The Chulym Cascade (14-16 levels) with the 
Chulym-Yenissey junction will allow them to: create the deep waterway, which 
provides outlet to the Kansk-Achinsk coal in the western (Ob) and eastern 
(Yenissey) directions; get electricity production no less than 3.5 billion kWh/
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year, arrange tankages for flood protection in the middle and the lower Ob; 
and increase the quality of water polluted by the operation of KATEK 
enterprises.
• The rivers Upper Ob, Biya, and Katun. For radical improvement of navigable 
conditions at the upper Ob (up to Tom river estuary), as well as for solving a set 
of the Ob problems (first of all, the problems of flood protection in the middle 
and the lower Ob) it is necessary, wherever possible, to implement the deep 
regulation of these rivers estuary. Earlier on the upper Ob it was proposed to 
create a cascade of 6 hydrosystems, among which only Novosibirsk Cascade 
alone has been built and is under operation
At present time, a large project of Altay (Katun, Yelandinsk) HPP is again 
proposed for implementation. On Katun, it is necessary to create regulating 
reservoirs but they should be based on TEWS development. Therefore, there 
are four river reconstruction projects implemented sequentially or in parallel. 
Project 1, Biya river. Taking into account the Biya river flow regulation by 
Teletskoye lake, the water-transport use of Biya river considerable part (225 
km of the total length 301 km) and Teletskoy lake (78 km) and their recreational 
attractiveness as well, the transport-energy reconstruction of Biya river must 
be of high priority (cascade of 5-10 levels, 5.2-5.5 billion kWh). 
Project 2, the Ob from the source to the Novosibirsk Reservoir. A cascade 
of 3-4 levels (4.6-4.7 billion kWh/year), while the Upper Ob Reservoir would 
prop the lower reaches of Biya and Katun.
Project 3, Katun river. A cascade along Katun with bottom-up development: 
the deep water-way would pass along the whole lower 100 km reach of the 
river and further to mountains. On the Katun reach lower than the range of 
Chemal HPP (1.6 billion kWh/year), which has recently been offered as the 
counter-regulator of Altay (Katun, Yelandinsk) HPP, there can be received 
electricity production of no less than 2.2 billion kWh/year (1-2 levels). 
Project 4. Baturin and Kireyevsk hydrosystems on the Ob river (lower than the 
Novosibirsk Reservoir) 2.2-2.3 billion kWh/year. 
8. The Irtysh-Ob Deep Water Main from China to the Northern Sea Route 
can become an international project. 
According to the “Scheme of Irtysh river Complex Use” developed in 1950-
60s, it was proposed to reconstruct the river into continuous cascade of 16 
levels, including 12 levels on the territory of Kazakhstan, 4 levels inside Russia. 
The total HPP cascade output is about 19 billion kWh/year. 
Presently, on the territory of Kazakhstan, 3 cascade levels have been 
constructed and are under operation: Bukhtarminskaya (with reservoir of 
over-year regulation), Ust-Kamenogorskaya, as well as the new Shulbinskaya 
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(the first HPP started its operation in 1987). Their total output makes about 
5.5 billion kWh/year.
There are some concerns that China’s water take-out from Black Irtysh river 
will lead to the impoverishment of Irtysh water resources. Besides, the quality 
of Irtysh water after crossing the borders of Kazakhstan and RF is low. These 
circumstances make the task of Irtysh Cascade development especially 
relevant. 
9. The Yenissey-Lena Main is suggested as a special project, as the 
construction of Turukhansk hydrosystem (Evenki HPP) on Lower Tunguska 
river is planned for 2010. It is proposed to include this project in the context of 
Yenissey-Lena Main Development (Class B Main Line): rivers Lower Tunguska, 
Vilyui, junctions of Lower Tunguska with Vilyui and Lena, Igarsk hydro-system 
on Yenissey river (a part of Yenissey Main).
This complex project will include 2 large HPP: Turukhanskaya (Evenki) and 
Igarskaya on Yenissey river with an electricity production of 46.0 and 30.6 
billion kWh/year respectively. 
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The Eurasian economic community is an international organisation created 
to provide the dynamic development of all its member states through agreed 
social and economic conversions and efficient usage of their economic 
potentials. One of the activity goals of EurAsEC in the area of economic policy 
is the formation of Integrated Transport System (ITS), which is combination of 
transport systems of the member states of EurAsEC. ITS formation includes 
the solution of several problems, one of which is the efficient usage of the 
transit-transport potential of the states of the Community, both in mutual 
transit in the communications with third countries and in transportations 
of transit cargos between third countries across the territory of the 
Community. 
The UNECE forecasts 2.0-2.3 fold increase in trade volumes between the 
Caspian Sea and the Danube-Black Sea countries. In this context, South-
Western region, linking Central Asia and Europe across the Azov-Black 
Sea basin (ABSB), becomes a priority for reaping benefits of the existing 
transit potential. Meanwhile, the biggest economic effect, due to decrease of 
transport component in the product price, could be achieved through the 
creation of a steadily working transcontinental shipping route Europe – Central 
Asia, connecting Caspian ports with the ports of European countries.
The development of such route is aimed at:
• The creation of a general market of transportation services and the 
Integrated Transport System of EurAsEC member states;
• The Realisation of geographic advantages for EurAsEC member 
states during the implementation of the transit transport-economic 
communications between Europe and Asia;
• Meeting the needs of mutual transit for EurAsEC member states in the 
communications with third countries, and transportations of transit cargos 
between third countries across the territory of the Community;
• A technical upgrade of transportation systems for the purposes of efficient 
operation, transportation safety and environment protection;
• The proliferation of more economic and ecologically friendly water 
transport for cargo transportation.
Transcontinental Shipping 
Route Europe – Central Asia lEonid koZlov,
 vitaly  
ZbaraschEnko
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The provision of direct non-terminal communication between the ports of the 
Caspian Sea and European countries. 
Figure 15.1.  
The Scheme of 
Transcontinental 
Shipping Route 
Europe – Central 
Asia 
The western route branch goes along the Danube with a possible further outlet 
through the Main-Danube Canal (171 km) to the Main and further to the Rhine. 
However, the main bulk of transportations expected on the Danube reach 
2.226 km long from the influx to Passau (Germany), which has guaranteed 
depths of more than 2.0 m and where the shipping is regulated by the 
“Convention of the shipping regime on the Danube” (the Danube Convention) 
which entered into effect on May 11, 1949. The Convention specifies that 
“the navigation on the Danube must be free and open for citizens, merchant 
ships and goods of all states on the basis of equality with regard to port and 
navigation duties and trade shipping conditions. In contrast to the Danube, the 
Main-Danube Canal has the status of an inland waterway and an insignificant 
width (12 m) of sluice chambers. There are 83 sluices on the waterway Rhine-
Main-Danube (from Rotterdam to Sulina) with the length of 3503 km. The 
average passage time of ships/compounds between Rotterdam and Sulina 
makes: 10.5-13.5 days along the current, 17-18 days against the current. In 
the peak 1987 year, 3496 ships passed across Sulina and 10.1 million tons 
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of cargo have been transported, 2.9 million tons of which was transported in 
the direction of Black Sea, and 7.2 million tons of which was transported from 
Black Sea to the Danube. Prospectively, a radical improvement to shipping 
conditions on the Danube is related to bringing the guaranteed navigable 
pass depth up to 2.7 m by building more than 10 hydrosystems with sluice 
chambers of 310x34x4.5m. 
The eastern route branch represents water-transport connection between 
the Caspian Sea and the Azov-Black Sea basin (ABSB). This connection, as 
stated in the address of Russia’s President Vladimir Putin to the Russian 
Federation Federal Assembly of April 26, 2007, “… will not just provide the 
entrance for Caspian Sea countries to Black and Mediterranean Seas, i.e. 
to the world’s oceans, but it is going to change qualitatively their geopolitical 
position and allow them to become the sea powers”. 
At the present time, there are two suggestions on the removal of limitations 
for transportations increase between Caspian and Azov-Black Sea basins: the 
construction of the second branch of the Volga-Don waterway (Volga-Don 2) 
and the Eurasia Canal. It should be noted that there are no technical designs 
for the Eurasia Canal and Volga-Don 2 as such; there are however conceptual 
ideas and preliminary planning available for these.
Figure 15.2.  
Options of water-
ways transport 
connection of 
Caspian and Azov 
Seas 
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Nevertheless, at this stage a number of issues could be noted providing fairly 
good summary of prospects of the water-ways transport communication 
development between Caspian Sea and Azov-Black Sea basin.
A transcontinental shipping route from Europe to Central Asia would be 
formed between the ports of the Caspian Sea and European countries 
irrespective of which option would be pursued. Still, its operational efficiency 
(a key demand on the part of stakeholders) would first of all be based on 
characteristics of Azov-Caspian communication, which would allow for the 
realisation of modern transport-technological schemes of cargo delivery, and 
would suffice to the requirements of cargo traffic, modern shipbuilding, and 
safety requirements of shipbuilding.
The Volga-Don route from the Azov Sea to the Caspian Sea (even in case 
of second sluice lines construction), unfortunately, does not allow for the 
implementation of modern high-speed technologies of container and rolling 
(motor transport) cargo transportation. Limitations for draft (no more than 
3.6 m) exclude the possibility of using a lighter aboard the ship (LASH) non-
terminal technologies due to long transit passage time (seven days on an 
average) coupled with the length of the route (about 1300 km), passage of 
18 sluices and a large number of difficult reaches on the Nizhni Don (Lower 
Don). Besides, the geographic location of the route of the Volga-Don shipping 
canal has the main advantages of entering the inland waterways of Russia, 
thereby increasing the water-ways transport routes for foreign trade cargos 
of Caspian Sea countries by 600-800 km when compared to the route of the 
Eurasia Canal. 
Using the Eurasia Canal for shipping, the transit passage time from Azov to the 
Caspian Sea (about 700 km, six sluices) would take no more than 2.5–3 days, 
and the navigation period will be no less than 10 months per year, compared 
to the 8 months of the Volga-Don route. The dimensions of the canal and 
navigation passes will allow for the wide usage requirements of modern ships 
(consist of ships) with a width of up to 28 m and a draft of up to 5.0 m.
An important conclusion is that the Volga-Don 2 and Eurasia Canal cannot 
be considered as competing options. Each has its own purpose, and its own 
role in the development of the transport system of Russia and ITS of EurAsEC. 
Volga-Don 2 goal is to provide the operation of the united deep-water system 
of the European part of Russia, cargos transportation between the Volga 
basin and ABSB. The Eurasia Canal aims to provide cargos transportation 
between Caspian Sea and ABSB.
The implementation of the Eurasia Canal Project will open several new 
prospects for developing transparent open-end routes from Western and 
Central Europe to the ports of Caspian basin, and will provide a new entrance 
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for the Central Asian countries into the markets of Europe. The route will make 
possible the realisation of modern technological transport projects allowing 
for: 
• A reduction of cost of cargo transportations owing to using sea and river 
transport; 
• The same, or even reduced time of goods delivery; 
• A decrease in energy consumption of transportation products; 
• Long-distance transportation of heavy and large-dimensioned packages 
without the costs for preparation of the route. 
The new transcontinental route makes expedient the implementation of such 
transport-technological systems (TTS) as: 
• LASH TTS on the basis of LASHs of dock type with capacity of six lighters 
of the type “the Danube – Sea”, each having a weight-carrying capacity of 
more than 1000 tons; 
• Barge-towing TTS with separate cargo and power modules; 
• Rо-Rо TTS for providing transportation of trailers, containers and motor 
transport by fast-speed ferry vessels (cargos delivery “HH” (house-house) 
by motor transport); 
• Container TTS, using feed container ships with a capacity of up to 400 
– 500 TEU, allowing transport communication with main ocean container 
lines for servicing the Caspian Sea ports. 
A significant contribution to the development of the transcontinental shipping 
route Europe – Central Asia can be made by the implementation of the 
perspective development plan of Ust-Dunaisk Port, a project of the sluice 
junction between the canal Danube – Black Sea on the area of established 
soils on the northern part of the Danube delta on the route Vilkovo – South-
Western part of Zhebriyanski bay.
The construction of a deep-water port “Kuban” in the Taman Gulf of the 
Kerch Strait will not only provide transshipment of significant volumes of 
foreign trade cargos to ocean- shipping facilities, but will also predetermine 
the construction of a new shipping canal between the North-Eastern part of 
Taman Gulf and the Azov Sea.
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As an example, we will consider a multimodal transport-technological system 
(TTS) for the transportation of rolling and container cargo modules, which can 
be implemented on the basis of the shipping route described above for the 
purpose of:
•  Optimising non-terminal cargo delivery through the “HH” scheme between 
the states of Europe and Central Asia;
•  Decreasing loads on highways;
•  Reducing the negative environmentl impact.
TTS transport assets include:
• A fleet of motor trailers (MT);
• A fleet of twenty- and forty-foot containers;
• The Danube river ferry vessels with width 22.8 m, length 160-180 m, draft 
1.9 m, speed 26 km/h, capacity about 80 АТ.
• Ro-Ro Ships with draft up to 5.0 m.
Figure 15.3.  
The Scheme of 
Perspective Port 
“Kuban” and Azov-
Black Sea Canal 
Kerch – Enikalskii canal, Ukraine (H = 8.5 m)
Territory of port “Kuban”
Water area of port “Kuban”
Black sea – sea of Azov canal, Russia (H = 9.0 m)
Entrance chanel to the port “Kuban”, Russia (H = 16.5 m)
Zone of perspective development of port “Kuban”
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Figure 15.4.  
The Scheme 
of Transport-
Technological 
System for 
Transportation of 
Rolling and Container 
Modules 
River ferry vessels within the Black, Azov and Caspian Seas achieve the 
transportation of motor trailers within the Danube and the Eurasia Canal 
– by Ro-Ro ships. Transshipment from river motor ferry vessels to Ro-Ro 
ships and back is performed at Ust-Dunaisk Port. The transit time of cargo 
delivery (including handling operations) between the route terminals amounts 
to 13.5-16.5 days, against which the time of the Passage makes: across the 
Dunabe along the current – 6 days (against the current – 8 days), between 
Ust-Dunaisk and Eurasia Canal – 1.5 days, across Eurasia Canal – 3 days, 
from Eurasia Canal to the ports of Caspian Sea countries – 0.6-1.5 days. 
Preliminary studies of other TTS, which can be formed on the basis of the 
reviewed shipping route, suggest a reasonably high efficiency of operation.
In this context, a transcontinental shipping route from Europe to Central 
Asia, expanding as far as Caspian Sea to the west, the seven (Danube) 
International Transportation Corridor (ITC), systemically interacting 
with “Cretan” transportation corridors №№ 4,7,8,9, ITC “North-South”, 
TRACEСA will bring in an important component in the system of Euro-Asian 
international transportation corridors, significantly improving the transit 
potential of EurAsEC member states.
Leonid Kozlov, Vitaly Zbaraschenko “Transcontinental Shipping 
Route Europe – Central Asia”
Passau (Germany) 2.226 km
Canal Dunabe – Black Sea
Port Ust-Dunaisk (Ukraine) 0 km (mile)
ConRo terminal
Vienna   1929 km
Bratislava  1868 km
Budapesht  1647 km
Belgrade   1170 km 
Black Sea
Azov Sea
Port Azov (Russia)Port Caucasus (Russia) Port Poti (Georgia) Port Trabzon (Turkey)
TurkeyGeorgia
Armenia Iran IraqSyria
Kuwait
RussiaRussiaUkraine
Port Skadovsk (Ukraine)
Port Turkmenbashi (Turkmenistan) Port Aktau (Kazakhstan) Port Baku (Azerbaijan) Port Enzeli (Iran)
IranAzerbaijanKazakhstan
KyrgyzstanUzbekistan
Turkmenistan
Afganistan
Tajikistan
Eurasia Canal
Kizlyar Gulf
Joint Stock Transport Enterprises
transit Time, days
unloading and locating, days
miles/days
water transportation
transportations by motor transport
Integrating Eurasian 
Transport Systems
27 Eurasian Development Bank
EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook 2009
Intermodal Transport Technological Systems (TTS) make it possible to choose 
the appropriate transport system of cargo delivery and the cost and transit 
time of shipment, exploiting the advantages of each mode of transportation. 
According to the prime cost of cargo transportations, water transport, in 
comparison with land transport, represents the cheapest mode due to the 
large cargo capacity of vessels and the low consumption of power resources 
as per unit of ton-mile (or ton-km) output.
Thus, a main motor hauler equal to a 40-foot container spends 1MJ per 1 
ton-km, train – 0.6 MJ and sea container carrier only 0.1 MJ.
According to the French Agency on Environment and Energy Resources 
Management, it is possible to transport 50 tons of cargo by motor transport, 
97 tons by railway, 127 tons by river transport and 250 – 300 tons (depending 
on cargo capacity of a vessel) by sea transport at consumption of one liter of 
fuel per one kilometer. In monetary terms, such an advantage of sea transport 
becomes even more obvious, as the large marine vessels consume heavy and 
accordingly cheaper fuel types.
At the same time, the direct “door-to-door” delivery by motor transport does 
not require any additional loading operations and excludes related potential 
commercial losses due to the goods damage and shortage, and often longer 
delivery time. 
The constant technological improvement of loading operations and, primarily, 
the introduction of the containerisation and rolling method (Ro-Ro) of general 
cargo handling, has led to wide spread use of multimodal transportation such 
Megalogistic Intermodal 
Transport Technological 
System Germany – Russia –  
Central Asia – Afghanistan – 
China
vitaly  
ZbaraschEnko
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as main-feed systems for sea transport and routing for railway transport 
applying logistical (optimization) schemes of cargo traffic formation.
Round the World (RtW) and transoceanic intercontinental container lines, as 
well as interbasin sea ferry communications and feed container lines, make 
it possible to find optimal transport decisions due to the combined use of 
various transport types with regard to both transportation cost and transit 
time, following the principle of “door-to-door” delivery. 
An example of the design plan on the formation of international transportation 
corridors within the Eurasian united transport space using the modern 
megalogistic intermodal transport technological systems is shown below.
SCO States – Western Europe. Railway–Ferry Transport 
Complex
The increase in tonnage of the main container carriers between Europe and 
Far East to 12 thousand TEU (20-foot containers) has led to a reduction in 
the cost of traffic. As a result, transit container transportations by the Trans-
Siberian Railway from the ports of Japan, South Korea and Southeast ports 
of China are becoming unprofitable. The same will regretfully happen to much 
aspired Great Silk Road with the use of the motor transport for direct traffic 
(except for specialised shipment of narrow nomenclature of expensive and 
urgent goods). 
In 2007, even with very high prices for energy resources (bunker fuel) and 
freight charges for passing over the Suez Canal, the freight rates for 
transporting a 20-foot container between Western Europe (Hamburg) and 
Japan (Tokyo) in an easterly direction made 500, and in a westerly direction 
made $1500, which is completely unattainable by the transportation prime 
cost for the Trans-Siberian railway version. 
Moreover, marine fed transportations over the Baltic and Far East also 
demand additional charges when forming the entry rate. Today, it is widely 
known that the difference in freight rates in terms of Eastern and Western 
directions are caused by unbalance in foreign trade freight traffic.
At the same time, there are perspective transport directions for the 
realisation of the unique transit potential of the Trans-Siberian Railway. 
Thus, the economic regions of Beijing and North-West China, the states of 
Central Asia, and Afghanistan, using the transshipment points Zabaykalsk 
(Russia), Druzhba (Kazakhstan), Termez (Uzbekistan) and ferry terminal 
Ust-Luga (Russia) in the Baltic sea, can be connected to Western Europe 
with intermodal transport technological complex using the combined large- 
capacity sea ferries and piggyback shuttle trains. The Chart of such 
technological transport complexity is shown below with transport route 
characteristics in Table 16.1. 
Vitaly Zbaraschenko “Megalogistic Intermodal Transport  
Technological System Germany – Russia – Central Asia –  
Afghanistan – China”
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Figure 16.1.  
The Chart of the 
railway-ferry 
transport complex 
Germany – Russia –  
Central Asia –  
Afghanistan – China 
Besides the cheapest types of transport (sea and railway), there is the option 
to cut the costs for transport services in the selected direction by excluding 
or minimizing empty runs of transport and equipment (containers, trailers). 
Large-scale cargo traffic from China is compensated by the import over export 
cargo prevalence for Siberia, Kazakhstan, Afghanistan and other countries of 
Central Asia from Western Europe.
Thus, the maximum synergetic effect, which is making it possible to compete 
with the large-capacity container carriers going to the ports of Western 
Europe over the Suez Canal, is reached due to integration in the consolidated 
transport technological corridor of transit cargoes in the Western direction 
from the Chinese economic regions, remote from seaports and import cargo 
traffics from the Western Europe and America (with transshipment point 
out of transatlantic lines in the Continent ports), for Siberia and the countries 
of Central Asia and due to using, in the shortest geographical distances, the 
advantages of sea, railway and automobile types of transport in step with 
establishing the transport logistical centres on routes. 
Along with the transportation of cargo in 20 and 40-foot containers, there is 
an opportunity to realise a devout wish of motor transport patriots to revive 
the Great Silk Road and deliver cargoes “door-to-door” in piggy-back freighting 
mode. 
Because of this, the cheapest rolling technology for freight operations (Ro-Ro) 
is used, and, accordingly, there is an opportunity to hire the local drivers, who 
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Terminals, ports Time, day Terminals, ports Time, day
Kiel (import to Russia, 
transit to SCO states) 0.f/h*
Mukran (import to Russia, transit to SCO states and Afghani-
stan) 0. f/h
Kiel – Ust-Luga 
1300 km (70 miles) 1.8 t** Mukran – Ust-Luga1110 km (00 miles) 1. t
Ust-Luga (import to 
Russia, transit  
to SCO states)
0. f/h Terminals Time, day Terminals Time, day
Yekaterinburg and 
other TLC (empty stock, 
export to China)
1.0 f/h
Ust-Luga (import to 
Russia, transit to SCO 
states)
0. f/h
Ust-Luga (import to 
Russia, transit to Uz-
bekistan, Afghanistan) 
0. f/h
Ust-Luga– Zabaykalsk 
700 km 8 t
Almaty (empty stock, 
export to China) 1.0 f/h
Tashkent (transit, 
cotton) 1.0 f/h
Zabaykalsk, Beijing, 
Harbin 0. f/h
Ust-Luga– Druzhba 
00 km .0 t
Ust-Luga–Termez 
700 km .0 t
Zabaykalsk 0. f/h Druzhba (transit to Northwest China) 0. f/h
Termez (transit to 
Afghanistan, empty 
stock to China)
0. f/h
Zabaykalsk – Ust-Luga 
700 km 8 t
Druzhba (transit to the 
Western Europe) 0. f/h
Termez (transit to the 
Western Europe) 0. f/h
Ust-Luga (transit, 
export of Russia) 0. f/h
Druzhba – Ust-Luga 
00 km .0 t
Termez – Ust-Luga 
700 km .0 t
Ust-Luga– Kiel 1300 
km (70 miles) 1.8 t
Ust-Luga(transit, 
export) 0. f/h
Ust-Luga  
(transit, export) 0. f/h
Kiel 0. f/h
Ust-Luga– Mukran 
1110 km (00 miles)
Mukran
1. t
0. f/h
Ust-Luga– Mukran 
1110 km (00 miles)
Mukran
1. t
0. f/h
Round trip
(sea + railway) 23.
Round trip 
(sea + railway) 19.0
Round trip 
(sea + railway) 17.0
Transit time 11.8 Transit time 9. Transit time 8.
Round trip ferry .0 Round tripferry .0
Round trip
ferry .0
Round trip of train 23. Round trip of train 19.0 Round trip of train 17.0
Overall distance of one 
way (km) 8870
Overall distance of one 
way (km) 10
Overall distance of one 
way (km) 810
including sea (%) 1 including sea (%) 17 including sea (%) 19
Service frequency daily Service frequency
every 
other day
Ferry daily
Service frequency
every 
other day
Ferry daily
Table 16. 1.  
Transport 
characteristics of 
the railway-ferry 
transport complex 
Germany – Russia –  
Central Asia –  
Afghanistan – China
Note:* – f/h – time 
of freight handling; 
** – t – travel time. 
know the system, rules and geography of traffic in the terminal stations of the 
main line. 
Each container train which is made of about 40 long-base flat cars 80 feet 
(24.4 m) in length each with maximum holding capacity 4 х 40 = 160 TEU 
will occupy up to 40% of the ferry holding capacity (24.4 х 40 = 976 running 
meters of the main deck at 2500 m of the overall ferry capacity in running 
Vitaly Zbaraschenko “Megalogistic Intermodal Transport  
Technological System Germany – Russia – Central Asia –  
Afghanistan – China”
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meters). The rest 1500 running meters of the ferry are used for transportation 
of cargoes at bilateral trade Russia – EU.
It is necessary to operate 43 trains and 11 sea ferries for the daily pull-out of 
piggyback shuttle trains and sea ferries in each direction. The carrying capacity 
of transit cargoes in the Western direction will comprise about 117000 TEU 
(1.4 million tons at average loading 12 tons/TEU), which is a tiny amount of 
large-scale container transportations in the direction of Asia to Europe over 
the Suez Canal (out of $600 billion of turnover between Europe and Asia the 
Russian transit potential serves only 1% of transit). 
Therefore, there are no doubts in cargo base sufficiency but on the other hand 
it is about half of average annual volume of container transit transportations 
with the Trans-Siberian Railway. The cargo base analysis of the bilateral trade 
only between Russia and Germany urge to assert that the carrying capacity 
of all 11 ferries after transit will be ensured with cargoes of the two-way trade 
Russia – EU.
Container/rolling transportations (piggyback) are predominantly combined 
transportation modes, which turn out to be effective and therefore competitive 
through the accurate logistical chains, effective organisation and interaction 
of all participants following the long-term contracts or interconnecting 
corporate structures. 
When organising the transport long-distance projects, the integrated 
logistical chain, transformed in the non-stop conveyor, will make the 
intermodal transport “door-to-door” as reliable, flexible and easy to operate 
as the automobile one, but there will be an incomparably lower transportation 
costs and substantial savings of energy resources per unit.
Owners and operators of vessels, rolling stock of land types, equipment, 
terminals and obviously freighters and forwarders on a contractual basis, 
including other structures in the transport industry are to be engaged. In 
a nutshell, all transport assets have to be potentially incorporated into a 
single transportation chain corporately integrated in a holding.
Actually, there is an issue on the agenda to create the so-called universal 
carrier or freight integrator, which will own and operate all transport assets 
of multimodal ТТS and bear responsibility for the final results of the transport 
project with regard to transportation quality market requirements and 
sufficient profitability and liquidity of all structural components and of a holding 
as a whole.
Such international transport holding for the implementation of the 
Transsiberian multimodal project involving owners of the Baltic ferry system 
(JSC Sovkomflot, Far Eastern ocean company, a branch of the Danish shipping 
company DFDS in Germany, Rosmorport), affiliated structures of the Russian 
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and Kazakhstan railways and motor transport enterprises, could be created 
in Moscow with a developed network of the regional affiliated transport 
logistical centres.
Within the framework of this project, the transport logistical centres (TLC 
or hubs) could be established in the main transport-industrial cities of the 
following route – Kiel, Hamburg, Mukran, Berlin, Ust-Luga, St.Petersburg, 
Moscow, Sverdlovsk, Tomsk, Omsk, Krasnoyarsk, Termez, Tashkent, Almaty, 
Druzhba, Zabaykalsk, Beijing and Harbin. That in turn will provide a framework 
to form a transport industrial zone or effective international continental 
transportation corridor fit for the processes of economy globalisation.
By delegating reasonable decision-making authority to regional (peripheral) 
affiliated companies, including the preparation of offers to set up a cargo base 
and, in particular, drawing up cargo plans for ferries and trains loading in each 
run, the key strategic and overall planning functions should be centralized. The 
modern state of development of information communication technologies 
provide solutions not limited only to the problems, of most effective use of the 
sea tonnage and a rolling stock, but also allow permanent control over the 
observance of safety standards and to trace promotion of each cargo module 
at all sites operated with the multimodal ТТS.
Thus, already back in late 1980s, the drawing up of cargo plans of large-
capacity container carries for each call port at container line Balt Orient Line 
Hamburg – Hong Kong was carried out by the company experts at the central 
office of a line of the Soviet-German JSC Transglob/Transnautic in Hamburg 
in real time.
Along with the function of the Transsiberian sector of ТТС in such combinations 
as ferry/railway, the Baltic ferry complex enables the option to change the 
automobile cargo traffic of Russian-European bilateral trade over to marine, 
which will cut the idle time of motor transport at land boundaries and allow the 
introduction of the rolling transportation on the industrial scale, without using 
the routes of motor haulers and quite big contingent of drivers on the sea. 
The corporate structure of the joint Russian-German motor transportation 
joint-stock companies will provide employment of labour forces due to the 
transportation of trailers between ferry call ports and start-end points of 
cargo traffic in the territory of Russia and the European Union.
It is in no doubt that, transport assets of the TTS considered, rolling-stock, sea 
ferry and terminals should predominantly correspond to the modern advanced 
standards and provide the highest level of competitiveness. 
The fleet of container flat wagons should consist of long-base cars for 4 FEU 
(40-foot containers) each. Ferries should have the maximum cargo capacity, 
passenger complex for no less than 200 passengers and economic and large 
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power motors. Ferry bodies can be constructed at Baltiysk shipbuilding yard, 
St.Petersburg, with fitting-out in Germany. Sea ferry terminals should have 
technological systems of two-level motor transport (rolling cargoes) loading/
unloading to minimize the time of ferry servicing in ports.
The main transport assets necessary for realisation of the megalogistic 
intermodal TTS Germany – Russia – Central Asia – Afghanistan – China are 
shown in Table 16.2. 
Conveyance unit Quantity Price (€)
Investments 
(€)
Binary rail-motor passenger ferry 
RoPax*
    length – 200–220 m;
    width – 30 m;
    draught – 7.0 m;
    deadweight – 1200 t;
    register tonnage – 12000 BRT;
    capacity of main engines –  
    1000-18000 kW 
12 8 million 1020 million
Long-base flat 80-foot car of 
Russian standard, holding capacity 
 TEU (2 FEU)**
2000 72000 1 million
0-foot (FEU) container of 
International standard *** 000 000 20 million
Total: 1182 million
Table 16. 2.  
Transport 
characteristics of 
the railway-ferry 
transport complex 
Germany – Russia –  
Central Asia –  
Afghanistan – China
* Binary rail-motor passenger ferry (RoPax), passenger capacity about 200 persons, 3 cargo 
decks with total cargo track length 200 running meters. Main deck (about 1000 running meters) 
is meant for  cars of Russian standard or highway freighters located at  railway lines, top and 
bilge decks – for motor-cars and highway freighters.
Out of 12 ferries  go for trip at line Ust-Luga – Kiel,  – Ust-Luga – Mukran and one ferry is for 
substitution in case of scheduled repairs and unforeseen circumstances. 
** formation of about 3 piggyback shuttle trains, 0 cars each for daily trip of two trains in each 
direction of transit transportation, including the technological reserve for repair.
*** fleet of 0 and 20-foot containers provides loading of piggyback shuttle trains and delivery of 
goods to the end users. 
Along with the mentioned investments, it has corporate shareholding in three 
sea terminals (Ust-Luga, Kiel, Mukran), boundary terminals (Zabaykalsk, 
Termez, Druzhba), transport logistical centres TLC (Sverdlovsk, Krasnoyarsk, 
Tashkent, Almaty, others are possible) and central office of the holding in 
Moscow.
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Introduction
The purpose of this short article is to connect the discussion on the 
proposal of the Eurasian Development Bank to design an indicator system 
for monitoring the Eurasian integration process to the ongoing discussions 
about similar monitoring systems in other regions. I will explore the ‘lessons’ 
that can be drawn from these – not always successful – experiences and I will 
identify a number of issues that will have to be addressed in the course of the 
development of the EDB indicator system in order to make it a successful, 
relevant and sustainable system. As will be shown, these issues are of different 
types, not only methodological and technical, but also political. My remarks are 
organised in five points.
1. Monitoring Regional Integration: Technical versus Political 
Aspects
Although there might be a temptation to engage immediately in a technical 
discussion on the construction of indicators and the collection of statistics, the 
first point I would like to make is that the question of how to monitor regional 
integration cannot be reduced to a technical problem, or a set of technical 
problems.
The starting point for setting up an indicator system is rather of a political 
nature.2 It is related to the underlying mandate for monitoring. The purpose of 
monitoring is usually the evaluation of regional integration policies, given the 
“implementation problem” faced by several regional initiatives, and to test the 
quality of regional governance. 
When considering political and technical aspects of a monitoring system, it 
would not be correct, however, to deal with them separately and consider 
them as sequential (i.e. technical aspects following political aspects).
Indicator-Based Monitoring 
of the Eurasian Integration 
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1 This article is based on an intervention by the author at the 3rd EDB Conference on Eurasian 
Integration, Eurasian Development Bank, Almaty, Kazakhstan, October 15-17, 2008.
2 This will be further developed in point 2.
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The political and technical aspects are clearly linked. Several examples of such 
linkages can be mentioned:
• the number of aspects to be considered in an indicator-system are a 
function of the underlying mandate;
• the inclusion of (inter-regional) comparison and benchmarking is a political 
choice;
• the choice of weights in a monitoring systems and in the design of composite 
indicators cannot be based only on technical (statistical) criteria;
• the choice to include good governance indicators (like transparency, 
participation and accountability) is also a political choice.
2. The Monitoring Process: By Whom? For Whom? For What 
Purpose?
Monitoring is not an isolated (academic) activity. It refers to a series of relevant 
processes of information gathering, processing and dissemination with the 
aim to influence, scrutinize and/or evaluate regional integration policies or 
to secure their implementation. These processes take place in a monitoring 
system in which different actors participate: regional and national, public and 
private. These actors can be internal to the regional integration process (e.g. 
regional secretariats, regional parliaments, regional development banks) or 
external to the process (e.g. academics, NGOs) (Costea et al., 2008). The role 
of monitoring can be political, coordinating, academic, technical, financial, etc. 
In other words, monitoring can take place closer to or further away from the 
decision-making centres. Monitoring is thus not to be equated with evaluation, 
and displays both positive and normative aspects.
In some cases, the integration arrangements have built-in monitoring 
provisions. These are especially effective when, at the same time, the 
integration agreement itself includes explicit objectives. 
The use of (extra-regional) benchmarks is a particularly sensitive issue and 
poses a series of methodological problems.
From an academic point of view, indicator-based monitoring is of particular 
value because it allows testing opinions and accepted opinions on ‘progress’, 
‘success’ or ‘failure’ of particular regional integration processes.
It should thereby not be forgotten that regionalism or regional integration is 
a ‘moving target’. The institutional complexity of the regional arrangements 
tends to increase with time. And shifts have been noticed from uni-dimensional 
regional organisations towards multidimensional and hybrid forms of 
regional cooperation (Hettne and Soderbaum, 2004). A good example of 
the latter, in the Eurasian context, is the Central Asia Regional Economic 
Cooperation.
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Finally, it should be noted that the monitoring actors are not necessarily 
(intra-) regional actors. Extra-regional actors (like other regions, international 
organisations, international NGOs, academics) are possibly interested in the 
monitoring process.
3. Monitoring Experiences: Where Do We Stand?
When designing an indicator system for the Eurasian region, it might be useful 
to have a look at the number of (not always successful) monitoring experiences 
elsewhere. 
Focusing on indicator-based experiences, most of them were promoted 
by (regional or international) organisations, including: EC, ECB, IDB, ALADI, 
COMESA, ECOWAS, ACP Secretariat, ASEAN and UNECA. Academic 
proposals include: Hufbauer and Schott (1994) and Feng and Genna (2003); 
and UNU-CRIS (RIKS, World Report).3 The academic proposals, together with 
the UNECA and ECB proposals incorporate a comparative element.
What can we observe from these experiences with indicator-based systems? 
From our reading, at least the following points can be made:
• There are very few sustained efforts, which is not very encouraging for the 
EDB;
• The political role of monitoring does not seem to be crucial for the regional 
integration process;
• Few actors are usually involved in monitoring;
• Different logical components of regional integration are targeted (De 
Lombaerde and Van Langenhove, 2006);
• Monitoring in practice seems to have different objectives (including: 
measurement of the level of regional integration, measurement of pre-
conditions, assessment of the contribution of individual countries to 
regional integration, evaluation of regional integration policies, comparison, 
evaluation of donor-financed support programmes, strategic use in the 
context of interregional negotiation processes);
• Monitoring systems are often characterized by underdeveloped 
conceptual frameworks and poor selection criteria for the indicators (De 
Lombaerde, Pietrangeli and Weeratunge, 2008);
• The size of the indicator-systems varies considerably. A recent review of 
several systems revealed that indicator systems cover between less than 
ten and close to 150 variables (De Lombaerde, Pietrangeli and Weeratunge, 
2008);
3 See: www.cris.unu.edu/riks/
Monitoring and Measuring 
Regional Integration
Philippe De Lombaerde “Indicator-Based Monitoring  
of the Eurasian Integration Process: Preliminary Remarks”
28 Eurasian Development Bank
EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook 2009
• The same review revealed that one third of the included variables does not 
necessarily inform us about the regional integration processes.
Apart from the observations that can be derived from the indicator-based 
systems, some additional observations can be derived from monitoring 
experiences more in general:
• The increasing complexity of regional integration makes monitoring more 
challenging;
• The increasing complexity of regional integration seems to go hand-in-hand 
with increasingly complex monitoring systems. In the case of the EU, for 
example, the monitoring system consists of a whole array of interconnected 
processes, both at the level of internal monitoring (reporting, and auditing 
processes, EUROSTAT, Eurobarometer, Internal Market Scoreboard, good 
governance agenda) and at the level of external monitoring (by academics, 
think tanks, lobbyists, national and subnational parliaments) (Costea et al., 
2008);
• The deepening of regional integration leads to a more political role of 
monitoring and a two-way interaction between the regional and national 
levels. Whereas initially, the national level (member states and other 
actors) monitors the regional level, when the regional integration process 
deepens, regional bodies start to monitor the implementation of regional 
commitments by member states (De Lombaerde, Estevadeordal and 
Suominen, 2008);
• Monitoring covers the full project cycle. It is not limited to ex post evaluation; 
it covers the whole cycle, from the policy preparation phase onwards;
• Built-in monitoring agendas are perceived as quite functional; 
• The role and quality of national institutions is crucial for (good) monitoring. 
Especially in the case of young and shallow forms of regional integration (De 
Lombaerde, Estevadeordal and Suominen, 2008).
4. Technical aspects
The actual design of an indicator-based monitoring system is based on three 
pillars: the conceptual framework, data and methods. 
The conceptual framework should guide the selection of variables and 
indicators. It can be based on one of the theories from the arsenal of theories 
available for the purpose, or on a combination of these.4 One should be aware 
of the fact that many of the available theoretical frameworks are rooted in 
Monitoring and Measuring 
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the European experience, so that transferability should be evaluated. Also, 
the teleological logic of frameworks like Balassa’s (1961), should be critically 
assessed. Indicator systems should be sufficiently flexible to allow for region-
specific variables. When there is an underlying understanding of the/a logic of 
the integration process, variables and indicators can be classified in categories 
(institutionalized integration versus ‘real’ integration, positive versus negative 
integration, by sectors, etc.) (De Lombaerde and Van Langenhove, 2005). In 
indicator-systems set-up to monitor regional integration, the indicators are 
supposed to reflect some aspect of the process. However, as experience shows 
us (see above), this is not always the case in practise. At the same time it is 
true that there will always be a grey area between those variables that should 
be ‘in’ and those that should be ‘out’. Sometimes a simple transformation of 
variables can turn irrelevant variables into relevant variables. For example, 
inflation or growth rates that tell us something about the national economies 
of the member states can be transformed into (regional) convergence 
indicators.
Other issues come up when designing indicator-systems. For example, systems 
can be designed at the regional and/or national level of analysis. An example 
of the latter is the system proposed by UN ESCWA to assess the participation 
of each national economy in the regionalisation process in the Middle East (UN 
ESCWA, 2007). Another issue is related to overlapping memberships and 
poses serious problems to designing indicator systems. Still another issue is 
related to the question of whether composite indices will be constructed or 
not. These composite indices might well capture the multi-dimensional nature 
of the processes and they are easy to read and communicate. However, they 
might become rather abstract to interpret and the weighting of the different 
components of the index will always be arbitrary (De Lombaerde, Dorrucci 
et al., 2008).
My final remark refers to data. When monitoring is based on quantitative 
data or on a combination of quantitative and qualitative information, one is 
faced with the problem of data availability. This problem is still more serious 
at the regional level than at the national level. For many variables that are not 
mere aggregations of national variables such as intra-regional flows of people, 
services and capital, or data on regional budgets and policies, systematic 
data are often still lacking, even in regions with relatively good quality data in 
general.5
5. Comparison and Comparability
My fifth and final point refers to the issues of comparison and comparability. 
Different contexts, different regional realities and different regional 
5 See, for example, OECD (2004) concerning lacking data on trade in intermediate goods, services 
and intra-firm trade.
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architectures exist. These differences, like e.g. the differences with respect to 
the European institutional architecture are often confused with differences in 
effectiveness, but should not.
Comparison should be sensitive to these differences, without adopting 
the opposite extreme position that specific contexts imply that different 
processes become incomparable. Different levels of regional interaction and 
interdependence, and other aspects of regionalisation can be compared.
Comparison can be based on traditional comparative indicators or on relative 
comparative indicators. The latter compare regional performance first with 
the region-specific objectives or benchmarks, and then, in a second instance, 
across regions. Combinations of both approaches are obviously also possible, 
as the indicator system proposed by UNECA has illustrated (UNECA, 2002). 
Finally, as the UNECA experience also shows, comparison is still a politically 
sensitive issue at the (inter-)regional level, although accepted practise at the 
(inter-)national level. When designing an indicator system with a comparative 
dimension, this should preferably be discussed previously with the major 
stakeholders. 
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On January 10, 2006, Henley & Partners (hereafter ‘Henley’), a Swiss firm 
specializing in international migration, consular and citizenship law issued 
a press release describing their analysis of worldwide visa regulations (van 
der Burg, 2006). The story, delivered by the Associated Press, was covered 
by news media around the world. In general, the press coverage was brief, 
and emphasised the facts that Danish, Finnish and American citizens had the 
greatest travel-freedom, as they could each visit 130 other countries visa-
free, while Iranian and Afghan citizens had the least travel freedom, able to 
only visit 14 and 12 other countries respectively without visas. A full list of the 
195 countries ranked by Henley, with the number of other countries that their 
citizens can visit visa-free, is given in Table 18.1. 
Henley claimed that this was the first-ever ranking of international travel 
freedom, and had been compiled “by assessing some 40 000 combinations of 
countries and territories”, and added that “visa restrictions play an important 
role in controlling the movement of foreign nationals across borders. ... Visa 
requirements... generally reflect the relations and status of a country within 
the international community” (van der Burg, 2006).
To be mathematically correct, Henley should not have said ‘combinations’, 
but rather ‘permutations’, because the existence of visa-free access for a 
national of country X travelling to country Y is distinct from the existence of 
visa-free access for a national of country Y travelling to country X. Given n 
countries, there are n ( n – 1 ) permutations of nationality-destination pairs. 
Self-pairings are not included, because it makes little sense to talk about visa 
requirements for citizens of country X to travel to their own country (while 
internal passports and travel controls do exist in some countries, we are only 
interested in international travel here). Therefore each of the 195 countries 
listed by Henley have 194 other countries to potentially travel to, for a total of 
195 × 194 = 37830 possible permutations, which was rounded to 40000 in 
Henley’s press release.
The text of the press release focused on the top and bottom few countries 
in the ranking. By doing so, much information of interest may have been 
missed. The present paper will analyse the full data set in order to more fully 
understand the pattern of global travel freedom and to answer the question: 
Visa-free Travel: an Indicator 
of Global IntegrationbrEndan r. 
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1. Finland, 130. 
 Denmark, 130.   
 United States, 130. 
4. Germany, 129. 
 Ireland, 129. 
 Sweden, 129. 
7. Britain, 128. 
 France, 128. 
 Italy, 128. 
 Japan, 128. 
11. Belgium, 127. 
 Norway, 127. 
 Spain, 127. 
 Switzerland, 127. 
15. Netherlands, 126. 
16. Austria, 125. 
 Canada, 125. 
 Luxembourg, 125. 
 New Zealand, 125. 
20. Portugal, 123. 
21. Singapore, 122. 
22. Australia, 120. 
 Greece, 120. 
 Iceland, 120. 
 Malaysia, 120. 
26. Liechtenstein, 116. 
27. South Korea, 115. 
 Malta, 115. 
29. Cyprus, 113. 
30. Hong Kong, 110. 
31. Chile, 109. 
San Marino, 109. 
33. Monaco, 108. 
34. Poland, 106. 
35. Slovenia, 105. 
36. Israel, 104. 
37. Argentina, 101. 
 Brunei, 101. 
 Hungary, 101. 
40. Andorra, 99. 
 Brazil, 99. 
 Uruguay, 99. 
43. Czech Republic, 98. 
 Mexico, 98. 
45. Slovakia, 97. 
46. Costa Rica, 95. 
47. Lithuania, 94. 
48. Venezuela, 92. 
49. Estonia, 91. 
 Latvia, 91. 
51. Vatican City, 87. 
52. Croatia, 84. 
53. Bolivia, 83. 
 Bulgaria, 83. 
55. Guatemala, 82. 
 Panama, 82. 
 Paraguay, 82. 
58. El Salvador, 81. 
59. Honduras, 80. 
60. Nicaragua, 75. 
61. Romania, 73 
62. Barbados, 71. 
Bahamas, 71. 
Macau, 71. 
65. Trinidad & Tobago, 
66. 
66. South Africa, 65. 
67. St. Vincent, 64. 
68. St. Lucia, 63. 
Antigua & Barbuda, 63. 
70. St. Kitts-Nevis, 62. 
71. Grenada, 60. 
72. Belize, 58. 
73. Jamaica, 57. 
74. Solomon Islands, 54. 
75. Guyana, 53. 
Gambia, 53. 
77. Dominica, 52. 
Mauritius, 52. 
Seychelles, 52. 
Turkey, 52. 
81. Lesotho, 51. 
82. Tuvalu, 50. 
83. Kiribati, 49. 
Western Samoa, 49. 
85. Botswana, 48. 
Malawi, 48. 
87. Fiji, 47. 
Sierra Leone, 47. 
Vanuatu, 47. 
90. Kenya, 46. 
Maldives, 46. 
Swaziland, 46. 
Tonga, 46. 
94. Ghana, 45. 
Zambia, 45. 
Table 18. 1.  
Countries of the 
world, ranked by 
Travel Freedom 
(i.e. the number of 
other countries their 
citizens can visit 
without a visa)
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96. Nauru, 44. 
97. Taiwan, 42. 
98. Ecuador, 41. 
Namibia, 41. 
Papua New Guinea, 41. 
Peru, 41. 
Tanzania, 41. 
Zimbabwe, 41. 
104.  Suriname, 40. 
105.  Kuwait, 39. 
Mauritania, 39. 
Uganda, 39. 
108.  Bahrain, 38. 
Mali, 38. 
Tunisia, 38. 
111.  Guinea, 37. 
Ivory Coast, 37. 
Niger, 37. 
Qatar, 37. 
Senegal, 37. 
116.  Benin, 36. 
Cape Verde, 36. 
Marshall Islands, 36. 
Oman, 36. 
120.  Burkina Faso, 35. 
Nigeria, 35. 
Russia, 35. 
Togo, 35. 
United Arab Emirates, 35
125.  Guinea-Bissau, 33. 
Micronesia, 33. 
Philippines, 33. 
128.  Belarus, 32. 
Colombia, 32. 
Palau Islands, 32. 
Serbia-Montenegro, 32. 
Ukraine, 32. 
133.  Liberia, 31. 
Macedonia, 31. 
Saudi Arabia, 31. 
136.  Morocco, 30. 
137.  Indonesia, 29. 
Moldova, 29. 
Thailand, 29. 
140.  Azerbaijan, 28. 
Bangladesh, 28. 
Central African Republic, 
28
Georgia, 28. 
Kazakhstan, 28. 
Kyrgyzstan, 28. 
146.  Armenia, 27. 
Chad, 27. 
Rep. Congo, 27. 
Cuba, 27. 
Tajikistan, 27. 
151.  Cameroon, 26. 
152.  Bosnia & Herze-
govina, 25. 
Dominican Rep, 25. 
India, 25. 
Madagascar, 25. 
156.  Egypt, 24. 
Gabon, 24. 
Mongolia, 24. 
Uzbekistan, 24. 
160.  Algeria, 23. 
Rwanda, 23. 
162.  Haiti, 22. 
Mozambique, 22. 
Sao Tome & Principe, 22. 
Sri Lanka, 22. 
166.  East Timor, 21. 
Jordan, 21. 
168.  Comoros, 20. 
Equatorial Guinea, 20. 
Eritrea, 20. 
Laos, 20. 
Nepal, 20. 
173.  Angola, 19. 
Bhutan, 19. 
Djibouti, 19. 
Libya, 19. 
Turkmenistan, 19. 
178.  Burundi, 18. 
China, 18. 
Ethiopia, 18. 
North Korea, 18. 
Vietnam, 18. 
Yemen, 18. 
184.  Albania, 17. 
Cambodia, 17. 
Lebanon, 17. 
Pakistan, 17. 
Sudan, 17. 
189.  Dem. Rep. Congo, 
16. 
Syria, 16. 
191.  Iraq, 15.  
Myanmar, 15. 
Somalia, 15. 
194.  Iran, 14. 
195.  Afghanistan, 12.
 (van der Burg, 2006)
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“Is it true that western/developed countries have much greater travel 
freedom than developing countries or those with dictatorial regimes, and if 
so, why?”
Strangely, travel freedom in terms of tourist travel has received little attention 
from academics. Some analysis has been undertaken for individual countries 
on the effects of tourist visa requirements and the potential impact of their 
abolition (Kirisci, 2005), but in general only news media and tourist industry 
journals have shown much interest in changes to visa regimes (Office of the 
Prime Minister, 2009).
Methodology
As the data were received ‘as is’, several qualifications need to be stated 
regarding the dataset and definitions of the terms ‘visa’ and ‘visa-free’.
1) Henley does not state either its method or the date of data collection.
The press release talks of a ‘study’ conducted by Henley, but despite several 
requests, no details of this ‘study’ were given by Henley. The study may simply 
be the press release and accompanying ranking of 195 countries, or it may 
have been a more profound analysis conducted for a client. The source and 
date of the data for each country are thus unknown, and it is only possible to 
speculate on how and when the data was obtained.
Henley may have written to the embassies or foreign ministries of each of 
the 195 countries and requested information on which other countries’ 
nationals were permitted visa-free entry. However, such an approach would 
be inefficient, time-consuming, and if answered at all, likely to result in late or 
incomplete information.
Another possible data collection method would be via travel industry channels, 
such as the “Travel Information Manual” (TIM) published by the International 
Air Travel Association (IATA). TIM is available both as a book and online 
(Timaticweb) at http://www.timaticweb.com. Several airlines (KLM) integrate 
Timacticweb into their own websites to provide visa and passport information 
to travellers. Australian travel agents use a similar online product called 
“Visalink” https://visalink.com.au/frontpage.aspx. Both TIM and Visalink 
allow users to enter the nationality of a traveller’s passport, and the country 
to which he wishes to travel, and returns the visa requirements, if any. Neither 
system allows a user to obtain a listing of all countries to which a national of 
given country can travel visa-free, nor a listing of all countries whose travellers 
require a visa to enter a given country. So using a system like TIM or Visalink 
would still be labour-intensive as each of the 37830 permutations of nationality 
and destination country would have to be checked individually.
Given the difficulties in collecting the data, it cannot be assumed that the 
data are all from a single point in time. Visa regulations change over time, 
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sometimes without warning. If collecting data from individual governments, 
the time lag between the first and last of the 195 responses could not only 
be significant, but the first responding government might well have changed 
its regulations by the time the last government supplied its data. This is also 
a problem with TIM and Visalink, whose data are collected fairly continuously, 
but which cannot be relied upon to be up to date, or even synchronous. At best, 
it can be assumed that the data released by Henley gives a general indication 
of the situation in late 2005.
2) The data as released show only the total number of countries to which a 
given country’s citizens can travel visa-free. The data does not include 
information on how many different nationalities can enter a given country 
visa-free, nor does it give information on individual nationality-destination 
combinations. 
3) Visa regulations differ depending on the purpose of a traveller’s visit, 
whether he is travelling alone or in a group, his intended length of stay, and 
other factors such as method of entry (air, land, sea) and port of entry. As 
Henley gave no indication of the criteria they applied to their data, the most 
simple criteria are assumed here: short-term individual tourist arrivals by air. 
This has the added advantage of fitting the data from TIM, whose online FAQ 
(Frequently Asked Questions) page states:
TIM should be consulted for airline passengers travelling for tourist or business 
purposes. TIM cannot be consulted for immigrants, persons wishing to adopt 
children, to study or take up paid employment abroad or individuals crossing 
borders overland. Those passengers should be referred to the consulate of 
the country concerned (IATA, 2009).
Nevertheless, it should be remembered that the activities allowed to a traveller 
in a foreign country as a tourist, with or without a visa, vary significantly 
between destination countries. Likewise different visiting nationalities may 
have significantly different conditions imposed upon them within the same 
destination country. 
4) Henley’s data covers 195 polities: all 191 UN member states of the time, 
plus two non-members Vatican City and Taiwan, and the two Chinese “Special 
Autonomous Regions” of Hong Kong and Macau. In contrast, TIM provides 
data for more than 216 countries and territories. The most notable territories 
missing from Henley’s list include Puerto Rico, Greenland and French Polynesia 
as well as more controversial entities such as Northern Cyprus and the 
Palestinian Territories. These missing territories together account for only 
0.2% of the world’s population, so their absence from the Henley data is not 
significant. However, it should be noted that many territories have different 
visa regimes than their parent state (e.g. Hong Kong and Macau allow many 
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nationalities to visit without a visa, whereas few, if any, ordinary foreign citizens 
can travel to China visa free. Conversely, residents of such territories may 
have different travel privileges to other countries than nationals of the parent 
state (again, Hong Kong and Macau residents can travel much more freely 
overseas than mainland Chinese). 
5) The requirement to possess a visa in order to visit a country obscures 
large differences in the cost, effort and documentation necessary to obtain 
one. Large differences also exist in the conditions of entry and duration of stay 
granted by one country to different nationalities who do (or do not) require a 
visa. Thus the existence of a visa-free travel privilege to a country for some 
nationalities does not necessarily mean that travel is any less restricted than 
for those nationalities requiring a visa. 
6) Some visas, such as those required of New Zealanders visiting Australia, 
are a legal fiction, as for all practical purposes New Zealanders can visit (and 
work and settle) in Australia visa-free (DIMIA, 2008). It is not clear how Henley 
categorised such cases. 
7) The requirement to possess a visa (or the existence of a visa-free privilege) 
may differ between different ports of entry, or modes of entry (foot, bicycle, 
motor vehicle, sea, air).
8) It must be remembered that entry to a country may be denied even to those 
in possession of a valid visa, or who otherwise qualify for a visa-free privilege. 
A visa is “an endorsement on a passport etc. indicating that it has been 
examined and found correct, especially as permitting the holder to enter 
or leave a country” (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 2003: 3544). It is a 
pre-emptive check on the bona fides of the traveller and his travel purpose and 
itinerary. Visa-free travel is simply the absence of a requirement to hold a visa, 
and is usually considered a privilege.
Many visas require the traveller to submit his passport ahead of time to an 
embassy of the country he intends to visit. Other visas are purely formalities 
and are issued at land borders or ports of entry. These are often termed ‘visa 
on arrival’, and are little more than a simple form to complete, and an extra 
form of revenue generation for authorities, than a pre-emptive check on the 
visitor. 
To obtain a visa issued by consular officials ahead of time, the cost, time and 
effort involved for a traveller can be significant. Even an innocuous tourist may 
be required to provide a detailed itinerary, details of persons he will visit, a list 
of languages he speaks, his parent’s details, and proof of booking or payment 
for accommodation, transport or guiding services from authorised providers. 
Photographs and even fingerprints are also commonly required. 
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Visa costs vary greatly not only between different issuing countries, but 
also between applicants from different countries seeking entry to the same 
destination country. Some visas are issued free, or cost only a token amount. 
Others are issued on a cost-recovery or even a profit-making basis, the actual 
costs of which vary considerably depending on the wages levels of the officials 
and the work load involved. Some countries charge on a sliding scale based 
on the perceived wealth of the applicant’s country (western countries pay 
more), on an ideological basis (‘friendly’ countries pay less), or on the basis 
of reciprocity, matching the prices charged to their own citizens by the other 
country. Some countries charge different fees for applications made at an 
embassy outside the applicant’s home country, or have different requirements 
and costs for different ports or modes of entry.
A visa may be issued in a few minutes, or may take days or even weeks for 
various reasons. On the other hand, a visa may be as simple as the Special 
Category Visa (SCV) issued to New Zealanders visiting Australia, which is 
obtained by completing the normal passenger arrival card (DIMIA, 2008). 
The average New Zealander does not realise that he is applying for and being 
issued a visa, and no evidence is visible in his passport, apart from the normal 
entry stamp, but for Australian government purposes this technically counts 
as a visa. 
Even with a visa, there is no right to enter a foreign country. Additional validation 
may even be required at the entry point: proof of onward travel, of sufficient 
funds, of acceptable health, or even of ‘decency’. In the latter case, Singapore 
was notorious in the 1970s for subjecting long-haired male travellers to a 
haircut as a requirement of entry. 
Eligibility for visa-free privileges may also be qualified. For visa-free entry to the 
US under the Visa Waiver Programme, travellers from eligible countries must 
now use machine-readable passports with digital photos. Passports issued 
after 26 October 2006, must also have microchips which store biometric 
information (Dept. of State, 2009).
Once within a destination country, visitors may also be subjected to travel 
restrictions, for political, military or anthropological reasons, such as the 
additional requirements necessary to visit Tibet in China, Aboriginal reserves 
in Australia, or inhabited (non-resort) islands in the Maldives.
Not all governments allow all other nationalities to visit, even with a visa. 
Malaysia, Brunei and several Middle Eastern countries prohibit visits by 
Israelis, while Syria prohibits entry even to non-Israelis whose passports show 
evidence of a visit to Israel. A traveller’s own government may prohibit him 
from visiting certain countries. For example, Israel does not permit its own 
citizens to enter Palestinian-controlled areas, although foreigners can do so; 
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in the 1980s, ordinary Malaysian passports were not valid for travel to China; 
and today ordinary Chinese citizens can travel only to the 137 countries (as 
of February 2009) which have received ‘Approved Destination Status’ from 
Beijing (Graff, 2009). 
Just as visa regulations vary enormously between countries, and between 
different nationalities seeking to visit a country, so do visa-free privileges vary. 
While the most common durations of stay for visa-free entry in the author’s 
experience are 14, 30, 60 or 90 days, New Zealanders, with their invisible 
visa, can remain indefinitely in Australia, work and settle, and similar privileges 
exist among EU members.
In the analysis that follows, the ability to travel visa-free to other countries is 
termed ‘travel freedom’. Thus the more countries that a given national(ity) can 
visit visa-free, the higher his (value of) travel freedom. 
Initial Analysis
The nationals of any of the 195 countries listed by Henley could theoretically 
be able to visit between 0 and 194 other countries visa-free. Table 18.2, 
however, shows that the actual range of the data is between 12 and 130, with 
a mean of 57.6 and a median of 41. Of the total 37830 possible permutations 
of visitor nationality and destination country, only 11223, or 29.7%, allow 
visa-free travel. Fully 70.3% require a visa. 
Figure 18.1 shows a frequency plot of the Henley data. The y-axis measures 
the number of countries whose nationals possess the level of travel freedom 
shown on the x-axis. In an ideal world, the graph would have a single bar at 
x = 194, with a height of 195. The real world is obviously less happy. The 
plot is asymmetric and bimodal. The larger mode is at the bottom tail of the 
distribution, with a smaller mode at the upper tail, both tails being compact in 
the sense of having few gaps between individual x-values. Between the modes, 
the data have smaller frequencies and are more spread out between individual 
x-values. There are no outliers, and no real gaps in the dataset, although only 
five countries have travel freedom values between 66 and 80.
A percentage cumulative frequency line is superimposed on the graph. From 
this can be seen that nationals of 50% of the world’s countries have a travel 
freedom of at most 40. Equivalently, citizens of 50% of the world’s countries 
have a travel freedom of at least 41.
n   19
Mean  7.
Median  1
Minimum 12
Maximum 130
Range   199
Sum 11223
Theoretical Sum 7830
% of Theoretical  29.7
Table 18. 2.  
Data Summary
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Figure 18.2 plots cumulative travel freedom on the y-axis. This measures 
how many of the 11223 visa-free permutations exist for each value of travel 
freedom on the x-axis. For example, if the nationals of three countries enjoy 
a travel freedom of 25, this represents a total of 3 × 25 = 75 of the 11223 
existing permutations, and 75 is plotted on the y-axis against 25 on the x-
axis. The heights of all the bars sum to 11223. In an ideal world the graph 
would be a single bar at x = 194, with a height of 37830. Again a percentage 
cumulative frequency plot is superimposed on the bar graph. This indicates 
that the nationals of the countries in the upper tail provide most of the existing 
11223 visa-free permutations: 50% of the 11223 visa-free permutations 
are enjoyed by nationals of the 50 countries with a travel freedom of at least 
91. So 50% of travel freedom is enjoyed by the citizens of only 25.6% of the 
world’s countries.
Mapping and Explaining Travel Freedom
To better visualise the Henley data, the data were divided into five classes, 
the maximum number easily distinguishable in print by the eye, and the 
results classes mapped. To ensure the class breaks did not influence the 
interpretation of the data, two different methods of classifying the data into 
five classes were used, and each mapped separately.
Figure 18.1.  
Frequency plot 
and percentage 
cumulative 
frequency of travel 
freedom values by 
country
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Figure 18.3 uses five classes with equal ranges of travel freedom. Travel 
freedom takes values between 12 and 130, for a total range of 119. The data 
were therefore divided into five classes with ranges of 24. It should be noted 
that the number of countries falling into each class varies considerably, from 
19 to 76.
Figure 18.4 again uses five classes, but divides the 195 countries into five 
groups of equal size, that is, 39 countries per class. However as the class 
breaks fall within clusters of countries having the same travel freedom, the 
class breaks were manually adjusted so that for any given value of travel 
freedom, all countries having the value fall in the same class. The resulting 
classes have between 37 and 40 countries each. While the number of 
countries in each class is now almost equal, the class ranges are significantly 
different, the narrowest class having a range of 12, the widest having a range 
of 47. 
The maps use circles for the smallest countries like Monaco and Nauru, 
and ovals for archipelagic countries like Kiribati. All overseas territories not 
listed in the Henley data have been removed for clarity, except French Guiana, 
Greenland, and Western Sahara, whose absence would make the map look 
strange. These territories have been shaded as if they were integral parts of 
Figure 18.2.  
Distribution of visa-
free permutations 
vs. travel freedom 
value
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their administering countries (France, Denmark and Morocco), even though 
their populations may not enjoy the same travel freedoms as the mother 
country. 
Figure 18.3 shows, as expected, that western, developed countries have 
the greatest travel freedom. Anglo-America, Western Europe, Japan and 
South Korea, and Australia and New Zealand visually dominate the map, 
all with travel freedoms of 108 or more. Hong Kong and Singapore are not 
unexpected members of this class, while Chile and Malaysia perhaps are. 
The next two classes have only 19 members each, but include much of Latin 
America and Eastern Europe, along with Israel and South Africa. The fourth 
class, with 48 countries whose travel freedom is between 38 and 58, includes 
the more troubled South American countries of Guyana and Peru, along with 
much of Francophone West Africa, Anglophone southern and central Africa, 
and most of the Pacific island states. The lowest class, countries with a travel 
freedom of 35 or less, has 76 members, almost 40% of the world’s countries, 
and includes four countries in the western hemisphere: violence-plagued 
Colombia, politically isolated Cuba, and impoverished Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic. Most of Africa also falls into this class, as does almost all of Asia, and 
all the former USSR except the Baltic States.
Next Map (see Figure 18.4) is visually less extreme. The range of the highest 
class has expanded a little, and now includes Argentina, several Eastern 
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European countries, Israel, and oil-rich Brunei. The second and third classes 
have expanded their membership, but the general patterns are similar, 
particularly in Latin America and Africa. The fourth and fifth classes, each with 
a small range (12 or 13) but 40 members each, have effectively split the fifth 
class from the previous map (range 24 with 76 members) into halves. The 
fourth class in the latter map includes the remainder of Francophone Africa, 
the stable, rich Middle Eastern states, almost all the former USSR, the more 
developed countries of ASEAN, along with India and somewhat surprisingly, 
Bangladesh. The fifth class includes poor, violence-plagued, of politically 
isolated countries, including only Haiti in the western hemisphere, Algeria, 
Somalia, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
Burma, Indochina, China and North Korea.
As expected, both maps indicate that countries that are westernized, wealthy 
(or developed) and politically stable have the greatest travel freedom while 
those that are poor, dictatorial or unstable have the least. In between the 
extremes a number of other factors come into play. Former colonial ties 
increase travel freedom, if not to the mother country, then at least between her 
former colonies. Thus the travel freedoms for Francophone and Anglophone 
Africa are higher than for former Italian, Belgian, Spanish or Portuguese 
colonies in Africa, as there is a reasonable degree of freedom of travel within 
those former colonial groupings. In the French case, this is also assisted by 
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the use of common currencies between neighbouring former colonies, and in 
fact the division of Francophone Africa in Figure 18.4 between the third and 
fourth classes almost exactly mirrors the division between the West African 
states using the West African Franc and the Central African states using the 
Central African Franc. 
The high values of travel freedom in Europe are obviously heavily influenced 
by the European Union, which allows visa-free travel among its member 
states’ citizens. Membership of the Union thus greatly increases a country’s 
travel freedom, and the varying EU statuses of the East European countries 
in late 2005 is apparent on the maps, with Romania and Bulgaria, who only 
entered the EU in January 2007, having significantly lower travel freedom 
than the 10 states joining in May 2004 (the Baltic states, Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus). Apart from Croatia 
which has certain entry privileges to the EU, the European countries outside 
the EU, namely the former Yugoslav states and Albania, have very low travel 
freedom.
In addition to the EU itself as a factor, is the Schengen agreement. This treaty 
regulates entry by third party nationals to the territory of signatory states. All 
EU states, except the UK and Ireland, are full members of Schengen, although 
Cyprus, Romania and Bulgaria have yet to implement its provisions fully. In 
addition four non-EU members are parties to the Schengen agreement. 
Norway and Iceland are full members, Switzerland partially implemented 
the agreement in December 2008, and will do so fully by the end of March 
2009, while Liechtenstein should do so by the end of 2009. A national of a 
non-Schengen state either needs a single visa to visit any Schengen countries, 
or no visa for any of them. Thus, gaining visa-free privileges to the Schengen 
countries as a bloc will increase the travel freedom of foreign citizens by about 
25.
A similar common visa (and visa-free) system has recently been implemented 
by four Central American countries: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and 
Nicaragua. Outside nationals obtaining a visa for one country can use it to also 
visit the other three, while nationals with visa-free privileges for one country 
have likewise visa-free privileges to the other three. 
While it may seem obvious that wealthy, stable, open countries have higher 
travel freedom than poor, unstable, authoritarian ones, it is useful to consider 
exactly why this is. Visas are used as a means to track and control the entry 
of visitors, and ensure the genuineness of their travel intentions. Controlling 
the entry of potential troublesome persons is easier and cheaper if done pre-
emptively rather than post-facto. Visas provide a hurdle for entry by visitors 
who are not genuine tourists but rather potential asylum-seekers, likely 
to engage in illegal or undesirable activities, or who come from ‘unfriendly’ 
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countries. Visitors from countries whose nationals are likely to overstay, seek 
employment, engage in prostitution or drug dealing, become a burden on the 
judicial or social security systems, or whose travel documents are likely to 
need more thorough checking than can be done at a port of entry, are more 
likely to be required to apply for visas ahead of planned travel. As there is a 
strong correlation between these factors and the level of poverty, corruption, 
violence, instability and political openness of a country, it is not surprising 
that these factors can be readily identified from a country’s ranking in the 
dataset. 
The imposition of a visa requirement is not necessarily a negative. It can 
assist regulate arrivals over time and space to ensure that the needs of 
genuine refugees are recognised early, and appropriate social services can 
be budgeted for and delivered to the arrivals as needed. But in an imperfect 
world, visa processing to assist in the placement of refugees is too often and 
easily morphed into a bureaucratic process of exclusion. 
Besides the greater likelihood of a visitor from a stable, wealthy, western 
country being a genuine tourist who will not cause trouble and will go home 
at the end of his visit, wealthy tourists are usually highly desirable due to the 
economic benefits they bring to a destination country. A visa requirement 
discourages spur-of-the-moment, and even planned decisions to travel, 
whether for business or pleasure, particularly if the visa requirement involves 
much effort or cost to the potential traveller, such as the need to visit an 
embassy in person to make the visa application, and then return days or 
weeks later to collect it. One study of destination competitiveness (Enright 
& Newton, 2005), although not mentioning visa requirements specifically, 
presumably factors it into a ‘government policy’ category.
If a country does not offer visa-free privileges to nationals of its main tourist 
markets, it would seem unlikely to remain a competitive destination unless it 
had very special attractions. Therefore countries like Australia, Egypt, India 
and China, with unique cultural or natural attractions can afford to require 
visas before arrival from all or most visiting nationalities, whereas the various 
island states of the Caribbean, all offering a very similar tourism product, 
cannot. 
Countries like Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong and Thailand market 
themselves not only as ‘exotic’ tourism destinations in themselves, but, 
due to their role as airline hubs, also encourage stopovers those travelling 
between Europe and Australia, or Europe and America. By removing visa 
requirements for travellers on these intercontinental routes, these countries 
gain obvious economic benefits from the spending of travellers whose main 
destination is elsewhere. Dubai in the United Arab Emirates is now adopting 
a similar strategy, developing itself as an airline hub and offering an exotic 
Monitoring and Measuring 
Regional Integration
Brendan R. Whyte “Visa-free Travel:  
an Indicator of Global Integration”
30 Eurasian Development Bank
EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook 2009
visa-free stopover destination for travellers between Europe, Africa, Asia and 
Australia. 
When visa-free privileges are granted to others by a country seeking to 
gain competitive advantage in the tourism market, these privileges are not 
necessarily reciprocated. Thailand and the United Arab Emirates may grant 
visa-free access to most short-term tourist arrivals, but their own nationals 
do not enjoy much travel freedom at all. In contrast, Australia is unusual for a 
western country in requiring all visitors to have visas (although, as noted, for 
New Zealanders this is purely a technicality), but its own citizens enjoy very 
high travel freedom. 
Other factors that influence the granting of visa-free travel privileges include 
geographical proximity and international politics. Regional blocs like the EU, 
ASEAN and others may encourage or indeed require visa-free travel between 
member states, or insist that other countries treat all members of the bloc 
equally in terms of visa requirements. For example, the EU insisted recently 
that Canada extend visa-free entry to the new EU member states of Latvia, 
Lithuania and Estonia (Workpermit.com, 2007). Even without the existence 
of a regional bloc, geographical and cultural proximity are likely to encourage 
visa-free access between closely-linked neighbouring states simply because 
of the bureaucratic and economic burden of requiring visas (for an analysis of 
the effect of cultural distance on tourism, see Crotts, 2004). It may also be 
politically advantageous to remove visa requirements, simply to be seen as a 
friendly neighbour. Visa requirements may not only be removed, but can also be 
(re)imposed for political reasons. In 2003, New Zealand joined Canada, Ireland, 
the UK and US in reimposing visa requirements on Zimbabwean citizens in 
response to the policies of the Mugabe government. This multilateral reaction 
not only imposed travel controls on Zimbabwean government officials, but 
also helped control the influx of Zimbabwean citizens seeking asylum (ABC 
Online, 2003).
Travel Freedom and Population
The analysis of travel freedom above has been made on a country by country 
basis. It takes no account of the different populations of each country. China’s 
low travel freedom is much more significant due to the size of the Chinese 
population so affected, compared to Bhutan, with a slightly higher travel 
freedom, but a much smaller population. 
Of the ten most populous countries in the world, with 59.2% of world population 
between them, only two, the US and Japan, with 6.5% of world population, fall 
in the highest class of travel freedom on Figures 18.3 and 18.4. Brazil, home 
to 2.9% of world population, falls into the second highest class on both maps. 
The other seven, China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Russia and 
Monitoring and Measuring 
Regional Integration
30Eurasian Development Bank
Nigeria, who are home to 49.8% of world population, all fall in the bottom class 
on Figure 18.3, and the bottom two on Figure 18.4. By including populations 
of each country in the analysis, a more realistic, and more highly skewed, 
picture results. 
Populations in 2005 for each of Henley’s 195 countries were obtained 
from the website of the US Census Bureau (2008). In Figure 18.5, for 
each value of travel freedom on the x-axis, the combined populations of the 
countries with that travel freedom are plotted on the y-axis. The populations 
of China and India, with travel freedoms of 18 and 25 respectively are now 
very dominant, so that the upper tail of the distribution, even with the large 
US and Japanese populations, appears hardly significant anymore. Again, a 
cumulative percentage line is superimposed on the bar graph, indicating, for 
any x-value, the percentage of the world’s population with at most that travel 
freedom. From this it can be seen that 50% of the world’s population has 
access to at most 25 other countries visa-free, while only 21.4% have access 
to at least half (97 or more of 194) of the other countries.
In Figure 18.6, the travel freedom of each country was multiplied by the size 
of its population to arrive at a “national travel freedom”. For each value of 
travel freedom on the x-axis, the sum of the “national travel freedoms” for the 
countries with that value was plotted on the y-axis. In other words, each person 
Figure 18.5.  
Population (absolute, 
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in the world was assigned the value of his country’s travel freedom (e.g. 130 
for American citizens, 18 for Chinese citizens) and the sum of these individual 
human values plotted on the y-axis for all people from countries possessing 
a given level of travel freedom. Note that while US population is 4.4 times 
smaller than that of China, the travel freedom of each US citizen is 130 ÷ 18 
= 7.2 times more than that of a Chinese citizen, and so the “national travel 
freedom” of the US is 7.2 ÷ 4.4 = 1.6 times that of China. For this reason, 
the upper tail of the distribution in Figure 18.6 becomes dominant. Values of 
“National Travel Freedom” for selected countries are given in Table 18.3.
In an ideal world, with perfect travel freedom for all, this figure would be a 
single bar at an x-value of 194, with a height of 1270 billion. In figure, the 
sum of the heights of all the bars, representing the current value of ‘global 
travel freedom’, is only 303 billion, so that, when populations of each country 
are taken into account, only 303 ÷ 1270 = 23.8% of all possible international 
trips can be made visa-free. This is lower than the 29.7% calculated purely 
on a country basis without considering population, but perhaps not as much 
lower as might have been expected. 
As with Figures 18.3 to 18.5, Figure 18.6 also has a cumulative percentage 
line overlaid on the bar graph. This shows that while 50% of the “global travel 
freedom” is held by citizens of countries able to visit at least 99 others visa-
free, these citizens make up only 19.5% of the world’s population. In simple 
Figure 18.6.  
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fractions, one fifth of the world’s population enjoys half of its total travel 
freedom. 
Finally, we can formally define a Global Travel Freedom Index (GTFI), that 
measures how many of the potential international trips that can be made by 
the combined global population are currently visa-free. The GTFI takes values 
between 0 and 100%. 
Global Travel Freedom Index = 
100 × Σ (population of each country × number of countries that its citizens 
can visit visa-free)
(world population × (total number of countries – 1) )
From the Henley data, the GTFI for late 2005 is 23.8%
Conclusion
Not unexpectedly, visa-free privileges are generally granted to citizens of 
stable, wealthy democracies, and less likely to be granted to citizens of 
unstable, poor authoritarian states. This reflects a combination of positive 
and negative factors, such as membership of regional or other international 
blocs and the competitive advantages to be gained in the tourism industry by 
eliminating visa requirements on one hand, and the desire to control entry by 
asylum seekers, economic migrants, undesirables, and citizens of countries 
who are perceived as likely to abuse access privileges on the other. 
Rank Country National Travel Freedom (= population × 
travel freedom)
1 US 38.8 billion
2 India 27. billion 
3 China 23.7 billion 
 Brazil 19.0 billion
 Japan 1.3 billion 
…
1 Russia .97 billion
 Uzbekistan 3 million
87 Kazakhstan 27 million
11 Tajikistan 198 million
120 Kyrgyzstan 1 million 
139 Turkmenistan 90.0 million
…
19  Vatican City 87000
Table 18. 3.  
“National Travel 
Freedom” values for 
selected countries
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On a country by country basis, there are a possible 37 830 permutations of 
visitor nationality and destination, or which only 11 223 (29.7%) were visa-
free, according to the Henley data, circa 2005. After national populations 
are considered, of a potential global travel freedom of 1270 billion, only 303 
billion (23.8%) actually exists, so that at an individual human level, less than 
a quarter of possible international movement permutations are visa-free.
Unfortunately the data released by Henley only indicate one side of the 
picture: the number of other countries that can be visited visa-free by a given 
citizenship. One other aspect is the number of different foreign countries 
whose citizens can visit a particular country visa-free; but ideally one would also 
like to know the visa (or visa-free) status of every possible visitor nationality-
destination pair. Only with such a full dataset, with 37830 items of data, can 
the full picture of human travel freedom be understood. Until such time these 
data are collected concurrently, we can nevertheless still measure progress 
towards global integration by means of the proposed Global Travel Freedom 
Index. A modified dataset and thus a modified index could also potentially be 
developed for various regions to measure their own internal integration. By 
updating the data at regular intervals, say every few years, the Global Travel 
freedom Index can help measure progress towards an ideally integrated (and 
visa-free) world.
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